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`MICHAEL A. SHERMAN (SBN 94783)
`masherman@stubbsalderton.com
`JEFFREY F. GERSH (SBN 87124)
`jgersh@stubbsalderton.com
`SANDEEP SETH (SBN 195914)
`sseth@stubbsalderton.com
`WESLEY W. MONROE (SBN 149211)
`wmonroe@stubbsalderton.com
`STANLEY H. THOMPSON, JR. (SBN 198825)
`sthompson@stubbsalderton.com
`VIVIANA BOERO HEDRICK (SBN 239359)
`vhedrick@stubbsalderton.com
`STUBBS, ALDERTON & MARKILES, LLP
`15260 Ventura Blvd., 20th Floor
`Sherman Oaks, CA 91403
`Telephone:
`(818) 444-4500
`Facsimile:
`(818) 444-4520
`
`Attorneys for PersonalWeb Technologies, LLC
`[Additional Attorneys listed below]
`
`
`
`AMAZON.COM, INC., et., al.,
`
` Plaintiffs,
`v.
`PERSONALWEB TECHNOLOGIES, LLC,
`et., al.,
`
`
` Defendants.
`
`PERSONALWEB TECHNOLOGIES, LLC
`and LEVEL 3 COMMUNICATIONS, LLC,
`
`Counterclaimants,
`v.
`AMAZON.COM, INC. and AMAZON WEB
`SERVICES, INC.,
`
`Counterdefendants.
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`
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`PERSONALWEB’S AMENDED OPENING
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`SAN JOSE DIVISION
`CASE NO.: 5:18-md-02834-BLF
`IN RE PERSONAL WEB TECHNOLOGIES,
`
`LLC, ET., AL., PATENT LITIGATION
`
`
`Case No.: 5:18-cv-00767-BLF
`Case No.: 5:18-cv-05619-BLF
`PERSONALWEB TECHNOLOGIES,
`LLC’S AMENDED OPENING CLAIM
`CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`CASE NO: 5:18-md-02834-BLF
`CASE NO: 5:18-cv-00767-BLF
`CASE NO.: 5:18-CV-05619-BLF
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`

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`Case 5:18-md-02834-BLF Document 406 Filed 04/12/19 Page 2 of 25
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`
`
`PERSONALWEB TECHNOLOGIES, LLC, a
`Texas limited liability company, and
`LEVEL 3 COMMUNICATIONS, LLC,
`a Delaware limited liability company,
`
`
`Plaintiffs,
`
`v.
`
`TWITCH INTERACTIVE, INC. a Delaware
`corporation,
`
`
`
`Defendant.
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`CASE NO: 5:18-cv-00767-BLF
`CASE NO.: 5:18-CV-05619-BLF
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`Case 5:18-md-02834-BLF Document 406 Filed 04/12/19 Page 3 of 25
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`I.
`II.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`2.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`D.
`
`INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1
`DISPUTED CONSTRUCTIONS ........................................................................................1
`A.
`“Unauthorized or unlicensed” (’310 at Claim 20) ...................................................1
`1.
`This claim phrase does not need to be construed because their plain
`and ordinary meaning suffices. ....................................................................1
`Amazon’s proposal erroneously makes the term “unauthorized”
`synonymous with the term “unlicensed” contradicting the specification
`and prosecution history. ...............................................................................4
`Collateral Estoppel Does Not Apply............................................................5
`3.
`“Authorization” (’420 patent, claims 25, 166) .........................................................7
`1.
`This term does not need to be construed because its plain and ordinary
`meaning suffices. .........................................................................................8
`Collateral Estoppel Does Not Apply............................................................9
`2.
`“the request including at least a content dependent name of a particular data
`item” (’310 at Claim 20) ..........................................................................................9
`“Content‐dependent name” (’310, Claims 20, 69; ’420 patent, claim 25) ............12
`1.
`PersonalWeb’s construction flows from the claim language. ....................12
`2.
`PersonalWeb’s construction is consistent with the specification. .............13
`“Name for a data file” (’442 patent, claim 10) ......................................................13
`“digital key for the particular file” / “file key for each particular file” (’544
`patent, claims 46, 52) .............................................................................................14
`“part” (’544 patent, claims 46, 52).........................................................................15
`“being based on a first function of the contents of the specific part” (’544
`patent, claim 46).....................................................................................................17
`1.
`The Court should apply the plain and ordinary meaning of this term. ......17
`2.
`PersonalWeb’s alternative construction flows from the claim language. ..17
`“part value” (’544 patent, claims 46, 52) ...............................................................18
`“function of the one or more of part values” (’544 patent, claim 46) ....................18
`1.
`Only “part value” should be construed in this term. ..................................18
`2.
`Amazon’s proposed construction of the phrase improperly rewrites the
`claim. ..........................................................................................................19
`
`E.
`F.
`
`G.
`H.
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`I.
`J.
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`PERSONALWEB’S AMENDED OPENING
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`CASE NO: 5:18-md-02834-BLF
`CASE NO: 5:18-cv-00767-BLF
`CASE NO.: 5:18-CV-05619-BLF
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`

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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Page(s)
`
`Cases
`Exxon Chem. Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp.,
`64 F.3d 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1995) .......................................................................................................... 4
`
`Finjan, Inc. v. Secure Computing Corp.,
`626 F.3d 1197 (Fed. Cir. 2010)......................................................................................................... 3
`Garcia v. United States,
`469 U.S. 70 (1984) ............................................................................................................................ 4
`Gonzalez v. Infostream Group, Inc.,
`Case No. 2:14–cv–906–JRG–RSP, 2015 WL 5604448 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 21, 2015) ........................ 4
`Hydranautics v. FilmTec Corp.,
`204 F.3d 880 (9th Cir. 2000) ............................................................................................................ 6
`IPXL Holdings, L.L.C. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
`430 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005)....................................................................................................... 12
`Libel-Flarsheim,
`358 F.3d .......................................................................................................................................... 13
`Mentor H/S, Inc. v. Med. Device Alliance, Inc.,
`244 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2001)......................................................................................................... 3
`Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc.,
`395 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2005)......................................................................................................... 4
`O2 Micro Int'l v. Beyond Innovation,
`Tech., 521 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008) .............................................................................................. 3
`PersonalWeb Techs., LLC v. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp.,
`No. 6:12-CV-659 (Dkt. 103), 2016 WL 922880 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 11, 2016)................................. 7,9
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)......................................................................................................... 1
`Reiter v. Sonotone Corp.,
`442 U.S. 330 (1979) ...................................................................................................................... 4, 5
`Thorner,
`669 F.3d .......................................................................................................................................... 13
`United States Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc.,
`103 F.3d 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1997)......................................................................................................... 3
`Wasica Fin. GmbH v. Cont'l Auto. Sys.,
`853 F.3d 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2017)......................................................................................................... 4
`
`
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`PERSONALWEB’S AMENDED OPENING
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`CASE NO: 5:18-md-02834-BLF
`CASE NO: 5:18-cv-00767-BLF
`CASE NO.: 5:18-CV-05619-BLF
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`Case 5:18-md-02834-BLF Document 406 Filed 04/12/19 Page 5 of 25
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`Other Authorities
`The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (5th Ed. 2019) ………………..2, 8,16
`
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`CASE NO: 5:18-md-02834-BLF
`CASE NO: 5:18-cv-00767-BLF
`CASE NO.: 5:18-CV-05619-BLF
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`Case 5:18-md-02834-BLF Document 406 Filed 04/12/19 Page 6 of 25
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`PersonalWeb’s proposed constructions “stay[] true to the claim language and most naturally
`align[] with the patent's description of the invention [and, therefore,] will be, in the end, the correct
`construction.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). In contrast,
`Amazon.com, Inc., Amazon Web Services, Inc., and Twitch's (collectively, “Amazon”) proposed
`constructions: (i) rewrite claims; (ii) improperly read-in additional limitations from the specification
`that appear nowhere in the claims and significantly lengthen them; (iii) ignore express claim language;
`and (iv) confuse rather than clarify the meaning of the claims. Accordingly, PersonalWeb requests
`the Court adopt its proposed constructions and reject Defendants’ constructions.
`DISPUTED CONSTRUCTIONS
`II.
`In this brief, bold underline indicates that a term or phrase has an agreed construction, and
`italicized bold underline indicates that a term or phrase has a disputed construction that is part of this
`Markman proceeding.
`“Unauthorized or unlicensed” (’310 at Claim 20)
`A.
`’310 at Claim 20: “based at least in part on said content-dependent name of said
`particular data item, the first device (A) permitting the content to be provided to or
`accessed by the at least one other computer if it is not determined that the content is
`unauthorized or unlicensed, otherwise, (B) if it is determined that the content is
`unauthorized or unlicensed, not permitting the content to be provided to or accessed
`by the at least one other computer”
`Declaration of Stanley H. Thompson, Jr. (“Thompson Decl.”), Ex. 1.
`PersonalWeb’s Proposed Construction
`Amazon’s Proposed Construction
`Plain and ordinary meaning
`not compliant with a valid license
`
`Alternative construction: Not permitted or Not
`legally permitted
`
`1.
`
`This claim phrase does not need to be construed because their plain
`and ordinary meaning suffices.
`The plain and ordinary meaning of “authorize” connotes that something is given permission to
`perform an action. Consistent with the plain and ordinary meaning, the specification includes several
`
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`CASE NO: 5:18-cv-00767-BLF
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`examples of certain exemplary embodiments of the inventive system permitting, or not permitting,
`certain actions to take place on the basis of a given criteria. For example, the specification discusses
`that a “region” (directory) can be set as read-only, meaning another computer would not have
`permission to change the contents of the region:
`
` ’310 at 10:23-35; see also Fig. 5. The specification also discusses that a file can be locked so that
`another computer does not have permission to modify it:
`
`
`
`
` ’310 at 9:23-26; see also Fig. 3. The flowchart in Fig. 26(a) also discloses in block S422 “PROHIBIT
`OPEN” that a computer may not be permitted to open a file in a non-read only mode if it is in a read-
`only directory. ’310 at 20:19-22, Fig. 26(a). The plain and ordinary meaning of “authorize” is
`applicable without regard to a concept of licensing. This intrinsic evidence is confirmed by the
`dictionary definition of “authorize” which is “to give permission for.” Thompson Decl., Ex. 2, The
`American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (5th ed. 2019) (https://ahdictionary.com/word
`/search.html?q=authorize).
`A “license,” on the other hand, means something narrower. It is a specific kind of
`authorization. The specification discusses licenses in the sense of having legal permission to have a
`copy of a file. For example, the specification states that a license table 136 maintains a record of the
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`CASE NO: 5:18-cv-00767-BLF
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`True Names of “key files in the product (that is, files which are required in order to use the product,
`and which do not occur in other products)[.] Typically, for a software product, this would include the
`main executable image and perhaps other major files such as clip-art, scripts, or online help.” ’310 at
`31:17-22. This demonstrates the specification contemplates having a license is having legal
`permission to possess things like program executables and images such as clip-art, items that may be
`the subject, for example, of a copyright license, or a license granted by an End User License Agreement
`(EULA). The specification also discusses mechanisms for enforcing licenses. For example, the
`specification discusses active and passive enforcement of licenses (’310 at 31:9-12), and the license
`table (LT) 136 in Fig. 1(b) “is a table identifying files, which may only be used by licensed users.” ’310
`at 8:60-61.
`Using the plain and ordinary meaning of a term is often correct. See Mentor H/S, Inc. v. Med.
`Device Alliance, Inc., 244 F.3d 1365, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[T]he court properly instructed the jury
`that [‘irrigating’ and ‘frictional heat’] should receive their ordinary meanings.”). All words have
`definitions and thus may be rewritten using different words. This does not mean that all words in a
`claim should be construed. See, e.g., O2 Micro Int'l v. Beyond Innovation Tech., 521 F.3d 1351, 1362
`(Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[D]istrict courts are not (and should not be) required to construe every limitation
`present in a patent’s asserted claims.”); Finjan, Inc. v. Secure Computing Corp., 626 F.3d 1197, 1207
`(Fed. Cir. 2010) (upholding district court’s rejection of defendant’s proposed construction, and finding
`that no construction is necessary). In other words, claim construction is “not an obligatory exercise in
`redundancy.” United States Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., 103 F.3d 1554, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
`Where a term is used in accordance with its plain meaning, the court should not re-characterize it using
`different language.
`Thus, because the terms are not confusing to a jury, no further construction of these terms is
`required. If the Court believes the terms require construction, PersonalWeb believes “authorized”
`should be construed as “permitted,” and “licensed” should be construed as “legally permitted.”
`Amazon’s proposed constructions are inconsistent with the claim language and violate canons of claim
`construction.
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`PERSONALWEB’S AMENDED OPENING
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`CASE NO: 5:18-cv-00767-BLF
`CASE NO.: 5:18-CV-05619-BLF
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`Case 5:18-md-02834-BLF Document 406 Filed 04/12/19 Page 9 of 25
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`2.
`
`Amazon’s proposal erroneously makes the term “unauthorized”
`synonymous with
`the
`term “unlicensed” contradicting
`the
`specification and prosecution history.
`Amazon’s proposed construction, taken at face value, represents its contention that the phrase
`“unauthorized or unlicensed” should be construed as meaning “not compliant with a valid license.”
`But “unlicensed” by itself would mean “not compliant with a valid license,” so Amazon’s proposal
`expressly reads “unauthorized” out of the claim.
`“Canons of construction indicate that terms connected in the disjunctive in this manner be
`given separate meanings.” Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 73 (1984). See also Reiter v. Sonotone
`Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979) (the use of the term “or” indicates an intent to give the nouns their separate,
`normal meanings); Gonzalez v. Infostream Group, Inc., Case No. 2:14–cv–906–JRG–RSP, 2015 WL
`5604448, at *17–19 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 21, 2015) (recognizing that “or” is not restricted to mutually
`exclusive alternatives (A or B, [but not both]) and may be used to denote an inclusive list (A, or B [or
`both]), depending on context.). So a proper construction must give meaning to both words in the
`phrase “unauthorized or unlicensed.” See Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364,
`1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“A claim construction that gives meaning to all terms of the claim is preferred
`over one that does not do so.”); Exxon Chem. Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 64 F.3d 1553, 1557 (Fed.
`Cir. 1995) (“We must give meaning to all the words in Exxon’s claims.”).
`The separate term “unlicensed” is a specific species of the genus “unauthorized” that connotes
`something that is not legally permitted under a contract or agreement. Thus, Amazon’s proposed
`construction is erroneous. If “unauthorized” were defined in terms of unlicensed, which is what would
`effectively result from Amazon’s proposed construction, then either the presence of “unauthorized” in
`Claim 20 would be superfluous and/or the word “or” would be construed as “and.” Such a construction
`would be contrary to law, by disregarding the claim term “or” and its clear, disjunctive meaning.
`In order to narrow a claim term beyond its normal meaning, there must be clear disavowal of
`the scope given to a claim term. Wasica Fin. GmbH v. Cont'l Auto. Sys., 853 F.3d 1272, 1281-82
`(Fed. Cir. 2017) (“It is axiomatic that we will not narrow a claim term beyond its plain and ordinary
`meaning unless there is support for the limitation in the words of the claim, the specification, or the
`prosecution history. If the intrinsic record supports several definitions of a term, the term may be
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`PERSONALWEB’S AMENDED OPENING
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`CASE NO: 5:18-cv-00767-BLF
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`construed to encompass all such consistent meanings. Therefore, absent a clear disavowal or
`alternative lexicography by a patentee, he or she is free to choose a broad term and expect to obtain
`the full scope of its plain and ordinary meaning”) (internal citations omitted).
`Amazon cannot point to any such clear disavowal of claim scope for the term “unauthorized.”
`First, there is no discussion in the specification that is inconsistent with the plain and ordinary meaning
`of the term “unauthorized” and the disjunctive term “or.” Second, the prosecution history also
`supports separate meanings to “unauthorized” and “unlicensed”. Indeed, the prosecution history of
`the ’442 patent unambiguously shows that the patentee was not using the words “authorized” to mean
`“licensed”, but rather was using the term “authorized” as a broader “genus” term, and the term
`“licensed” as a narrower “species” term. For example, PersonalWeb amended claim 23 to only recite
`the term “unauthorized” and moved the term “unlicensed” into a new claim 25 that depended from
`claim 23:
`
`
`
`
`Thompson Decl., Ex. 3 (Response to Final Office Action (Feb. 14, 2010)), at 9-10. See also id. at 14
`(“Nor does Gardener teach or in any suggest (as per claim 23) that ‘an unauthorized copy of a file is
`not allowed to be provided from one of the computers.’ Nor does Gardner teach or in any way
`suggest (as per claim 25) that an unlicensed copy of a file is not allowed to be provided from one of
`the computers.” (original emphasis))
`Collateral Estoppel Does Not Apply.
`3.
`It is anticipated that Amazon will argue that collateral estoppel applies for its proposed
`construction of “unlicensed or unauthorized” because its proposed construction is based upon a prior
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`construction in a case between PersonalWeb and IBM. In that case, Judge Rodney Gilstrap of the
`Eastern District of Texas separately construed “licensed,” “unlicensed,” “authorized,” “unauthorized”
`and “authorization.” Thompson Decl., Ex. 4, Memorandum Opinion and Order (Dkt. 103) at 25, 28,
`PersonalWeb Techs., LLC v. Int’l Bus. Machines Corp., No. 6:12-cv-00661 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 11, 2016).
`After that matter was transferred to the Northern District of California, the parties eventually reached
`a settlement and stipulated to dismiss the case with prejudice. Thompson Decl., Ex. 5, Order of
`Dismissal With Prejudice (Dkt. 381), PersonalWeb Techs., LLC v. Int’l Bus. Machines Corp., No.
`5:16-cv-01266 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2017). In another Eastern District case, PersonalWeb Techs., LLC
`v. Amazon.com Inc., No. 6:11-cv-00658 (E.D. Tex. Filed Dec. 8, 2011) (“Amazon I”), which actually
`involved Amazon (in contrast to the IBM ruling upon which Amazon now relies), Judge Leonard
`Davis ruled that no construction of the terms “licensed” and “unlicensed” was needed. Thompson
`Decl., Ex. 6, Memorandum Opinion and Order (Dkt. 140) at 26, 47, PersonalWeb Techs., LLC v.
`Amazon.com Inc., No. 6:11-cv-00658 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 5, 2013). Neither claim construction ruling is
`binding here.
`“Under collateral estoppel, once a court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its
`judgment, that decision may preclude relitigation of the issue in a suit on a different cause of action
`involving a party to the first case.” Hydranautics v. FilmTec Corp., 204 F.3d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 2000).
`Under both California and federal law, collateral estoppel applies only where it is established that “(1)
`the issue necessarily decided at the previous proceeding is identical to the one which is sought to be
`relitigated; (2) the first proceeding ended with a final judgment on the merits; and (3) the party against
`whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity with a party at the first proceeding.” Id.
`The conditions for collateral estoppel are not met here. First, neither of the prior Eastern
`District of Texas claim construction rulings made any determination of the scope or meaning of the
`identical phrase “unauthorized or unlicensed” at issue in this case. In other words, the issue of the
`separation of these words by the disjunctive phrase “or” was never considered and ruled upon. Second,
`there was no final judgment that relied upon any claim construction from the IBM case because that
`case settled and the parties did not have the opportunity to appeal. Amazon cannot demonstrate that
`collateral estoppel applies to Judge Gilstrap’s decision. Thus, “unauthorized or unlicensed” should be
`
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`PERSONALWEB’S AMENDED OPENING
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`CASE NO: 5:18-md-02834-BLF
`CASE NO: 5:18-cv-00767-BLF
`CASE NO.: 5:18-CV-05619-BLF
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`Case 5:18-md-02834-BLF Document 406 Filed 04/12/19 Page 12 of 25
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`given its plain and ordinary meaning, which necessarily includes the disjunctive term “or.” If
`construed, however, the phrase should be construed as “not permitted or not legally permitted.”
`Amazon’s proposed constructions are based on a prior construction of individual terms,
`including “unauthorized” and “unlicensed,” that ignored their use in disjunctive phrases that require
`that they mean something different. PersonalWeb Techs., LLC v. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp., No. 6:12-
`CV-659 (Dkt. 103), 2016 WL 922880 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 11, 2016). As discussed above, collateral
`estoppel does not apply to Judge Gilstrap’s construction, which is not even from Amazon I. Moreover,
`Judge Gilstrap’s decision is different from and in conflict with the construction of Judge Davis (in
`Amazon I). Judge Davis held the term “authorized” did not require any construction, which is
`consistent with the plain usage of the term, and the claim language, specification and prosecution
`history.
`In the event that Amazon contends that its proposed construction for “unauthorized or
`unlicensed” is actually “not compliant with a valid license or not compliant with a valid license,” then
`that construction is erroneous, for the reasons discussed above, and also confusing. It is unclear what
`an “invalid right” is. How can something be characterized as a “right” and also be characterized as
`“invalid?” Also, if one incorporates Amazon’s proposed construction of “unlicensed” into its
`proposed construction of “unauthorized,” then “not compliant with a valid license” becomes “not
`compliant with a valid right to content.” But this is only another way of stating that access or use of
`the content is not permitted, which is precisely what PersonalWeb argues “unauthorized” should mean.
`Indeed, the prior construction does not specify that the right to content derives its validity from a legal
`and/or contractual source.
`For these reasons, “unlicensed or unauthorized” should be given their plain and ordinary
`meaning. If construed, however, PersonalWeb’s proposed constructions should be adopted. If
`Amazon’s proposed construction is adopted, it should be clarified that “unauthorized” is not limited
`to the legal and/or contractual sense of the of term “unlicensed.”
`“Authorization” (’420 patent, claims 25, 166)
`B.
`’420 at Claim 25: “(C) based at least in part on said ascertaining in step (B), selectively
`allowing a copy of the particular sequence of bits to be provided to or accessed by or
`
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`PERSONALWEB’S AMENDED OPENING
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`7
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`CASE NO: 5:18-md-02834-BLF
`CASE NO: 5:18-cv-00767-BLF
`CASE NO.: 5:18-CV-05619-BLF
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`Case 5:18-md-02834-BLF Document 406 Filed 04/12/19 Page 13 of 25
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`from at least one of the computers in a network of computers, wherein a copy of the
`sequence of bits is not to be provided or accessed without authorization, as determined,
`at least in part, based on whether or not said first content-dependent name of the
`particular sequence of bits corresponds to one of the plurality of identifiers”
`’420 at Claim 166: “(a2) selectively permit the particular data item to be made available
`for access and to be provided to or accessed by or from at least some of the computers
`in a network of computers, wherein the data item is not to be made available for access
`or provided without authorization, as resolved based, at least in part, on whether or not
`at least one of said one or more content-dependent digital identifiers for said particular
`data item corresponds to an entry in one or more databases, each of said one or more
`databases comprising a plurality of identifiers, each of said identifiers in each said
`database corresponding to at least one data item of a plurality of data items, and each
`of said identifiers in each said database being based, at least in part, on at least some of
`the data in a corresponding data item”
`Thompson Decl., Ex. 7.
`PersonalWeb’s Proposed Construction
`Plain and ordinary meaning
`
`Alternative construction: “authorization”:
`permission
`
`Amazon’s Proposed Construction
`a valid license
`
`1.
`
`This term does not need to be construed because its plain and
`ordinary meaning suffices.
`The plain and ordinary meaning of “authorization” is “permission.” as shown above in the
`discussion of the phrase “unauthorized or unlicensed,” the specification is consistent with the plain
`and ordinary meaning. This intrinsic evidence is confirmed by the dictionary definition of “authorize”
`which is “1. The act of authorizing. See Synonyms at permission.” Thompson Decl., Ex. 8, The
`(5th
`Language
`ed.
`2019)
`American Heritage Dictionary
`of
`the
`English
`(https://ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=authorization) (emphasis added).
`
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`PERSONALWEB’S AMENDED OPENING
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`8
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`CASE NO: 5:18-md-02834-BLF
`CASE NO: 5:18-cv-00767-BLF
`CASE NO.: 5:18-CV-05619-BLF
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`Case 5:18-md-02834-BLF Document 406 Filed 04/12/19 Page 14 of 25
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`Collateral Estoppel Does Not Apply.
`2.
`It is anticipated that Amazon will also argue that collateral estoppel applies for its proposed
`construction of “authorization” because its proposed construction is based upon a prior construction
`of that term. See Thompson Decl., Ex. 4, Memorandum Opinion and Order (Dkt. 103) at 25, 28,
`PersonalWeb Techs., LLC v. Int’l Bus. Machines Corp., No. 6:12-cv-00661 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 11, 2016).
`However, Amazon cannot show that the construction of term “authorization” was in any manner
`outcome determinative regarding the products in that case and there was no final judgment that
`necessarily relied upon the construction of “authorization” in that case because it settled and the parties
`did not have the opportunity to appeal. Thus, for the reasons above in the discussion of the phrase
`“unauthorized or unlicensed,” collateral estoppel does not apply to this term.
`“the request including at least a content dependent name of a particular
`C.
`data item” (’310 at Claim 20)
`’310 at Claim 20: “20. A computer-implemented method operable in a system which
`includes a plurality of computers, the method comprising:
`controlling distribution of content from a first computer to at least one other computer,
`in response to a request obtained by a first device in the system from a second device
`in the system, the first device comprising hardware including at least one processor,
`the request including at least a content-dependent name of a particular data item, the
`content-dependent name being based at least in part on a function of at least some of
`the data comprising the particular data item, wherein the function comprises a message
`digest function or a hash function, and wherein two identical data items will have the
`same content-dependent name”
`
`Thompson Decl., Ex. 1.
`
`PersonalWeb’s Proposed Construction
`the request including at least a content
`dependent name of a particular data item
`
`Amazon’s Proposed Construction
`the request including at least a content
`dependent name of a particular requested data
`item
`PersonalWeb’s proposed construction is the claim language itself. In other words, the plain
`and ordinary meaning should be used because it is readily understandable without being rewritten.
`
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`PERSONALWEB’S AMENDED OPENING
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
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`CASE NO: 5:18-md-02834-BLF
`CASE NO: 5:18-cv-00767-BLF
`CASE NO.: 5:18-CV-05619-BLF
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`Case 5:18-md-02834-BLF Document 406 Filed 04/12/19 Page 15 of 25
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`Amazon apparently agrees, because for the most part they leave the language of this term in Claim 20
`untouched. However, Amazon does change the claim language “a content dependent name of a
`particular data item” to “a content dependent name of a particular reques

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