Before the Court is an Unopposed Motion for a Protective Order under Federal Rule of Evidence 502(d) concerning certain electronic evidence the Government wishes to produce to the defendants.

Specifically, the Government possesses (1) Outcome Health devices used by defendants Rishi Shah, Shradha Agarwal, and Brad Purdy; and (2) Apple iCloud accounts used by defendants Shah, Agarwal, Purdy, and Desai.

Some of these devices and accounts may contain materials protected by one or more parties’ attorney-client privileges.

Having considered the Unopposed Motion and good cause appearing therefor, the Court will enter a protective order under Federal Rule of Evidence 502(d) as follows: The following items and accounts may be produced to the defendants by the Government as identified below without effecting waiver of any defendant’s or any third-party’s attorney-client privilege, attorney work product privilege, or other valid legal privilege in this proceeding or any other federal or state proceeding: a. The Apple iCloud account used by defendant Shah, with the exception of the files that hit on the privilege screen, to defendants Agarwal and Purdy; b.

Honorable Thomas M. Durkin United States District Judge

Comes now, SHRADHA AGARWAL,defendant in the above-entitled matter, and by her attorneys, Koren Bell, A. Alexander Lowder, Patrick W. Blegen, and Kelsey Killion, states as follows:

On November 21, 2019, defendant SHRADHA AGARWALwas charged with violations of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1341, 13843, and 1344.

The superseding indictment included an allegation that certain property is subject to forfeiture; In the event defendant SHRADHA AGARWALis found guilty of the charged offense requiring forfeiture, she has a right to have a jury decide whether certain property belonging to is subject to forfeiture to the United States pursuantto the provisionsof Title 18, United States Code, Section 981(a)(1)(C), Title 28, United States Code, Section 2461(c), and Title 18 United States Code, Section 982(a)(2)(A) by a preponderance of the evidence; The verdict of the jury on the forfeiture allegation must be unanimous; Defendant SHRADHA AGARWAL has had an opportunity to discuss this waiver with counsel and she understands that by signing this waiver she relinquishes her right to have a jury consider whether certain property is subject to forfeiture; If a jury is waived, the judge alone will decide whether certain property belonging to defendant SHRADHA AGARWALissubject to forfeiture to the United States pursuant to the provisions of Title 18, United States Code, Section 981(a)(1)(C), Title 28, United States Code, Section 2461(c), and Title 18 United States Code, Section 982(a)(2)(A);

Attorneys for Defendant MORRIS PASQUAL, Acting United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, hereby consents to the waiver by the above-named defendant of a jury determination of the forfeiture allegation in the above-entitled matter.

Chief, Fraud Section Criminal Division U.S. Department of Justice By:

Before the Court is an Unopposed Motion for a Protective Order under Federal Rule of Evidence 502(d) concerning certain electronic evidence the Government wishes to produce to the defendants.

Specifically, the Government possesses (1) Outcome Health devices used by defendants Rishi Shah, Shradha Agarwal, and Brad Purdy, and co-defendants Ashik Desai, Oliver Han, and Kathryn Choi; (2) Apple iCloud accounts used by defendants Shah, Agarwal, Purdy, and Desai; and (3) text and voice messages for accounts with the application Voxer.

Having considered the Joint Motion and good cause appearing therefor, the Court will enter a protective order under Federal Rule of Evidence 502(d) as follows: The following items and accounts may be produced to the defendants by the Government as identified below without effecting waiver of any defendant’s or any third-party’s attorney-client privilege, attorney work product privilege, or other valid legal privilege in this proceeding or any other federal or state proceeding: a. The contents of all the Voxer accounts to defendants Shah, Agarwal, and Purdy; b.

The devices used by Ashik Desai, Oliver Han, and Kathryn Choi to defendants Shah, Agarwal, and Purdy.

Honorable Thomas M. Durkin United States District Judge

Under 28 U.S.C. § 853(a)(1), any person convicted of certain federal crimes “punishable by imprisonment for more than one year shall forfeit to the United States ... any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as the result of such violation.” Additionally, “[u]pon application of the United States, the court may enter a restraining order or injunction, require the execution of a satisfactory performance bond, or take any other action to preserve the availability of property described in subsection (a) for forfeiture under this section.” 28 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1).

Instead, the question here is a legal one: whether the settlement agreement Shah and Agarwal reached with the company, the lenders, and the investors, cleans the funds of the taint associated with their undisputed allegedly illegal source.

Shah and Agarwal argue that because the $31 million they received in the settlement agreement was their “compensation for giving up their company-provided indemnity coverage and releasing their claims against the Investors and Lenders, the Government cannot meet its burden to show that the assets are subject to forfeiture.” R. 75-2 at 15.

Shah and Agarwal’s argument rests on the premise that the victim of a crime can undermine the government’s right to seek forfeiture of criminal proceeds by agreeing to permit the defendant to keep them.

Lastly, the Court notes that Shah and Agarwal could be understood to be arguing that they “substituted” the dividend funds for their indemnification rights in the form of permission to retain $31 million.

The Government hereby waives its right to file a response to the petition in this case, unless requested to do so by the Court.

I, Jodi L. Garvey, do swear or declare that on this date, January 29, 2018, as required by Supreme Court Rule 39, I have served the enclosed Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Petition for a Writ of Certiorari on each party to the above proceeding or that party’s counsel, and on every other person required to be served, by depositing an envelope containing the above documents in the United States mail properly addressed to each of them and with first class postage prepaid, or by delivery to a third party commercial carrier for delivery within 3 calendar days.

The names and addresses of those served are as follows: Bob Wood Assistant United States Attorney 10 West Market Street, Ste.

2100 Indianapolis, IN 46204 Solicitor General of the United States Room 5614, Department of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

The Petitioner asks leave to file the attached Petition for a Writ of Certiorari without prepayment of costs and to proceed in forma pauperis.

Counsel was appointed to represent Petitioner on appeal in the Seventh Circuit, pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. §3006A.

Respectfully submitted, s/ Jodi L. Garvey

Petitioner David Johnson respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit entered in this case on November 3, 2017.

(R. 62) Walton and Johnson were also alleged in the indictment to have participated in a separate scheme to defraud certain purchasers of Land Bank property by unjustly inflating the price.

An honest services bribery theory under §1346 requires a quid pro quo; that is, a specific intent to give or receive something of value in exchange for an official act.

Absent evidence of Johnson’s intent to aid Walton in defrauding the City, as opposed to merely trying to generate resources for a legitimate non-profit entity, Johnson’s conviction must be vacated.

Johnson urges the Court to grant a writ of certiorari so that he may more fully demonstrate the impropriety of his conviction in this case, as well as to clarify the proof necessary to establish a quid pro quo and a fiduciary duty in the context of an honest services fraud prosecution.

Walton’s official title was Assistant Administrator for the Department of Metropolitan Development (“DMD”), but his specific position gave him primary authority over ac- quiring and selling properties in the Land Bank.

The evidence underlying this count reflected that Wal- ton and Johnson worked with the Marion County Prosecu- tor’s office to secure low-priced homes for individuals who risked homelessness and had been victims of a fraud by Sheila Amos (the “Amos Victims”).

He actively concealed the scheme by writing false entries in the memo line of kickback checks and removing Walton’s name from property lists he forwarded to potential purchasers.

Citing United States v. Anderson, 517 F.3d 953 (7th Cir. 2008), Walton highlights Nos. 15-3830 and 16-1471 that unlike a gratuity, a bribe must be made with a corrupt purpose, such as inducing a public official to influence his of- ficial action.

Seventh Circuit precedent, including the case cited by defendants, United States v. Manjarrez, 258 F.3d 618 (7th Cir. 2001), makes clear that it “is unnecessary to give a par- ticular defense instruction if its essential points are covered in another instruction.” Id. at 626.

On or soon after November 25, 2019, I learned that the Court had entered a protective order that had the effect of freezing the funds then held in the McGuire Woods trust account.

At some point after the Court's April 8, 2020 order, I approached a bank at which I was opening an account, the Randolph-Brooks Federal Credit Union, about the possibility of borrowing against the Austin property.

I did not attempt to sell the Austin property, because I did not think it possible to find a buyer and complete the transaction by the June 30, 2020 deadline for retaining counsel.

I did not explore the possibility of selling or borrowing against that apartment, because I understood the process would likely take many months to complete and would at some point require my presence in India, which my conditions of release would not permit.

The search was made difficult by several factors, including my limited funds, conflicts of interest, complications from the pandemic, and other circumstances.

I adopt and incorporate the February 14, 2020 declaration I submitted in support of the motion Rishi Shah and I filed to amend the Court's protective order and vacate the seizure warrant.

At the time of the Court's order denying the motion Mr. Shah and I had filed (Doc. 108), McGuire Woods held more than $3.8 million that I had provided for the firm's representation of me at trial in this matter.

Without the $3.8 mil1ion that I had provided to McGuire Woods, I did not have sufficient funds to pay the fee the firm required to represent me at trial.

Because I could not afford the fee McGuire Woods requested, the firm declined to Exhibit A represent me at trial and asked that I find new counsel.

If my portion of those substitute assets had been available to me following the Court's April 8, 2020 order, I would have used them--combined with my own funds if necessary--to keep McGuire Woods as my counsel.

Exhibit A From: To: Cc: Subject: Date: Richard Finneran Madden, Matthew (USAILN) Johnston, William (CRM) [EXTERNAL] RE: Update Thursday, October 26, 2023 2:24:33 PM Matt, Just got off the phone with Vicki.

But she did share a few things that I believe are directly responsive to your question about whether, as we argued in our reply, the estimates provided by QE in 2020 were “reasonable” (which, again, we don’t concede is relevant), which I detail below.

Mr. Shah did not have the means to pay that amount at the time the representation was initiated, so they accepted a smaller retainer to commence their work with the expectation that the additional monies would be paid as Mr. Shah’s liquidity increased.

In our view, that is sufficient to show that QE’s $14-15 million estimate for both Mr. Shah’s and Ms. Agarwal’s representation was, if anything, an underestimate of the fees and expenses that would actually have been required.

It doesn’t sound like Vicki will be able to get me much more additional information before we are set to be in court tomorrow, but hopefully that gives you what you need in order to be able to assess whether you will continue to challenge the reasonableness of QE’s fee estimate.