Case 2:24-cv-02232-MAK Document 33 Filed 06/27/24 Page1of 2

AND NOW,this 27"day of June 2024, upon studying Plaintiff's Motion to remand and for sanctions (ECF No. 8), two served Defendants’ Oppositions (ECF Nos. 22, 23), Plaintiff's Reply (ECF No. 29), mindful ofMotionsto dismiss raising the bar to recovery under Pennsylvania Law (ECF Nos, 30, 31), finding Defendants have not met their burden to invoke ourlimited “arising under”federal law subject matter jurisdiction given the pleaded issues can be resolved entirely under Pennsylvania Law,finding no basis for sanctions against the removing Defendants (but not expressing an opinion on Plaintiff's counsel’s representations as to the amount of the Judgmentat issue), and for reasons in today’s accompanying Memorandum, it is ORDERED Plaintiff's Motion (ECF No.8) is GRANTEDin part and DENIED in part requiring:

The Clerk of Court forthwith REMANDthis case, including the pending Motions to dismiss (ECF Nos. 30, 31) to the Court Administrator for the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County at No. 2024-8720; 2,

We DENYthe request for sanctions against the removing Defendants; and, The Clerk of Court close this case as we divest subject matter jurisdiction.

The financial institutions do not meet their heavy burden as the removing parties of demonstrating our subject matter jurisdiction reserved for a special and small category of cases “arising under” federal law.

Lincoln Investment, Teachers Insurance, Baxter Credit Union, and Ms. McManus each moved to dismiss the complaint.20 Ms. James amended to assert the same claims but added Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

The Supreme Court reversed, holding imposing a constructive trust to remedy Mr. Guidry’s theft of money from the union (and not the union’s pension plans) violated ERISA’s anti-alienation provision.71 The facts of Guidry are distinguishable.

Judge Foglietta held a hearing on March 21, 2024 to determine the reason Attorney Brown believed his client is entitled to an additional $43,300 in damages over the judgment amount, for a total of $181,067.89.

When Attorney Brown “present[ed] to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper,” he “certifi[ed] that to the best of [his] knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances: … (3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support.” Id. at 147 (quoting Fed. R. Civ.

Civil Procedure 16(b) and Local Rule of Court 16.1, and following a telephonic case management conference attended by all parties, during which the views of all counsel were solicited, it is hereby ORDERED that:

The following dates and deadlines shall govern the discovery and dispositive motions phase of the above-captioned civil action:

Counsel shall not mutually agree to extend any time periods covered by this order, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or the Local Rules of Court without court approval.

The Clerk of Court shall issue our standard civil practice order forthwith.

Counsel and pro se parties are responsible for reading the civil practice order thoroughly upon receipt and for reviewing it regularly as the case proceeds.

Any motion to exclude expert testimony that will require a Daubert hearing shall be filed within 30 days from receipt of the challenged expert’s report, unless otherwise ordered.

To utilize JERS, counsel must submit a properly formatted USB flash drive with the complete set of exhibits to the court’s Deputy Clerk no less than five days before the start of trial.

Should the parties jointly agree to employ any of these forms of alternative dispute resolution, they shall so notify the court by filing a letter to the docket by no later than the date of the pretrial conference.

No signature line for judicial approval is required; a signed notice of dismissal closes the case and ends the court’s jurisdiction without further court action.

No signature line for judicial approval is required; a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties to have appeared closes the case and ends the court’s jurisdiction without further court action.

Specifically, Defendants assert that the Court should not have granted Plaintiff Michael P. McDonough leave to amend his complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) to amplify his allegations with respect to Article III standing.

Noting the absence of Third Circuit caselaw regarding the interaction between TransUnion and alleged violations of the FDCPA, the Court found that Mr. McDonough had standing merely “by virtue of [his] receipt of false or misleading debt collection communications.” See ECF No. 92 at 6 (citing cases).

Good cause will not exist when such a motion is “used as a means to reargue matters already argued,” is merely “an attempt to relitigate a point of disagreement between the Court and the litigant,” is nothing more than a “second bite at the apple,” or raises “new arguments or evidence that could have been proffered prior to the issuance of the order in question.” Qazizadeh, 214 F. Supp.

The Third Circuit has explained that delay becomes undue when it is “protracted and unjustified” because it either (i) places a burden on the court or the opposing party or (ii) shows “a lack of diligence sufficient to justify a discretionary denial of leave.” Spartan Concrete Prod., LLC v. Argos USVI, Corp., 929 F.3d 107, 115 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Mullin v. Balicki, 875 F.3d 140, 151 (3d Cir. 2017)).

To the extent defendants assert that delay is undue because of the burden it places on them at a relatively late stage of the litigation, the cases they rely on are inapposite because they involved denial of leave to amend after judgment had been entered.