Case 4:18-cv-07229-YGR Document 42 Filed 02/10/20 Page 1 of 24
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`
`
`PAUL J. ANDRE (State Bar No. 196585)
`pandre@kramerlevin.com
`LISA KOBIALKA (State Bar No. 191404)
`lkobialka@kramerlevin.com
`JAMES HANNAH (State Bar No. 237978)
`jhannah@kramerlevin.com
`AUSTIN MANES (State Bar No. 284065)
`amanes@kramerlevin.com
`KRAMER LEVIN NAFTALIS & FRANKEL LLP
`990 Marsh Road
`Menlo Park, CA 94025
`Telephone: (650) 752-1700
`Facsimile: (650) 752-1800
`
`Attorneys for Plaintiff
`FINJAN, INC.
`
`
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`
`FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`
`OAKLAND DIVISION
`
`
`Case No.: 4:18-cv-07229-YGR
`
`PLAINTIFF FINJAN, INC.’S OPENING
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`Date: May 1, 2020
`Time:
`10:00 AM
`Place: Courtroom 1, 4th Floor
`Before: Hon. Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers
`
`
`FINJAN, INC.,
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`
`QUALYS INC.,
`
`
`
`
`Defendant.
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`FINJAN’S OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`CASE NO.: 4:18-cv-07229-YGR
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`

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`
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`Case 4:18-cv-07229-YGR Document 42 Filed 02/10/20 Page 2 of 24
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`Page
`INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................... 1
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`STATEMENT OF FACTS .......................................................................................................... 1
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`D.
`
`E.
`
`F.
`
`The ‘408 Patent ................................................................................................................ 2
`
`The ‘968 Patent ................................................................................................................ 2
`
`The ‘731 Patent ................................................................................................................ 2
`
`The ‘844 Patent ................................................................................................................ 2
`
`The ‘154 Patent ................................................................................................................ 3
`
`The ‘494 Patent ................................................................................................................ 3
`
`III.
`
`ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................................... 3
`
`A.
`
`Term in the ‘408 Patent.................................................................................................... 3
`
`
`
`“instantiating, by the computer, a scanner for the specific
`programming language” (Claim 1) ................................................................ 3
`
`B.
`
`Terms in the ‘968 Patent .................................................................................................. 6
`
`
`
`
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`
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`“dynamically generating a policy index” (Claims 26, 32, and 33) ................ 6
`
`“known to be allowable relative to a given policy” / “allowable
`relative to a given policy” (Claims 1, 12, 13, 23, 26, 32, and 33) ................. 7
`
`“memory storing a cache of digital content” (Claims 1, 13, 23, 26,
`and 32) ........................................................................................................... 8
`
`C.
`
`Term in the ‘731 Patent.................................................................................................... 9
`
`
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`“incoming files from the internet” (Claim 1) ................................................. 9
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`D.
`
`Term in the ‘844 Patent.................................................................................................. 10
`
`
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`“web client” (Claims 1, 15, 22, 23, 32, and 41-44) ..................................... 10
`
`E.
`
`Terms in the ‘154 Patent ................................................................................................ 10
`
`
`
`
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`“a content processor” (Claims 1 and 6) ....................................................... 10
`
`“security computer” (Claims 1 and 6) ......................................................... 13
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`F.
`
`Terms in the ‘494 Patent, ‘968 Patent, and ‘154 Patent................................................. 14
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`“receiver” (‘494 Patent, Claim 10; ‘968 Patent Claim 7; ‘154 Patent,
`Claims 1-2 and 6-7) ..................................................................................... 14
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`Structure for “receiver” in the ‘494 Patent ...................................... 16
`
`Structure for “receiver” in the ‘968 Patent ...................................... 16
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`Structure for “receiver” in the ‘154 Patent ...................................... 17
`
` “transmitter” (‘968 Patent Claim 6; ‘154 Patent, Claims 1-3 and 6-8) ........ 17
`
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`
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`Structure for “transmitter” in the ‘968 Patent .................................. 18
`
`Structure for “transmitter” in the ‘154 Patent .................................. 18
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`IV.
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`CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................................... 19
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`Case 4:18-cv-07229-YGR Document 42 Filed 02/10/20 Page 4 of 24
`
`
`
`Federal Cases
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`Adams Respiratory Therapeutics, Inc. v. Perrigo Co.,
`616 F.3d 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2010)............................................................................................................ 6
`
`Chef Am., Inc. v. Lamb-Weston, Inc.,
`358 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004)................................................................................................... passim
`
`EnOcean GmbH v. Face Int’l Corp.,
`742 F.3d 955 (Fed. Cir. 2014)................................................................................................ 14, 15, 17
`
`Finjan, Inc. v. Bitdefender Inc.,
`No. 17-cv-04790 HSG, 2019 WL 634985 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2019) ................................... 11, 15, 18
`
`Finjan, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc.,
`No. 17-cv-00072-BLF, 2018 WL 3537142 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 23, 2018) ......................................... 15, 18
`
`Finjan, Inc. v. Eset, LLC,
`No. 17-cv-0183-CAB-(BGS), 2017 WL 5501338 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2017) .................................. 18
`
`Finjan, Inc. v. Proofpoint, Inc.,
`No. 3:13-cv-05808-HSG, 2015 WL 7770208 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2015) .................................... passim
`
`Finjan, Inc. v. Rapid7, Inc.,
`No. 18-1519 (MN), 2020 WL 565377 (D. Del. Feb. 5, 2020) ................................................. 5, 11, 12
`
`Finjan, Inc. v. Sonicwall, Inc.,
`No. 17-cv-04467-BLF, 2019 WL 1369938 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2019) ......................................... 5, 18
`
`Finjan, Inc. v. Symantec Corp.,
`No. 14-cv-02998-HSG, 2017 WL 550453 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2017) ....................................... 5, 6, 11
`
`Hill-Rom Servs., Inc. v. Stryker Corp.,
`755 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2014).......................................................................................................... 14
`
`Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
`517 U.S. 370 (1996) ............................................................................................................................. 5
`
`Nazomi Commc’ns, Inc. v. Arm Holdings, PLC.,
`403 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2005).......................................................................................................... 11
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc)........................................................................................ 4, 7
`
`Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, Inc.,
`711 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2013).......................................................................................................... 15
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`
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`SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am.,
`775 F. 2d 1107 (Fed. Cir. 1985)......................................................................................................... 12
`
`Superguide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters., Inc.,
`358 F.3d 870 (Fed. Cir. 2004).............................................................................................................. 7
`
`Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC,
`669 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012).................................................................................................. 4, 7, 13
`
`Visto Corp. v. Sproqit Techs., Inc.,
`445 F. Supp. 2d 1104 (N.D. Cal. 2006) ............................................................................................... 5
`
`Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC,
`792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015).............................................................................................. 14, 15, 17
`
`Federal Statutes
`
`35 U.S.C. § 112(6) ....................................................................................................................... 14, 15, 17
`
`Rules
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`Patent Local Rule 4-3................................................................................................................................. 1
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`Case 4:18-cv-07229-YGR Document 42 Filed 02/10/20 Page 6 of 24
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`
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`The Court should give each of the ten disputed terms a plain and ordinary meaning construction
`because they have a readily understood meaning to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the
`invention and the intrinsic record does not support a departure from that plain and ordinary meaning. For
`example, the jury does not need a construction of “incoming files from the Internet” or “transmitter,” and
`there is not any intrinsic evidence to suggest a departure from their plain and ordinary meaning, which is
`used consistently throughout the intrinsic evidence.
`Qualys Inc. (“Qualys”) invites error in asking the Court to import unsupported limitations into
`each of these terms. Qualys fails to carry its burden to overcome the presumption that the plain and
`ordinary meaning controls for these terms, and there is no basis for the Court to find that the inventors
`acted as their own lexicographers or disavowed claim scope, limiting the scope of these terms. For this
`reason, multiple Courts have already rejected many of the arguments that Qualys advances, and there is
`no reason for the Court to take a different approach here. Thus, the Court should construe each of the
`terms as having its plain and ordinary meaning and reject Qualys’ proposed constructions.
`STATEMENT OF FACTS
`II.
`Finjan, Inc. (“Finjan”) asserts seven patents against Qualys: U.S. Patent Nos. 8,677,494 (Ex. 1,
`the “‘494 Patent”); 6,154,844 (Ex. 2, the “‘844 Patent”); 8,141,154 (Ex. 3, the “‘154 Patent”);
`6,965,968 (Ex. 4, the “‘968 Patent”); 7,418,731 (Ex. 5, the “‘731 Patent”); 7,975,305 (Ex. 6, the “‘305
`Patent”); and 8,225,408 (Ex. 7, the “‘408 Patent”).1 With the exception of the ‘305 Patent, each of
`these patents includes terms that are at issue for claim construction.
`Pursuant to the Scheduling Order (Dkt. No. 39) and Patent Local Rule 4-3, the parties submitted
`a Joint Claim Construction and Pre-Hearing Statement (Dkt. No. 40) setting forth their nine agreed
`constructions, providing competing proposed constructions for ten disputed terms, and identifying
`supporting intrinsic and extrinsic evidence. Finjan proposes that the Court adopt a plain and ordinary
`
`
`1 Unless otherwise noted, all exhibits cited are attached to the Declaration of Austin Manes in Support of
`Finjan’s Opening Claim Construction Brief, filed herewith.
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`meaning construction for all terms at issue, as there is no specialized meaning for these terms that
`require departing from the plain and ordinary meaning of these terms.
`The ‘408 Patent
`A.
`The ‘408 Patent provides a method and system for scanning content to produce an analysis of
`potential exploits (malicious portions of the code) within the content. ‘408 Patent at 1:59–61. The
`invention uses scanners that can be configured based on the programming language of the content, and
`that dynamically scan and diagnose the content. Id. at 1:65–2:24. The system generates a parse tree
`based on tokens and patterns of tokens it identifies in the programming language, then identifies
`exploits within the parse tree. See id. at 2:25–57.
`The ‘968 Patent
`B.
`The ‘968 Patent is directed to managing content from the Internet, which can be cached so that
`the same web page does not have to be retrieved each time a user on the network requests the page.
`The ‘968 Patent provides a system and method of managing cached content in relation to multiple
`security policies by, inter alia, providing a “policy-based index . . . indicating allowability of cached
`content relative to a plurality of policies.” See ‘968 Patent at 1:63–2:7. A cache manager may then
`utilize the policy-based index to determine whether cached content is allowable for a different user than
`the original user who requested it and block cached content from being delivered to users for whom it is
`not allowed. Id. at 2:7–11.
`The ‘731 Patent
`C.
`The ‘731 Patent describes systems and methods of operating computer and network gateways
`that protect computers. The claimed inventions provide for caching of security information and policies
`at the gateway. ‘731 Patent at Abstract. This caching mitigates delays in the transmission of data over
`a network that are caused when the gateway processes downloadable information. Id. at 1:65-67.
`The ‘844 Patent
`D.
`The ‘844 Patent claims systems and methods for inspecting Downloadables for suspicious code or
`behavior according to a set of rules, and generating a profile of the results from that inspection. See, e.g.,
`‘844 Patent at 1:62–3:7. In some embodiments, a content inspection engine generates a security profile
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`and links that profile to a Downloadable. Id. at 2:3–11. By providing verifiable profiles, the claimed
`systems and methods may efficiently protect computer systems from hostile Downloadables. Id. at 2:61–
`3:7.
`
`The ‘154 Patent
`E.
`The ‘154 Patent provides protection by offloading the processing of security decisions to a
`security computer. Specifically, the ‘154 Patent teaches that incoming software is analyzed and aspects
`of the software are checked against a security computer to determine whether the software is malicious
`or not. If the software is not deemed malicious, it is allowed to execute. See ‘154 Patent, Abstract.
`The ‘494 Patent
`F.
`The ‘494 Patent covers a system for receiving a Downloadable and creating a profile for the
`Downloadable to be stored in a database. See ‘494 Patent. The system derives a security profile that
`includes a list of suspicious operations that the Downloadable may attempt. The database can also hold
`additional information about the Downloadable, such as the date and time the profile was derived and the
`URL from which the Downloadable originated. Id., at 21:26-28.
`III. ARGUMENT
`
`A.
`
`Term in the ‘408 Patent
`
`
`
`“instantiating, by the computer, a scanner for the specific
`programming language” (Claim 1)
`
`Finjan’s Proposed Construction
`No construction necessary – Plain and ordinary
`meaning.
`
`Qualys’ Proposed Construction
`substituting specific data, instructions, or both
`into a scanner to make it usable for scanning the
`specific programming language
`
`“Instantiating” does not require construction because it is easily understood by a person of
`ordinary skill in the art of computer security. “Instantiating” is a computing term that means creating an
`instance of something. See, e.g., whatis.techtarget.com/definition/instantiation (“In computer science,
`instantiation is the realization of a predefined object… a class of object may be defined… An instance
`of that object may then be declared, giving it a unique, named identity so that it may be used in the
`program. This process is called ‘instantiation.’”). The object at issue in the ‘408 Patent is a scanner, so
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`“instantiating” here means setting up an instance of a scanner process. Qualys seeks to inject a
`requirement that the substantiation process involves “substituting specific data, instructions or both.”
`Two courts have already rejected Qualys’ narrow and unsupported construction.
`Because “instantiating” has a clear, plain and ordinary meaning, it needs no further construction.
`Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312-13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). “Generally, claim terms
`should be given their ordinary and customary meaning–i.e., the meaning that the terms would have to a
`person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.” Finjan, Inc. v. Proofpoint, Inc., No.
`3:13-cv-05808-HSG, 2015 WL 7770208, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2015) (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at
`1312-13; Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“The
`words of a claim are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning”). The ‘408 Patent’s claims
`use “instantiating” consistent with this plain and ordinary meaning, describing the act of creating an
`instance of a scanner to scan a file. See ‘408 Patent at Claims 1, 9, and 22 (“instantiating, by the
`computer, a scanner for the specific programming language, in response to said determining [the
`programming language]”).
`Qualys’ proposed construction would improperly narrow the claim to require “substituting
`specific data, instructions, or both into a scanner to make it usable for scanning the specific
`programming language,” but there is no basis in the intrinsic record to do so. Qualys is relying on
`citations to discussions in the specification of adapting the scanner to scan a specific type of content by
`using rules files for the particular language (serving as “adaptors”), but the ‘408 Patent does not
`disclose, let alone require substituting data or instructions into the scanner. See, e.g., ‘408 Patent at
`1:65-2:15. Indeed, the words “substitute” and “substituting” do not even appear in the ‘408 Patent.
`Qualys also cites generally to the joint claim construction briefing in Finjan, Inc. v. Rapid7, Inc.,
`No. 18-cv-01519-MN (D. Del.) as support for its proposed construction. Dkt. No. 40, Ex. A at 24.
`However, the Rapid7 case lends no support to Qualys. In fact, in that case Judge Noreika of the District
`of Delaware rejected the same construction that Qualys offers here (and gave the term its plain and
`ordinary meaning, as Finjan proposes), finding the construction “substituting specific data, instructions,
`or both” unsupported by and inconsistent with the intrinsic record:
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`
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`The word “substituting,” which Defendants propose, is not in the ‘408
`Patent. Defendants took that word from the PTAB. But the PTAB used a
`different standard and its statements are not binding on this Court . . .
`Additionally, I find that the concept of requiring substitution appears to
`be inconsistent with the description of a scanner repository as referenced
`in the ‘408 Patent.
`Finjan, Inc. v. Rapid7, Inc., No. 18-1519 (MN), 2020 WL 565377, at *13 (D. Del. Feb. 5, 2020)
`(emphasis added). The Supreme Court has stressed the importance of uniformity in claim construction,
`and as a result “district courts have granted ‘reasoned deference’ to claim construction orders outside
`their jurisdiction that address the same term in the same patent.” Finjan, Inc. v. Symantec Corp., No.
`14-cv-02998-HSG, 2017 WL 550453, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2017) (citing Markman v. Westview
`Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390–91 (1996)).
`Similarly, Qualys cited to the March 26, 2019 claim construction decision in Finjan, Inc. v.
`SonicWall, Inc. as evidence supporting its proposed construction. Dkt. No. 40, Ex. A at 24. Judge
`Freeman rejected the same construction in the SonicWall case that Qualys proposes here, finding that
`the patentees used “instantiating” to describe “a procedure of customizing or setting up ‘a scanner for
`the specific programming language.’” Finjan, Inc. v. Sonicwall, Inc., No. 17-cv-04467-BLF, 2019 WL
`1369938, at *16 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2019) (citing ‘408 Patent at Claims 1 and 9) (emphasis added). In
`so construing the claims, Judge Freeman rejected SonicWall’s proposal to add a limitation of
`“substituting specific data, instructions, or both into a generic program unit to make it usable for
`scanning the specific programming language,” essentially the same infirm construction Qualys
`proposes here. Id. (emphasis added). Courts grant even more deference to prior claim constructions
`from within their Districts, as is the case here. Symantec, 2017 WL 550453, at *3 (citing Visto Corp. v.
`Sproqit Techs., Inc., 445 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1107–08 (N.D. Cal. 2006)).
`Thus, the Court should give “instantiating” its plain and ordinary meaning.
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`Case 4:18-cv-07229-YGR Document 42 Filed 02/10/20 Page 11 of 24
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`
`
`B.
`
`Terms in the ‘968 Patent
` “dynamically generating a policy index” (Claims 26, 32, and 33)
`
`
`Finjan’s Proposed Construction
`No construction necessary – Plain and ordinary
`meaning.
`
`Qualys’ Proposed Construction
`creating or updating a policy index in response
`to user requests for cached or non-cached
`content
`There is no need to construe the term “dynamically generating a policy index” because in the
`context of the claims it is easily understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art of computer security.
`Specifically, the claim explains that “dynamically generating a policy index of the cached contents” is
`accomplished by “by indicating pieces of cached content known to be allowable relative to a given
`policy.” ‘968 Patent at Claim 26. Thus, the context of the claim and how it is used provides the
`meaning of the term, i.e., how the policy index is generated.
`Qualys’ construction is erroneous in importing unsupported limitations. Qualys would limit the
`definition of “dynamically generating” to “creating or updating.” But the specification describes
`alternative situations where the policy index may have already been “created” but is empty (‘968 Patent
`at 5:64-6:13), may be “built up on-the-fly as content filter analyzes specific content relative to specific
`policies” (id. at 6:7-13), or may be synchronized or “reset” (id. at 7:57-63). All of these descriptions go
`beyond the “creating or updating” limitation that Qualys proposes, and therefore Qualys’ construction is
`contrary to the intrinsic record. Claim constructions that exclude embodiments are “rarely, if ever,
`correct.” Adams Respiratory Therapeutics, Inc. v. Perrigo Co., 616 F.3d 1283, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
`Qualys’ proposed construction is also flawed in that it would limit the time when a policy index
`is generated to only “in response to user requests” and further mandates that those user requests be “for
`cached or non-cached content.” But while Qualys apparently took this language from a preferred
`embodiment of the invention, none of these limitations made it into the claim language and Qualys’
`proposed construction is not permitted to import limitations from the specification into the claims.
`Proofpoint, 2015 WL 7770208, at *1 (holding the Court may look to the specification of the patent at
`issue for help construing a disputed term, but “it is improper to read limitations from the specification
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`into the claims”); Superguide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters., Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
`(accord: “Specifications teach. Claims claim.”).
`Finally, there is no need for Qualys’ proposal because it does not shed any light on what it
`means to “dynamically generat[e] a policy index.” Qualys proposes defining “generating a policy
`index” as “creating or updating a policy index,” essentially just replacing “dynamically generated” with
`“creating or updating.” Qualys confusingly further proposes that the term be limited to acting in
`response to “user requests for cached or non-cached content.” Because “cached or non-cached content”
`would seem to cover all content, adding this to the construction does nothing to define the scope of the
`claim and only elongates the construction.
`Thus, the Court should reject Qualys’ proposal because it would improperly limit the claims and
`would not aid the jury in understanding the claims’ scope. Instead, the Court should give this term a
`plain and ordinary meaning construction.
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`“known to be allowable relative to a given policy” / “allowable relative to a
`given policy” (Claims 1, 12, 13, 23, 26, 32, and 33)
`
`Qualys’ Proposed Construction
`Finjan’s Proposed Construction
`Whether the given digital content may be sent to
`No construction necessary – Plain and ordinary
`the web client
`meaning.
`“Known to be allowable relative to a given policy” and “allowable relative to a given policy”
`should be given their plain and ordinary meaning: content that has the property of being allowable by a
`policy or that is known to be allowable by a policy. The ‘968 Patent discloses an invention for caching
`and indexing digital content based on multiple security policies. The claims set forth that “allowable
`relative to a given policy” refers to indicating which items of content are allowed. See, e.g., ‘968
`Patent, Claim 26 (“the policy index including entries that relate cached content and policies, by
`indicating pieces of cached content known to be allowable relative to a given policy”). Thus, the
`meaning of terms in the context of the claim is clear and they do not need to and should not be
`construed. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312-13.
`Qualys seeks to depart from this plain and ordinary meaning, but fails to overcome the
`presumption that the terms’ plain and ordinary meaning should control. Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1365.
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`Case 4:18-cv-07229-YGR Document 42 Filed 02/10/20 Page 13 of 24
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`Qualys’ construction is further flawed in injecting two unsupported requirements into the claims. First,
`Qualys’ construction includes a requirement that digital content is sent somewhere else with the
`additional limitation of “may be sent.” But the claims are directed to a cache manager and do not
`contain a transmission requirement. The Court should not read one into the claim, as there is no support
`for including such a limitation into the scope of the claim, where it is not specifically recited.
`Second, Qualys proposes that the recipient of the transmission must be a web client, another
`limitation not supported by the claims or the specification. Indeed the term “web client” does not
`appear anywhere in the claim language. To the contrary, the claim language and specification both
`make clear that the “content” that is allowable can be transmitted to a “user,” to multiple different
`“users,” or to a “client computer,” with no limitation on the type of client or application that it may be
`transmitted to. See ‘968 Patent at Claim 6, 2:3-11, 5:39-45.
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`“memory storing a cache of digital content” (Claims 1, 13, 23, 26, and 32)
`
`Finjan’s Proposed Construction
`No construction necessary – Plain and ordinary
`meaning.
`
`Qualys’ Proposed Construction
`a memory storing [memory for storing] a
`collection of digital content previously requested
`and retrieved for a web client
`The term “memory storing a cache of digital content” should be given its plain and ordinary
`meaning — memory that stores digital content. See Chef Am., Inc. v. Lamb-Weston, Inc., 358 F.3d
`1371, 1373–76 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (claim terms should be given their plain and ordinary meaning in the
`absence of evidence that the applicant intended for them to have a different meaning.) Reading this
`term in the context of the ‘968 Patent, which discloses an invention that caches digital content, makes
`clear that the cached content is stored in a computer memory. This is a basic computing function
`(storing data in memory) that even laypersons understand, and, as such, this term needs no construction.
`The first half of Qualys’ construction is unnecessary because it simple restates the already-
`present claim language, replacing “memory storing a cache of digital content” with “a memory storing
`a collection of digital content.” This will not assist the jury to understand the scope of these claims.
`The second half of Qualys’ construction is unsupported. The claims are not limited to “digital
`content previously requested and retrieved for a web client,” and should not be so construed. Qualys
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`Case 4:18-cv-07229-YGR Document 42 Filed 02/10/20 Page 14 of 24
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`appears to be relying on Figure 1 and the associated discussion in the specification, which show a cache
`manager receiving content from a web client, but the ‘968 Patent states that this is only a “preferred
`embodiment,” and thus it is not a definitional statement that should be imported into the claims. ‘968
`Patent at 3:20-3:30; Proofpoint, 2015 WL 7770208, at *1 (“it is improper to read limitations from the
`specification into the claims”).
`Therefore, the Court should deny Qualys’ construction and retain the plain and ordinary
`meaning of this term.
`Term in the ‘731 Patent
`C.
`“incoming files from the internet” (Claim 1)
`
`
`Qualys’ Proposed Construction
`Internet files requested by an intranet computer
`
`Finjan’s Proposed Construction
`No construction necessary – Plain and ordinary
`meaning.
`As with the other disputed terms, “incoming files from the internet” should be given its plain
`and ordinary meaning. The ’731 Patent is directed to securing a computer network from threats, such
`as from downloaded viruses. Claim 1 discloses a computer gateway that contains “a scanner for
`scanning incoming files from the Internet and deriving security profiles for the incoming files.” ‘731
`Patent, Claim 1. Thus, reading this term in the context of the claim, this term simply means files
`coming in from the internet that will be scanned by the scanner, and no construction is necessary for the
`jury to understand this term. See Chef Am., 358 F.3d at 1373.
`Qualys’