In any event, Steinberg’s opening papers explain that New York courts interpreting nearly identical “anti-specific performance” provisions have found that such “limitation[s] contemplate[] the existence of a situation beyond the control of the parties and implicitly require[] the seller to act in good faith.” Naso v. Haque, 289 A.D.2d 309, 310 (2d Dep’t 2001); see also Mokar Properties Corp. v. Hall, 6 A.D.2d 536, 539 (1st Dep’t 1958) (clause limiting liability for seller’s failure to provide marketable title does not “exculpate [seller] from liability ... when his own conduct is the cause of the nonperformance of that condition.
Brum Really, Inc. v. Takeda, 205 A.D.2d 365, 3 74 (1st Dep’t 1994) (“If the date so fixed as time of the essence is subsequently waived, the party causing the waiver cannot later claim a default on account of such delay.”).
Having dealt with [purchasers] in such a manner, the [sellers] could not, without warning, declare a forfeiture or suddenly maintain that the [purchasers’] earlier conduct constituted a default.”); Kutalek v. Studer, 26 Misc.
2009) (“Having attempted to renegotiate the deal after May 2008, defendant cannot [sic] now claim that plaintiff was in default as of May 31, 2008”); Haiduk v. Nassar, 177 A.D.2d 545, 545 (2d Dep’t 1991) (“Any defense based upon the purchaser’s alleged failure to appear at a[] ... closing was waived by the parties’ subsequent negotiations.”).
Despite that, A.S. Estates now claims that Steinberg’s argument that the Executor “had the power and authority to sell the property by the preliminary letters testamentary issued to him ... misses the point (at best) and is highly disingenuous (at worst) .