Northern District of California United States District Court A “party seeking to seal judicial records must show that ‘compelling reasons supported by specific factual findings ... outweigh the general history of access and the public policies favoring disclosure.’” Id. (quoting Kamakana v. City and County of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178-79 (9th Cir. 2006)).

The Court therefore presumes plaintiffs lodged any objections they had with sealing or redacting documents contained within Dkt. No. 1097 when they stated they only opposed sealing documents which “redact information about 1) the value of the settlement, as explained in the approval motion, and (2) the quantity of data that Google is required to delete, as memorialized in the settlement agreement.” Northern District of California United States District Court seeks to maintain under seal “[p]laintiffs’ damages expert Michael Lasinski’s purported estimates of Google’s revenue loss due to a feature in Incognito mode that blocks third-party cookies by default, which [Google argues] is based on highly confidential and competitively sensitive Google data ... .” (Dkt. No. 1103 at 1.)

True; but the Court did not have to weigh the right of the public to evaluate the terms of a settlement that could impact millions and potentially end the litigation at that time.

However, the request to redact certain portions of these documents is GRANTED IN PART: the undisputed portions of the documents shall remain sealed, the topline revenue loss figure that bears on the value of the settlement shall be publicly filed, and internal metrics used to calculate that number shall be redacted.

Further identified within this category are three documents submitted in camera for the Court’s review that contain information on billing records in connection with plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees.

Northern District of California United States District Court A “party seeking to seal judicial records must show that ‘compelling reasons supported by specific factual findings ... outweigh the general history of access and the public policies favoring disclosure.’” Id. (quoting Kamakana v. City and County of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178-79 (9th Cir. 2006)).

The Court therefore presumes plaintiffs lodged any objections they had with sealing or redacting documents contained within Dkt. No. 1097 when they stated they only opposed sealing documents which “redact information about 1) the value of the settlement, as explained in the approval motion, and (2) the quantity of data that Google is required to delete, as memorialized in the settlement agreement.” Northern District of California United States District Court seeks to maintain under seal “[p]laintiffs’ damages expert Michael Lasinski’s purported estimates of Google’s revenue loss due to a feature in Incognito mode that blocks third-party cookies by default, which [Google argues] is based on highly confidential and competitively sensitive Google data ... .” (Dkt. No. 1103 at 1.)

True; but the Court did not have to weigh the right of the public to evaluate the terms of a settlement that could impact millions and potentially end the litigation at that time.

However, the request to redact certain portions of these documents is GRANTED IN PART: the undisputed portions of the documents shall remain sealed, the topline revenue loss figure that bears on the value of the settlement shall be publicly filed, and internal metrics used to calculate that number shall be redacted.

Further identified within this category are three documents submitted in camera for the Court’s review that contain information on billing records in connection with plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees.

The report stated in relevant part that “Google has represented that it performed a reasonable investigation and confirmed that it can produce the , where available, together with the Google Account ID [i.e. ], where available, for the prior and forthcoming productions of sampled named-Plaintiff data.

While plaintiffs repeatedly assert that any time the Court used the term “joining keys,” this necessarily included nothing in either of these orders clearly required Google to preserve and produce and/or decrypted .

To the contrary, Google offers persuasive evidence that its ordinary practice of destroying the keys after is an important data security and privacy measure.

In these circumstances, plaintiffs’ argument that, because they demanded “joining keys” in litigation, Google had an obligation to preserve ignores the history of the parties’ disputes and the Court’s prior orders regarding this ESI, as recounted in detail above.

That is, as of May 24, 2023, the parties’ status report to the Court did not identify any remaining disputes about what Google would preserve or produce with respect to named plaintiffs data, and plaintiffs’ counsel’s email did not wipe the slate clean.

Defendant Google, LLC seeks to stay proceedings in this Court pending the Ninth Circuit’s resolution of this Court’s order denying a motion to intervene.

The intervention motion took no issue with the substance of the injunctive relief negotiated by the parties, but claimed the settlement was unfair in its disparate treatment of the named class representatives and the Salcido plaintiffs.

More specifically, the Salcido plaintiffs alleged the following: • First, whereas named class members could arbitrate their damages claims using procedures enumerated in the settlement agreement, the Salcido plaintiffs “must individually file actions in state court, paying costs and fees, prove up their case using evidence either adduced during that litigation or obtained by way of this motion, present liability and damages evidence to the trier of fact, subject to Google’s complete line of defenses, which judgment would then be appealable by Google when Moving Parties were found successful at trial.” (Id. at 11.)

Indeed, counsel for Moving Parties sought information regarding the tolling agreement, class counsel refused to provide a copy or any information regarding the negotiations leading to the agreement.” (Id.)2 Northern District of California United States District Court The Court took argument on the intervention motion and issued a denial, which the Salcido plaintiffs appealed.

Nor do the statements collected from Google and the Salcido plaintiffs change the fundamental fact that the intervention motion sought to delay this Court’s approval of the agreement.

Defendant Google, LLC seeks to stay proceedings in this Court pending the Ninth Circuit’s resolution of this Court’s order denying a motion to intervene.

The intervention motion took no issue with the substance of the injunctive relief negotiated by the parties, but claimed the settlement was unfair in its disparate treatment of the named class representatives and the Salcido plaintiffs.

More specifically, the Salcido plaintiffs alleged the following: • First, whereas named class members could arbitrate their damages claims using procedures enumerated in the settlement agreement, the Salcido plaintiffs “must individually file actions in state court, paying costs and fees, prove up their case using evidence either adduced during that litigation or obtained by way of this motion, present liability and damages evidence to the trier of fact, subject to Google’s complete line of defenses, which judgment would then be appealable by Google when Moving Parties were found successful at trial.” (Id. at 11.)

Indeed, counsel for Moving Parties sought information regarding the tolling agreement, class counsel refused to provide a copy or any information regarding the negotiations leading to the agreement.” (Id.)2 Northern District of California United States District Court The Court took argument on the intervention motion and issued a denial, which the Salcido plaintiffs appealed.

Nor do the statements collected from Google and the Salcido plaintiffs change the fundamental fact that the intervention motion sought to delay this Court’s approval of the agreement.

The Parties dispute the scope of the Suspension Order in just one respect: whether it grants Plaintiffs immediate production of all of the data preserved to date.

Upon such an order of remand, Google is to immediately re- instate the preservation protocols and pipelines as they currently exist.

This Order does not suspend or modify any of Google’s preservation duties or requirements in any other litigation or proceedings, including but not limited to Brown v. Google, 20-cv-3664-YGR.

Google raises two additional arguments regarding production of the preserved data, which the Court addresses in brief.

Finally, Plaintiffs also raise a further point in the form of a proposed compromise wherein they forgo immediate production of preserved data and Google stipulates to various issues relating to ascertainability of the class.

to serve as Special Master for the purpose of assisting the Court in reviewing claims of attorney-client privilege and attorney work product protection asserted by defendant Google, Inc.

In resolving disputes about privilege claims, the Special Master may: a. determine the order in which disputes will be resolved; b. determine whether Google has established a prima facie claim that a privilege or protection applies; c. require the parties to submit briefing and/or supporting declarations; d. review documents in camera; e. hear oral argument; and f. conduct other proceedings that the Special Master deems necessary to

In addition to filing, the Special Master shall email copies of his orders, reports, or recommendations to counsel of record for the parties and to the Court.

Pursuant to Rule 53(f)(1), in acting on an order, report, or recommendation of the Special Master, the Court shall afford each party an opportunity to be heard and, at its discretion, may receive evidence and may adopt or affirm, modify, wholly or partly reject or reverse, resubmit to the Special Master with instructions, or make any further orders it deems appropriate.

Pursuant to Rule 53(f)(3), the Court will review de novo all objections to findings of fact made or recommended by the Special Master as the parties have not reached agreement on a different standard.

There is a strong presumption in favor of access by the public to judicial records and documents accompanying dispositive motions that can be overcome only by a showing of “compelling reasons supported by specific factual findings.” Kamakana v. City & Cnty.

A party seeking to seal documents or information in connection with such a motion must meet the lower “good cause” standard of Fed. R. Civ.

Google argues that good cause exists to seal portions of the briefing and supporting materials here because these materials refer to “highly sensitive data logs, data systems, and mechanisms related to the protection of user identifiers that Google maintains as confidential in the ordinary course of its business and that are not generally known to the public or Google’s competitors.” Dkt. No. 705 at 4; Dkt. No. 712 at 4; Dkt. No. 721 at 3; see also Dkt. No. 707 at 4.

Google argues that these materials also contain “confidential, technical details pertaining to Google’s advertising products and their proprietary functionalities, data infrastructure, logs, and metrics.” Dkt. No. 707 at 4.

With a few exceptions, the redactions Google proposes to the public versions of these documents are minimal and narrowly tailored to address the concerns it identifies.

Movants claim that the Ninth Circuit’s recent opinion in Calhoun v. Google, LLC warrants reconsideration of this Court’s prior order denying certification of a damages class in this action.

“Motions for reconsideration are disfavored and ‘should not be granted, absent highly unusual circumstances, unless the district court is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an intervening change in the controlling law.’” Day v. GEICO Cas.

1 The parties to this action jointly filed a request to move the date on which this motion could be heard.

As the Court finds the motion appropriate for resolution without oral argument, the parties’ request is DENIED AS MOOT.

Nor do movants present any information to alleviate the concerns expressed by the Court at argument on the motion to intervene.