None of 2 The Court of Federal Claims has aptly explained the relationship between takings jurisprudence and tort law in defining property rights: [T]he common law of property relie[s] on tort principles, particularly trespass and nuisance, ...

... that “the imposition of the navigational servitude in this context will result in an actual physical invasion of the privately owned marina . . . . And even if the Government physically invades only an easement in property, it must nonetheless ...

It is nonetheless troubling, however, that the current state of the law is such that California’s assertion of public use was not even challenged in this case, considering the extraordinarily narrow and private union interests benefiting from ...

In none of them did the holding turn on a multifactor analysis in which extent of economic injury played the dominant role.

And even if the Government physically invades only an easement in property, it must nonetheless pay just compensation.

It is at this point in Kaiser Aetna that the Court cinched its reasoning about the navigational servitude, saying that “even if the Government physically invades only an easement in property, it must nonetheless pay just compensation.” 444 ...

Supreme Court of the United States

I, Rita L. Hemenway of Bateman & Slade, Inc., hereby declare that on this sixth day of January 2021, I have served three (3) true copies of the Brief of Amicus Curiae New England Legal Foundation in Support of Petitioner by priority mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: Counsel of Record for Petitioners: Joshua Paul Thompson, Esq. Pacific Legal Foundation 930 G Street Sacramento, CA 95814 Counsel of Record for Respondents: Joshua Patashnik, Esq. Deputy Solicitor General California Department of Justice 455 Golden Gate Ave., Suite 11000 San Francisco, CA 94102 Signed under the pains and penalties of perjury,

If the plaintiff prevailed, he nonetheless had no way at common law to obtain money damages for a permanent taking— that is, just compensation for the total value of his prop- erty.

But none of that is true of Takings Clause violations.

Plaintiff argues that Section 6(g) does not have the other indicia of being a substantive rule because it lacks procedural requirements and penalty provisions such as those that accompany the unfair or deceptive acts or practices rulemaking.

Read together, the various components of the statute show Congress conferred at least some form of substantive rulemaking authority to the FTC with regard to unfair methods of competition.

Under the major questions doctrine, the Court assumes that Section 6(g) of the FTC Act grants some type of substantive rulemaking authority and that there's a plausible textual basis for it.

To determine whether a major question is implicated, the Supreme Court looks at a number of non-exhaustive factors; first is whether the rule affects "a significant portion of the American economy."

However, on balance, given the sweep and the breadth of the final rule, including its application to existing contracts, I find it substantially likely -- and the plaintiffs have shown me this -- that it presents a major question as defined by the Supreme Court.

All parties required to be served have been served by Priority Mail.

Packages were plainly addressed to the following:

I am duly authorized under the laws of the State of Nebraska to administer oaths.

General Notary State of Nebraska My Commission Expires Nov 24, 2020

The problem, however is that the Brand X Doc- trine ultimately elevates administrative agency inter- pretations to a parity with—and even to a superiority over—judicial interpretations, a point that has been criticized on separation of powers grounds from the outset.

But then DOT sought a stay to consider the matter, and in 2012—four years after the initial determination by the Bankruptcy Court—it said that the federal act did preempt the state law causes of action.

4 True, Brand X purports to deny deference to agency inter- pretations that conflict with a prior court determination as to the unambiguous terms of the statute, but Rapanos did not result in such a finding.

For these and other reasons, the Wisconsin Su- preme Court recently issued an important decision re- jecting administrative deference doctrines as a matter of its own state law—including the theory of Brand X.

This intrudes on state authority in ways that even Congress may have never considered, and clashes with this Court’s longstanding presumption against preemption in the absence of a “clear statement”—especially given the fact that Brand X’s effect increases in proportion as the statute lacks a clear statement.

As required by Supreme Court Rule 33.1(h), I certify that the BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF GOLDWATER INSTITUTE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS in the above entitled case complies with the typeface requirement of Supreme Court Rule 33.1(b), being prepared in New Century Schoolbook 12 point for the text and 10 point for the footnotes, and this brief contains 3180 words, excluding the parts that are exempted by Supreme Court Rule 33.1(d), as needed.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of October, 2019.

I am duly authorized under the laws of the State of Nebraska to administer oaths.

General Notary State of Nebraska My Commission Expires Nov 24, 2020 Notary Public Affiant 38893

U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Solicitor General Washington, D.C. 20530 October 17, 2019 Honorable Scott S. Harris Clerk Supreme Court of the United States Washington, D.C. 20543 Re: Howard L. Baldwin, et ux v. United States of America, S.CtNo.

19-402 Dear Mr. Harris: The petition for a writ of certiorari in the above-captioned case was filed on September 23, 2019, and placed on the docket on September 25, 2019.

We respectfully request, under Rule 30.4 of the rules of this Court, an extension of time to and including November 25, 2019, within which to file the government's response.

This extension is requested to complete preparation of the government's response, which was delayed because of the heavy press of earlier assigned cases to the attorneys handling this matter.

Sincerely, Noel J. Francisco Solicitor General cc: See Attached Service List

This area of the law is character- ized by “ad hoc, factual inquiries, designed to allow careful examina- tion and weighing of all the relevant circumstances.” Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U. S. 302, 322 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

In the case now before the Court, petition- ers contend that governmental entities took their real property—an undeveloped residential lot—not by some physical occupation but instead by enacting burdensome regulations that forbid its improvement or separate sale because it is classified as substandard in size.

Lucas v. South Caro- lina Coastal Council, 505 U. S. 1003, 1014 (1992) (citation, brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted); accord, Horne v. Department of Agriculture, 576 U. S. ___, ___ (2015) (slip op., at 7); see also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U. S. 419, 427 (1982).

This bottom-line conclusion does not trouble me; the majority presents a fair case that the Murrs can still make good use of both lots, and that the ordinance is a commonplace tool to preserve scenic areas, such as the Lower St. Croix River, for the benefit of landowners and the public alike.

These types of actions give rise to “per se taking[s]” because they are “perhaps the most serious form[s] of invasion of an owner’s property inter­ ests, depriving the owner of the rights to possess, use and dispose of the property.” Horne v. Department of Agricul- ture, 576 U. S. ___, ___ (2015) (slip op., at 7) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Circuit concluded that Kokesh may have stripped the SEC’s ability to bar a broker-dealer from membership in a professional organization and remanded the question to the SEC to determine in the first instance whether the lifetime ban was a penalty or a remedy.

Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians, et al. (filed March 18, 2019); (2) travel to Saudi Arabia in April 2019 in connection with discovery-related matters for In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 03 MDL 1570 (GBD) (SN) (S.D.N.Y.); and (3) oral argument in the Sixth Circuit in Buchwald Capital Advisors LLC v. Dimitrios Papas, et al., No. 18-1167 (scheduled for May 8, 2019).

*1 Charles Liu (“Liu”) and his wife, Xin Wang (“Wang”), appeal the district court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the SEC, finding that the couple violated Section 17(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933.

The POM provided that if the cancer center project succeeded, after five years the second LLC would repay its loan with interest “at the rate of 0.25% per annum,” and these funds would be distributed to investors.

The inference was corroborated by several items of evidence tending to show that, among other things, the Appellants organized and controlled the project and that, at its outset, they entered contracts with marketers that would require payments in excess of the sums raised by way of the Administrative Fee, thereby violating the promises of the POM.

As required by Supreme Court Rule 33.1(h), I certify that the REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI in the above entitled case complies with the typeface requirement of Supreme Court Rule 33.1(b), being prepared in New Century Schoolbook 12 point for the text and 10 point for the footnotes, and this brief contains 2565 words, excluding the parts that are exempted by Supreme Court Rule 33.1(d), as needed.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 16th day of October, 2018.

I am duly authorized under the laws of the State of Nebraska to administer oaths.

My Commission Expires Nov 24, 2020 Notary Public General Notary State of Nebraska

None of these arguments has merit.

As required by Supreme Court Rule 33.1(h), I certify that the RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI in the above entitled case complies with the typeface requirement of Supreme Court Rule 33.1(b), being prepared in New Century Schoolbook 12 point for the text and 10 point for the footnotes, and this brief contains 5339 words, excluding the parts that are exempted by Supreme Court Rule 33.1(d), as needed.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 5th day of October, 2018.

I am duly authorized under the laws of the State of Nebraska to administer oaths

'uprtmc (Court of the Nuiteb tate

As required by Supreme Court Rule 33.1(h), I certify that the document contains 3,432 words, excluding the parts of the document that are exempted by Supreme Court Rule 33.1(d).

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on October 5, 2018.

/6memiia Rita L. Hemenway