In Clapper the Court stated that “we have repeatedly reiterated that ‘threatened injury must be certainly impending to constitute injury in fact,’ and that ‘[a]llegations of possible future injury’ are not suf- ficient.” 568 U.S. at 409 (emphases ...
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US 555 (1992): . The person who has been. accorded a procedural right to protect his concrete interests can assert that right without meeting all the normal stand- ards for redressability and immediacy.
The Court stated that Congress may “elevat[e] to the status of legally cognizable injuries con- crete, de facto injuries that were previously inadequate in law.” Lujan, 504 US. at 578.
... —in-fact when Momenta “is not engaged in any activity that would give rise to a possible infringement suit.” Consumer Watchdog, 753 F.3d at 1262; see also Hallingswor‘t/i U. Perry, 570 US. 693, 704 (2013) (the party must be in the position of “seek[ing] a remedy for a personal ...
1916, 1929 (2018) (“the require- ment of such a personal stake [in the outcome] ‘ensures that courts exercise power that is judicial in nature’” (quot- ing Lance U. Coffman, 549 US.
In Consumer Watchdog the court held that a general public interest without a particularized or personal interest and injury does not provide standing to appeal a decision of the PTAB.
167, 189 (2000) (“The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness).” (inter- nal citation and quotation marks omitted)).
In es- sence, “mootness is the doctrine of standing set in a time frame; that is, the requisite personal interest that must ex- ist at the time of commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness).” Id. at 929 (quotations and alteration omitted). Here the cessation of potential infringement ...