Under this Court’s case law, qualified immunity shields government actors from civil liability “so long as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasona- ble person would have known.” Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (quotation marks omitted).
Indeed, this case shows just how high the barriers to recovery have be- come: the court below held that the Fourth Amend- ment, which prohibits “unreasonable searches and sei- zures” from violating “[t]he right of the people to be se- cure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,” U.S. Const.
Judicial immun- ity is therefore supported by the rationale of Tenney: members of the Forty-Second Congress surely would have known of this rule and, had they wished to abol- ish it, “would have specifically so provided.” Pierson, 386 U.S. at 555; see Buckley, 509 U.S. at 280 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“the presumed legislative intent not to eliminate traditional immunities is our only justifica- tion for limiting the categorical language of the stat- ute” (quoting Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 498 (1991))).
What followed, however, was a steady slide toward “less deference to statutory language and congres- sional intent, less belief that law is fixed and unchang- ing, and less commitment to the notion that the judi- cial function is a merely mechanical one of ‘finding’ the law.” David Achtenberg, Immunity Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Interpretive Approach and the Search for the Legislative Will, 86 Nw.
This situation could be ameliorated by honoring Congress’s plan in passing Section 1983 and ensuring that immunity determina- tions are guided by “a considered inquiry into the im- munity historically accorded the relevant official at common law and the interests behind it.” Tower, 467 U.S. at 920 (quotation marks omitted).