Case 1:16-cv-00830-RGA Document 8 Filed 11/18/16 Page 1 of 22 PageID #: 481
`Case 1:16-cv-00830-RGA Document 8 Filed 11/18/16 Page 1 of 22 PageID #: 481
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
`
`smco,Lu3mm1PC0uLLCdeMINTUS
`IQ,
`
`Plaintiffs,
`
`V.
`
`STREETLINE, INC. and KAPSCH
`TRAFFICCOM HOLDING CORP.=
`
`Defendants.
`
`vvvvvvvvvvvvv
`
`CA. No. 16—830-RGA
`
`DEFENDANTS’ VMEMORANDUM OF REASONS IN SUPPORT OF
`THEIR MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE llgbflfil
`
`ROSS ARONSTAM & MORITZ LLP
`
`Benjamin J. Sehladweiler (#4601)
`100 S. West Street, Suite 400
`Wilmington, DE 19801
`(3 02) 576- 1600
`bsehladweilerfiQramllp.com
`
`Counselfor Defendams Streerline, Inc. and
`Kapsch TrafficCom Holding Corp.
`
`Of Counsel:
`
`Pierre R. Yanney
`Stephen E. Underwood
`Wesley A. Homer
`STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP
`180 Maiden Lane
`New York, NY 10038
`(212) 8066400
`Eganneygcgstroock. com
`sunderwoodgtgstroock.com
`whorner@,stroo el<.com
`
`Dated: November 18, 2016
`
`

`

`Case 1:16-cv-00830-RGA Document 8 Filed 11/18/16 Page 2 of 22 PageID #: 482
`Case 1:16-cv-00830-RGA Document 8 Filed 11/18/16 Page 2 of 22 PageID #: 482
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`I.
`
`NATURE AND STAGE OF THE PROCEEDINGS ............................................................. I
`
`II.
`
`SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ..................................................................................... I
`
`III.
`
`STATEMENT OF FACTS ................................................................................................. 3
`
`IV.
`
`ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................... 5
`
`A. Legal Standards Governing a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion .......................................................... 5
`
`B.
`
`SIPCO Has Not Sufficiently Alleged Direct Infringement................................................. 8
`
`_ I.
`
`SIPCO Has Failed to State a Claim for Direct Patent Infringement in Counts 2, 3, 5, 8
`
`and 10 ...................................................................................................................................... 8
`
`2.
`
`SIPCO Has Failed to State a Claim for Direct Patent Infringement in Counts l, 4, 6, 7
`
`and 9 ........................................................................................................................................ 9
`
`C.
`
`SIPCO Has Not Alleged Sufficient Facts to Identify the Respective Roles of Each
`
`Defendant in the Alleged Infringement .................................................................................... 12
`
`D.
`
`STPCO Has Not Adequately Alleged Involvement by Kapsch ......................................... 14
`
`E.
`
`STPCO Has Not Sufficiently Alleged Indirect Infringement ............................................ 17
`
`V. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................... l7
`
`

`

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`Case 1:16-cv-00830-RGA Document 8 Filed 11/18/16 Page 3 of 22 PageID #: 483
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Cases
`
`Page(s)
`
`Ashcrofi v. Iqbal,
`129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009) ............................................................................................................ 1, 7
`
`Arias IP, LLC v. Exeion Corp,
`N0. 15 C 10746, 2016 WL 2866134(N.D.111.May 17, 2016) ................................................. 7
`
`Arias 1P LLC 1). Pacific Gas and Electric Co,
`No. 15-CV-05469-EDL, 2016 WL 1719545 (ND. Cal. Mar. 9, 2016) .................................... 8
`
`Bell Ail. Corp. v. Twombly,
`550 US. 544 (2007) ......................................................................................................... passim
`
`In re BillT QfLading Transmission (1’: Processing Sys. Paiem Ling,
`681 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ............................................................................................. 5-6
`
`Certain Undeiwriiers at Lloyd's, London 12. U—Line Corp,
`N0. CIV. 13-3203 NLH/AMD, 2013 WL 5503672 (DNJ. Oct. 1, 2013) ...................... passim
`
`CG Tech. Development, LLC v. FanDuel, Inc,
`No. 2:16-CV-00801-RCJ-VCF, 2016 WL 6089693 (D. Nev. Oct. 18, 2016) ....................... 5, 8
`
`Chestnut Hill Soundlnc. v. Appie Inc”
`No. 15-261-RGA, Dkt. 53 (D. Del. Feb. 29, 2016) ................................................................... 8
`
`eDigirai C0130. v. iBabyLabs, Inc,
`No. 15—CV~05790—JST, 2016 WL 4427209 (ND. Cal. Aug. 22, 2016) .................................... 5
`
`Eidos Commc’ns, LLC v. Sigzpe Techs. SA,
`686 F. Supp. 2d 465 (D. Del. 2010) ........................................................................................... 9
`
`Kost v. Kazakiewicz,
`133d 176 (3d Cir. 1993) ........................................................................................................... 5
`
`Lyda v. CBS C0111,
`No. 2015-1923, 2016 WL 5539875 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 30, 2016) ....................................... passim
`
`M2M Sois. LLC V. Teiit Commc'ns PLC,
`No. CV 14-1103-RGA, 2015 WL 4640400 (B. Del. Aug. 5, 2015) ................................ passim
`
`McZeai v. Sprint Nexiei Corp,
`501 F.3d 1354 (Fed.C1r.2007) .................................................................................................... 6
`
`

`

`Case 1:16-cv-00830-RGA Document 8 Filed 11/18/16 Page 4 of 22 PageID #: 484
`Case 1:16-cv-00830-RGA Document 8 Filed 11/18/16 Page 4 of 22 PageID #: 484
`
`Mike Mum/17y ’5 Enterprises, Inc. v. Fineline 1176045.,
`LLC, No. 1:16-CV-784-LJO-SAB, 2016 WL 4160756 (ED. Cal. Aug. 5,
`2016) ...................................................................................................................................... 7', 8
`
`Novo Nordisk v. Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories,
`450 F.Supp.2d 757 (E.D.Mich.2006) ................................................................................... 3, 15
`
`Raindance Techs., Inc. v. 1ch Genomics, Inc,
`
`No. CV 15-152-RGA, 2016 WL 927143 (D. DeL Mar. 4, 2016) .................................... 2, 8, 12
`
`Sheeran v. Blyrh Shiphola’ing 8A.,
`No. CV 14-5482, 2015 WL 9048979 (DNJ. Dec. 16, 2015) ............................................. 2, 13
`
`Other Authorities
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 .....................................................................................' .......................................... 7
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) .......................................................................................................................... 5
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) ...................................................................................................................... 5
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(1))(6) ................................................................................................................ 1, 5
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 84 ..................................................................................................................... 2, 5, 6
`
`

`

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`
`Defendants Streetline, Inc. (“Streetline”) and Kapsch TrafficCom Holding Corp.
`
`(“Kapsch”) (collectively “Defendants”) hereby submit this Memorandum of Reasons in support
`
`of their motion to dismiss the complaint of Plaintiffs SIPCO, LLC and 1? CO, LLC (d/b/a/
`
`INTUS IQ) (collectively “SIPCO”) under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
`
`I.
`
`NATURE AND STAGE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
`
`This is a patent infringement case. On September 19, 2016, SIPCO filed a Complaint
`
`against the Defendants, alleging infi'ingement of ten different patents: US. Patent Nos. 8,908,842
`
`(“the “842 patent”), 8,625,496 (“the ‘496 patent”), 8,233,471 (“the ‘471 patent”), 8,223,010 (“the
`
`‘010 patent”), 7,697,492 (“the ‘492 patent”), 7,468,661 (“the ‘661 patent”), 7,103,511 (“the ‘511
`
`patent”), 6,914,893 (“the ‘893 patent”), 6,437,692 (“the ‘692 patent”) and 6,249,516 (“the “516
`
`patent) (collectively, “the Patents-in—Suit”). The Complaint was served on September 20, 2016.
`
`On October 7', 2016, this Court granted Defendants an extension of time until November 18,
`
`2016 to respond to the Complaint. See DJ. 6. This motion is timely pursuant to that extension.
`
`11.
`
`SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
`
`1.
`
`SIPCO’s Complaint fails to state a claim for direct patent infringement, because it
`
`does not allege sufficient factual content
`
`to show ho_w Streetline’s products and services
`
`allegedly infringe the asserted claims. At best, SIPCO’s Complaint identifies the products and
`
`services that are alleged to be infringing, then makes the conclusory assertion that these products
`
`and services are “within the scope of the claims.” See, e.g., D1. 1, 11 18. Under Bell/1t]. Corp. v.
`
`Twombt‘y, 550 US. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009), and in View of the
`
`Supreme Court’s recent abrogation of the “Form 18” complaint for patent infringement,1 such
`
`conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a claim for patent infringement.
`
`1 See Supreme Court of the United States, Order Regarding Amendments to the Federal Rules of
`
`

`

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`2.
`
`SIPCO’S Complaint fails to state a claim against either of the Defendants,
`
`because it does not identify which specific conduct of each Defendant allegedly constitutes
`
`infringement by that defendant. SlPCO’s Complaint lumps Kapsch and Streetline - who are
`
`separate legal entities - together as “Defendants,” and then simply alleges that “Defendants” have
`
`committed various acts of infringement. See, e.g., D1. 1, W 18, 22, 27. “Lumping .
`
`.
`
`. two
`
`defendants together and generally claiming that these entities were involved in [the alleged
`
`wrongdoing] does not satisfy the federal court pleading requirements” of Twombly and Iqbal.
`
`Certain. Underwriters atLloya’Cs, London v. U—Line Corp, No. CW. 13-3203 NLH/AMD, 2013
`
`WL 5503672, at *6 (D.N.J. Oct. 1, 2013). Rather, the complaint must “inform fl Defendant of
`
`the particular claims against
`
`it.” Sheeran v. Blyrlz Slazpltolding SA, No. CV 14—5482
`
`(JBS/AMD), 2015 WL 9048979, at *4 (DNJ. Dec. 16, 2015) (dismissing complaint because
`
`“lumping all defendants together for different misconduct fails to demonstrate each defendant's
`
`individual liability”) (emphasis added). This rule applies even where, as here, the defendants are
`
`related corporate entities. See M2M Sals. LLC v. Telii Camme’ns PLC, N0. CV l4-1103-RGA,
`
`2015 WL 4640400, at *3 (D. Del. Aug. 5, 2015) (dismissing direct infringement claim against
`
`corporate parent defendant, because complaint simply “lump[ed the] two defendants together,”
`
`and did not plead facts showing that parent was actually involved in the infringement). SIPCO’s
`
`complaint simpiy treats Kapsch and Streetline as a single, undifferentiated entity, without
`
`2015),
`29,
`Apr.
`(U.S.
`Procedure
`Civil
`https:l/wwwsupremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/frcvlStandate) 1823pdf (“SCOTUS Order”)
`at 28 (abrogating Fed. R. Civ. P. 84, which previously allowed plaintiffs to plead patent
`infringement in the relatively—threadbare form set forth in “Form 18”); see also Raindanee
`Techs, Inc. v. 10): Genomics, Inc, No. CV IS-lSZ-RGA, 2016 WL 927143, at *2 (D. Del. Mar.
`4, 2016) (Andrews, 1.) (acknowledging that on “December 1, 2015, Federal Rule of Civil
`Procedure 84 and the Appendix of Forms were ‘abrogated’” and that, since then, patent
`infringement complaints must be reviewed “{u]nder .
`.
`. Iqbal and Twombly.”)
`
`_2_
`
`

`

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`explaining which specific acts of each defendant are alleged to constitute the infringement. That
`
`is insufficient to state a claim against either defendant, under Twombly and Iqbal.
`
`3.
`
`Even if SIPCO states a ciairn against Streetline, it does not state a claim against
`
`Kapsch, because SIPCO had not alleged sufficient facts to show that Kapseh directs or controls
`
`the allegedly-infringing acts of its subsidiary, Streetline. “To state a claim [for patent
`
`infringement]
`
`‘based on an alleged parent-subsidiary relationship, a plaintiff would have to
`
`allege: (l) the existence of a parent—subsidiary relationship, and (2) facts that justify piercing the
`
`corporate veil .
`
`.
`
`. [such as] the existence of an agency relationship between the entities where the
`
`parent effectively controls the conduct of the subsidiary.” M2M, 2015 WL 4640400 at *3
`
`(quoting Nova Nora’z'sk v. Cameo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, 450 F.Supp.2d 757, 761
`
`(E.D.Mich.2006)). Although SIPCO alleges a parent-subsidiary relationship between Kapsch and
`
`Streetline (see D1. 1, {l 5), it does not allege any facts to justify piercing the corporate veil. Thus,
`
`even if the complaint is not dismissed as to Streetline, it must be dismissed as to Kapsch.
`
`4.
`
`Counts 1—10 of the Complaint allege only diregt infringement. However, in its
`
`prayer
`
`for relief, SIPCO seeks a judgment “that Defendants have directly and indirectly
`
`infringed” the Patents-in—Suit. D1.
`
`1 at 15. Nowhere else in the Complaint is there any mention
`
`of indirect infringement. SIPCO has not alleged any facts to establish the elements of indirect
`
`infringement. Thus, SIPCO’s demand for relief on indirect infringement must be dismissed.
`
`III.
`
`STATEMENT OF FACTS
`
`Streetline sells products and services that monitor parking spaces in real—time. See D1. 1,
`
`ll 18. Streetline’s products and services can make parking data available to consumers - e. g, via
`
`a smartphone app - to assist them in finding a parking space. 10’.
`
`(describing the “Parker”
`
`consumer app). They can also make this data available to government authorities, e.g., to assist
`
`in parking meter enforcement. Id. (describing the “Enforcement” mobile app).
`
`-3-
`
`

`

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`
`SIPCO asserts that Streetline’s parking-monitoring systems infringe ten different SIPCO
`
`patents. However, only one of these patents - the ‘010 patent - actually claims anything relating
`
`to parking—space monitoring. See D.I. 1-4 (‘010 patent), Claim 1 (“a vehicle parking monitoring
`
`system”). The remaining patents do not include fl claims directed to parking-space monitoring.
`
`Rather, they ciaim general aspects of various types of wireless networks, including “standard
`
`wireless mesh protocols such as WirelessHART, ZigBee, IEEE 802.154 [and] Z-Wave,” and
`
`aspects of certain “proprietary wireless protocols.” Di. 1, 11 15.
`
`In its Complaint, SIPCO identifies several Streetline products and services that it claims
`
`to be infringing. These are: (i) “Parl<er;” (ii) “ParkerMap;” (iii) “ParkEdge;” (iv) “Enforcement”
`
`(v) “ParkSight Analytics;” and (vi) “ParkingData” (collectively, “the Accused Systems”)
`
`However, SIPCO only identifies the Accused Systems in five out of the ten Counts in the
`
`complaint - i.e., Counts 1 (‘842 patent), 4 (‘010), 6 C661), 7 (‘511) and 9 (692).
`
`In the remaining five Counts, SIPCO does not identify my particular Streetline product
`
`or service that is aileged to be infringing. Rather, in these Counts - i.e., Counts 2 (‘496 patent), 3
`
`(‘471 patent), 5 (‘492 patent), 8 (‘893 patent) and 10 (‘516 patent) - SIPCO merely alleges that
`
`certain unnamed “Streetline smart parking monitoring hardware” is “within the scope of the
`
`[asserted] ciaims.” See D1. 1, W 22-23, 27, 35, 47-48 and 56. This threadbare allegation that
`
`some unnamed “Streetline smart parking monitoring hardware” is “within the scope of the
`
`[asserted] claims” is clearly insufficient to state a claim under Twombly and Iqbal. Indeed, as
`
`shown in Section iV.A.1 infra, such an allegation would have been insufficient even under the
`
`liberal “Form 18” pleading standard. Thus, Counts 2, 3, 5, 8 and 10 must be dismissed.
`
`The remaining counts in the Complaint — Counts 1, 4, 6, 7 and 9 - do, at least, identify the
`
`Accused Systems by name. However, these Counts also fail to state a claim. In Lyda v. CBS
`
`

`

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`Case 1:16-cv-00830-RGA Document 8 Filed 11/18/16 Page 9 of 22 PagelD #: 489
`
`Corp, No. 2015—1923, 2016 WL 5539875, at *5 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 30, 2016) 2, the Federal Circuit
`
`held that Twombl‘y and Iqbal “requires pleading facts sufficient to allow a reasonable inference
`
`that Mp; [or elements] of the claimed method [or device] are performed [or present]” in the
`
`accused device or process. Id. (emphasis added). Counts 1, 4, 6, 7 and 9 make no attempt to
`
`show that the Accused Systems satisfy even one element — let alone all elements — of any asserted
`
`claim. Thus, as shown in Section IV.A.2 infra, Counts 1, 4, 6, 7 and 9 must be dismissed.
`
`IV.
`
`ARGUMENT
`
`A. Legal Standards Governing a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion
`
`Rule 8(a)(2) requires-that the complaint include “a short and plain statement of the claim
`
`showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” A party may challenge the sufficiency of the
`
`complaint with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Kart v. Kazakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993).
`
`Until recently, Fed. R. Civ. P. 84 provided an authorized list of “form” complaints for
`
`different causes of action. A complaint that complied with the requirements of a Rule 84 form
`
`was presumptively valid under Rule 8(a). See In re Bill of Lading Transmission & Processing
`
`5323. Patent Litig, 681 F.3d 1323, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2012). One of these forms, Form 18, provided
`
`a form complaint for direct patent infringement. Id. Under Form 18, to state a valid claim for
`
`direct patent infringement, a complaint only needed to include:
`
`2 Although the claims asserted in Lyda were method claims, courts have held that Twombly and
`Iqbal also require a patentee asserting infringement of a system or device claim to allege
`sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference that all elements of the claim are present in the
`accused system or device.
`See CG Tech. Development, LLC v.
`fi‘anDuel, Inc, 2016 WL
`6089693, at *5 (D. Nev. Oct. 18, 2016) (dismissing allegations that system and apparatus claims
`were infringed, because “Piaintiffs have not addressed each element of’ each such claim);
`e.Digiral Corp. v. iBaby Labs, Inc, No. 15~CV~05790~JST, 2016 WL 4427209, at *3 (ND. Cal.
`Aug. 22, 2016) (noting that “[sleveral courts applying the Twombly pleading standard to claims
`of direct patent
`infringement since the abrogation of Form 18 have required plaintiffs to
`plausibly allege that the accused product practices each of the limitations found in at least one
`asserted claim”) (emphases added).
`
`

`

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`
`(1) an allegation of jurisdiction; (2) a statement that the plaintiff
`owns the patent; (3) a statement that defendant has been infringing
`the patent “by making, selling, and using [the device] embodying
`the patent” (4) a statement
`that
`the plaintiff has given the
`defendant notice of its infringement; and (5) a demand for an
`injunction and damages.
`
`Id. (citing M02651] 1). Sprint Nextel Corp, 501 F.3d 1354, 1355—56 (Fed.Cir.2007)); see also
`
`M2M, 2015 WL 4640400 at *3 (noting that Form 18 “also require[d] the identification of the
`
`accused product, process or method for each defendant”) Thus, under Form 18, a patent plaintiff
`
`did not need to plead any facts showing how or why the accused product allegedly infringed the
`
`asserted claims. Indeed, under Form 18, the plaintiff did not even need to identify which claims
`
`of each patent were alleged to be infringed. McZeai, 501 F.3d at 1355-56.
`
`That all changed, however, on December 1, 2015, when the Rules were amended to
`
`eliminate Rule 84 and Form 18. See SCOTUS Order at 28. Since then, “allegations of direct
`
`infringement are .
`
`.
`
`. subject to the pleading standards established by Twombly and Iqbal.” Atlas
`
`IP LLC v. Pacific Gas and Electric Co, 2016 WL 1719545, at *2 (ND. Cal. Mar. 9, 2016).
`
`Under Twombiy and Iqbal, “[tlo survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
`
`sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
`
`Id. (emphasis added). As the Supreme Court explained:
`
`A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads N
`
`content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
`
`defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. [Twombly, 550 US] at
`556, 127 S.Ct. 1955. The plausibility standard is not akin to a
`“probability requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility
`that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Ibia’. Where a complaint pleads
`facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant's liability, it “stops
`short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to
`relief.'”Id., at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955 .
`.
`.
`
`[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations
`contained in a complaint
`is
`inapplicable to legal conclusions.
`Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
`mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. Id, at 555, 127 S.Ct.
`
`-51
`
`

`

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`. [Thus,] where the weil—pieaded facts do not permit the court
`.
`1955 ,
`to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint
`
`has ailegedwbut it has not “show[n]”
`“that the pleader is entitled to
`relief.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2).
`
`In keeping with these principles a court considering a motion to
`dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because
`they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption
`of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the fiamework of a
`complaint, they must be supported by factuai allegations. When there
`are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their
`veracity and then determine Whether they plausibly give rise to an
`entitlement to relief.
`
`Iqbal, 556 US. at 678—679, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-1950 (emphases added).
`
`Although “the pleading standard [that} Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed
`
`factual ailegations’ .
`
`.
`
`. it demands more than an unadorned, the—defendant-umawfuily-harmed—
`
`me accusation.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 US. at 555). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and
`
`conclusions1 or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Iqbal,
`
`556 US. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 US. at 557). “Nor does a complaint
`
`suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.” Iqbal, 556 US.
`
`at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombi’y, 550 US. at 557').
`
`The heightened pleading standard of Twomey/Iqbal plays _a meaningful role in patent
`
`infringement cases, “[b]ecause the failure to practice even a single element is all that separates
`
`[lawful] innovation from infringement.” Atlas IP, LLC v. Exelon Corp, 2016 WL 2866134, at *5
`
`(ND.
`
`111. May 17, 2016). Accordingly,
`
`in a patent case, “[m]erely naming a product and
`
`providing a conclusory statement that it infringes a patent is insufficient to meet the ‘plausibiiity’
`
`standard set forth in Twombly and Iqbal.” Mike Murphy’s Enrerprises, Inc. v. Ftneline Indus,
`
`LLC, No. 1:16-CV-7'84-LJO-SAB, 2016 WL 4160756, at *2 (ED. Cal. Aug. 5, 2016).
`
`Rather, Twombly and Iqbal “requirefl pleading facts sufficient to allow a reasonable
`
`inference that at] steps of the claimed method,” 01' all elements of the claimed device, are present
`
`-7-
`
`

`

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`
`in the accused product or process. Lyda, 2016 WL 5539875, at *5; see also RainDance Techs,
`
`Inc. v. 10X Genomics, Inc, 2016 WL 927143, at *2 (dismissing complaint because it failed to
`
`allege sufficient facts to show that a_ll claim elements were met); CG Tech, 2016 WL 6089693,
`
`at *4—*9 (dismissing complaint where “Plaintiffs have not addressed each element of [the
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`claiins]”); Atlas JP, 2016 WL 1719545, at >1‘3 (dismissing “complaint [that] recites only some of
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`the elements of the sole asserted claim, and provides only a threadbare description of the alleged
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`abilities of the accused device”); Chestnut Hill Sound Inc. 1). Apple Inc, No. 15~261—RGA, Dkt.
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`53 (D. Del. Feb. 29, 2016) (dismissing “formulaic” infringement claim) (emphases added).
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`B. SIPCO Has Not Sufficiently Alleged Direct Infringement
`
`SiPCO has not plausibly alleged direct
`
`infringement under Twombly and Iqbal. The
`
`Complaint lacks sufficient factual content to support a reasonable inference that {each element of
`
`any asserted claim is satisfied by the Accused Systems. Thus, SIPCO has failed to state a claim.
`
`1. SlPCO Has Failed to State a Claim for Direct Patent Infringement in
`Counts 2 3 5 8 and 10
`
`As discussed in Section 111 supra, Counts 2, 3, 5, 8 and 10 of the Complaint do not even
`
`identify which specific products or services of Streetline are alleged to be infringing. Rather,
`
`these Counts simply allege that certain unidentified “Streetline smart parking monitoring
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`hardware” is “within the scope of the [asserted] claims.” See D1. 1, W 22-23, 27, 35, 47-48 and
`
`56. This allegation is clearly insufficient to state a claim under Twombly and Iqbal.
`
`“Merely naming a product and providing a conclusory statement that it infringes a patent
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`is insufficient to meet the ‘plausibility’ standard set forth in Twombly and Iqbal.” Mike Murphy’s
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`Enterprises, 2016 WL 4160756, at *2, Thus, a fortiori, a complaint that does not even “nam e
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`the[ product” that is alleged to be infringing also fails to meet the “plausibility” standard.
`
`

`

`Case 1:16-cv-00830-RGA Document 8 Filed 11/18/16 Page 13 of 22 PageID #: 493
`Case 1:16-cv-00830-RGA Document 8 Filed 11/18/16 Page 13 of 22 PageID #: 493
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`Counts 2, 3, 5, 8 and 10 do not even “name the product” that SlPCO alleges to be infringing
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`Thus, clearly, these Counts are inadequate to state a claim under Twombly and Iqbal.
`
`Indeed, these Counts would have been inadequate under the liberal pleading standards of
`
`Form 18. In Eidos Commc’ns, LLC v. Sig/p8 Techs. SA, 686 F. Supp. 2d 465 (D. Del. 2010),
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`which was decided under Form 18, this Court found a complaint to be defective because it failed
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`to adequately identify the products that were alleged to be infringing. In Eidos, the complaint
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`merely alleged that the defendants’ “communication system products and]or methodologies .
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`.
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`.
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`infringe[d] one or more claims” of the patents. Id. at 466. This Court found that
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`the bare
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`reference to “communication system products and/or methodologies” was insufficient to identify
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`even “a general class of [allegedly—infringing] products or a general identification of the alleged
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`infringing methods,” as was required by Form 18. Id. at 467. Thus,
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`this Court found,
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`the
`
`complaint failed to adequately allege direct patent infringement under Form 18.161.
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`Similarly, here, Counts 2, 3, 5, 8 and 10 do not even identify “a general class of
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`[allegedly-infringing] products or a general identification of the alleged infringing methods.” Id.
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`Rather, they simply allege that certain unnamed “smart parking monitoring hardware” infringes
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`SIPCO’s patents. This allegation is just as generic as
`
`the allegation against unnamed
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`“communication system products and/or methodologies” that was found to be inadequate in
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`Eidos. Thus, even under the liberal pleading standards of Form 18, Counts 2, 3, 5, 8 and 10 fail
`
`to state a claim. Accordingly, these Counts must be dismissed.
`
`2. SIPCO Has Failed to State a Claim for Direct Patent Infringement in
`Counts l 4 6 7 and9
`
`The direct infringement allegations in Counts l, 4, 6, 7 and 9 are marginally more
`
`detailed than those in Counts 2, 3, 5, 8 and 10. Nonetheless, they still fail to state a claim.
`
`

`

`Case 1:16-cv-00830-RGA Document 8 Filed 11/18/16 Page 14 of 22 PageID #: 494
`Case 1:16-cv-00830-RGA Document 8 Filed 11/18/16 Page 14 of 22 PageID #: 494
`
`Counts l, 4, 6, 7 and 9 allege direct infringement. Each Count identifies a patent, and at
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`least one claim of that patent, which SIPCO alleges to be infringed. However, all of these Counts
`
`allege the exact same facts with respect to the functionality of the Accused Systems. Compare
`
`DJ. 1, ii 18 (Count l’s allegations about the Accused Systems) with fl 31 (Count 4’s allegations
`
`about the Accused Systems), ll 39 (Count 6), ll 43 (Count 7) and fll 52 (Count 9). Thus, for
`
`convenience, Streetline will only expressly demonstrate the inadequacy of the allegations in
`
`Count 1. Since Counts 4, 6, 7 and 9 are essentially identical to Count 1, once it has been shown
`
`that Count 1 fails to state a claim, it will follow that Counts 4, 6, 7 and 9 also fail to state a claim.
`
`Count 1 alleges that Streetline has “directly infringed .
`
`.
`
`. at least claim 16 of the [‘842]
`
`Patent .
`
`.
`
`. by making, having had made, using, offering for sale and selling, or offering for use
`
`and using,
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`the Streetline smart parking monitoring hardware and software systems
`
`in
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`combination with” the Accused Systems. Di. 1, 1] 18. As discussed in Section IV.A.l supra,
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`SlPCO’s bare allegation that “Streetline smart parking monitoring hardware and software
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`systems .
`
`.
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`.[infringe] at least claim 16 of the ‘842 Patent” fails to state a Claim, even under the
`
`liberal standards of Form 18. Thus, for Count 1 to survive, the remainder of the Count would
`
`have to allege sufficient “factual content” about how the Accused Systems work to support a
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`reasonable inference that they meet all the elements of claim 16. Lyda, 2016 WL 5539875, at *5.
`
`Count 1 falls far short on this front. The only allegation that SIPCO provides against each
`
`of the Accused Systems is a short parenthetical which describes, at a very high level, what
`
`SIPCO understands the Accused Systems to do. For instance, the only allegation that SIPCO
`
`provides about the Accused System “Parker” is that it “guides drivers to available parking
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`spaces.” 13.1. 1, ll 18. Similarly, the only allegation that SIPCO provides about “ParkerMap” is
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`that it is a “service for city merchants that enables them to provide real-time parking information
`
`-10..
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 1:16-cv-00830-RGA Document 8 Filed 11/18/16 Page 15 of 22 PageID #: 495
`Case 1:16-cv-00830-RGA Document 8 Filed 11/18/16 Page 15 of 22 PageID #: 495
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`to their patrons, and which can be embedded on a merchant’s website and automatically updates
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`with the latest parking information.” Id. SIPCO’S allegations against the other four Accused
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`Systems are equally threadbare, describing only their general functionality, rather than how they
`
`actually work, or how they are actualiy stluctured. See id. (providing equally-vague descriptions
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`of the accused “ParkEdge,” “Enforcement," “ParkSight Analytics” and “ParkingData” systems”).
`
`Meanwhile, the asserted claim in Count 1 - i.e., ciaini 16 of the ‘842 Patent — recites a
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`wireless communication “device” which has a number of different components, performing a
`
`number of different functions.3 Specifically, claim 16 recites:
`
`16. A device for communicating information, the device comprising:
`
`a processor; and
`
`a memory, the memory comprising logical instructions that
`when executed by the processor are configured to cause the
`device to:
`
`wirelessly transmit a signal comprising instruction
`data for delivery to a network of addressable lOW-
`power transceivers;
`
`establish a communication link between at least one
`
`low-power transceiver in the network of addressable
`low-power transceivers and a central location based
`on
`an
`address
`included
`in
`the
`signal,
`the
`communication link comprising one or more low-
`power transceivers in the network of addressable
`low-power transceivers; and
`
`receive one or more low-power RF signals and
`connnunicate information contained within the
`
`signals to the central location along with a unique
`transceiver
`identification
`number
`over
`the
`communication link.
`
`
`
`D.I. 1~l (‘842 Patent), Claim 16.
`
`3 The Asserted Claims in Counts 4, 6, 7 and 9 recite similarly-lengthy and detailed limitations.
`
`-11-
`
`

`

`Case 1:16-cv-00830-RGA Document 8 Filed 11/18/16 Page 16 of 22 PageID #: 496
`Case 1:16-cv-00830-RGA Document 8 Filed 11/18/16 Page 16 of 22 PageID #: 496
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`777;]
`
`_
`
`,
`
`‘
`
`-
`
`7
`
`... l
`
`'. M. 7777777.
`
`SIPCO’s Complaint makes no attempt to demonstrate how each of these claim elements
`
`is met by the Accused Systems. Indeed, in the complaint, there is m mention of any claim
`
`el