throbber
Case 4:18-cv-07229-YGR Document 52 Filed 03/16/20 Page 1 of 28
`
`EDWARD G. POPLAWSKI (SBN 113590)
`epoplawski@wsgr.com
`OLIVIA M. KIM (SBN 228382)
`okim@wsgr.com
`WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH &
`ROSATI, P.C.
`633 West Fifth Street, Suite 1550
`Los Angeles, CA 90071
`Telephone: (323) 210-2901
`Facsimile: (866) 974-7329
`
`RYAN R. SMITH (SBN 229323)
`rsmith@wsgr.com
`CHRISTOPHER D. MAYS (SBN 266510)
`cmays@wsgr.com
`WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH &
`ROSATI, P.C.
`650 Page Mill Road
`Palo Alto, CA 94304-1050
`Telephone: (650) 493-9300
`Facsimile: (650) 493-6811
`
`Attorneys for Defendant
`QUALYS INC.
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`
`FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`
`OAKLAND DIVISION
`
`CASE NO.: 4:18-cv-07229-YGR
`
`DEFENDANT QUALYS INC.’S
`RESPONSIVE CLAIM
`CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`Date: May 1, 20201
`Time: 10:00 AM
`Place: Courtroom 1, 4th Floor
`Before: Hon. Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers
`
`)))))))))))
`
`FINJAN, INC.,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`QUALYS INC.,
`
`Defendant.
`
`1 Subject to the Court’s March 12, 2020 Order (D.I. 48) suspending in-person appearances.
`
`CASE NO. 4:18-cv-07229-YGR
`
`QUALYS’ RESPONSIVE
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`Qualys Responsive Claim Construction Br FINAL.D
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`

`

`Case 4:18-cv-07229-YGR Document 52 Filed 03/16/20 Page 2 of 28
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`I.
`II.
`III.
`
`IV.
`
`V.
`
`VI.
`
`VII.
`
`VIII.
`
`IX.
`
`INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... 1
`GOVERNING LAW ON CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ...................................................... 1
`’408 PATENT ..................................................................................................................... 3
`A.
`’408 Patent Overview .............................................................................................. 3
`B.
`Term 1: “instantiating, by the computer, a scanner for the specific
`programming language” .......................................................................................... 3
`’968 PATENT ..................................................................................................................... 4
`A.
`’968 Patent Overview .............................................................................................. 4
`B.
`Term 2: “dynamically generating a policy index” .................................................. 5
`C.
`Term 3: “known to be allowable relative to a given policy”................................... 6
`D.
`Term 4: “memory storing a cache of digital content” ............................................. 8
`’731 PATENT ..................................................................................................................... 9
`A.
`’731 Patent Overview .............................................................................................. 9
`B.
`Term 5: “incoming files from the internet” ........................................................... 10
`’844 PATENT ................................................................................................................... 11
`A.
`’844 Patent Overview ............................................................................................ 11
`B.
`Term 6: “web client” ............................................................................................. 12
`’154 PATENT ................................................................................................................... 13
`A.
`’154 Patent Overview ............................................................................................ 13
`B.
`Term 7: “a content processor” ............................................................................... 14
`C.
`Term 8: “security computer” (’154 patent) ........................................................... 17
`INDEFINITENESS ........................................................................................................... 18
`A.
`Legal Background on Indefiniteness ..................................................................... 19
`B.
`Terms 9 and 10: “receiver” and “transmitter” ....................................................... 20
`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 23
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`CASE NO. 4:18-cv-07229-YGR
`
`i
`
`QUALYS’ RESPONSIVE
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`Qualys Responsive Claim Construction Br FINAL.DOCX
`
`

`

`Case 4:18-cv-07229-YGR Document 52 Filed 03/16/20 Page 3 of 28
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`CASES
`
`Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Intern., Inc.,
`174 F.3d 1308, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ....................................................16, 19
`Alloc, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
`342 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ..........................................................................................6, 9
`Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc.,
`757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014), overruled on other grounds by Williamson,
`792 F.3d 1339 .......................................................................................................................20
`Astrazeneca AB v. Mut. Pharm. Co.,
`384 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ..............................................................................................3
`Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Hospira, Inc.,
`675 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ..............................................................................................3
`David Netzer Consulting Eng’r LLC v. Shell Oil Co.,
`824 F.3d 989 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ..............................................................................................11
`EnOcean GmbH v. Face Int’l Corp.,
`742 F.3d 955 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ..............................................................................................21
`Finjan, Inc. v. Cisco Sys.,
`2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122951, 2018 WL 3537142 (N.D. Cal. July 23,
`2018) .....................................................................................................................................12
`Finjan, Inc. v. Juniper Networks, Inc.,
`387 F. Supp. 3d 1004 (N.D. Cal. May 8, 2019) .............................................................15, 16
`Finjan, Inc. v. Juniper Networks, Inc.,
`N.D. Cal. Case No. C 17-05659-WHA ..........................................................................15, 16
`Finjan, Inc. v. Proofpoint, Inc.,
`No. 3:13-cv-5808-HSG, Dkt. No. 321 ...................................................................................7
`Finjan, Inc. v. Proofpoint, Inc.,
`No. 3:13-cv-5808-HSG, Dkt. No. 462 .............................................................................7, 16
`Finjan, Inc. v. Rapid7, Inc.,
`No. CV 18-1519 (MN), 2020 WL 565377 (D. Del. Feb. 5, 2020).......................................16
`Finjan, Inc. v. Sonicwall, Inc.,
`Case No. 17-cv-04467-BLF ...............................................................................................3, 4
`Finjan, Inc. v. Sophos, Inc.,
`2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68128 (N.D. Cal. May 24, 2016) .....................................................7
`Finjan, Inc. v. Symantec Corp.,
`2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19526, 2017 WL 550453 (N.D. Cal. February 10,
`2017) ...............................................................................................................................12, 16
`Kinik Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
`362 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ..............................................................................................2
`ii
`CASE NO. 4:18-cv-07229-YGR
`QUALYS’ RESPONSIVE
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`

`

`Case 4:18-cv-07229-YGR Document 52 Filed 03/16/20 Page 4 of 28
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`Luminara Worldwide, LLC v. Liown Elecs. Co.,
`814 F.3d 1343 .......................................................................................................................11
`Medrad, Inc. v. MRI Devices Corp.,
`401 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ..............................................................................................2
`Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings,
`370 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ..............................................................................................2
`O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co.,
`521 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ......................................................................................12, 17
`On Demand Mach. Corp. v. Ingram Indus., Inc.,
`442 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ..............................................................................................3
`Pacing Techs. LLC v. Garmin Int’l, Inc.,
`778 F.3d 1021 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ............................................................................................11
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ..............................................................................................2
`Poly-America, L.P. v. API Indus., Inc.,
`839 F.3d 1131 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ................................................................................5, 7, 8, 16
`Regents of Univ. of Minnesota v. AGA Med. Corp.,
`717 F.3d 929 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ..............................................................................................15
`SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc.,
`242 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ..............................................................................................3
`Techtronic Indus. Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
`944 F.3d 901 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ..................................................................................5, 7, 8, 16
`Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC,
`669 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ......................................................................................2, 3, 5
`Trustees of Columbia Univ. in City of New York v. Symantec Corp.,
`811 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ..................................................................................3, 13, 16
`UltimatePointer, L.L.C. v. Nintendo Co.,
`816 F.3d 816 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ..............................................................................................10
`Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift–Eckrich, Inc.,
`375 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ..............................................................................................2
`V–Formation, Inc. v. Benetton Group SpA,
`401 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ..............................................................................................2
`Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp.,
`503 F.3d ................................................................................................................................15
`VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc.,
`767 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ................................................................................11, 12, 13
`Visto Corp. v. Sproqit Techs., Inc.,
`445 F. Supp. 2d 1104 (N.D. Cal. 2006) ...............................................................................16
`
`CASE NO. 4:18-cv-07229-YGR
`
`iii
`
`QUALYS’ RESPONSIVE
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`

`

`Case 4:18-cv-07229-YGR Document 52 Filed 03/16/20 Page 5 of 28
`
`Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC,
`792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ................................................................................19, 21, 22
`World Class Tech. Corp. v. Ormco Corp.,
`769 F.3d 1120 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ............................................................................................11
`STATUTES
`35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2 ...................................................................................................................19, 20
`35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 .......................................................................................................19, 20, 21, 22
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`CASE NO. 4:18-cv-07229-YGR
`
`iv
`
`QUALYS’ RESPONSIVE
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`

`

`Case 4:18-cv-07229-YGR Document 52 Filed 03/16/20 Page 6 of 28
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`This case is one of many patent infringement actions filed by Finjan involving the
`patents-in-suit. In the Case Management Statement (filed February 14, 2019), Finjan represented
`that the damages in this case exceeded $100 million. D.I. 23 at 11. For a case of such value, one
`would expect Finjan to have carefully mapped-out its proposed claim constructions and to
`maintain those claim constructions across its many cases. In fact, during the case management
`conference, Finjan informed the Court that it would “just appl[y] the same claim construction so
`that there would be consistency across those” numerous cases it has filed. D.I. 28 at 2:20-25; see
`also id. at 12:24-13:13. Finjan went on to explain that “it’s the other side” that will “challenge
`either existing rulings or try to modify existing rulings.” Not so.
`In several instances, Finjan has refused to stipulate to constructions issued by other courts
`in this District and proposes now that “no construction is necessary” for any disputed term.
`Take, for example, the term “web client.” In a previous litigation, Finjan proposed the exact
`same construction that Qualys now proposes. However, Finjan refused to stipulate to that
`construction in this case and now argues against its own former position.
`Finjan’s contentions that “no construction is necessary” for any disputed claim terms is
`unhelpful, does not resolve the parties’ disputes as to the meaning of these terms, and will almost
`certainly lead to further claim construction disputes down the road. Rather than crystallizing its
`theories through the claim construction process as the local rules contemplate, Finjan is trying to
`take no positions whatsoever, even at the risk of contradicting its prior statements.
`As discussed more fully below, Qualys has proposed constructions for ten terms from
`five of the seven patents-in-suit: U.S. Patent Nos. 6,154,844 (“the ’844 patent”); 6,965,968 (“the
`’968 patent); 8,141,154 (“the ’154 patent”); 7,418,731 (“the ’731 patent”); and 6,154,844 (“the
`’844 patent”). Qualys’ proposed construction are consistent with prior rulings and that are fully
`supported by the intrinsic and extrinsic evidence.
`II.
`GOVERNING LAW ON CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
`The words of a patent claim are generally given their “ordinary and customary meaning.”
`Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quotations omitted). The
`
`CASE NO. 4:18-cv-07229-YGR
`
`1
`
`QUALYS’ RESPONSIVE
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`Qualys Responsive Claim Construction Br FINAL.DOCX
`
`

`

`Case 4:18-cv-07229-YGR Document 52 Filed 03/16/20 Page 7 of 28
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`“ordinary and customary meaning” of a claim term “is the meaning that the term would have to a
`person of ordinary skill in the art [“POSITA”] in question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of
`the effective filing date of the patent application.” Id. (citations omitted). The POSITA “is
`deemed to read the claim term not only in the context of the particular claim in which the
`disputed term appears, but in the context of the entire patent, including the specification.” Id.;
`see also Medrad, Inc. v. MRI Devices Corp., 401 F.3d 1313, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“We cannot
`look at the ordinary meaning of the term . . . in a vacuum. Rather, we must look at the ordinary
`meaning in the context of the written description and the prosecution history.”); V–Formation,
`Inc. v. Benetton Group SpA, 401 F.3d 1307, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (intrinsic record “usually
`provides the technological and temporal context to enable the court to ascertain the meaning of
`the claim to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention”); Unitherm Food Sys.,
`Inc. v. Swift–Eckrich, Inc., 375 F.3d 1341, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (proper definition is the
`“definition that one of ordinary skill in the art could ascertain from the intrinsic evidence in the
`record”).
`Patent claims “must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part.”
`Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315. The specification “aids in ascertaining the scope and meaning of the
`claims inasmuch as the words of the claims must be based on the description.” Id.; see also
`Kinik Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 362 F.3d 1359, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“The words of patent
`claims have the meaning and scope with which they are used in the specification and the
`prosecution history.”); Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354,
`1360 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“In most cases, the best source for discerning the proper context of claim
`terms is the patent specification wherein the patent applicant describes the invention.”).
`A patent’s specification may, for example, clearly express an intent to redefine a term.
`Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The
`specification may also “make[] clear that the invention does not include a particular feature,” in
`which case “that feature is deemed to be outside the reach of the claims of the patent, even
`though the language of the claims, read without reference to the specification, might be
`considered broad enough to encompass the feature in question.” Id. (citing SciMed Life Sys., Inc.
`
`CASE NO. 4:18-cv-07229-YGR
`
`2
`
`QUALYS’ RESPONSIVE
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`

`

`Case 4:18-cv-07229-YGR Document 52 Filed 03/16/20 Page 8 of 28
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). Express
`statements of redefinition or disavowal are not required. Trustees of Columbia Univ. in City of
`New York v. Symantec Corp., 811 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The expression required by
`Thorner “may be inferred from clear limiting descriptions of the invention in the specification or
`prosecution history.” Id. (quoting Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Hospira, Inc., 675 F.3d 1324, 1330
`(Fed. Cir. 2012)); see also Astrazeneca AB v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 384 F.3d 1333, 1340 (Fed. Cir.
`2004) (“the patentee’s choice of preferred embodiments can shed light on the intended scope of
`the claims.”); On Demand Mach. Corp. v. Ingram Indus., Inc., 442 F.3d 1331, 1340 (Fed. Cir.
`2006) (“[W]hen the scope of the invention is clearly stated in the specification, and is described
`as the advantage and distinction of the invention, it is not necessary to disavow explicitly a
`different scope.”).
`III.
`’408 PATENT
`A.
`’408 Patent Overview
`
`The ’408 patent describes a particular way of scanning content at a destination computer
`as the content arrives on the computer from the Internet, using three different components: a
`tokenizer, a parser, and an analyzer. See ’408 patent at Fig. 2. As the content arrives on the
`computer, the scanner uses a tokenizer to identify tokens, a parser to identify patterns of tokens
`in a parse tree, and an analyzer to find exploits based on this parsed information. The patent thus
`envisions breaking-down code into its component parts in order to analyze the code.
`B.
`Term 1: “instantiating, by the computer, a scanner for the specific
`programming language”
`
`’408
`Claims
`1
`
`Qualys’ Proposed Construction
`
`Substituting specific data, instructions, or
`both into a scanner to make it usable for
`scanning the specific programming language
`
`Finjan’s Proposed
`Construction
`No construction necessary –
`plain and ordinary meaning
`
`Qualys’ proposed construction is identical to the construction adopted by Judge Freeman
`in Finjan, Inc. v. Sonicwall, Inc., Case No. 17-cv-04467-BLF (“Sonicwall”). See 2019 WL
`1369938, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2019). There, Judge Freeman determined that the plain and
`ordinary meaning of this term is “substituting specific data, instructions, or both into a scanner to
`
`CASE NO. 4:18-cv-07229-YGR
`
`3
`
`QUALYS’ RESPONSIVE
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`

`

`Case 4:18-cv-07229-YGR Document 52 Filed 03/16/20 Page 9 of 28
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`make it usable for scanning the specific programming language,” the same as Qualys now
`proposes. Sonicwall, 2019 WL 1369938 at *16. Judge Freeman criticized Finjan’s “no
`construction necessary” position as unhelpful to the jury. Id. Judge Freeman explained that the
`’408 patent “uses an adaptive rule-based content (‘ARB’) scanner, which dynamically scans and
`diagnoses incoming Internet content.” Id. at *15 (citing 1:65-2:24).2 Judge Freeman determined
`that the claimed scanner “is customized using language-specific data substituted into a generic
`module to allow the scanning of a specific programming language.” Id. (citing 1:65-2:1; 6:17-
`24; 8:7-9). Consequently, she found the construction that Qualys now proposes is consistent
`with the term’s plain and ordinary meaning and would be helpful to the jury. Id. at *16.3
`Here, while Finjan again refuses to take a position on a construction for this term, it does
`concede that the plain and ordinary meaning should govern. Br.4 at 5. Finjan does not argue that
`Judge Freeman’s construction is incorrect or inconsistent with the plain and ordinary meaning.
`Finjan also concedes that Judge Freeman’s construction should be given deference. Id. (“Courts
`grant even more deference to prior claim constructions from within their Districts, as is the case
`here.”).
`In sum, Finjan presents no reason for doing anything other than adopting Judge
`Freeman’s construction in this case.
`IV.
`’968 PATENT
`A.
`’968 Patent Overview
`
`The ’968 patent is generally directed to a cache (or repository) of digital content (such as
`web-pages from the Internet) with a corresponding policy index to indicate whether a given piece
`
`2 Citations to “XX:YY” refer to the column and line numbers of the patent to which the term
`belongs, unless otherwise indicated.
`3 Finjan incorrectly states in its brief that “Judge Freeman [in Sonicwall] rejected the same
`construction . . . that Qualys proposes here.” Br. at 5. In that decision, Judge Freeman rejected a
`proposal by the defendants that Qualys has not advanced here. Qualys proposes the same
`construction that Judge Freeman ultimately adopted.
`
`4 “Br.” refers to Plaintiff Finjan, Inc.’s Opening Claim Construction Brief, D.I. 42 (Feb. 10,
`2020).
`
`CASE NO. 4:18-cv-07229-YGR
`
`4
`
`QUALYS’ RESPONSIVE
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`

`

`Case 4:18-cv-07229-YGR Document 52 Filed 03/16/20 Page 10 of 28
`
`of content is allowable. Dkt. 42-5 ’968 patent at 1:63-64; 2:3-6. The policy-based based index is
`a data structure indicating allowability of cached content relative to a plurality of policies. See,
`e.g., id. at 2:3-6. The cache uses the policy-based index to control access to the cached content
`by checking the policy-based index to determine whether cached content is allowable for a
`different user than the original user who requested it. See, e.g., id. at 6-11. That way, the digital
`content need not be evaluated against a policy each time the content is requested by an end-user.
`B.
`Term 2: “dynamically generating a policy index”
`
`’968
`Claims
`26, 32, and
`33
`
`Qualys’ Proposed Construction
`
`creating or updating a policy index in
`response to user requests for cached
`or non-cached content
`
`Finjan’s Proposed
`Construction
`No construction necessary – plain
`and ordinary meaning
`
`Qualys’ construction seeks to clarify how the claimed policy index is “dynamically
`generated.” The ’968 patent’s specification makes clear that the policy index is dynamically
`generated only in response to a user request for content. See Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1365. For
`example, the ’968 patent states that “[t]he present invention allows for policy-based cache index
`190 to be updated dynamically as user requests for cached and non-cached content arrive.”
`Dkt. 42-5 ‘968 patent at 5:66-6:2. In other words, dynamic generation occurs when the policy
`index receives a user request for cached and non-cached content and creates or updates the
`policy index accordingly.
`Finjan incorrectly describes this limitation as pertaining to merely “a preferred
`embodiment of the invention.” Br. at 6. To the contrary, the specification refers to this feature
`as part of “the present invention,” effectuating a disavowal of scope. See Techtronic Indus. Co.
`v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 944 F.3d 901, 907 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“It is axiomatic that, where the
`specification describes the present invention as having a feature, that representation may
`disavow contrary embodiments.”); Poly-America, L.P. v. API Indus., Inc., 839 F.3d 1131, 1136
`(Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[A]n inventor may disavow claims lacking a particular feature when the
`specification describes ‘the present invention’ as having that feature.”). Moreover, every
`embodiment in the patent describes dynamic generation as occurring through receiving a user’s
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`CASE NO. 4:18-cv-07229-YGR
`
`5
`
`QUALYS’ RESPONSIVE
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`

`

`Case 4:18-cv-07229-YGR Document 52 Filed 03/16/20 Page 11 of 28
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`content request. See Dkt. 42-5 ’968 patent at Figure 2 (showing an initial user content request at
`step 205 causing the policy-based cache index to be updated at steps 250 and 265); see also id. at
`6:22, 6:31-35, 8:17-18 and 8:33-40 (describing embodiments for updating policy index after
`receiving a user’s content request). The inclusion of this feature in every embodiment
`underscores that the inventors intended for “dynamic generation” to occur in response to a user’s
`content request. See Alloc, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 342 F.3d 1361, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
`(finding relevant that “all the figures and embodiments disclosed in the asserted patents imply
`play, or, as in the case of Figure 1b, expressly disclose play.”).
`Finjan’s arguments miss the mark. First, Finjan presents a straw man argument that
`“dynamically generating” does not mean “creating or updating.” Br. at 6. This argument omits
`the critical portion of Qualys’ proposal – i.e., that dynamic generation is creating or updating in
`response to a user request for content. Second, Finjan identifies what it contends are
`“alternative situations,” such as an empty policy index, building the policy index “on-the-fly,” or
`“synchronizing/resetting.” Id. at 6 (citing 5:64-6:13, 6:7-13, and 7:57-63). On their face, these
`seem to merely be examples of ways that the policy can be created or updated, and do not
`contradict Qualys’ proposed construction. Importantly, in each example the policy index first
`received a user content request. The Court should therefore adopt Qualys’ construction.
`C.
`Term 3: “known to be allowable relative to a given policy”
`
`’968
`Claims
`1, 12, 13, 23,
`26, 32, and 33
`
`Qualys’ Proposed Construction
`
`Whether the given digital content
`may be sent to the web client
`
`Finjan’s Proposed
`Construction
`No construction necessary –
`plain and ordinary meaning
`
`Qualys seeks clarification about what it means for digital content to be “allowable
`relative to a given policy.” Qualys contends that this term refers to whether a piece of digital
`content may be sent to a user, i.e. a web client.
`Qualys’ construction is firmly rooted in the intrinsic record. For example, the ’968
`patent’s specification describes that under “the present invention” an “allowable” determination
`indicates whether to send or block content to a user:
`Using the policy-based index of the present invention, a cache manager can
`check whether cached content is allowable for a different user than the
`
`CASE NO. 4:18-cv-07229-YGR
`
`6
`
`QUALYS’ RESPONSIVE
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`

`

`Case 4:18-cv-07229-YGR Document 52 Filed 03/16/20 Page 12 of 28
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`original user who requested it, and thus block cached content from being
`delivered to users for whom it is not allowed.
`
`Dkt. 42-5 ‘968 patent at 2:6-10; see also 2:39-67 (describing embodiments of the “present
`invention” as receiving a content request from a user and determining whether that content is
`allowable for that user); Id. at 5:19-30 (“if policy-based cache index 190 indicates that the
`content is allowable, then the content is delivered from cache to the user.”); Id. at 6:22-7:2
`(providing the algorithms for sending or blocking content to a user upon allowability
`determination); Id. at 7:14-15. By describing these features as part of “the present invention,” it
`is appropriate to construe this term consistent with Qualys’ proposal. See also Techtronic, 944
`F.3d at 907; Poly-America, 839 F.3d at 1136.
`Dkt. 42-5 ‘968 patent at Figure 2 depicts the above-described process in greater detail.
`First, the system receives a user request for content (at step 205). It makes an allowability
`determination at step 245. If the content is allowable based on the user’s policy group, the
`system sends the content to the user (at step 255). If the content is not allowable based on the
`user’s policy group, the system blocks the user from receiving the content (at step 270). See Id.
`at Fig. 2; 8:17-55 (describing steps).
`Finjan takes issue with Qualys’ inclusion of the term “web client” in the proposed
`construction. But Finjan has consistently argued across multiple litigations that “web client”
`means an end user’s computer. See Finjan, Inc. v. Sophos, Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68128 at
`*71 (N.D. Cal. May 24, 2016) (“[Finjan] argues that the web clients in the accused products are
`the end users, not the accused products themselves.”); Ex. A (Finjan’s supplemental claim
`construction brief for the term “web clients” from the ’844 patent in Finjan, Inc. v. Proofpoint,
`Inc., No. 3:13-cv-5808-HSG, Dkt. No. 462) at 1-5 (arguing that the plain and ordinary meaning
`of “web client” is the “end user’s computer”); Ex. B (Finjan’s opposition to motion for summary
`judgment of noninfringement of the ’844 patent, inter alia, in Finjan, Inc. v. Proofpoint, Inc., No.
`3:13-cv-5808-HSG, Dkt. No. 321) at 10 (“The only logical interpretation, which is fully
`supported with the documentary and testimony evidence, is that the end user is the web client.”).
`Moreover, the ’968 Patent’s specification synonymizes “web client” with an end user who
`
`CASE NO. 4:18-cv-07229-YGR
`
`7
`
`QUALYS’ RESPONSIVE
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`

`

`Case 4:18-cv-07229-YGR Document 52 Filed 03/16/20 Page 13 of 28
`
`requests content. See Dkt. 42-5 ‘968 patent at Fig. 2; 8:8-32. Thus, whether the Court’s ultimate
`construction uses “web-client” or “end user,” the critical point is that “allowability” refers to
`whether content may be sent to an end user/web-client.
`D.
`Term 4: “memory storing a cache of digital content”
`
`’968
`Claims
`1, 13, 23,
`26, and 32
`
`Qualys’ Proposed Construction
`
`A memory storing [memory for
`storing] a collection of digital
`content previously requested and
`retrieved for a web client
`
`Finjan’s Proposed
`Construction
`No construction necessary – plain
`and ordinary meaning
`
`For this term, Qualys again seeks clarification about what type of digital content is stored
`in the cache’s memory. Qualys’ position is that the cache contains digital content that has been
`previously requested by a web client. Finjan apparently contends that the cache’s content need
`have no relationship to any user requests.
`The specification makes clear that digital content stored in the cache is content previously
`requested and retrieved for a web client. See Dkt. 42-5 ‘968 patent at 2:6-9 (“Using the policy-
`based index of the present invention, a cache manager can check whether cached content is
`allowable for a different user than the original user who requested it…”); see Techtronic, 944
`F.3d at 907 (describing invention in terms of the “present invention” effectuates a disavowal of
`scope); Poly-America, 839 F.3d at 1136. Consistent with the specification’s description of the
`“present invention” including a cache filled with d

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

throbber

A few More Minutes ... Still Working

It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.

Thank you for your continued patience.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket