In response, the defendants offer an explanation of the circumstances and provide justification concerning the disclosure of Norman as an expert witness on August 19, 2009, and then they urge the court not to exclude Norman’s report and testimony.

), and he considers himself to be an expert in “first amendment law as it applies to colleges and universities, higher education.” Lukianoff has never testified as an expert before, but the essence of his opinion in this case would be that “Zaccari’s treatment of Hayden Barnes is one of the worst, if not the worst, violations of free speech rights against a university student that [he has] seen since [he] began working in this field in October of 2001.” Further, the plaintiff contends Lukianoff’s testimony is being proffered to assist the trier of fact’s understanding of three critical issues: (1) the relative harmlessness of plaintiff’s speech compared to the severity of the punishment; (2) the defendants’ apparent willfully disingenuous rationale for expelling the plaintiff; and (3) the defendants’ refusal to undo its punishment in the face of public pressure and exposure of the facts in this case.

On the other hand, the defendants argue that Lukianoff’s testimony offers nothing more than legal conclusions and is inadmissible because it is not helpful to the jury (finder of fact) as required by Federal Rule of Evidence 701(b).

Moreover, this proffered testimony is not beyond the understanding of the average lay person and will not help the trier of fact because it offers nothing more than what lawyers for the parties in this case could present in closing arguments.

Furthermore, expert testimony on the recognized standards and principles in the regulation of student expression in American public higher education is not necessary because it is not beyond the understanding of the average lay person and will not help the trier of fact.

In response, the defendants offer an explanation of the circumstances and provide justification concerning the disclosure of Norman as an expert witness on August 19, 2009, and then they urge the court not to exclude Norman’s report and testimony.

), and he considers himself to be an expert in “first amendment law as it applies to colleges and universities, higher education.” Lukianoff has never testified as an expert before, but the essence of his opinion in this case would be that “Zaccari’s treatment of Hayden Barnes is one of the worst, if not the worst, violations of free speech rights against a university student that [he has] seen since [he] began working in this field in October of 2001.” Further, the plaintiff contends Lukianoff’s testimony is being proffered to assist the trier of fact’s understanding of three critical issues: (1) the relative harmlessness of plaintiff’s speech compared to the severity of the punishment; (2) the defendants’ apparent willfully disingenuous rationale for expelling the plaintiff; and (3) the defendants’ refusal to undo its punishment in the face of public pressure and exposure of the facts in this case.

On the other hand, the defendants argue that Lukianoff’s testimony offers nothing more than legal conclusions and is inadmissible because it is not helpful to the jury (finder of fact) as required by Federal Rule of Evidence 701(b).

Moreover, this proffered testimony is not beyond the understanding of the average lay person and will not help the trier of fact because it offers nothing more than what lawyers for the parties in this case could present in closing arguments.

Furthermore, expert testimony on the recognized standards and principles in the regulation of student expression in American public higher education is not necessary because it is not beyond the understanding of the average lay person and will not help the trier of fact.

... 144 :12-16 (testifying that it does not affect his opinion one way or the other that none of the clinicians that are actually involved in this case believed that Mr. Barnes was a threat) .) Incredibly, Dr . Norman 21 Case 1:08-cv-00077-CAP ...

... 144 :12-16 (testifying that it does not affect his opinion one way or the other that none of the clinicians that are actually involved in this case believed that Mr. Barnes was a threat) .) Incredibly, Dr . Norman 21 Case 7:12-cv-00089-HL ...

... to have an advisor accompany the student to the hearing; (4) the right to question any and all witnesses and to submit his or her own witnesses ; (5) the right to open proceedings ; and (6) the right to have the proceedings recorded . None ...

... to have an advisor accompany the student to the hearing; (4) the right to question any and all witnesses and to submit his or her own witnesses ; (5) the right to open proceedings ; and (6) the right to have the proceedings recorded . None ...

But -- is it your testimony then that people who did talk to Mr. Barnes at the time of the events of his expulsion would be in a better position to assess whether or not he was dangerous?

Or -- or an independent evaluator that understands the risk of dangerousness and plus or minus Page 146

and don't have a therapeutic alliance or are aligned in such a way with the doctor-patient relationship with Mr. Barnes.

with a patient is in not as good a position to assess dangerousness?

Q Let's mark as Norman Deposition Exhibit Number 10 a deposition transcript in the case of Mastrilli, M-a-s-t-r-i-1l-1-i, versus Prison Health Services.

But -- is it your testimony then that people who did talk to Mr. Barnes at the time of the events of his expulsion would be in a better position to assess whether or not he was dangerous?

Or -- or an independent evaluator that understands the risk of dangerousness and plus or minus Page 146

and don't have a therapeutic alliance or are aligned in such a way with the doctor-patient relationship with Mr. Barnes.

with a patient is in not as good a position to assess dangerousness?

Q Let's mark as Norman Deposition Exhibit Number 10 a deposition transcript in the case of Mastrilli, M-a-s-t-r-i-1l-1-i, versus Prison Health Services.

Indeed, even before the post-discovery conference took place, the VSU defendants sought leave of this Court to file a motion for summary judgment in excess of the page limits set forth in the Local Rules.

Only after representing to this Court that they were prepared to proceed with a summary judgment motion did the VSU defendants submit their proposed expert report, nearly three weeks after the close of discovery.

In addition to excluding Norman’s evidence at trial or on motions, the Court may impose an award of attorney’s fees for a party’s failure to properly disclose expert witnesses.

Given the posture of the case and recent filings, it is not a stretch to infer that the VSU defendants intend to use Norman’s expert report in support of their upcoming summary judgment motion.

The VSU defendants’ attempt to slide in Norman’s testimony and expert report through an unexplained, tardy filing shows a disregard for the Court’s Scheduling Order and the discovery process and warrants sanctions pursuant to Rule 37(c)(1).

Indeed, even before the post-discovery conference took place, the VSU defendants sought leave of this Court to file a motion for summary judgment in excess of the page limits set forth in the Local Rules.

Only after representing to this Court that they were prepared to proceed with a summary judgment motion did the VSU defendants submit their proposed expert report, nearly three weeks after the close of discovery.

In addition to excluding Norman’s evidence at trial or on motions, the Court may impose an award of attorney’s fees for a party’s failure to properly disclose expert witnesses.

Given the posture of the case and recent filings, it is not a stretch to infer that the VSU defendants intend to use Norman’s expert report in support of their upcoming summary judgment motion.

The VSU defendants’ attempt to slide in Norman’s testimony and expert report through an unexplained, tardy filing shows a disregard for the Court’s Scheduling Order and the discovery process and warrants sanctions pursuant to Rule 37(c)(1).

At no time wasit agreed upon, or even discussed, that my being retained was conditioned upon my findings or conclusion being favorable to the Defendants.

On October 30, 2009, I was served with pre-deposition discovery requesting me to produce voluminous documents to Plaintiff's counsel prior to my deposition.

It is my customary practice to require attorneys to prepay for the expected time for preparing andsitting for my deposition.

retained an attorney and, in consultation with Ms. Hance and Plaintiff’s counsel, it wasagreed that I would be paid $1824.25 as payment for my expenses and fees prior to the deposition.

An in-person assessment of the Plaintiff, anytime outside the period of April to May 2007, would not have provided any additional data to change my analysis ofthe risk factors in this case, Further affiant sayeth not.