On November 2, 2022, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for an Emergency Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order, requesting a temporary restraining order enjoining Defendants from unconstitutionally restricting their speech under the First Amendment, denying them equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment, and denying Federal Equal Access Act2 treatment, benefits, and

Denial of equal access prohibited (a) Restriction of limited open forum on basis of religious, political, philosophical, or other speech content prohibited It shall be unlawful for any public secondary school which receives Federal financial assistance and which has a limited open forum to deny equal access or a fair opportunity to, or discriminate against, any students who wish to conduct a meeting within that limited open forum Case 2:22-cv-12632-PDB-DRG ECF No. 14, PageID.194 Filed 11/07/22 Page 5 of 12 privileges that other student clubs enjoy at Skyline High School.

“This is so because … the issues of the public interest and harm to the respective parties largely depend on the constitutionality of the [state action].” Hamilton’s Bogarts, Inc. v. Michigan, 501 F.3d 644, 649 (6th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).

The Court finds, as stated from the bench at the hearing, that Plaintiffs have shown a strong likelihood of success on the merits of their First Amendment claim, and that they therefore have satisfied the requirements for obtaining a temporary restraining order at this early stage of the case.

The Court finds that Defendants seek to silence Plaintiffs’ appropriate First Amendment speech as to Michigan Proposal 3, and violate the Equal Access Act by refusing to broadcast Defendants’ modified announcement with their morning announcements, while permitting – indeed facilitating – its students to walkout from classes and join a demonstration in favor of Proposal 3 at the main entrance to Skyline High School.

But, nonetheless, Phillips was entitled to the neutral and respectful consideration of his claims in all the circumstances of the case.

Nonetheless, the Com- mission held that Mr. Phillips’s conduct violated the Colo- rado public accommodations law.

See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Wedding, http://www.masterpiececakes.com/ wedding-cakes (as last visited June 1, 2018) (gallery with 31 wedding cake images, none of which exhibits words).) The Division and the Court of Appeals could ...

Plaintiff disagrees, and moved for a preliminary injunction in this Court, claiming that enforcing the medical requirement would violate: (1) the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb et seq.

In so doing, the Court concluded broadly that Plaintiff was unlikely to succeed on the merits of any of her claims, did not show impending, irreparable harm, and the balance of the equities weighed against preliminary relief.

For example, the medical expert on Plaintiff’s RRT wrote that they were “unaware of any consistent scientific data documenting a less restrictive means than vaccination which is capable of meeting the government’s compelling interest to protect the health and safety of Airmen and Guardians.” ECF No. 22-13 at 100.

Another team member concluded that “[l]ess restrictive means including social distancing, mask wearing, and/or increased COVID-19 testing cannot be used to meet the compelling government interest.” Id. at 99.

Even then, the level of deference, the Court opined, that may be due is much more akin to the Supreme Court’s conclusion in Holt that “courts should respect th[e] expertise” of prison officials in reviewing a denial of a request for a religious exemption.

Amici have an interest in promoting clear standards for determining when statutes may be read to confer authority on agencies to promulgate legislative rules, which are binding regula- tions that alter regulated parties’ legal rights and re- sponsibilities.

Congress codified that exact principle in the Administrative Pro- cedure Act, which instructs courts to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action * * * in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statu- tory right.” 5 U.S.C. 706(2).

Moreover, the delegation must be clear and express before an agency can exercise interpretive authority respecting a “ques- tion of deep economic and political significance that is central to [a] statutory scheme.” King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Unlike employers facing potential liability under Title VII, federal agen- cies promulgating legislative rules are not private par- ties whose liberty and property interests may be at stake and accordingly do not need the same kind of leeway.

By con- trast, the government’s proposed approach—under which all federal departments and agencies would pos- sess implied authority to promulgate potentially con- flicting prophylactic exemptions subject to no congres- sional guidance—would create substantial confusion and likely do more harm than good.

Additionally, this case raises two new questions that were not present in Navy SEAL: (1) whether a servicemember has Article III standing to contest the denial of a religious accommodation where separation proceedings (or any other adverse action) have not yet begun; and (2) whether administrative, general (under honorable conditions) discharge is irreparable harm as a matter of law.

The Court would be inclined to agree that those sorts of claims are justiciable because (1) the test is concerned predominantly with legal process and (2) it does not involve second-guessing the wisdom of military judgments dealing with readiness and lethality.

also Fulton v. City of Phila., 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1906 (2021) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting Free Exercise claims have long been due different constitutional treatment in military context notwithstanding colonial reprieves from service).

Beyond a citation to Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223, 234 (2d Cir. 1985), which stands for the unremarkable proposition that soldiers enjoy some First Amendment protections as a matter of constitutional law, Plaintiff offers no authority suggesting that the Court should take a different tack.

First and foremost, a religious exemption from a medical requirement always starts from a disadvantaged position relative to other requests because, as the previously explained, there can be no greater military interest than in keeping each servicemember fit and healthy enough to accomplish their duties.

The same issues befall the out-of-circuit cases cited by the Mesaros defendants—none of the cases cited deals with the election advocacy portion of § 1985(3).

He served as a reviewer of the “Highway Capacity Manual 2010 (aka HCM2010), Reviewer, Transportation Research Board,” served as author of sections of Chapter 9 Intersections of the AASHTO A Policy on the Geometric Design of Highways and Streets (2018 Green Book), which is adopted by the Code of Federal Regulations as the United States national design standard, and his research work is specifically referenced in Chapter 9 Intersections of the Green Book.

Dr. Dorothy was the Technical Program Chair for the 4th International Symposium on Highway Geometric Design, which examined the potential safety and operational effects of the latest in research, policies and innovative practices.

Dr. Dorothy’s project was published in the American Society of Civil Engineers’ Journal of Transportation Engineering.3 The article’s abstract explains “[t]he purpose of the research reported on here was to determine if the results of [CDL] standardized testing could be directly linked to safer commercial vehicle operation in Michigan.

This is nothing like the instant case, where Dr. Dorothy provided a list of the evidence he relied upon and cited it in his report, including the most critical video identified by Plaintiffs’ Bates numbers.

Texas Apr. 23, 2019)(reliance on a commercial driver’s handbook as part of the materials he reviewed when conducting an accident reconstruction analysis can be appropriate if the witness is otherwise qualified to serve as an expert); Union Pac.

The Third Circuit correctly held that students have a constitutional right not to be seen undressed by the opposite sex but nonetheless upheld the policy, concluding it satisfied strict scrutiny.

In addition, the Fourth Circuit erred by focusing on the President’s campaign-trail com- ments to conclude that §2(c)—religiously neutral on its face—nonetheless has a principally religious purpose.