As the Supreme Court has put it, “the right’s contours [must have been] sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in the defendant’s shoes would have understood that he was violating it.” Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1153 (2018) (quoting Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 778–79 (2014)).

It is available if the parents’ complaint did not state “a plausible claim for violation of a constitutional or statutory right” or the “right was [not] clearly established at the time of the alleged infraction.” Hager v. Ark.

Even assuming that the facts in the complaint are true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the parents’ favor, “existing precedent” does not “place[] ... the constitutional question beyond debate.” Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1152 (citation omitted).

1See Villarreal v. City of Laredo, Tex., 17 F.4th 532, 542 n.1 (5th Cir. 2021) (holding that “this circuit does not recognize” a retaliatory-investigation claim); Lincoln v. Maketa, 880 F.3d 533, 540 (10th Cir. 2018) (“The Supreme Court has declined to consider whether a retaliatory criminal investigation entails a constitutional violation.

Other circuits disagree with one another on the issue.” (citation omitted)); Archer v. Chisholm, 870 F.3d 603, 620 (7th Cir. 2017) (“There is no clearly established rule of law under which an official pursuing a lawful investigation, based on probable cause, has been found liable under the First Amendment to a target.”); Rehberg v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 828, 850–51 (11th Cir. 2010) (noting that “[t]he Supreme Court has never defined retaliatory investigation, It makes no difference that, “as a general matter, the First Amendment prohibits government officials from subjecting an individual to retaliatory actions ... on the basis of ... constitutionally protected speech.” Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787–88 (8th Cir. 2015) (quotation marks and brackets omitted) (emphasis added).

No publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock, as it has issued none.

JANET L. YELLEN,in herofficial capacity as Secretary of the Treasury; RICHARD DELMAR,in hisofficial capacity as acting inspector general of the Department of the Treasury; UNITED STATES

1115 H Street, N.E.

But in concluding that Treasury’s regulations mooted challenges premised on the plaintiff States’ pre-enforcement theories of standing, the court adopted reasoning that is similar to the Eighth Circuit’s decision here.

Indeed, the fact that Missouri alone, among all pending challenges, offers a saving construction of the Tax Mandate that preserves state sovereignty while avoiding constitutional problems makes this case a uniquely appropriate vehicle for review.

Treasury’s focus on what the Tax Mandate means underscores that this case “calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction.” Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946); see also Kentucky v. Yellen, 54 F.4th 325, 349 n.16 (6th Cir. 2022) (making this point).

That splits with the Ninth Circuit, which concluded that Treasury’s regulations evidenced Arizona’s standing, see Arizona, 34 F.4th at 850 (“[T]he recoupment process outlined in the IFR show[s] the federal government’s intent to enforce the Offset Provision.”), and never mentioned them in analyzing the harms to Arizona’s sovereign interests, see 34 F.4th at 851–53.

But that “approximates requiring [the States] to admit to violating a law in order to have standing to challenge it,” and so embraces a theory of jurisdiction this Court “has repeatedly rejected.” Arizona, 34 F.4th at 849 (gathering examples); see also Pet. 22–

Supreme Court of the Anited States

Petitioner, JANET L. YELLEN,in herofficial capacity as Secretary of the Treasury; RICHARD DELMAR,inhisofficial capacity as acting inspector general of the Department of the Treasury; UNITED STATES

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court ofAppeals for the Eighth Circuit

As required by Supreme Court Rule 33.1(h), I certify that the document contains 2,705 words, excluding the parts of the document that are exempted by Supreme Court Rule 33.1(d).

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.