As set forth in other filings, after Quinn Emanuel withdrew, Shah retained no fewer than 11 attorneys from four prestigious law firms to represent him.

How did Shah, if he had insufficient funds to hire Quinn Emanuel, not only hire these great lawyers, but have sufficient funds to (1) live in a multi-million- dollar luxury home in Puerto Rico while owning a home in Chicago worth about $10 million and owning a condo in Chicago worth more than $1 million, R. 483 at 3-5; (2) invest $2 million in LEAF VIP, LLC—what appears to be a cannabis investment entity associated with Shah’s long- time employee David Cho—in April 2023 at the end of trial, R. 483 at 8; (3) invest $500,000 in LEAF VIP in October 2022, Id.; (4) spend copious amounts of money on private jets, private yacht charters and fine dining after he was indicted, R. 512 at 24, R. 482 at 51; and (5) attempt to set up multiple six-figure sports gambling accounts after conviction?

Agarwal, for her part, retained lawyers from Larson O’Brien LLP, an elite trial firm in Los Angeles, and Blegen & Garvey, a highly-regarded criminal defense boutique in Chicago.

Though Agarwal could have sold the residences in Austin and/or India or taken out asset-backed loans in order to raise legal fees, she chose not to; she held onto her properties and benefitted from their use and appreciation in value.

Luis v. United States, 578 U.S. 5, 10 (2016) (plurality) (holding that “the pretrial restraint of legitimate, untainted assets needed to retain counsel violates the Sixth Amendment”) (emphasis added).

None of his arguments have merit.

Before the Court is an Unopposed Motion for a Protective Order under Federal Rule of Evidence 502(d) concerning certain electronic evidence the Government wishes to produce to the defendants.

Specifically, the Government possesses (1) Outcome Health devices used by defendants Rishi Shah, Shradha Agarwal, and Brad Purdy; and (2) Apple iCloud accounts used by defendants Shah, Agarwal, Purdy, and Desai.

Some of these devices and accounts may contain materials protected by one or more parties’ attorney-client privileges.

Having considered the Unopposed Motion and good cause appearing therefor, the Court will enter a protective order under Federal Rule of Evidence 502(d) as follows: The following items and accounts may be produced to the defendants by the Government as identified below without effecting waiver of any defendant’s or any third-party’s attorney-client privilege, attorney work product privilege, or other valid legal privilege in this proceeding or any other federal or state proceeding: a. The Apple iCloud account used by defendant Shah, with the exception of the files that hit on the privilege screen, to defendants Agarwal and Purdy; b.

Honorable Thomas M. Durkin United States District Judge

Comes now, SHRADHA AGARWAL,defendant in the above-entitled matter, and by her attorneys, Koren Bell, A. Alexander Lowder, Patrick W. Blegen, and Kelsey Killion, states as follows:

On November 21, 2019, defendant SHRADHA AGARWALwas charged with violations of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1341, 13843, and 1344.

The superseding indictment included an allegation that certain property is subject to forfeiture; In the event defendant SHRADHA AGARWALis found guilty of the charged offense requiring forfeiture, she has a right to have a jury decide whether certain property belonging to is subject to forfeiture to the United States pursuantto the provisionsof Title 18, United States Code, Section 981(a)(1)(C), Title 28, United States Code, Section 2461(c), and Title 18 United States Code, Section 982(a)(2)(A) by a preponderance of the evidence; The verdict of the jury on the forfeiture allegation must be unanimous; Defendant SHRADHA AGARWAL has had an opportunity to discuss this waiver with counsel and she understands that by signing this waiver she relinquishes her right to have a jury consider whether certain property is subject to forfeiture; If a jury is waived, the judge alone will decide whether certain property belonging to defendant SHRADHA AGARWALissubject to forfeiture to the United States pursuant to the provisions of Title 18, United States Code, Section 981(a)(1)(C), Title 28, United States Code, Section 2461(c), and Title 18 United States Code, Section 982(a)(2)(A);

Attorneys for Defendant MORRIS PASQUAL, Acting United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, hereby consents to the waiver by the above-named defendant of a jury determination of the forfeiture allegation in the above-entitled matter.

Chief, Fraud Section Criminal Division U.S. Department of Justice By:

... Psychomotor ActivitY: Other General APPearance: Normal Behavior: CooPerative Mood: APProPriate to Content Thought Process: Goal Directed Thought Content: Normal Hx of Mental Health Treatment: None Hx of Head lnjury: None ...

... Psychomotor Activity: Normal General Appearance: Normal Behavior: Cooperative Mood: Appropriate to Content Thought Process: Goal Directed Thought Gontent: Normal Hx of Mental Health Treatment: None Hx of Head lnjury: None ...

... Psychomotor Activity: Normal General Appearance: Normal Behavior: Cooperative Mood: Appropriate to Content Thought Process: Goal Directed Thought Content: Normal Hx of Mental Health Treatment: None Hx of Head lnjury: None ...

As set out in the Complaint, TGC entered into consulting performance agreements (“Agreements”) with investors, in which it committed to create and host websites on their behalves in exchange for up-front payments.

Additionally, the SEC alleges that TGC commingled loan proceeds with investor funds and diverted millions of dollars to pay for Courtright’s personal expenses.

The Court finds the Receiver’s case-by-case approach to be a fair and reasonable solution, as it will ensure payout to a greater number of victims while preventing payments to individuals who participated in Defendants’ scheme.

“It is settled that an equity receiver has the power to bring ancillary actions to recover assets which were fraudulently transferred to investors in a Ponzi scheme.” CFTC v. Am. Commodity Grp.

Given the Receiver’s representations that the Estate’s assets will not be sufficient to compensate all claimants’ losses, the Court finds that her proposal fairly and reasonably addresses the concerns of net winners who may prefer their websites over their monetary claims.

Before the Court is an Unopposed Motion for a Protective Order under Federal Rule of Evidence 502(d) concerning certain electronic evidence the Government wishes to produce to the defendants.

Specifically, the Government possesses (1) Outcome Health devices used by defendants Rishi Shah, Shradha Agarwal, and Brad Purdy, and co-defendants Ashik Desai, Oliver Han, and Kathryn Choi; (2) Apple iCloud accounts used by defendants Shah, Agarwal, Purdy, and Desai; and (3) text and voice messages for accounts with the application Voxer.

Having considered the Joint Motion and good cause appearing therefor, the Court will enter a protective order under Federal Rule of Evidence 502(d) as follows: The following items and accounts may be produced to the defendants by the Government as identified below without effecting waiver of any defendant’s or any third-party’s attorney-client privilege, attorney work product privilege, or other valid legal privilege in this proceeding or any other federal or state proceeding: a. The contents of all the Voxer accounts to defendants Shah, Agarwal, and Purdy; b.

The devices used by Ashik Desai, Oliver Han, and Kathryn Choi to defendants Shah, Agarwal, and Purdy.

Honorable Thomas M. Durkin United States District Judge

It is ordered that the defendant must notify the United States attorney for this district within 30 days of any change of name, residence, or mailing address until all fines, restitution, costs, and special assessments imposed by this judgment are fully paid.

(a)(ii) (home detention) for a period of # months, you are restricted to your residence at all times except for employment; education; religious services; medical, substance abuse, or mental health treatment; attorney visits; court appearances; court—ordered obligations; or other activities pre-approved by the probation officer.

(23) You shall submit your person, property, house, residence, vehicle, papers [computers (as defined in 18 U.S.C. 1030(ex1», Case: 1:09-cr-00059 Document #: 150 Filed: 05/20/20 Page 5 of 25 Paagglg #:2 10 ILND 245C (Rev.

It is ordered that the defendant'must notify the United States attorney for this district within 30 da 5 of any change ofname, residence, _ _ or mallmg address untilall fines, restitutionlcosts, and spemal assessments imposed by this Judgment are fu ly paid.

as directed by the probation officer, the ureau of Prisons, or any state sex offender registration agency in which he or she resides, works, is a student, or was convrcted of a qualifying offense.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 853(a)(1), any person convicted of certain federal crimes “punishable by imprisonment for more than one year shall forfeit to the United States ... any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as the result of such violation.” Additionally, “[u]pon application of the United States, the court may enter a restraining order or injunction, require the execution of a satisfactory performance bond, or take any other action to preserve the availability of property described in subsection (a) for forfeiture under this section.” 28 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1).

Instead, the question here is a legal one: whether the settlement agreement Shah and Agarwal reached with the company, the lenders, and the investors, cleans the funds of the taint associated with their undisputed allegedly illegal source.

Shah and Agarwal argue that because the $31 million they received in the settlement agreement was their “compensation for giving up their company-provided indemnity coverage and releasing their claims against the Investors and Lenders, the Government cannot meet its burden to show that the assets are subject to forfeiture.” R. 75-2 at 15.

Shah and Agarwal’s argument rests on the premise that the victim of a crime can undermine the government’s right to seek forfeiture of criminal proceeds by agreeing to permit the defendant to keep them.

Lastly, the Court notes that Shah and Agarwal could be understood to be arguing that they “substituted” the dividend funds for their indemnification rights in the form of permission to retain $31 million.

On or soon after November 25, 2019, I learned that the Court had entered a protective order that had the effect of freezing the funds then held in the McGuire Woods trust account.

At some point after the Court's April 8, 2020 order, I approached a bank at which I was opening an account, the Randolph-Brooks Federal Credit Union, about the possibility of borrowing against the Austin property.

I did not attempt to sell the Austin property, because I did not think it possible to find a buyer and complete the transaction by the June 30, 2020 deadline for retaining counsel.

I did not explore the possibility of selling or borrowing against that apartment, because I understood the process would likely take many months to complete and would at some point require my presence in India, which my conditions of release would not permit.

The search was made difficult by several factors, including my limited funds, conflicts of interest, complications from the pandemic, and other circumstances.

Denise consented to a partial judgment for an injunction from engaging in future violations of the Security Exchange Act, with civil penalties bifurcated and to be decided at a later date.

Later, Denise read an article published on August 15, 2019 noting that Alder was nearing FDA approval of its migraine drug and as a result hiring a large salesforce, quoting the CEO as saying that “[a]ny day someone could knock on the door” and there could be an acquisition.

While the Government may argue that buying Alder stock in different accounts linked to family members rather than Dale was an attempt to conceal insider trading, this assertion is unsupported by the evidence.

summary from her doctor, Denise has several serious and debilitating chronic health problems that make her high risk for infections and complications in a custodial environment.

As Dale states, “[s]ince November 2021, my wife has taken me to 36 medical appointments which she coordinated, researched, and scheduled…I need Denise for daily activities as my condition is chronic and unpredictable.

I adopt and incorporate the February 14, 2020 declaration I submitted in support of the motion Rishi Shah and I filed to amend the Court's protective order and vacate the seizure warrant.

At the time of the Court's order denying the motion Mr. Shah and I had filed (Doc. 108), McGuire Woods held more than $3.8 million that I had provided for the firm's representation of me at trial in this matter.

Without the $3.8 mil1ion that I had provided to McGuire Woods, I did not have sufficient funds to pay the fee the firm required to represent me at trial.

Because I could not afford the fee McGuire Woods requested, the firm declined to Exhibit A represent me at trial and asked that I find new counsel.

If my portion of those substitute assets had been available to me following the Court's April 8, 2020 order, I would have used them--combined with my own funds if necessary--to keep McGuire Woods as my counsel.

Petitioner raises several other alleged deficiencies in SC’s representation, but none are either objectively unreasonable or prejudicial.

Exhibit A From: To: Cc: Subject: Date: Richard Finneran Madden, Matthew (USAILN) Johnston, William (CRM) [EXTERNAL] RE: Update Thursday, October 26, 2023 2:24:33 PM Matt, Just got off the phone with Vicki.

But she did share a few things that I believe are directly responsive to your question about whether, as we argued in our reply, the estimates provided by QE in 2020 were “reasonable” (which, again, we don’t concede is relevant), which I detail below.

Mr. Shah did not have the means to pay that amount at the time the representation was initiated, so they accepted a smaller retainer to commence their work with the expectation that the additional monies would be paid as Mr. Shah’s liquidity increased.

In our view, that is sufficient to show that QE’s $14-15 million estimate for both Mr. Shah’s and Ms. Agarwal’s representation was, if anything, an underestimate of the fees and expenses that would actually have been required.

It doesn’t sound like Vicki will be able to get me much more additional information before we are set to be in court tomorrow, but hopefully that gives you what you need in order to be able to assess whether you will continue to challenge the reasonableness of QE’s fee estimate.