Further, section (c)(ii) of the Confidentiality Agreement defines the term “Confidential Information” as follows: The term “Confidential Information” means any secret, confidential or proprietary information possessed by the Company relating to its businesses, including, without limitation, customer lists, details of client or consultant contracts, the terms and conditions of this [Confidentiality Agreement], current and anticipated customer requirements, pricing policies, price lists, market studies, business plans, licensing strategies, advertising campaigns, operational methods, marketing plans or strategies, product development techniques or flaws, computer software programs (including object code and source code), data and documentation, data base [sic] technologies, systems, structures and architectures, inventions and ideas, past, current and planned research and development, compilations, devices, methods, techniques, processes, financial information and data, employee compensation information, business acquisition plans and new personnel acquisition plans, which are not otherwise included in the definition of a Trade Secret under this [Confidentiality Agreement], and that has not become generally available to the public by the act of one who has the right to disclose such information without violating any right of the Company.

When reviewing a motion brought under Rule 12(b)(6), a court “must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint,” drawing “all reasonable inferences” in the plaintiff's favor.

Second, Defendant contends that, even if Plaintiff were to prove damages, the Complaint should still be dismissed because it does not properly allege a breach of the Fiduciary Duty Provision of the Confidentiality Agreement.

Taking Plaintiffs’ allegations as true, this Court finds that Plaintiff has pleaded sufficient facts to support a breach of contract claim at this stage of the proceedings.

In Reply, Defendant cites to Reading & Language Learning Center v. Sturgill, 94 Va. Cir. 94 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2016), which is one of the few post-Assurance Data cases where the trial court declared a restrictive covenant to be facially invalid at the demurrer stage.

During this same time period, however, Goodman told the Hanover County Commonwealth’s Attorney that Helmlinger’s act of creating a pre-emptive police report constituted a “Brady” issue – that is, that it was material that could be used to impeach and attack Helmlinger’s credibility as a witness in future trial testimony.

In a published decision issued almost three full years before Goodman made his “Brady” accusations against Helmlinger, the Court of Appeals of Virginia held that a law enforcement officer’s prior one-time false statement in a police report does not qualify as “Brady” material because it is neither exculpatory nor able to be used for impeachment against the officer.

As a direct result of the actions of the defendants named in this Count, in violation of the rights secured to him under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”), Helmlinger has been caused to suffer the loss of occupational opportunities and the compensation and benefits associated therewith.

Here, Goodman, for himself and for the Town, violated liberty interests by falsely indicating (in paragraphs 40-41 of the Complaint and Exhibit A), in conjunction with his suspension, removal from duty and later forced resignation, that Helmlinger had engaged in acts that constituted exculpatory or impeachment conduct under Brady.

As a direct result of the actions of the defendants named in this Count, in violation of the rights secured to him under Section 1983, Helmlinger has been caused to suffer the loss of occupational opportunities and the compensation and benefits associated therewith.