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`Case 5:15-cv-03295-BLF Document 424 Filed 11/14/17 Page 1 of 20
`
`
`
`STEFANI E. SHANBERG (State Bar No. 206717)
`sshanberg@mofo.com
`JENNIFER J. SCHMIDT (State Bar No. 295579)
`jschmidt@mofo.com
`NATHAN B. SABRI (State Bar No. 252216)
`nsabri@mofo.com
`ROBIN L. BREWER (State Bar No. 253686)
`rbrewer@mofo.com
`EUGENE MARDER (State Bar No. 275762)
`emarder@mofo.com
`MADELEINE E. GREENE (State Bar No. 263120)
`mgreene@mofo.com
`MICHAEL J. GUO (State Bar No. 284917)
`mguo@mofo.com
`ALEX N. HADDUCK (State Bar No. 312962)
`ahadduck@mofo.com
`MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP
`425 Market Street
`San Francisco, California 94105
`Telephone:
`(415) 268-7000
`Facsimile:
`(415) 268-7522
`
`DAVID A. NELSON (Pro Hac Vice)
`davenelson@quinnemanuel.com
`NATHAN A. HAMSTRA (Pro Hac Vice)
`nathanhamstra@quinnemanuel.com
`QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN LLP
`500 W. Madison Street, Suite 2450
`Chicago, Illinois 60661
`Telephone:
`(312) 705-7400
`Facsimile:
`(312) 707-7401
`
`Attorneys for Defendant
`BLUE COAT SYSTEMS LLC
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`
`SAN JOSE DIVISION
`
`FINJAN, INC., a Delaware Corporation,
`
`Case No.: 15-cv-03295-BLF-SVK
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`BLUE COAT SYSTEMS LLC, a Delaware
`Corporation,
`
`Defendant.
`
`BLUE COAT SYSTEMS LLC’S
`NOTICE OF MOTION AND RULE
`50(A) MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A
`MATTER OF LAW
`
`
`
`BLUE COAT’S RULE 50(A) MOTION
`15-cv-03295-BLF-SVK
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 5:15-cv-03295-BLF Document 424 Filed 11/14/17 Page 2 of 20
`
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page
`
`NOTICE OF MOTION .................................................................................................................... 1
`RELIEF REQUESTED .................................................................................................................... 1
`I. LEGAL STANDARD .............................................................................................................. 2
`II. BLUE COAT IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT OF NONINFRINGEMENT ........................ 2
`A. There Is No Evidence of Infringement of Claim 15 of the ’844 Patent. .............................. 2
`B. There Is No Evidence of Infringement of Claim 1 of the ’968 Patent. ................................ 4
`C. There is No Evidence of Infringement of Claim 1 of the ’731 Patent. ................................ 5
`D. There is No Evidence of Infringement of Claim 22 of the ’408 Patent. .............................. 6
`E. There is No Evidence of Infringement of Claim 10 of the ’494 Patent. .............................. 7
`F. There is No Evidence of Infringement of Claims 1 or 10 of the ’621 Patent. ..................... 8
`III. BLUE COAT IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT OF NO WILLFUL INFRINGEMENT. ...... 9
`IV. BLUE COAT IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT OF NO DAMAGES. ................................. 11
`A. Blue Coat is Entitled to Judgment as a Matter of Law Regarding Foreign Users ............. 11
`B. Blue Coat Is Entitled to Judgment as a Matter of Law Regarding Government Sales ...... 13
`C. Blue Coat is Entitled to Judgment as a Matter of Law on Reasonable Royalties .............. 13
`V. CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................................... 16
`
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`BLUE COAT’S RULE 50(A) MOTION
`15-cv-03295-BLF-SVK
`
`
`
`i
`
`

`

`Case 5:15-cv-03295-BLF Document 424 Filed 11/14/17 Page 3 of 20
`
`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`Cases
`
`Adrea v. Barnes & Noble, Inc.,
`227 F. Supp. 3d 303 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) .................................................................................10, 11
`
`Biscotti Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,
`Case No. 2:13-CV-01015-JRG-RSP, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93166 (E.D. Tex.
`May 18, 2017) .....................................................................................................................13, 14
`
`CAE Screenplates, Inc. v. Heinrich Fiedler Gmbh & Co. Kg,
`224 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ...................................................................................................8
`
`Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp.,
`406 U.S. 518 (1972) ..................................................................................................................12
`
`Erfindergemeinschaft UroPep Gbr v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
`Case No. 2:15-CV-1202-WCB, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75517 (E.D. Tex. May
`18, 2017) ...................................................................................................................................10
`
`Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc.,
`No. 2016-2520, Dkt. No. 41 (filed Jan. 30, 2017) ....................................................................12
`
`Finjan, Inc. v. Sophos, Inc.,
`Case No. 14-cv-01197-WHO, 2016 U.S. Dist. Lexis 107831 (N.D. Cal. Aug.
`15, 2016) .............................................................................................................................15, 16
`
`Good Tech. Corp. v. Mobileiron, Inc.,
`Case No. 5:12-cv-05826-PSG, 2015 WL 4090431 (N.D. Cal. July 5, 2015) ...........................13
`
`Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc.,
`136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016) ....................................................................................................9, 10, 11
`
`Honeywell Int’l Inc. v. Universal Avionics Sys. Corp.,
`347 F. Supp. 2d 114 (D. Del. 2004) .................................................................................. passim
`
`Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States,
`534 F.2d 889 (Ct. Cl. 1976) ......................................................................................................13
`
`KW Plastics v. U.S. Can Co.,
`131 F. Supp. 2d 1289 (M.D. Ala. 2001) .............................................................................13, 15
`
`Microsoft v. AT&T,
`550 U.S. 437 (2007) ..................................................................................................................12
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`BLUE COAT’S RULE 50(A) MOTION
`15-cv-03295-BLF-SVK
`
`
`
`ii
`
`

`

`Case 5:15-cv-03295-BLF Document 424 Filed 11/14/17 Page 4 of 20
`
`
`
`Open Text S.A. v. Box, Inc.,
`Case No. 13-cv-04910-JD, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11311 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 30,
`2015) .........................................................................................................................................13
`
`Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, Inc.,
`711 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2013) .................................................................................................15
`
`Radware, Ltd. v. F5 Networks, Inc.,
`Case No. 5:13-cv-02024-RMW, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112504 (N.D. Cal.
`Aug. 22, 2016) ............................................................................................................................9
`
`Roy-G-Biv Corp. v. ABB, Ltd.,
`Case No. 6:11-cv-622, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188699 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 1,
`2014) .........................................................................................................................................13
`
`Streck, Inc. v. Research & Diagnostic Sys.,
`665 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ...................................................................................................2
`
`TecSec, Inc. v. IBM Corp.,
`No. 10-cv-115, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159356 (E.D. Va. Feb. 10, 2011) ...............................13
`
`Texas Instruments, Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp.,
`90 F.3d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ........................................................................................... passim
`
`Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,
`632 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2011) .................................................................................................14
`
`Volterra Semiconductor Corp. v. Primarion, Inc.,
`799 F. Supp. 2d 1092 (N.D. Cal. 2011) ......................................................................................2
`
`Statutes
`
`28 U.S.C. § 1498 .............................................................................................................................13
`
`Other Authorities
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1) .....................................................................................................................2
`
`
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`BLUE COAT’S RULE 50(A) MOTION
`15-cv-03295-BLF-SVK
`
`
`iii
`
`

`

`Case 5:15-cv-03295-BLF Document 424 Filed 11/14/17 Page 5 of 20
`
`NOTICE OF MOTION
`
`TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:
`
`PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that at the Court’s earliest convenience, or as soon thereafter as
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`the matter may be heard by the Honorable Beth Labson Freeman in Courtroom 3, United States
`
`District Court for the Northern District of California, Robert F. Peckham Federal Building, 280
`
`South 1st Street, San Jose, CA 95113, Defendant Blue Coat shall and hereby does respectfully
`
`seek an order granting judgment as a matter of law.
`
`
`
`This motion is based on this notice of motion and supporting memorandum, the trial
`
`record, and such other written or oral argument as was presented and may be presented at or
`
`before the time this motion is taken under submission by the Court.
`
`RELIEF REQUESTED
`
`
`
`Blue Coat respectfully seeks an order granting it judgment as a matter of law on Finjan’s
`
`claims for relief.
`
`Dated: November 13, 2017
`
`MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`By:
`
`/s/ Nathan B. Sabri
`Nathan B. Sabri
`
`Attorneys for Defendant
`BLUE COAT SYSTEMS LLC
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`BLUE COAT’S RULE 50(A) MOTION
`15-cv-03295-BLF-SVK
`
`
`
`1
`
`

`

`Case 5:15-cv-03295-BLF Document 424 Filed 11/14/17 Page 6 of 20
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`I.
`
`LEGAL STANDARD
`Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate when “a party has been fully heard on an issue
`
`during a jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient
`
`evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1). Importantly for this
`
`motion, “conclusory expert assertions do not give rise to a genuine issue of material fact.” Streck,
`
`Inc. v. Research & Diagnostic Sys., 665 F.3d 1269, 1290-91 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (upholding district
`
`court’s grant of JMOL); see also Volterra Semiconductor Corp. v. Primarion, Inc., 799 F. Supp.
`
`2d 1092, 1098 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (“When an expert opinion is not supported by sufficient facts to
`
`validate it in the eyes of the law, or when indisputable record facts contradict or otherwise render
`
`the opinion unreasonable, it cannot support a jury’s verdict.”) (quoting Brooke Group Ltd. v.
`
`Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993)).
`
`II.
`
`BLUE COAT IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT OF NONINFRINGEMENT
`There Is No Evidence of Infringement of Claim 15 of the ’844 Patent.
`A.
`There is no evidence that Blue Coat (either literally or by equivalents) infringes claim 15
`
`of the ’844 patent. Finjan is bound by the construction of “Downloadable security profile that
`
`identifies suspicious code in the received Downloadable” issued by the Court in this case. The
`
`Court’s construction defines the term as “a profile that identifies code in the received
`
`Downloadable that performs hostile or potentially hostile operations.” There is no evidence that
`
`GIN, or any of the systems included in GIN, generates a downloadable security profile. Finjan
`
`points to MAA reports, generated by customer- and Blue Coat-operated MAAs, as meeting this
`
`limitation. It is undisputed, however, that MAA reports contain lists of behaviors, and that
`
`identifying behaviors does not identify the code underlying the behaviors. (See, e.g., Trial Tr.
`
`(Cole) at 582:10-25.)
`
`Dr. Cole’s testimony to the contrary directly contradicts the court’s claim construction
`
`order in Blue Coat I, which the parties stipulated would govern this term. (Compare Finjan Inc.
`
`v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc., No. 13-03999 BLF, 2014 WL 5361976 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2014) (Blue
`
`Coat I Claim Construction Order); Dkt. No. 180 (Amended Joint Claim Construction and Pre-
`
`Hearing Statement Pursuant to Patent L.R. 4-3) (stating that Blue Coat I Claim Construction
`
`BLUE COAT’S RULE 50(A) MOTION
`15-cv-03295-BLF-SVK
`
`
`2
`
`

`

`Case 5:15-cv-03295-BLF Document 424 Filed 11/14/17 Page 7 of 20
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`governs), with Trial Tr. (Cole) at 527:2-7 (“Q. And once again, just to be clear, when you talk
`about suspicious operations, you’re also talking about suspicious code? A. Yes. Suspicious
`operations and suspicious code are both the same thing and it’s in the file and looking for what
`
`actions that code would take that could be harmful.”) (emphasis added); see also Dkt. No. 421 at
`
`47 [Jury Instructions] (“As used in the [’844] patent, ‘code’ and ‘operations’ are not the same”).)
`
`Finjan relies solely on counterfactual and conclusory testimony from Dr. Cole that identifying
`
`operations is the same thing as identifying code. (See Trial Tr. (Nielson) at 1605:16-1608:8;
`
`1611:6-16; 1616:17-18.) Dr. Nielson cited the specific code refuting Finjan’s allegations, and
`
`explained how the evidence cited by Finjan did not support the claim elements being met. (Id. at
`
`1618:24-1628:8; PTX-1025 at 860, 3439-40.)
`
`Further, Finjan has provided no evidence establishing that GIN, or any accused Blue Coat
`
`product, performs the limitation of “linking the first Downloadable security profile to the
`Downloadable before a web server makes the Downloadable available to web clients.” Rather, it
`is undisputed that content must already have been made available by a web server in order for
`
`the accused Blue Coat products to access the content and perform their analysis. (Trial Tr.
`
`(Sorgic) at 1446:1-7.) Dr. Cole’s testimony ignores this limitation and points only to the fact that
`GIN scans the downloadable before it reaches the client. This does not, however, have anything
`to do with when the web server makes a downloadable available to web clients in the plural,
`
`which is what the limitation concerns. Indeed, Dr. Cole only mentions a web server once, when
`
`he recites the claim language, making no attempt to explain how this part of the limitation is met.
`
`(Id. (Cole) at 517:15-518:2; see also id. at 533:7-25 (trying to explain the web server element
`
`without discussing a web server).) Dr. Nielson explained how Finjan’s arguments and testimony
`
`did not demonstrate that this claim element is met (Trial Tr. (Nielson) at 1608:9-1610:3; 1611:6-
`
`1616:16; 1628:9-1630:5.)
`
`Finjan has failed to provide the jury with a legally sufficient basis for finding infringement
`
`under the doctrine of equivalents (“DoE”). The Federal Circuit has consistently held that a
`
`doctrine of equivalents argument “cannot merely be subsumed in plaintiff’s case of literal
`infringement,” and must be established by “particularized testimony and linking argument as to
`
`BLUE COAT’S RULE 50(A) MOTION
`15-cv-03295-BLF-SVK
`
`
`3
`
`

`

`Case 5:15-cv-03295-BLF Document 424 Filed 11/14/17 Page 8 of 20
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`the insubstantiality of the differences between the claimed invention and the accused device or
`
`process.” Texas Instruments, Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 90 F.3d 1558, 1566-68 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 1996) (upholding grant of JMOL regarding DoE where “overwhelming majority of [expert’s]
`
`testimony . . . was solicited for purposes of establishing literal infringement.”) On each of its
`
`doctrine of equivalents arguments, Finjan did not present and support doctrine of equivalents as a
`
`theory on its own merits—or even cite back to and incorporate by reference generally applicable
`
`technical background discussions. Instead, it presented its doctrine of equivalents theories as
`
`insufficiently supported “at the very least” fallbacks based on the literal infringement arguments.
`(See, e.g., Trial Tr. at 538:8-9 “So does GIN, at the very least, does GIN function in the same
`
`way as the second element of claim 15?”) An expert “cannot simply boot-strap his conclusions
`
`with respect to literal infringement and extend them to the infringement under the Doctrine of
`
`Equivalents.” Honeywell Int’l Inc. v. Universal Avionics Sys. Corp., 347 F. Supp. 2d 114, 119
`
`n.21 (D. Del. 2004) (citing Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Sealy Mattress Co., 873 F.2d 1422, 1425 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 1989).
`
`Finjan’s expert provided only a conclusory argument that the second element of the ’844
`
`patent was met under the function/way/result test. (Trial Tr. (Cole) at 537:14-539:9.) In making
`
`this argument, Dr. Cole repeated the same arguments he used for literal infringement. (See id. at
`
`536:17-537:2.) Dr. Cole’s attempt to bootstrap his literal infringement conclusions into a DoE
`
`argument is legally insufficient, and would effectively vitiate the second element of the ’844
`
`patent if allowed. Honeywell Int’l Inc., 347 F. Supp. 2d at 119 n.21; Texas Instruments, 90 F.3d
`
`at 1566-68. The only non-conclusory testimony on this issue confirms that the accused product
`
`features are not equivalent to the missing claim elements. (Trial Tr. (Nielson) at 1626:12-
`
`1630:5.)
`
`There Is No Evidence of Infringement of Claim 1 of the ’968 Patent.
`B.
`There is no evidence that Blue Coat (either literally or by equivalents) infringes claim 1 of
`
`the ’968 patent. Finjan is bound by the construction of “policy index” issued by the Court in this
`
`case. The Court’s construction defines “policy index” as “a data structure indicating allowability
`
`of cached content relative to a plurality of policies.” The first and third limitations of this claim
`
`BLUE COAT’S RULE 50(A) MOTION
`15-cv-03295-BLF-SVK
`
`
`4
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`

`

`Case 5:15-cv-03295-BLF Document 424 Filed 11/14/17 Page 9 of 20
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`require storage of an allowability decision—“a memory storing . . . a policy index to the cache
`contents . . . for each of a plurality of policies” and “a content evaluator . . . for determining
`whether a given digital content is allowable . . the results of which are saved as entries in the
`policy index.” Finjan has produced no evidence that ASG coupled with MAA contains a policy
`
`index that meets these elements. Finjan asserts that the policy ticket generated by the ProxySG
`
`component of ASG satisfies this claim limitation. It is undisputed, however, that as soon as
`
`ProxySG makes an allowability determination, the policy ticket is discarded. (Id. (Sorgic) at
`
`1436:6-1439:19.) It is further undisputed that a policy ticket only relates to a single policy, not a
`
`plurality of policies. (Id.) Finjan’s expert confirmed on cross examination that a second
`
`ProxySG user, who could be subject to a different policy, would need a brand new policy ticket.
`
`(Id. (Mitzenmacher) at 837:2-838-7, 847:16-22.) Because of this, the first and third limitations of
`
`the claim, which require storage of an allowability decision, are not met. (See Trial Tr. (Nielson)
`
`at 1673:2-1684:23; PTX1025 at 4515-4516, 4155.)
`
`As discussed above, Finjan also failed to provide the jury with a legally sufficient basis
`
`for finding infringement under the doctrine of equivalents (“DoE”). Finjan’s expert provided a
`
`conclusory argument that the “policy index” limitation was met under the function/way/result
`
`test. (Trial Tr. (Mitzenmacher) at 760:19-762:13.) In making this argument, Dr. Mitzenmacher
`
`repeated the same arguments he used for literal infringement. (See id. at 759:18-760:20.) Dr.
`
`Mitzenmacher’s attempt to bootstrap his literal infringement conclusions into a DoE argument is
`
`legally insufficient, and would effectively vitiate the “policy index” limitation of the ’968 patent
`
`if allowed. Honeywell Int’l Inc., 347 F. Supp. 2d at 119 n.21; Texas Instruments, 90 F.3d at
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`1566-68. The only non-conclusory testimony on this issue confirms that the accused product
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`features are not equivalent to the missing claim elements. (Trial Tr. (Nielson) at 1683:22-
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`1684:23.)
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`There is No Evidence of Infringement of Claim 1 of the ’731 Patent.
`C.
`There is no evidence that Blue Coat (either literally or by equivalents) infringes claim 1 of
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`the ’731 patent. The final element of claim 1 requires “a security policy cache for storing security
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`policies…” Finjan has produced no evidence that ASG with MAA contains a security policy
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`BLUE COAT’S RULE 50(A) MOTION
`15-cv-03295-BLF-SVK
`
`
`5
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`

`

`Case 5:15-cv-03295-BLF Document 424 Filed 11/14/17 Page 10 of 20
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`cache. Finjan alleges that ProxySG’s storage of a policy file satisfies this limitation, but presents
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`no evidence that the policy file is stored in a cache. Finjan alleges that ProxySG’s policy file is
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`stored in persistent storage and volatile memory, but does not explain how this qualifies as a
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`cache. (Trial Tr. (Mitzenmacher) at 730:9-25.) This missing element is especially glaring given
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`that Finjan has explicitly pointed out the existence of a “file cache” and “security profile cache”
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`(separate limitations of the claim), which indicates that Finjan is capable of explicitly identifying
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`caches, and has simply failed to identify a security policy cache. (Trial Tr. (Nielson) at 1647:21-
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`1653:5; 1653:23-1654:6; id. at (Sorgic) at 1445:9-23.)
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`Finjan has also failed to provide the jury with a legally sufficient basis for finding
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`infringement under the doctrine of equivalents (“DoE”). Finjan’s expert provided a conclusory
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`argument that the first element of the claim was met under the function/way/result test. (Trial Tr.
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`(Mitzenmacher) at 735:14-738:9.) In making this argument, Dr. Mitzenmacher repeated the same
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`argument he used for literal infringement. (See id. at 734:5-735:13.) Dr. Mitzenmacher’s attempt
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`to bootstrap his literal infringement conclusions into a DoE argument is legally insufficient, and
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`would effectively vitiate the first element of the ’731 patent if allowed. Honeywell Int’l Inc., 347
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`F. Supp. 2d at 119 n.21; Texas Instruments, 90 F.3d at 1566-68. The only non-conclusory
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`testimony on this issue confirms that the accused product features are not equivalent to the
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`missing claim elements. (Trial Tr. (Nielson) at 1653:6-1654:6.)
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`There is No Evidence of Infringement of Claim 22 of the ’408 Patent.
`D.
`There is no evidence that Blue Coat infringes claim 22 of the ’408 patent. In particular,
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`Finjan has produced no evidence that any accused product “dynamically builds” a parse tree as
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`required by the claim. Finjan accuses the DRTR component of the WSS with GIN/WebPulse
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`combination, but provides no evidence that DRTR “dynamically builds” a parse tree, because
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`DRTR does not build a parse tree while an incoming stream is being received. Instead, it is
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`undisputed that DRTR downloads all of the content to be analyzed, severs the connection, and
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`then analyzes the content. (Trial Tr. (Mitzenmacher) at 875:4-15 (DRTR is the receiving
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`element); id. at 877:2-878:4 (DRTR does not scan content until it has been downloaded).)
`Finjan’s argument that the accused parse tree (the pContext structure) is built before the client
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`BLUE COAT’S RULE 50(A) MOTION
`15-cv-03295-BLF-SVK
`
`
`6
`
`

`

`Case 5:15-cv-03295-BLF Document 424 Filed 11/14/17 Page 11 of 20
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`has received any content to be analyzed or “parsed” is similarly unavailing, because that also fails
`to establish the building of a parse tree during the receiving. (Trial Tr. (Nielson) at 1658:8-
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`1659:5; 1660:11-1666:22; 1670:22-5; PTX1025 at 106.)
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`In addition, Finjan has presented no evidence that any accused product utilizes a parse tree
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`at all, construed by the Court as “a hierarchical structure of interconnected nodes built from
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`scanned content.” Finjan argues that a pContext structure is the relevant parse tree. This fails,
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`however, because Finjan has not shown any evidence that pContext’s nodes are “tokens being
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`lexical constructs” or “combinations of tokens and patterns,” as required by the third claim
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`element. (See Trial Tr. (Nielson) at 1659:6-1660:10; 1660:11-1663:10; 1666:23-1669:20;
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`1670:6-8.)
`
`There is No Evidence of Infringement of Claim 10 of the ’494 Patent.
`E.
`There is no evidence that Blue Coat (either literally or by equivalents) infringes claim 10
`
`of U.S. Patent No. 8,677,494 (“the ’494 patent.”) Finjan accuses the Yara rules functionality
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`within GIN, particularly the Yara rule hits stored in Cookie2 and subsequently stored in SeeMore,
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`as meeting the “deriving security profile data for the Downloadable, including a list of suspicious
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`computer operations” limitation of claim 10. It is undisputed, however, that the Yara rule hits
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`stored in Cookie2, and SeeMore, list nothing more than the number of Yara rule hits and the
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`abbreviated names of the Yara rules that hit. (Trial Tr. (Cole) at 593:23-595:24; JTX-3060.)
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`Finjan’s expert contradicted the explicit claim language by suggesting that the security profile
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`data stored in the claimed database did not need to include the list of suspicious computer
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`operations. (Id. at 604:22-605:6.) Finjan has produced no evidence establishing that a Yara rule
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`corresponds to suspicious computer operations such that a list of abbreviated Yara rule names
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`could correspond to a list of suspicious computer operations. (See Trial Tr. (Nielson) at 1590:11-
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`1601:14, 1605:4-12.)
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`As discussed above, Finjan failed to provide the jury with a legally sufficient basis for
`
`finding infringement under the doctrine of equivalents (“DoE”). Finjan’s expert provided a
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`conclusory argument that the second element of the claim was met under the function/way/result
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`test. (Trial Tr. (Cole) at 552:18-554:10.) In making this argument, Dr. Cole repeated the same
`
`BLUE COAT’S RULE 50(A) MOTION
`15-cv-03295-BLF-SVK
`
`
`7
`
`

`

`Case 5:15-cv-03295-BLF Document 424 Filed 11/14/17 Page 12 of 20
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`argument he used for literal infringement. (See id. at 552:7-17.) Dr. Cole’s attempt to bootstrap
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`his literal infringement conclusions into a DoE argument is legally insufficient, and would
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`effectively vitiate the second element of the ’494 patent if allowed. Honeywell Int’l Inc., 347 F.
`
`Supp. 2d at 119 n.21; Texas Instruments, 90 F.3d at 1566-68. The only non-conclusory testimony
`
`on this issue confirms that the accused product features are not equivalent to the missing claim
`
`elements. (Trial Tr. (Nielson) at 1601:15-1604:8.)
`
`There is No Evidence of Infringement of Claims 1 or 10 of the ’621 Patent.
`F.
`There is no evidence that Blue Coat (either literally or by equivalents) infringes claims 1
`
`or 10 of the ’621 patent. Both claims require “an interrupter for interrupting processing of the
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`request.” Finjan alleges that MAA’s “hooking” of certain operations satisfies this limitation. The
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`record is clear that hooking merely allows MAA to monitor the operation as it continues to run.
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`(Trial Tr. (Medvidovic) at 1010:1-1018:2.) From the prior limitation in claim 1, which separately
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`requires monitoring, it is clear that monitoring and interrupting cannot be the same thing. (See
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`Trial Tr. (Nielson) at 1632:23-1634:6; 1635:3-1640:11; PTX1025 at 3439-3440; CAE
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`Screenplates, Inc. v. Heinrich Fiedler Gmbh & Co. Kg, 224 F.3d 1308, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“In
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`the absence of any evidence to the contrary, we must presume that the use of these different terms
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`in the claims connotes different meanings.”).)
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`Further, both claims require a “comparator . . . for comparing information pertaining to
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`the downloadable against a predetermined security policy.” Finjan has provided no evidence that
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`MAA contains any such comparator. The evidence shows that MAA lets a file run, monitors the
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`file, and then, well after runtime, compares what it observes to a list of patterns.. (Trial. Tr.
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`(Medvidovic) at 1018:19-1027:3.) Finjan has not established that creating a list of observed
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`patterns after runtime is the same as comparing information against a predetermined security
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`policy by a comparator that is coupled to operating system probes. Moreover, the accused MAA
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`pattern matching engine only uses stored events, previously gathered during file execution, to
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`compare against existing patterns. It has no access to runtime monitoring or operating system
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`probes, and therefore cannot be “coupled to” said probes. (Trial Tr. (Nielson) at 1634:7-21;
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`1640:12-1647:16; PTX1025 at 3521-3522, 3853-3854.)
`
`BLUE COAT’S RULE 50(A) MOTION
`15-cv-03295-BLF-SVK
`
`
`8
`
`

`

`Case 5:15-cv-03295-BLF Document 424 Filed 11/14/17 Page 13 of 20
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`As discussed above, Finjan failed to provide the jury with a legally sufficient basis for
`
`finding infringement under the doctrine of equivalents (“DoE”). Finjan’s expert provided a
`
`conclusory argument that the “interruptor” limitation of the claims was met under the
`
`function/way/result test. (Trial Tr. (Medvidovic) at 1050:9-1051:23.) In making this argument,
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`Dr. Medvidovic explicitly stated that “that’s literally what interruption means” when discussing
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`how DoE applies. (Id.) Dr. Medvidovic’s attempt to bootstrap his literal infringement
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`conclusions into a DoE argument is legally insufficient, and would effectively vitiate the
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`“interruptor” limitation of the ’621 patent if allowed. Honeywell Int’l Inc., 347 F. Supp. 2d at 119
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`n.21; Texas Instruments, 90 F.3d at 1566-68. The only non-conclusory testimony on this issue
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`confirms that the accused product features are not equivalent to the missing claim elements.
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`(Trial Tr. (Nielson) at 1640:2-11; 1647:6-16.)
`
`III. BLUE COAT IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT OF NO WILLFUL
`INFRINGEMENT.
`
`To prove willful infringement, Finjan must show that Blue Coat’s behavior was egregious,
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`such as where the infringement is malicious, deliberate, consciously wrongful, or done in bad
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`faith. See Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1932-33 (2016). Only the
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`accused infringer’s subjective willfulness, intentional or knowing—not objective willfulness—is
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`relevant. Halo Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1933. There is insufficient evidence for a reasonable
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`jury to find that Blue Coat has willfully infringed the asserted claims.
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`Finjan put forth no evidence of willfulness on a particularized basis, and made only
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`general allegations as to all patents. Finjan never identified when Blue Coat had knowledge as to
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`each of the asserted patents, and never identified specific acts constituting willful infringement on
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`a per patent basis. Finjan also did not provide Blue Coat notice prior to the filing of the
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`complaints. Finjan’s primary argument that Blue Coat continued to sell products after the verdict
`
`in Blue Coat I without designing around is unavailing at least because that verdict occurred after
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`the filing of the second complaint. Radware, Ltd. v. F5 Networks, Inc., Case No. 5:13-cv-02024-
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`RMW, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112504 at*20-21 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2016) (noting that “post-
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`complaint conduct is of limited relevance” and that Halo did not change this principle) (citing
`
`BLUE COAT’S RULE 50(A) MOTION
`15-cv-03295-BLF-SVK
`
`
`9
`
`

`

`Case 5:15-cv-03295-BLF Document 424 Filed 11/14/17 Page 14 of 20
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