In 2015, ISIS terrorists unleashed a set of coordinated at- tacks across Paris, France, killing 130 victims, including Nohemi Gonzalez, a 23-year-old U. S. citizen.1 Gonzalez’s parents and brothers then sued Google, LLC, under 18 U. S. C. §§2333(a) and (d)(2), alleging that Google was both directly and secondarily liable for the terrorist attack that killed Gonzalez.2 For their secondary-liability claims, —————— 1“ISIS” is shorthand for the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.
2Title 18 U. S. C. §2333(a) provides: “Any national of the United States injured in his or her person, property, or business by reason of an act of international terrorism, or his or her estate, survivors, or heirs, may sue therefor in any appropriate district court of the United States and shall recover threefold the damages he or she sustains and the cost of the suit, including attorney’s fees.” Section 2333(d)(2) provides: “In an action un- der subsection (a) for an injury arising from an act of international ter- rorism committed, planned, or authorized by an organization that had been designated as a foreign terrorist organization under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U. S. C. 1189), as of the date on which such act of international terrorism was committed, planned, or authorized, liability may be asserted as to any person who aids and GONZALEZ v. GOOGLE LLC
Instead, plaintiffs stood on their complaint and appealed, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed in a consolidated opinion that also addressed Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh, ___ U. S. ___ (2023).
In light of those unchallenged holdings and our disposition of Twitter, on which we also granted certiorari and in which we today reverse the Ninth Circuit’s judgment, it has become clear that plaintiffs’ com- plaint—independent of §230—states little if any claim for relief.
Per- haps for that reason, at oral argument, plaintiffs only suggested that they should receive leave to amend their complaint if we were to reverse and remand in Twitter.