`
`EDWARD G. POPLAWSKI (SBN 113590)
`epoplawski@wsgr.com
`OLIVIA M. KIM (SBN 228382)
`okim@wsgr.com
`WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH &
`ROSATI, P.C.
`633 West Fifth Street, Suite 1550
`Los Angeles, CA 90071
`Telephone: (323) 210-2901
`Facsimile: (866) 974-7329
`
`RYAN R. SMITH (SBN 229323)
`rsmith@wsgr.com
`CHRISTOPHER D. MAYS (SBN 266510)
`cmays@wsgr.com
`WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH &
`ROSATI, P.C.
`650 Page Mill Road
`Palo Alto, CA 94304-1050
`Telephone: (650) 493-9300
`Facsimile: (650) 493-6811
`
`Attorneys for Defendant
`QUALYS INC.
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`
`FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`
`OAKLAND DIVISION
`
`CASE NO.: 4:18-cv-07229-YGR
`
`DEFENDANT QUALYS INC.’S
`RESPONSIVE CLAIM
`CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`Date: May 1, 20201
`Time: 10:00 AM
`Place: Courtroom 1, 4th Floor
`Before: Hon. Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers
`
`)))))))))))
`
`FINJAN, INC.,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`QUALYS INC.,
`
`Defendant.
`
`1 Subject to the Court’s March 12, 2020 Order (D.I. 48) suspending in-person appearances.
`
`CASE NO. 4:18-cv-07229-YGR
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`QUALYS’ RESPONSIVE
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`Qualys Responsive Claim Construction Br FINAL.D
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`Case 4:18-cv-07229-YGR Document 52 Filed 03/16/20 Page 2 of 28
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`I.
`II.
`III.
`
`IV.
`
`V.
`
`VI.
`
`VII.
`
`VIII.
`
`IX.
`
`INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... 1
`GOVERNING LAW ON CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ...................................................... 1
`’408 PATENT ..................................................................................................................... 3
`A.
`’408 Patent Overview .............................................................................................. 3
`B.
`Term 1: “instantiating, by the computer, a scanner for the specific
`programming language” .......................................................................................... 3
`’968 PATENT ..................................................................................................................... 4
`A.
`’968 Patent Overview .............................................................................................. 4
`B.
`Term 2: “dynamically generating a policy index” .................................................. 5
`C.
`Term 3: “known to be allowable relative to a given policy”................................... 6
`D.
`Term 4: “memory storing a cache of digital content” ............................................. 8
`’731 PATENT ..................................................................................................................... 9
`A.
`’731 Patent Overview .............................................................................................. 9
`B.
`Term 5: “incoming files from the internet” ........................................................... 10
`’844 PATENT ................................................................................................................... 11
`A.
`’844 Patent Overview ............................................................................................ 11
`B.
`Term 6: “web client” ............................................................................................. 12
`’154 PATENT ................................................................................................................... 13
`A.
`’154 Patent Overview ............................................................................................ 13
`B.
`Term 7: “a content processor” ............................................................................... 14
`C.
`Term 8: “security computer” (’154 patent) ........................................................... 17
`INDEFINITENESS ........................................................................................................... 18
`A.
`Legal Background on Indefiniteness ..................................................................... 19
`B.
`Terms 9 and 10: “receiver” and “transmitter” ....................................................... 20
`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 23
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`CASE NO. 4:18-cv-07229-YGR
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`QUALYS’ RESPONSIVE
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`Qualys Responsive Claim Construction Br FINAL.DOCX
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`Case 4:18-cv-07229-YGR Document 52 Filed 03/16/20 Page 3 of 28
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`CASES
`
`Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Intern., Inc.,
`174 F.3d 1308, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ....................................................16, 19
`Alloc, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
`342 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ..........................................................................................6, 9
`Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc.,
`757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014), overruled on other grounds by Williamson,
`792 F.3d 1339 .......................................................................................................................20
`Astrazeneca AB v. Mut. Pharm. Co.,
`384 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ..............................................................................................3
`Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Hospira, Inc.,
`675 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ..............................................................................................3
`David Netzer Consulting Eng’r LLC v. Shell Oil Co.,
`824 F.3d 989 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ..............................................................................................11
`EnOcean GmbH v. Face Int’l Corp.,
`742 F.3d 955 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ..............................................................................................21
`Finjan, Inc. v. Cisco Sys.,
`2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122951, 2018 WL 3537142 (N.D. Cal. July 23,
`2018) .....................................................................................................................................12
`Finjan, Inc. v. Juniper Networks, Inc.,
`387 F. Supp. 3d 1004 (N.D. Cal. May 8, 2019) .............................................................15, 16
`Finjan, Inc. v. Juniper Networks, Inc.,
`N.D. Cal. Case No. C 17-05659-WHA ..........................................................................15, 16
`Finjan, Inc. v. Proofpoint, Inc.,
`No. 3:13-cv-5808-HSG, Dkt. No. 321 ...................................................................................7
`Finjan, Inc. v. Proofpoint, Inc.,
`No. 3:13-cv-5808-HSG, Dkt. No. 462 .............................................................................7, 16
`Finjan, Inc. v. Rapid7, Inc.,
`No. CV 18-1519 (MN), 2020 WL 565377 (D. Del. Feb. 5, 2020).......................................16
`Finjan, Inc. v. Sonicwall, Inc.,
`Case No. 17-cv-04467-BLF ...............................................................................................3, 4
`Finjan, Inc. v. Sophos, Inc.,
`2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68128 (N.D. Cal. May 24, 2016) .....................................................7
`Finjan, Inc. v. Symantec Corp.,
`2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19526, 2017 WL 550453 (N.D. Cal. February 10,
`2017) ...............................................................................................................................12, 16
`Kinik Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
`362 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ..............................................................................................2
`ii
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`Luminara Worldwide, LLC v. Liown Elecs. Co.,
`814 F.3d 1343 .......................................................................................................................11
`Medrad, Inc. v. MRI Devices Corp.,
`401 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ..............................................................................................2
`Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings,
`370 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ..............................................................................................2
`O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co.,
`521 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ......................................................................................12, 17
`On Demand Mach. Corp. v. Ingram Indus., Inc.,
`442 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ..............................................................................................3
`Pacing Techs. LLC v. Garmin Int’l, Inc.,
`778 F.3d 1021 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ............................................................................................11
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ..............................................................................................2
`Poly-America, L.P. v. API Indus., Inc.,
`839 F.3d 1131 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ................................................................................5, 7, 8, 16
`Regents of Univ. of Minnesota v. AGA Med. Corp.,
`717 F.3d 929 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ..............................................................................................15
`SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc.,
`242 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ..............................................................................................3
`Techtronic Indus. Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
`944 F.3d 901 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ..................................................................................5, 7, 8, 16
`Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC,
`669 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ......................................................................................2, 3, 5
`Trustees of Columbia Univ. in City of New York v. Symantec Corp.,
`811 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ..................................................................................3, 13, 16
`UltimatePointer, L.L.C. v. Nintendo Co.,
`816 F.3d 816 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ..............................................................................................10
`Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift–Eckrich, Inc.,
`375 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ..............................................................................................2
`V–Formation, Inc. v. Benetton Group SpA,
`401 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ..............................................................................................2
`Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp.,
`503 F.3d ................................................................................................................................15
`VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc.,
`767 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ................................................................................11, 12, 13
`Visto Corp. v. Sproqit Techs., Inc.,
`445 F. Supp. 2d 1104 (N.D. Cal. 2006) ...............................................................................16
`
`CASE NO. 4:18-cv-07229-YGR
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`QUALYS’ RESPONSIVE
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`Case 4:18-cv-07229-YGR Document 52 Filed 03/16/20 Page 5 of 28
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`Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC,
`792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ................................................................................19, 21, 22
`World Class Tech. Corp. v. Ormco Corp.,
`769 F.3d 1120 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ............................................................................................11
`STATUTES
`35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2 ...................................................................................................................19, 20
`35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 .......................................................................................................19, 20, 21, 22
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`CASE NO. 4:18-cv-07229-YGR
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`This case is one of many patent infringement actions filed by Finjan involving the
`patents-in-suit. In the Case Management Statement (filed February 14, 2019), Finjan represented
`that the damages in this case exceeded $100 million. D.I. 23 at 11. For a case of such value, one
`would expect Finjan to have carefully mapped-out its proposed claim constructions and to
`maintain those claim constructions across its many cases. In fact, during the case management
`conference, Finjan informed the Court that it would “just appl[y] the same claim construction so
`that there would be consistency across those” numerous cases it has filed. D.I. 28 at 2:20-25; see
`also id. at 12:24-13:13. Finjan went on to explain that “it’s the other side” that will “challenge
`either existing rulings or try to modify existing rulings.” Not so.
`In several instances, Finjan has refused to stipulate to constructions issued by other courts
`in this District and proposes now that “no construction is necessary” for any disputed term.
`Take, for example, the term “web client.” In a previous litigation, Finjan proposed the exact
`same construction that Qualys now proposes. However, Finjan refused to stipulate to that
`construction in this case and now argues against its own former position.
`Finjan’s contentions that “no construction is necessary” for any disputed claim terms is
`unhelpful, does not resolve the parties’ disputes as to the meaning of these terms, and will almost
`certainly lead to further claim construction disputes down the road. Rather than crystallizing its
`theories through the claim construction process as the local rules contemplate, Finjan is trying to
`take no positions whatsoever, even at the risk of contradicting its prior statements.
`As discussed more fully below, Qualys has proposed constructions for ten terms from
`five of the seven patents-in-suit: U.S. Patent Nos. 6,154,844 (“the ’844 patent”); 6,965,968 (“the
`’968 patent); 8,141,154 (“the ’154 patent”); 7,418,731 (“the ’731 patent”); and 6,154,844 (“the
`’844 patent”). Qualys’ proposed construction are consistent with prior rulings and that are fully
`supported by the intrinsic and extrinsic evidence.
`II.
`GOVERNING LAW ON CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
`The words of a patent claim are generally given their “ordinary and customary meaning.”
`Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quotations omitted). The
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`“ordinary and customary meaning” of a claim term “is the meaning that the term would have to a
`person of ordinary skill in the art [“POSITA”] in question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of
`the effective filing date of the patent application.” Id. (citations omitted). The POSITA “is
`deemed to read the claim term not only in the context of the particular claim in which the
`disputed term appears, but in the context of the entire patent, including the specification.” Id.;
`see also Medrad, Inc. v. MRI Devices Corp., 401 F.3d 1313, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“We cannot
`look at the ordinary meaning of the term . . . in a vacuum. Rather, we must look at the ordinary
`meaning in the context of the written description and the prosecution history.”); V–Formation,
`Inc. v. Benetton Group SpA, 401 F.3d 1307, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (intrinsic record “usually
`provides the technological and temporal context to enable the court to ascertain the meaning of
`the claim to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention”); Unitherm Food Sys.,
`Inc. v. Swift–Eckrich, Inc., 375 F.3d 1341, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (proper definition is the
`“definition that one of ordinary skill in the art could ascertain from the intrinsic evidence in the
`record”).
`Patent claims “must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part.”
`Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315. The specification “aids in ascertaining the scope and meaning of the
`claims inasmuch as the words of the claims must be based on the description.” Id.; see also
`Kinik Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 362 F.3d 1359, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“The words of patent
`claims have the meaning and scope with which they are used in the specification and the
`prosecution history.”); Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354,
`1360 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“In most cases, the best source for discerning the proper context of claim
`terms is the patent specification wherein the patent applicant describes the invention.”).
`A patent’s specification may, for example, clearly express an intent to redefine a term.
`Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The
`specification may also “make[] clear that the invention does not include a particular feature,” in
`which case “that feature is deemed to be outside the reach of the claims of the patent, even
`though the language of the claims, read without reference to the specification, might be
`considered broad enough to encompass the feature in question.” Id. (citing SciMed Life Sys., Inc.
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`v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). Express
`statements of redefinition or disavowal are not required. Trustees of Columbia Univ. in City of
`New York v. Symantec Corp., 811 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The expression required by
`Thorner “may be inferred from clear limiting descriptions of the invention in the specification or
`prosecution history.” Id. (quoting Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Hospira, Inc., 675 F.3d 1324, 1330
`(Fed. Cir. 2012)); see also Astrazeneca AB v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 384 F.3d 1333, 1340 (Fed. Cir.
`2004) (“the patentee’s choice of preferred embodiments can shed light on the intended scope of
`the claims.”); On Demand Mach. Corp. v. Ingram Indus., Inc., 442 F.3d 1331, 1340 (Fed. Cir.
`2006) (“[W]hen the scope of the invention is clearly stated in the specification, and is described
`as the advantage and distinction of the invention, it is not necessary to disavow explicitly a
`different scope.”).
`III.
`’408 PATENT
`A.
`’408 Patent Overview
`
`The ’408 patent describes a particular way of scanning content at a destination computer
`as the content arrives on the computer from the Internet, using three different components: a
`tokenizer, a parser, and an analyzer. See ’408 patent at Fig. 2. As the content arrives on the
`computer, the scanner uses a tokenizer to identify tokens, a parser to identify patterns of tokens
`in a parse tree, and an analyzer to find exploits based on this parsed information. The patent thus
`envisions breaking-down code into its component parts in order to analyze the code.
`B.
`Term 1: “instantiating, by the computer, a scanner for the specific
`programming language”
`
`’408
`Claims
`1
`
`Qualys’ Proposed Construction
`
`Substituting specific data, instructions, or
`both into a scanner to make it usable for
`scanning the specific programming language
`
`Finjan’s Proposed
`Construction
`No construction necessary –
`plain and ordinary meaning
`
`Qualys’ proposed construction is identical to the construction adopted by Judge Freeman
`in Finjan, Inc. v. Sonicwall, Inc., Case No. 17-cv-04467-BLF (“Sonicwall”). See 2019 WL
`1369938, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2019). There, Judge Freeman determined that the plain and
`ordinary meaning of this term is “substituting specific data, instructions, or both into a scanner to
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`make it usable for scanning the specific programming language,” the same as Qualys now
`proposes. Sonicwall, 2019 WL 1369938 at *16. Judge Freeman criticized Finjan’s “no
`construction necessary” position as unhelpful to the jury. Id. Judge Freeman explained that the
`’408 patent “uses an adaptive rule-based content (‘ARB’) scanner, which dynamically scans and
`diagnoses incoming Internet content.” Id. at *15 (citing 1:65-2:24).2 Judge Freeman determined
`that the claimed scanner “is customized using language-specific data substituted into a generic
`module to allow the scanning of a specific programming language.” Id. (citing 1:65-2:1; 6:17-
`24; 8:7-9). Consequently, she found the construction that Qualys now proposes is consistent
`with the term’s plain and ordinary meaning and would be helpful to the jury. Id. at *16.3
`Here, while Finjan again refuses to take a position on a construction for this term, it does
`concede that the plain and ordinary meaning should govern. Br.4 at 5. Finjan does not argue that
`Judge Freeman’s construction is incorrect or inconsistent with the plain and ordinary meaning.
`Finjan also concedes that Judge Freeman’s construction should be given deference. Id. (“Courts
`grant even more deference to prior claim constructions from within their Districts, as is the case
`here.”).
`In sum, Finjan presents no reason for doing anything other than adopting Judge
`Freeman’s construction in this case.
`IV.
`’968 PATENT
`A.
`’968 Patent Overview
`
`The ’968 patent is generally directed to a cache (or repository) of digital content (such as
`web-pages from the Internet) with a corresponding policy index to indicate whether a given piece
`
`2 Citations to “XX:YY” refer to the column and line numbers of the patent to which the term
`belongs, unless otherwise indicated.
`3 Finjan incorrectly states in its brief that “Judge Freeman [in Sonicwall] rejected the same
`construction . . . that Qualys proposes here.” Br. at 5. In that decision, Judge Freeman rejected a
`proposal by the defendants that Qualys has not advanced here. Qualys proposes the same
`construction that Judge Freeman ultimately adopted.
`
`4 “Br.” refers to Plaintiff Finjan, Inc.’s Opening Claim Construction Brief, D.I. 42 (Feb. 10,
`2020).
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`of content is allowable. Dkt. 42-5 ’968 patent at 1:63-64; 2:3-6. The policy-based based index is
`a data structure indicating allowability of cached content relative to a plurality of policies. See,
`e.g., id. at 2:3-6. The cache uses the policy-based index to control access to the cached content
`by checking the policy-based index to determine whether cached content is allowable for a
`different user than the original user who requested it. See, e.g., id. at 6-11. That way, the digital
`content need not be evaluated against a policy each time the content is requested by an end-user.
`B.
`Term 2: “dynamically generating a policy index”
`
`’968
`Claims
`26, 32, and
`33
`
`Qualys’ Proposed Construction
`
`creating or updating a policy index in
`response to user requests for cached
`or non-cached content
`
`Finjan’s Proposed
`Construction
`No construction necessary – plain
`and ordinary meaning
`
`Qualys’ construction seeks to clarify how the claimed policy index is “dynamically
`generated.” The ’968 patent’s specification makes clear that the policy index is dynamically
`generated only in response to a user request for content. See Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1365. For
`example, the ’968 patent states that “[t]he present invention allows for policy-based cache index
`190 to be updated dynamically as user requests for cached and non-cached content arrive.”
`Dkt. 42-5 ‘968 patent at 5:66-6:2. In other words, dynamic generation occurs when the policy
`index receives a user request for cached and non-cached content and creates or updates the
`policy index accordingly.
`Finjan incorrectly describes this limitation as pertaining to merely “a preferred
`embodiment of the invention.” Br. at 6. To the contrary, the specification refers to this feature
`as part of “the present invention,” effectuating a disavowal of scope. See Techtronic Indus. Co.
`v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 944 F.3d 901, 907 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“It is axiomatic that, where the
`specification describes the present invention as having a feature, that representation may
`disavow contrary embodiments.”); Poly-America, L.P. v. API Indus., Inc., 839 F.3d 1131, 1136
`(Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[A]n inventor may disavow claims lacking a particular feature when the
`specification describes ‘the present invention’ as having that feature.”). Moreover, every
`embodiment in the patent describes dynamic generation as occurring through receiving a user’s
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`CASE NO. 4:18-cv-07229-YGR
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`5
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`QUALYS’ RESPONSIVE
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`Case 4:18-cv-07229-YGR Document 52 Filed 03/16/20 Page 11 of 28
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`content request. See Dkt. 42-5 ’968 patent at Figure 2 (showing an initial user content request at
`step 205 causing the policy-based cache index to be updated at steps 250 and 265); see also id. at
`6:22, 6:31-35, 8:17-18 and 8:33-40 (describing embodiments for updating policy index after
`receiving a user’s content request). The inclusion of this feature in every embodiment
`underscores that the inventors intended for “dynamic generation” to occur in response to a user’s
`content request. See Alloc, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 342 F.3d 1361, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
`(finding relevant that “all the figures and embodiments disclosed in the asserted patents imply
`play, or, as in the case of Figure 1b, expressly disclose play.”).
`Finjan’s arguments miss the mark. First, Finjan presents a straw man argument that
`“dynamically generating” does not mean “creating or updating.” Br. at 6. This argument omits
`the critical portion of Qualys’ proposal – i.e., that dynamic generation is creating or updating in
`response to a user request for content. Second, Finjan identifies what it contends are
`“alternative situations,” such as an empty policy index, building the policy index “on-the-fly,” or
`“synchronizing/resetting.” Id. at 6 (citing 5:64-6:13, 6:7-13, and 7:57-63). On their face, these
`seem to merely be examples of ways that the policy can be created or updated, and do not
`contradict Qualys’ proposed construction. Importantly, in each example the policy index first
`received a user content request. The Court should therefore adopt Qualys’ construction.
`C.
`Term 3: “known to be allowable relative to a given policy”
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`’968
`Claims
`1, 12, 13, 23,
`26, 32, and 33
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`Qualys’ Proposed Construction
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`Whether the given digital content
`may be sent to the web client
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`Finjan’s Proposed
`Construction
`No construction necessary –
`plain and ordinary meaning
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`Qualys seeks clarification about what it means for digital content to be “allowable
`relative to a given policy.” Qualys contends that this term refers to whether a piece of digital
`content may be sent to a user, i.e. a web client.
`Qualys’ construction is firmly rooted in the intrinsic record. For example, the ’968
`patent’s specification describes that under “the present invention” an “allowable” determination
`indicates whether to send or block content to a user:
`Using the policy-based index of the present invention, a cache manager can
`check whether cached content is allowable for a different user than the
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`CASE NO. 4:18-cv-07229-YGR
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`QUALYS’ RESPONSIVE
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`Case 4:18-cv-07229-YGR Document 52 Filed 03/16/20 Page 12 of 28
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`original user who requested it, and thus block cached content from being
`delivered to users for whom it is not allowed.
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`Dkt. 42-5 ‘968 patent at 2:6-10; see also 2:39-67 (describing embodiments of the “present
`invention” as receiving a content request from a user and determining whether that content is
`allowable for that user); Id. at 5:19-30 (“if policy-based cache index 190 indicates that the
`content is allowable, then the content is delivered from cache to the user.”); Id. at 6:22-7:2
`(providing the algorithms for sending or blocking content to a user upon allowability
`determination); Id. at 7:14-15. By describing these features as part of “the present invention,” it
`is appropriate to construe this term consistent with Qualys’ proposal. See also Techtronic, 944
`F.3d at 907; Poly-America, 839 F.3d at 1136.
`Dkt. 42-5 ‘968 patent at Figure 2 depicts the above-described process in greater detail.
`First, the system receives a user request for content (at step 205). It makes an allowability
`determination at step 245. If the content is allowable based on the user’s policy group, the
`system sends the content to the user (at step 255). If the content is not allowable based on the
`user’s policy group, the system blocks the user from receiving the content (at step 270). See Id.
`at Fig. 2; 8:17-55 (describing steps).
`Finjan takes issue with Qualys’ inclusion of the term “web client” in the proposed
`construction. But Finjan has consistently argued across multiple litigations that “web client”
`means an end user’s computer. See Finjan, Inc. v. Sophos, Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68128 at
`*71 (N.D. Cal. May 24, 2016) (“[Finjan] argues that the web clients in the accused products are
`the end users, not the accused products themselves.”); Ex. A (Finjan’s supplemental claim
`construction brief for the term “web clients” from the ’844 patent in Finjan, Inc. v. Proofpoint,
`Inc., No. 3:13-cv-5808-HSG, Dkt. No. 462) at 1-5 (arguing that the plain and ordinary meaning
`of “web client” is the “end user’s computer”); Ex. B (Finjan’s opposition to motion for summary
`judgment of noninfringement of the ’844 patent, inter alia, in Finjan, Inc. v. Proofpoint, Inc., No.
`3:13-cv-5808-HSG, Dkt. No. 321) at 10 (“The only logical interpretation, which is fully
`supported with the documentary and testimony evidence, is that the end user is the web client.”).
`Moreover, the ’968 Patent’s specification synonymizes “web client” with an end user who
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`QUALYS’ RESPONSIVE
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`Case 4:18-cv-07229-YGR Document 52 Filed 03/16/20 Page 13 of 28
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`requests content. See Dkt. 42-5 ‘968 patent at Fig. 2; 8:8-32. Thus, whether the Court’s ultimate
`construction uses “web-client” or “end user,” the critical point is that “allowability” refers to
`whether content may be sent to an end user/web-client.
`D.
`Term 4: “memory storing a cache of digital content”
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`’968
`Claims
`1, 13, 23,
`26, and 32
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`Qualys’ Proposed Construction
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`A memory storing [memory for
`storing] a collection of digital
`content previously requested and
`retrieved for a web client
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`Finjan’s Proposed
`Construction
`No construction necessary – plain
`and ordinary meaning
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`For this term, Qualys again seeks clarification about what type of digital content is stored
`in the cache’s memory. Qualys’ position is that the cache contains digital content that has been
`previously requested by a web client. Finjan apparently contends that the cache’s content need
`have no relationship to any user requests.
`The specification makes clear that digital content stored in the cache is content previously
`requested and retrieved for a web client. See Dkt. 42-5 ‘968 patent at 2:6-9 (“Using the policy-
`based index of the present invention, a cache manager can check whether cached content is
`allowable for a different user than the original user who requested it…”); see Techtronic, 944
`F.3d at 907 (describing invention in terms of the “present invention” effectuates a disavowal of
`scope); Poly-America, 839 F.3d at 1136. Consistent with the specification’s description of the
`“present invention” including a cache filled with d