~
`Prials@@uspto. gov
`
`571-272-7822
`
`Paper11
`Entered: December6, 2023
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`META PLATFORMS, INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`V.
`
`IMMERSION CORPORATION,
`Patent Owner.
`
`IPR2023-00945
`Patent 10,664,143 B2
`
`Before PATRICK R. SCANLON, CHRISTOPHER L. OGDEN,and
`IFTIKHAR AHMED,Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`OGDEN,Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`DECISION
`Granting Institution of /nter Partes Review
`3S US.C. $314
`
`
`Prials@@uspto. gov
`
`571-272-7822
`
`Paper11
`Entered: December6, 2023
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`META PLATFORMS, INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`V.
`
`IMMERSION CORPORATION,
`Patent Owner.
`
`IPR2023-00945
`Patent 10,664,143 B2
`
`Before PATRICK R. SCANLON, CHRISTOPHER L. OGDEN,and
`IFTIKHAR AHMED,Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`OGDEN,Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`DECISION
`Granting Institution of /nter Partes Review
`3S US.C. $314
`
`
`
`IPR2023-00945
`Patent 10,664,143 B2
`
`1. INTRODUCTION
`
`Petitioner Meta Platforms, Inc. (““Meta’’) filed a Petition (Paper 2,
`
`“Pet.”) under 35 U.S.C. §§ 311-319 requesting inter partes review (“IPR”)
`
`of claims 1—3, 7-10, 14-17, and 20 of U.S. Patent No. 10,664,143 B2 (Ex.
`
`1001, “the ’143 patent”). Patent Owner Immersion Corporation
`
`(“Immersion”) filed a Preliminary Response (Paper 10, “Prelim. Resp.”).!
`
`Underthe authority delegated to us by the Director of the USPTO
`
`under 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a), we may institute an inter partes review when “the
`
`information presented in the petition .. . and any response .
`
`.
`
`. showsthat
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`there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect
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`to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); see
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`also 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(c) (2023). Applying that standard, we institute an
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`inter partes review of the challenged claimsof the 7143 patent for the
`
`reasons explained below. This is a preliminary decision, and we will base
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`our final written decision on the full trial record.
`
`Il. BACKGROUND
`
`A.
`
`THE ’143 PATENT (EX. 1001)
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`The ’143 patent describes “a system configured to present interactive
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`content to a user that is manipulating a peripheral.” Ex. 1001, 1:54—56. The
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`system can adjust the interactive content, as well as haptic feedback to the
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`' The parties identify themselvesasthe real parties in interest, and this is not
`contested on the preliminary record. See Pet. 1; Paper 8, 1.
`
`2
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`
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`IPR2023-00945
`Patent 10,664,143 B2
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`user, based in part on the sensed position of the peripheral. See id. at 1:61-
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`2:5. Haptic feedback, according to the ’143 patent, “may includetactile
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`and/or kinesthetic (force) feedback technology that takes advantage of a
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`user’s sense of touch by applying forces, vibrations, motions, and/or other
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`touch feedback to the user” to create “a more compelling and complete user
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`experience while interacting with interactive content.” Ex. 1001, 3:9-14.A
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`“peripheral” can include a device or physical object, including a bodypart,
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`that can be manipulated by a user. See id. at 3:29—56.
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`Sensing the position of a peripheral may involve the use of a “position
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`sensor”that is “configured to generate an output signal that conveys
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`information related to the position of the peripheral.” Ex. 1001, 5:48—50;
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`accord id. at 5:56—58. The position sensors maybe used for “remote
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`sensing,” such as by using an imaging device, triangulation with wireless
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`signals, or other types of motion tracking. Ex. 1001, 5:35-45. Remote
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`sensing may also include “access to data from device-embedded sensors
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`such as magnetometer, accelerometer/gyroscope, and/or other remote
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`sensing techniques.” /d. at 5:45—48. Also, “[i]n some implementations, the
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`position sensor ... may include one or moresensors carried by [the]
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`peripheral,” such as “an accelerometer, a gyroscope,[or] a digital compass.”
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`Td. at 5:53—56.
`
`B.
`
`CHALLENGED CLAIMS AND GROUNDS
`
`Representative claim 1 is as follows:
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`1. Asystem comprising:
`
`1[a]
`
`1[b]
`
`a position sensor;
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`a processor; and
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`
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`IPR2023-00945
`Patent 10,664,143 B2
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`1[c]
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`1[d]
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`1[e]
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`1[f]
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`I[g]
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`1[h]
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`1fa]
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`a non-transitory computer-readable medium comprising
`program codethat is executable by the processor to
`cause the processorto:
`
`output first interactive content to a display, the first
`interactive content comprising a virtual
`environment;
`
`receive one or more sensor signals from the position
`sensor;
`
`determine a position of a peripheral in real space
`based on the one or more sensorsignals, the
`peripheral configured to be worn on a user’s head;
`
`output secondinteractive contentto the display based
`on the position of the peripheral in real space, the
`second interactive content being different from the
`first interactive content;
`
`determine a haptic signal based on the position of the
`peripheral in real space and the secondinteractive
`content; and
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`transmit the haptic signal to a haptic output device, the
`haptic output device being configured to receive
`the haptic signal and output haptic feedback.
`
`Ex. 1001, 12:57—13:13 (Meta’s reference numbers added).
`
`
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`IPR2023-00945
`Patent 10,664,143 B2
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`Metaargues a single groundsfor inter partes review, aS Summarized
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`in the followingtable:
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` 1-3, 7-10, 14-17 103(a)?
`
`20
`
`Pet. 3.
`
`C.
`
`DECLARATORY TESTIMONY
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`Meta submits a declaration by Dr. Jeremy Cooperstock. Ex. 1002.
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`Immersion submits a declaration by Dr. Gregory Abowd. Ex. 2002.
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`D.
`
`RELATED PROCEEDING
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`Asrelated matters, the parties identify Jmmersion Corp. v. Meta
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`Platforms, Inc., No. 22-cv-00541 (W.D. Tex. filed May 27, 2022),
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`transferred within district, No. 23-cv-00623 (W.D. Tex. effective June1,
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`2023) (“related district court case’”’). Pet. 1; Paper 8, 1.
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`lil. DISCRETIONARY GROUND FOR DENYINGINSTITUTION
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`Institution of inter partes review 1s at the Director’s discretion, which
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`has been delegated to the Board under her guidance. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a);
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`Harmonic Inc. y. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
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`735 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006), amended by Leahy—Smith America Invents Act
`(“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112-29 § 103, sec. (n)(1), 125 Stat. 284, 287, 293
`(2011) (effective Mar. 16, 2013). This pre-AIA version of § 103 applies
`because the ’143 patent issued from a chain of continuation applications
`reaching back to September 30, 2010, which is before the effective date of
`the AIA amendments. See Ex. 1001, code (63).
`3 Nogamiet al., US 2009/0066725 A] (published Mar. 12, 2009) (Ex. 1003).
`
`5
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`IPR2023-00945
`Patent 10,664,143 B2
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`(“[T]he [USPTO] is permitted, but never compelled, to institute an IPR
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`proceeding.”); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (“The Boardinstitutes the trial on behalf
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`of the Director.’’).
`
`Under Board precedent, one of the considerations that may weigh in
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`favor of denying a petition under § 314(a) is the advancedstate of a parallel
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`district court action. See NHK Spring Co.v. Intri-Plex Techs., Inc., IPR2018-
`
`00752, Paper 8 at 20 (PTAB Sept. 12, 2018) (precedential); Patent Trial and
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`Appeal Board, Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, 58 & n.2 (Nov. 2019),
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`available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/tpgnov.pdf.
`
`In Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., 1PR2020-00019, Paper 11 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020)
`
`(precedential), the Board explained that “cases addressing earlier trial dates
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`as a basis for denial under NHK have soughtto balance considerations such
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`as system efficiency, fairness, and patent quality.” /intiv, Paper 11 at 5.
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`Fintiv sets forth six non-exclusive factors for determining “whether
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`efficiency, fairness, and the merits support the exercise of authority to deny
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`institution in view of an earlier trial date in the parallel proceeding.”/d. at 6.
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`The Director has also issued interim guidance to the Board on applying these
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`factors. See Katherine K. Vidal, Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials
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`in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation (June
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`21, 2022) 9, available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/
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`documents/interimprocdiscretionarydenialsaiaparalleldistrictcourt_
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`litigationmemo_20220621 _.pdf (“Director Memo’).
`
`The Director Memo explainsthat, “[c]onsistent with Sotera Wireless,
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`Inc., the PTAB will not discretionarily deny institution in view ofparallel
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`district court litigation wherea petitioner presents a stipulation not to pursue
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`in a parallel proceeding the same grounds or any grounds that could have
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`6
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`IPR2023-00945
`Patent 10,664,143 B2
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`reasonably been raised before the PTAB.” Director Memo3 (footnote
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`omitted) (citing Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019,
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`Paper 12 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (precedential as to § II.A)). The Director
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`Memoexplainsthat such a Sofera stipulation “mitigates concerns of
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`potentially conflicting decisions and duplicative efforts between the district
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`court and the PTAB . .. and allows the PTAB to review groundsthat the
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`parallel district court litigation will not resolve.” /d. at 7-8.
`
`Meta acknowledgesthat in the related district court case, the court has
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`set a trial date for February 20, 2024. Pet. 4.4 But to address any concerns
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`regarding duplication of efforts between the related district court case and
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`this proceeding, Meta providesa stipulation that it “will not pursue in the
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`district court any groundsof invalidity against the challenged claimsthat
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`were raised or reasonably could have been raised in IPR.” /d.
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`In response, Immersion acknowledges that Meta offers a Sotera
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`stipulation, and that under these circumstances“a petition should not
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`ordinarily be denied in accordance with the Fintiv factors.” Prelim. Resp. 33.
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`But Immersion contends that we should still exercise our discretion to deny
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`the Petition under § 314(a) based on the advancedstate of the district court
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`case and the duplication of invalidity groundsasserted in this proceeding. /d.
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`at 33-34 (citing Cisco Sys., Inc. v. Estech Sys., Inc., IPR2021-00329, Paper
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`13 (PTAB July 6, 2021)).
`
`4 Meta arguesthatit filed a motion to transfer the case to the U.S. District
`Court for the Northern District of California that remained pendingat the
`time of filing the Petition. Pet. 4. Immersion informsusthat this motion was
`unsuccessful. See PO Resp. 36.
`
`
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`IPR2023-00945
`Patent 10,664,143 B2
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`Wedo notagree that we can effectively ignore the Director Memo
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`under these circumstances. Immersion cites Cisco, a non-precedential Board
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`decision decided prior to the Director Memo in whichthe panel weighedthe
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`Fintiv factors and determined that a Sotera stipulation did not overcome a
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`trial date scheduled significantly before the projected date of a final written
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`decision. See Prelim. Resp. 34. The Director Memoissuedafter this decision
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`as “binding agency guidance.” Director Memoat 3. Thus, the Director
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`Memoabrogates any prior inconsistent holdings by Board panels, including
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`the Cisco decision. Because Meta has provided a Sotera stipulation, the
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`Director Memois controlling and the Fintiv factors are not a basis for
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`denyinginstitution.
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`IV. GROUND OF THE PETITION
`
`A claim is unpatentable under § 103(a) if the differences between the
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`claimed subject matter and the prior art are “such that the subject matter as a
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`whole would have been obviousat the time the invention was madeto a
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`person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.”
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`KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007).
`
`Webaseour obviousness inquiry on factual considerations including
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`(1) the scope and content of the prior art, (2) any differences between the
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`claimed subject matter and the priorart, (3) the level of skill in the art, and
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`(4) any objective indicia of obviousness or non-obviousness that may be in
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`evidence. See Graham y. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966).
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`
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`IPR2023-00945
`Patent 10,664,143 B2
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`Considering these factors,> we determine that Meta has demonstrated
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`a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing that at least one of
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`claims 1-3, 7-10, 14-17, and 20 of the ’143 patent is unpatentable as
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`obvious over Nogami. We begin by addressing two issues underlying our
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`analysis: the level of ordinary skill in the art and the construction we will
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`apply to the claim terms.
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`A.
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`LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART
`
`The level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art at the time of the
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`invention is one of the factors we consider when determining whether a
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`patent claim is obviousoverthe prior art. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 17-18. It
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`is also a factor in how weconstrue patent claims. See Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
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`A415 F.3d 1303, 1312-13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
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`To assess the level of ordinary skill, we construct a hypothetical
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`“person of ordinary skill in the art,” from whose vantage point we assess
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`obviousnessand claim interpretation. See /n re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1357
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`(Fed. Cir. 1998). This legal construct “presumesthat all prior art references
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`in the field of the invention are available to this hypothetical skilled artisan.”
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`Id. (citing In re Carlson, 983 F.2d 1032, 1038 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
`
`Metaarguesthat a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had
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`a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or computer
`science (or an equivalent degree), and two yearsofpractical or
`
`> Becauseneither party arguesthat there are objective indicia of obviousness
`or non-obviousnessat this stage, this does not factor into our decision. See
`Ex. 1002 4 100 (Dr. Cooperstock stating that he is not aware of any objective
`indicia of nonobviousness); see generally Prelim. Resp. (omitting any
`discussion of objective indicia).
`
`
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`IPR2023-00945
`Patent 10,664,143 B2
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`industry experience in the field of human computerinteraction,
`including implementation of computer-based systems and
`software for providing haptic feedback effects to a user and
`determining the position and/or orientation of a device used by
`a user (such as a device worn on the human body).
`
`Pet. 4-5 (citing Ex. 1002 4] 8-9).
`
`Immersion arguesthat a person of ordinary skill “would have had a
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`bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or computer science (or an
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`equivalent degree), and twoyears of practical or industry experience in the
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`field of human computer interaction (HCI), including implementation of
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`computer-based systemsand software for providing haptic feedback effects
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`to auser.” Prelim. Resp. 9 (citing Ex. 2002
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`11).
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`The only substantial difference between the two proposals is that Meta
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`includes experience in “determining the position and/or orientation of a
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`device used by a user (such as a device worn on the human body),” whereas
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`Immersion does not. Compare Pet. 4—5, with Prelim. Resp. 9. At this stage,
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`Immersion andits expert Dr. Abowd do notsay if, or why, it disagrees with
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`this part of Meta’s articulation. See Prelim. Resp. 8—9; Ex. 2002 J 8-12. We
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`preliminarily determine that this part of Meta’s proposal is consistent with
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`the types of technical problemsthat the ’143 patent assumes the reader
`
`would have been able to solve without detailed disclosure. See, e.g., Ex.
`
`1001, 5:35—58, 6:48-60. And because the remainder of Meta’s proposal is
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`substantially undisputed, we adopt Meta’s articulation of the level of
`
`ordinary skill in the art for this decision. Becausethis 1s a preliminary
`
`determination, Immersion may provide additional arguments or evidence
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`supporting a different level of ordinary skill at trial.
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`10
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`IPR2023-00945
`Patent 10,664,143 B2
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`B.
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`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
`
`In an inter partes review, we construe a patent claim “using the same
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`claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a
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`civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b).” 37 C.E.R. § 42.100(b) (2023). This
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`generally includes “construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and
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`customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in
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`the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” /d. The ordinary
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`and customary meaning of a claim term “is its meaningto the ordinary
`
`artisan after reading the entire patent,” and “as of the effective filing date of
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`the patent application.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313, 1321.
`
`Meta notes that in the related district court case, the parties have
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`proposed constructions for the term “real space.”Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1006, 2).
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`But Meta “does not believe any term requires express construction at this
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`time” for purposesof this proceeding. /d.
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`Immersion informs us that the district court construed the term “real
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`space”as havingits plain and ordinary meaning. Prelim. Resp. 9 n.2 (citing
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`Ex. 2005, 4). At this preliminary stage, Immersion contendsthat “all claim
`
`terms should be afforded their ordinary and customary meaning, as
`
`understood by a [person of ordinary skill in the art], in the context of the
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`patent specification.” /d. at 9-10 (citing Ex. 2002 § 36).
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`Based on the preliminary record, we havenot identified any claim
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`terms, including “real space,” that clearly depart from their ordinary and
`
`customary meanings, and our decision to institute trial does not require us to
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`construe any terms explicitly. See Realtime Data, LLC v. lancu, 912 F.3d
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`1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those
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`terms... that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve
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`11
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`IPR2023-00945
`Patent 10,664,143 B2
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`the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci & Eng’g, Inc., 200
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`F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). Accordingly, we analyze the claim
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`language below in the context of the priorart.
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`C.
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`OVERVIEW OF NOGAMI
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`Nogamigenerally relates to “an information-processing apparatus
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`configured to implement an interaction between a virtual space and a user
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`whoobservesthe virtual space.” Ex. 1003 4 2. Figure 1 of Nogami illustrates
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`“an exemplary state of a system, which is being used bythe user.” /d. J 30,
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`47.
`
`FIG.1
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`
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`Figure 1, above, depicts user 1, on whose hand, elbow, and knee are
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`mounted stimulation generation units 10, 11, and 12, respectively. Ex. 1003
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`12
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`
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`IPR2023-00945
`Patent 10,664,143 B2
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`451. Head-mounted display (““HMD”) 100 is also mounted on user 1’s head.
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`Id. | 49. Each of these devices allows the user to experience a virtual space
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`including virtual object 300, which in this exampleis a full-scale
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`automobile. /d. 9] 49-50. Position and orientation sensors 400 (depicted as
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`cameras) also acquire the position of markers 40 attached to stimulation
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`generation units 10-12 and HMD 100, and then calculation processing
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`apparatus 200 usesthis position information to output a combined imagethat
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`includes a virtual image and real space image to HMD 100. Id. 4 52.
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`Nogamidivides the space around user | into “attention range” 50 (the
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`volume in which user | can perceive virtual objects visually) and “non-
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`attention range” 60 (the remaining volume). Ex. 1003 4 100-101. In both
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`ranges, user 1 may makevirtual tactile contact with virtual objects; for
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`example, user 1’s hand (wearing simulation generation unit 10) might
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`contact virtual object 300 within attention range 50, while user 1’s knee
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`(wearing simulation generation unit 12) might contact virtual object 300 in
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`non-attention range 60. /d. ¥ 102—03. In this example, calculation
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`processing apparatus 200 might generate different haptic stimulations to
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`units 10 and 12, based on whetherthe contact is in attention range 50 or non-
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`attention range 60. /d. §§ 103, 120, 174, 279-280, Fig. 4.
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`D.
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`CLAIM 1
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`Meta’s arguments in the Petition include a limitation-by-limitation
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`comparison of claim | with the disclosures in Nogami. Pet. 8—41. Below, we
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`address Meta’s arguments and Immersion’s preliminary arguments in
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`response.
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`13
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`Preamble
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`The preamble of claim | recites “[a] system comprising”certain
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`hardwareset forth in the remainderof the claim. Ex. 1001, 12:57.
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`Metaargues that Nogamidiscloses a system with hardwareasrecited.
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`Pet. 8-11 (citing Ex. 1003 9] 46-59, 74, 77, 82-86, Figs. 1, 2).
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`Immersion does notspecifically contest these argumentsat this stage.
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`See generally Prelim. Resp. Because the preliminary evidence suggests that
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`Nogamidiscloses a system as recited in the preamble, we need not decide
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`whether the preambleis limiting.
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`1.
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`Limitation | [a]
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`Limitation | [a] recites “a position sensor.” Ex. 1001, 12:58. Meta
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`argues that Nogamidisclosesthis in the form of a magnetic sensor included
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`as part of HMD 100. Pet. 11-12 (citing Ex. 1003 99 77-78, Fig. 1).°
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`According to Meta, the magnetic sensor in HMD 100 “senses a magnetic
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`field generated by a transmitter” and “detects a change in the magnetic field
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`as HMD 100 changesits position and orientation within the magnetic field.”
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`Pet. 12—13 (citing Ex. 1003 4 77, Fig. 1). According to Meta, interpreting the
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`magnetic sensor as the recited “position sensor” is consistent with the °143
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`patent’s disclosure of a magnetometer as an example of a position sensor.
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`Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1001, 5:35—38; Ex. 1002 § 54).
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`° Metastates thatit does not rely on position and orientation sensor 400
`(shown in Figure 1, supra Section IV.C.1) as the recited “position sensor”
`for claim 1 because dependent claim 2 requires that the position sensor be
`“positioned on the peripheral.” Pet. 13 n.2 (emphasis omitted) (citing
`Ex. 1003 4 44, Fig. 1).
`
`14
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`Patent 10,664,143 B2
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`Immersion disagrees that Nogami discloses a “position sensor” as
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`recited in claim 1. See Prelim. Resp. 15-26.’ According to Immersion,
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`the 143 patent discloses two distinct embodiments, one a “remote sensing”
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`embodiment, “where the position sensor is physically separate from the
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`peripheral” (id. at 15 (citing Ex. 1001, 3:15—28, 3:64—4:5, 5:35—48, Fig. 1))
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`and the other embodiment “where the position sensor is mounted on the
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`peripheral”(id. at 15 (citing Ex. 1001, 5:52—58, 13:14—15, 13:56—57, 14:37-
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`39)). Immersion contends that Meta’s arguments rely solely on the magnetic
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`sensor in HMD 100, which falls within this latter embodiment where the
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`sensor is mounted on the peripheral. /d. at 15-16.
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`Immersion acknowledges Nogami’s disclosure that “a magnetic
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`sensor can be used for acquiring the position and orientation information
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`about the HMD 100.” Prelim. Resp. 20 (quoting Ex. 1003 § 77). But
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`according to Immersion, the magnetic sensoris not a “position sensor” as
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`recited in limitation I [a], but “is merely a building block componentthat
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`provides rudimentary signals relied upon by Nogam1’sposition and
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`orientation sensor 400—remote from HMD 100—in order to determine the
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`peripheral’s position.” /d. at 16. Immersion contends that sensor 400 is a
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`camerathat is physically separated from HMD 100, and which uses markers
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`40 to track the orientation and location of HMD 100 remotely. /d. at 16-18,
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`20-21 (citing Ex. 1003 9] 73-74, 77-79, Figs. 1, 2, 5; Ex. 2002 4] 48-50).
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`According to Immersion, in Meta’s scenario “the only thing mounted on
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`HMD 100 is marker 40, whichis not a position sensor.” /d. at 18 (citing
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`7 TImmersion’s arguments addressing claim 1 also apply to corresponding
`limitations in independentclaims 8 and 15. See Prelim. Resp. 15-32.
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`15
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`Ex. 1003 44 73—76, 138). Immersion argues that the magnetic receiver in
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`HMD 100 “does not qualify as the position sensor becauseit does not
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`directly provide position and orientation information. All it provides 1s raw
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`magnetic field detection signals to the separate position and orientation
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`sensor 400 unit, which derives the position and orientation information.” /d.
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`at 19 (citing Ex. 2002 4 41-50).
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`Notwithstanding Immersion’s preliminary contentions, we find Meta’s
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`arguments sufficiently persuasive at this stage as to limitation 1[a]. We find
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`nothing in claim 1, or the 7143 patent disclosure as a whole, requiring the
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`recited “position sensor” to output complete position or orientation
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`information. See Ex. 1001, 5:35—58, 12:57-13:13. And we find no
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`suggestion that “remote sensing”is a distinct embodiment from the use of
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`attached sensors. Seeid.
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`Rather, the ?143 patent contemplates that the position and orientation
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`of a peripheral may involve the fusion of data from multiple sensors, such as
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`wireless antennas, capacitive field sensors, optical sensors, magnetometers,
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`accelerometers, gyroscopes, or digital compasses. See Ex. 1001, 5:35-58.
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`Someof the sensors may be remote (e.g., radio receivers, cameras, or
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`capacitive field sensors) and some may be directly attached to the peripheral
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`(e.g., magnetometers, accelerometers, gyroscopes, or digital compasses). /d.
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`Each sensor, whether remote or directly attached, “may be configured to
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`generate an output signal that conveys information related to the position of
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`the peripheral .. .
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`. Such an output signal may be provided to the processor
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`... or other components of the system.” /d. at 5:48—52; see also id. at 5:54—
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`58 (directly-attached sensors may be “configured to generate output signals
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`16
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`conveying information related to the position and/or motion of[a]
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`peripheral”).
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`In other words, the ’143 patent appears to suggest that any single
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`position sensors need only “convey|] information related to the position of
`
`the peripheral” to a processing unit. Ex. 1001, 5:49—50 (emphasis added);
`
`accord id. at 5:57—58. We find nothing in the ’143 patent suggesting that this
`
`information must be complete, or that it cannot be combined with other
`
`information to obtain the position and orientation of a peripheral. This is
`
`consistent with other claim language requiring the processor to “determine a
`
`position of a peripheral in real space based on the one or more sensor
`
`signals.” /d. at 13:1—2 (emphasis added) (limitation 1[f], discussed infra
`
`Section IV.D.3). Thus, in claim 1 it is the processor, not the position sensor
`
`acting alone, that must determine the peripheral’s position. Ex. 1000, 13:1—
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`2; see also id. at 13:24—25 (unchallenged claim 5, which depends from claim
`
`1 and requires a processorto “determinethe position of the peripheral based
`
`on one or more images” from an imaging device (emphasis added)).
`
`For the above reasons, wefind that Meta has sufficiently shown, at
`
`this stage, that Nogamidiscloseslimitation1[a].
`
`2.
`
`Limitations |[b]-{[c]
`
`Limitations 1[b] and 1[c] recite “a processor; and a non-transitory
`
`computer-readable medium comprising program codethat is executable by
`
`the processor to cause the processor to” perform certain steps. Ex. 1001,
`
`12:59-62.
`
`Meta argues that Nogami discloses the recited processor (a CPU) and
`
`medium (a data recording unit or random-access memory). Pet. 13—16
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`17
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`(citing Ex. 1002 4] 56, 59, 68, 70, 72, 74, 84, 88; Ex. 1003 4¥ 83, 88-91,
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`284-287, Fig. 2).
`
`Immersion does not specifically contest these argumentsat this stage.
`
`See generally Prelim. Resp. We find sufficiently persuasive Meta’s argument
`
`that Nogami discloses limitations 1[b] and 1[c]. See, e.g., Ex. 1003, Fig. 2
`
`(items 201, 202, and 205).
`
`3.
`
`Limitations | [d]-[g]
`
`Limitations 1[d]—[g] recite steps within program code to be performed
`
`by the processor. In particular, limitation I[d] recites code causing the
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`processorto “outputfirst interactive content to a display, the first interactive
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`content comprising a virtual environment.” Ex. 1001, 12:63—65. Meta argues
`
`that Nogami discloses presenting a virtual environment comprising
`
`backgroundvirtual objects on HMD 100 such asvirtual car 300 and other
`
`background objects. Pet. 16—24 (citing Ex. 1001, 1:38—43, 3:2-6, 4:51-52,
`
`13:18-19; Ex. 1002 79 55, 58, 61-64, 67-68; Ex. 1003 99 5, 8, 27, 49-50,
`
`52-53, 56, 83, 91-93, 97-103, 111-114, 117-123, 137, 140-147, 268-270,
`
`272-273, 284-287, Figs. 1, 4-6).
`
`Limitation 1 [e] recites code causing the processor to “receive one or
`
`more sensorsignals from the position sensor.” Ex. 1001, 12:66-67. Meta
`
`argues that in Nogami, the processorreceives signals from the magnetic
`
`sensor in HMD 100. Pet. 24—25 (citing Ex. 1002 4] 69-70; Ex. 1003 §§| 76—
`
`78, 83-84, 91, 93-94, 96, 105-106, 108, 284—287, Fig. 4).
`
`Limitation 1[f] recites code causing the processor to “determine a
`
`position of a peripheral in real space based on the one or more sensor
`
`signals, the peripheral configured to be worn on a user’s head.” Ex. 1001,
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`13:1-3. Meta argues that in Nogami, the processor determines the position
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`18
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`of HMD 100 (which is worn on the user’s head) basedat least in part on the
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`signals sent from HMD 100’s magnetic sensor. Pet. 25—28 (citing Ex. 1001,
`
`3:43-53; Ex. 1002 4] 69-74; Ex. 1003 9 49, 56, 76-78, 82, 108-109, Figs.
`
`1, 4; Ex. 1004, 24 (dictionary definition of “peripheral”); Ex. 1006, 2
`
`(Immersion’s proposed construction for “real space”in the related district
`
`court case)).
`
`Limitation I[g] recites code causing the processor to “output second
`
`interactive content to the display based on the position of the peripheral in
`
`real space, the second interactive content being different from thefirst
`
`interactive content.” Ex. 1001, 13:4~-7. Meta argues that Nogami discloses
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`“region virtual objects” within the background space, such as virtual work
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`tools, and that these are different from the “backgroundvirtual objects”(first
`
`interactive content) corresponding to limitation 1[d]. Pet. 29-33 (citing
`
`Ex. 1002 4] 61-64, 75-78; Ex. 1003 49 5, 27, 97-103, 109, 111-114, 117—
`
`123, 139-147, 159, 270-273, Figs. 4, 6).
`
`Atthis stage, Immersion doesnot specifically contest Meta’s
`
`arguments for limitations I[d]-[g]. See generally Prelim. Resp. We find the
`
`arguments sufficiently persuasiveat this stage.
`
`4.
`
`Limitation 1 [h]
`
`Limitation 1[h] recites code causing the processor to “determine a
`
`haptic signal based on the position of the peripheral in real space and the
`
`second interactive content.” Ex. 1001, 13:8—10. Meta arguesthat the
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`processor in Nogami’s system determinesa particular haptic signal based on
`
`whether contact with a virtual object occurs inside or outside the view
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`volume(1.e., whether the contact occurs in attention range 50 or non-
`
`attention range 60). Pet. 34-38.
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`19
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`For example, Meta argues that Nogami’s system can generate a haptic
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`signal, defined as part of “operation setting information” whena virtual
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`work tool contacts a background virtual object (e.g., automobile 300), and
`
`the CPU “can generate different operation setting information based on
`
`whetherthe virtual work tool has contacted the virtual background object
`
`inside or outside the view volume.”Pet. 34—35 (citing Ex. 1002 4] 81-82;
`
`Ex. 1003 49 53, 97, 123, 148-154, 270, Fig. 4). The haptic signal would be
`
`less intense if the contact occurs inside the view volume,to “reflect[] the
`
`fact that, when the virtual work tool 1s within the view volume/attention
`
`range of the user, it 1s visible to the user via HMD 100 andthus a lower
`
`intensity is warranted.” Pet. 35—36 (citing Ex. 1002 4 81; Ex. 1003 97 152-
`
`154, 179-181, Fig. 6).
`
`According to Meta, this choice of haptic intensity is “based on the
`
`position of the peripheral in real space and the secondinteractive content,”
`
`as recited in limitation I[h], because the haptic signal depends both on the
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`virtual location of the virtual work tool and the real-space position and
`
`orientation of HMD 100, which defines the view volume. Pet. 36-38 (citing
`
`Ex. 1002 49 70, 79-84; Ex. 1003 4] 123, 139-145, Fig. 4).
`
`In response, Immersion argues that “Nogami does not determine a
`
`haptic signal based on the position of the peripheral,” but rather “based on
`
`whetherthe contact point between the user’s body part and a virtual objectis
`
`inside or outside the attention range of the user that is viewable through
`
`HMD 100.”Prelim. Resp. 29. Immersion contendsthat this is not the same
`
`as “determining haptic feedback to the user based on the position of the
`
`peripheral in free space,” because Nogami’s method “does not confer the
`
`sameresults or benefits” as the claimed invention. /d. at 30. One difference,
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`20
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`according to Immersion, is that “the possible variation of haptic feedback is
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`strictly binary relative to the bounds of the view volume space,” rather than
`
`being based on the “fine-grained movementof the head-worn peripheral,”
`
`and thus is not “based on the particular position of the peripheral in real
`
`space, as required by the claims.” /d. at 30-31.
`
`Immersion also contends that Nogami’s disclosure is “directed to a
`
`different problem [than claim 1], and thus [a] different solution.” Prelim.
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`Resp. 29. According to Immersion, “Nogami sought to improve
`
`shortcomingsof the prior art in which the user may not recognize the haptic
`
`stimulation if the intensity of the stimulation on a part of the user’s body that
`
`unconsciously contacted the virtual object is not high enough,” and solved
`
`this problem by boosting the haptic signal if the contact was unintentional.
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`Id. at 31-32 (citing Ex. 1003 §] 26). Immersion contrasts this to the objective
`
`of the ’143 patent, which “was to providea richer interactive experience for
`
`a user’s interaction with the virtual world andits interactive content.” /d. at
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`32 (citing Ex. 1001, 2:66-3:14, 7:25-44, 11:23-47; Ex. 200
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