a New Jersey corporation, Case No. 3:20-cv-09976 (BRM) (ZNQ) Document Electronically Filed Plaintiff,

Aaron P. Bradford (admitted pro hac vice)

Courthouse, 402 East State Street, Trenton, New Jersey 08608, for an Order staying the present action pending the adjudication of Onyx Enters.

PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that in support of the motion, Defendant will rely upon the accompanying Brief and the Declaration of Susan A. Smith submitted herewith, and all other pleadings and memoranda on file in this matter.

PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that a proposed form of Order is submitted herewith.

According to the Appellate Division Second Department's Decision dated September 12, 2018 in the case Miller Supreme v. Brunner, Kings to as the "2015 Action"), County Plaintiffs' Court Index #512723/2015 claims against Anmuth and Brunner, right to acquire title to real property known as 49 Dupont contractual New York, September have been deemed 18, 2014.

Plaintiffs do not dispute that, in the 2015 Action, they raised the same factual allegations as in opposition to Brunner's motion to dismiss.

alleged hereunder in their affirmation that Plaintiff Chaim Miller was duped into representation that Bo Jin Zhu would bring signing

is over party being 18 years duly of age sworn, and and deposes resides in Bergen says that County, is not deponent New Jersey.

Notary Public, State of New York No. 01AL6354109 Registration in Westchester County Oualified 02/06/2021 Expires Commisalan

Civil Action No. 20-09976 (BRM) (ZNQ) Document Electronically Filed

Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 6.1(b), defendant Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. (“VWGoA”) hereby applies for an Order of the Clerk of the Court for the District of New Jersey extending the time within which VWGoA may answer, move, or otherwise respond to the Amended Complaint filed by Plaintiff, and it is represented that:

No previous extension has been obtained from this Court; Plaintiff filed the Amended Complaint in this matter on or about September 1, 2020 [ECF No. 9], and appears to have effected service on VWGoA on September 3, 2020 [ECF No. 11]; VWGoA’s time to answer, move, or otherwise respond to the Amended Complaint thus expires on September 24, 2020; and By way of this application, VWGoA respectfully requests an extension of time to answer, move, or otherwise respond to the Amended Complaint for a period of fourteen (14) days though and including October 8, 2020.

Dated: September 23, 2020 Newark, New Jersey

The above application is GRANTED and the time within which VWGoA shall answer, move or otherwise respond to the Complaint in this matter is extended for a period of fourteen (14) days up to and including October 8, 2020, pursuant to Local Civil Rule 6.1(b) of the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey.

Accordingtothe Appellate Division Second Department’sDecision dated September 12, 2018 in the case Miller v. Brunner, Kings County Supreme Court Index #512723/2015 (hereinafter referred to as the “2015 Action”), Plaintiffs’ claims against Anmuth and Brunner, concerning Plaintiffs’ contractual right to acquire title to real property known as 49 Dupont Street in Brooklyn, New York, have been deemed barred pursuant tothe general release executed by Plaintiffs dated September 18, 2014.

Asa result, Plaintiffs’ first, third, fourth and fifth causes of action herein, which seek various relief based on the Brunner Defendants’ breach of the same contract, must be dismissed on the basisof issue preclusion.

Plaintiffs’ sixth cause of action is dismissed as duplicative pursuant to CPLR 3211[a][4], The sixth cause of action concerns Plaintiffs’ alleged entitlement to approximately $4,353 million out of the $4.7 million on deposit as collateral with Investors Bank based on an agreement with Anmuth dated September 18, 2014.

Specifically, that Plaintiff Chaim Miller was duped into signing the general release based on' Brunner’s representation that Bo Jin Zhu would bring RICO claims against him otherwise.

The Second Department held, in its September 12, 2018 decision, that Plaintiffs failed to sufficiently allege each of the elements of fraud in the inducement.

Section 2(a) Claims Section 2(a) of the Act states: It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality ... where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition ... or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall prevent differentials which make only due allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the differing methods or quantities in which such commodities are to such purchasers sold or delivered.

Firestone primarily argues there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Marjam suffered competitive or antitrust injuries (element four).

Pursuant to the “Morton Salt Inference,” plaintiffs may establish the presumption of an injury to competition “by proof of a substantial price discrimination between competing purchasers over time.

As a threshold matter, provision of inequitable rebates (or other terms of sale) is materially equivalent to “price discrimination,” and thus can trigger the Mortan Salt Inference.

Firestone argues it can rebut the Morton Salt Inference because it has evidence that conduct besides the alleged price discrimination caused Marjam’s losses.