None of the options ensure meaningful or prompt federal review.

(Amici continued on inside cover) J. Marc Wheat Counsel of Record Timothy Harper (Admitted in DC) Advancing American Freedom, Inc. 801 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

3 For example, after this Court’s decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health, 597 U.S. 215 (2022), Mr. Platkin created a Strike Force that, with the help of Planned Parenthood, issued a Consumer Alert “warning” New Jerseyans that pro-life pregnancy centers do not perform abortions.

Striking down this policy, the Eastern District of Virginia wrote, “Courts cannot be blind to the obvious, and the mere fact that Chapter 70 makes no mention of white or colored school children is immaterial when we consider the clear intent of the legislative body.” Id. at 442.

As this Court explained almost twenty years later: Any arrangement, implemented by state officials at any level, which significantly tends to perpetuate a dual school system, in whatever manner, is constitutionally impermissible.

This Court has recognized what Tocqueville found Americans knew at the dawn of our Republic: “Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association,” Ams.

MATTHEW PLATKIN,in his official capacity as Attorney General of New Jersey, Respondent.

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on February 24, 2025, three (3) copies of the BRIEF IN OPPOSITION in the above-captioned case wereserved, as required by U.S. Supreme Court Rule 29.5(c), on the following:

District of Columbia .

My commission expires April 30, 2029.

Faegeud

Supreme Court of the United States

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Supreme Court of the United States

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

ay Alan Sekulow, a member of the Bar of this Court and an attorney for amici, pursuant to Rule 33.1(h), hereby certifies the Amici Brief of the Pennsylvania Pregnancy Wellness Collaborative, et al., in Support of Petitioner contains 5,973, excluding the parts of the document that are exempted by Supreme Court Rule 33.1(d).

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on February 20, 2025, three (3) copies of the BRIEF FOR AMICUS CURIAE AMERICANS FOR PROSPERITY FOUNDATION IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERin the above-captioned case were served, as required by U.S. Supreme Court Rule 29.5(c), on the following:

440 First Street NW Suite 600 Washington, DC 20001 Counsel for Petitioner

ot /~ Ite~ te Fie .

Swornto and subscribed before me this 20th day of Febr

District of Columbia My commission expires April 30, 2029.

Supreme Court of the United States

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

As required by Supreme Court Rule 33.1(h), I certify that the document contains 4,626 words, excluding the parts of the document that are exempted by Supreme Court Rule 33.1(d).

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

District of Columbia My commission expires April 30, 2029. ee?

And the way in which AFPF was bypassed here exposes a serious loophole in First Amendment protection in which a motivated attorney general can impose an investigatory demand on a charity to threaten disclosure of unwilling donors without satisfying the exacting scrutiny that should limit such attempts.

AFPF v. Bonta controls the New Jersey Attorney General’s investigatory demand for donor disclosure, yet the procedural turnings of this case threaten to evade faithful application of its holding.

AFPF was a facial challenge to a regulation requiring charities operating in California to register with the Attorney General’s office and disclose major donors by filing their IRS Form 990.

The precedential bases for applying exacting scrutiny to donor disclosure were derived largely from cases protecting political speech and association, such as NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.

4 See Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 557 (1963) (“an adequate foundation for inquiry must be laid before proceeding in such a manner as will substantially intrude upon and severely curtail or inhibit constitutionally protected activities or seriously interfere with similarly protected associational rights.”); Button, 371 U.S. at 438 (“Broad prophylactic rules in the area of free expression are suspect.”); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 527 (1960) (the municipalities have failed to demonstrate a controlling justification for the deterrence of free association which compulsory disclosure of the membership lists would cause”); Sweezy v. State of N.H. by Wyman, 354 U.S. 234, 245 (1957) (“when the investigative process tends to impinge upon such highly sensitive areas as freedom of speech or press, freedom of political association, and freedom of communication of ideas” compulsory process must be carefully circumscribed.).

And the way in which AFPF was bypassed here exposes a serious loophole in First Amendment protection in which a motivated attorney general can impose an investigatory demand on a charity to threaten disclosure of unwilling donors without satisfying the exacting scrutiny that should limit such attempts.

AFPF v. Bonta controls the New Jersey Attorney General’s investigatory demand for donor disclosure, yet the procedural turnings of this case threaten to evade faithful application of its holding.

AFPF was a facial challenge to a regulation requiring charities operating in California to register with the Attorney General’s office and disclose major donors by filing their IRS Form 990.

The precedential bases for applying exacting scrutiny to donor disclosure were derived largely from cases protecting political speech and association, such as NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.

4 See Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 557 (1963) (“an adequate foundation for inquiry must be laid before proceeding in such a manner as will substantially intrude upon and severely curtail or inhibit constitutionally protected activities or seriously interfere with similarly protected associational rights.”); Button, 371 U.S. at 438 (“Broad prophylactic rules in the area of free expression are suspect.”); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 527 (1960) (the municipalities have failed to demonstrate a controlling justification for the deterrence of free association which compulsory disclosure of the membership lists would cause”); Sweezy v. State of N.H. by Wyman, 354 U.S. 234, 245 (1957) (“when the investigative process tends to impinge upon such highly sensitive areas as freedom of speech or press, freedom of political association, and freedom of communication of ideas” compulsory process must be carefully circumscribed.).

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on February 20, 2025, three (3) copies of the BRIEF FOR AMICUS CURIAE AMERICANS FOR PROSPERITY FOUNDATION IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERin the above-captioned case were served, as required by U.S. Supreme Court Rule 29.5(c), on the following:

440 First Street NW Suite 600 Washington, DC 20001 Counsel for Petitioner

ot /~ Ite~ te Fie .

Swornto and subscribed before me this 20th day of Febr

District of Columbia My commission expires April 30, 2029.