Trials@uspto.gov
`571-272-7822
`
`Paper8
`Entered: July 28, 2020
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`APPLEINC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`V.
`
`SEVEN NETWORKS, LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`
`IPR2020-00236
`Patent 9,369,539 B2
`
`Before THU A. DANG, KARL D. EASTHOM,and
`JONI Y. CHANG,Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`EASTHOM,Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`DECISION
`Granting Institution of Inter Partes Review
`35 US.C. $ 314
`
`
`571-272-7822
`
`Paper8
`Entered: July 28, 2020
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`APPLEINC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`V.
`
`SEVEN NETWORKS, LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`
`IPR2020-00236
`Patent 9,369,539 B2
`
`Before THU A. DANG, KARL D. EASTHOM,and
`JONI Y. CHANG,Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`EASTHOM,Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`DECISION
`Granting Institution of Inter Partes Review
`35 US.C. $ 314
`
`
`
`IPR2020-00236
`Patent 9,369,539 B2
`
`Apple Inc. (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition (Paper2, “Pet.”) requesting
`
`an inter partes review of claims 1-17 (the “challenged claims”) of U.S.
`
`Patent No. 9,369,539 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’539 patent”). Petitioner filed a
`
`Declaration of Thomas Wenisch, Ph.D (Ex. 1003) with its Petition. Patent
`
`Owner, Seven Networks, LLC (“Patent Owner”), filed a Preliminary
`
`Response (Paper6, “Prelim. Resp.”’).
`
`Wehave authority to determine whetherto institute an inter partes
`
`review (“IPR”). See 35 U.S.C. § 314(b); 37'C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Under 35
`
`U.S.C. § 314(a), we may not authorize an inter partes review unless the
`
`information in the Petition and the Preliminary Response “showsthat there
`
`is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at
`
`least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasonsthat follow,
`
`weinstitute an inter partes review as to the challenged claims of the °539
`
`patent on all grounds of unpatentability presented.
`
`I. BACKGROUND
`
`A.
`
`Real Parties-in-Interest
`
`Petitioner identifies Apple Inc. as the real party-in-interest. Pet. 71-
`
`72.
`
`B.
`
`Related Proceedings
`
`The parties identify SEVEN Networks, LLC v. Apple Inc., No. 2:19-
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`cv-00115 (E.D. Tex.) as a related matter involving the °539 patent. Pet. 72;
`
`Paper5.
`
`C.
`
`The ’539 patent
`
`The ’539 patent describes a power saving modeandtraffic
`
`optimization by reducingtraffic for mobile devices and acquire digital assets
`
`from a server. See Ex. 1001, code (57), Figs. 1A, 1B, 4:3-27. “The [mobile
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`device] user is queried whether to enter the power save mode and a
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`2
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`
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`IPR2020-00236
`Patent 9,369,539 B2
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`download request from another mobile device associated with the useris
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`delayed while the device is in the power save mode.” Jd. at code (57).
`
`The ’539 patent contends “[b]andwidth has been considered a major
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`issue in wireless technology today,” with prior art “[m]Jore and more
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`research done .. . related to the need for additional bandwidth to solve
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`access problems .
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`.
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`. focused on providing increased bandwidth.” Ex. 1001,
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`4:18-25. The ’539 patent acknowledgesthat “standards”“partially
`
`addressed” “lack of bandwidth”on the “data channel,” “a key problem that
`remains is lack of bandwidth on the signaling channel.” Jd. at 4:25-27.
`
`“Embodiments [of the 539 patent]... considerably lower[] device
`
`battery/power consumption, radio channel signaling, and bandwidth usage.”
`
`Id. at 4:35-40. Similarly, “[t]he traffic can be managed such that network
`
`consumption, for example, use of the cellular network is conserved for
`
`effective and efficient band-width utilization.” Jd. at 6:13-16.
`
`D.—Ilustrative Claim 1
`
`Of the challenged claims, independent methodclaim 1, reciting a
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`“method for transferring data between a mobile device and a server,”
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`materially encompassesthe limitations recited in independent product claim
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`7 drawn to a “mobile device” and independent product claim 13 drawnto a
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`“server.” The remaining challenged claims, 2-6, 8-12, and 14-17,
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`ultimately and respectively depend from claims 1, 7, and 13.
`
`Claim | illustrates the challenged claimsat issue:
`
`1. A method for transferring data between a mobile device and
`a server, comprising, with a processor of the mobile device,
`controlling the mobile devicefor:
`querying a user ofa first mobile device by displaying a
`notification on a userinterface of the first mobile device to select
`whetherto enter a power save mode;
`
`
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`IPR2020-00236
`Patent 9,369,539 B2
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`wherein a second mobile device shares a same user
`account with the first mobile device;
`upon selection by a user of entering the power save mode
`at the first mobile device, optimizing traffic at the first mobile
`device by blocking transmission ofat least sometraffic from the
`first mobile device;
`wherein content selected for download from the serverat
`the second mobile device is delayed for downloadat the first
`mobile device whenthefirst mobile device is in the power save
`mode,
`
`wherein the content selected for download at the second
`mobile device is downloaded at the second mobile device when
`the second mobile device is not in the power save mode.
`
`Ex. 1001, 31:37-56.
`
`E.
`
`The Asserted Grounds
`
`Petitioner challenges claims 1-17 of the ’539 patent on the following
`
`grounds(Pet. 1):
`
`
`
`Claim(s) Challenged
`1, 3-7, 9-13, 15-17
`
`35 oO Reference(s)/Basis
`Adriazola,? Lee?
`
`
`
`
`
`' The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125
`Stat. 284, 287-88 (2011), amended 35 U.S.C. § 103. For purposes of
`institution, as discussed further below (Section II.F.1), the ’539 patent does
`not contain a claim with an effective filing date before March 16, 2013 (the
`effective date of the relevant amendment), so the AIA version of § 103
`applies. Regardless of the applicable version of § 103, Petitioner shows
`sufficiently that the claims would have been obvious for purposes of
`institution.
`
`* Adriazola, US 2011/0138015 Al, published June 9, 2011 (Ex. 1004).
`3 Lee et al., US 2001/0080422 A1, published Apr. 7, 2011 (Ex. 1005).
`4 Araujo, Jr. US 2009/0217065 Al, published Aug. 27, 2009 (Ex. 1006).
`
`
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`IPR2020-00236
`Patent 9,369,539 B2
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`
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`
`
`Claim(s) Challenged 35 U.S.C
`§
`
`Reference(s)/Basis
`
`1, 3-7, 9-13, 15-17
`
`Chang,° Jiang®
`
`03
`
`II. ANALYSIS
`Petitioner challenges claims 1-17 as obvious based on the grounds
`listed above. Patent Ownerdisagrees.
`
`A.—Legal Standards
`
`35 U.S.C. § 103(a) renders a claim unpatentable if the differences
`
`between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that the subject
`
`matter, as a whole, would have been obviousat the time the invention was
`made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter
`pertains. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007).
`
`Tribunals resolve obviousness onthe basis of underlying factual
`
`determinations, including (1) the scope and contentof the prior art; (2) any
`
`differences between the claimed subject matter and thepriorart; (3) the level
`
`of skill in the art; and (4) where in evidence, so-called secondary
`
`considerations. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966).
`
`Prior art references must be “considered together with the knowledge of one
`
`of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.” In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480
`
`(Fed. Cir. 1994) (citing In re Samour, 571 F.2d 559, 562 (CCPA 1978)).
`
`> Changet al., US 2012/0233031 A1, published Sept. 13, 2012 (Ex. 1008).
`6 Jiang et al., US 2012/0260118 Al, published Oct. 11, 2012 (Ex. 1009).
`
`
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`IPR2020-00236
`Patent 9,369,539 B2
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`B.
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`Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art
`
`Dr. Wenischtestifies a person having ordinary skill in the art
`
`would have held a Bachelor’s degree in computer science,
`electrical engineering, or a similar discipline and one to two
`years of work experience in operating systems or networked
`computing device communication and power consumption of
`networked computing devices, or a related area. More education
`can substitute for practical experience and vice versa. I base this
`opinion on my own practical and educational experiences,
`including my knowledge of colleagues and others at the time.
`
`Ex. 1003 ¥ 41.
`
`Patent Ownerdoesnot present a proposed level of ordinary skill. For
`
`purposes of this Decision on Institution, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level
`
`of ordinary skill in the art, which comports with the teachings of the 7539
`
`patent and the asserted priorart.
`
`C.
`
`Claim Construction
`
`In an inter partes review, we construe each claim “in accordance with
`
`the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of
`
`ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.”
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under the same standard applied by district courts,
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`claim terms take their plain and ordinary meaning as would have been
`
`understood by a person ofordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention
`
`and in the context of the entire patent disclosure. Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
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`415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). “There are only two
`
`exceptions to this general rule: 1) whena patenteesets out a definition and
`
`acts as his own lexicographer, or 2) when the patentee disavowsthe full
`
`scope of a claim term either in the specification or during prosecution.”
`
`Thorner v. Sony Comput. Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2012).
`
`
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`IPR2020-00236
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`I. “processor configuredfor”
`
`Claim 7 recites “[a] mobile device ... comprising: a radio, a
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`memory;and a processor configured for.”’ Petitioner argues that the term
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`“processor configured for’ properly carries its plain and ordinary meaning.
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`Pet. 2. Nevertheless, Petitioner raises the issue of whether this claim term
`
`should be interpreted under 35 U.S.C. § 112,76. Jd.
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`A claim term that lacks the word “means”triggers a rebuttable
`
`presumption that 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph, does not apply.
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`Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348-49 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
`
`(en banc). That presumption can be overcome, however, if it is shown “that
`
`the claim term fails to ‘recite sufficiently definite structure’ or else recites
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`‘function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function.””
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`Id. at 1349 (quoting Watts v. XL Sys., Inc., 232 F.3d 877, 880 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2000)).
`
`‘““The standard is whether the words of the claim are understood by
`
`personsof ordinaryskill in the art to have a sufficiently definite meaning as
`
`the namefor structure.” Jd. (citing Greenberg v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery,
`
`Inc., 91 F.3d 1580, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). “To determine whether the claim
`
`limitation at issue connotessufficiently definite structure to a person of
`
`ordinary skill in the art, we lookfirst to intrinsic evidence, and then, if
`
`necessary, to the extrinsic evidence.” TEK Glob., S.R.L. v. Sealant Sys. Int'l,
`
`Inc., 920 F.3d 777, 785 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
`
`Here, the claim term “processor configured for” does not use the word
`
`“means,” triggering a rebuttable presumption that § 112, 4 6, does not apply.
`
`See Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1348-49. The intrinsic evidence showsthat the
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`°539 patent uses the term “processor” to refer to the computational or control
`
`unit of a computer. For example, the specification discloses that “a
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`
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`IPR2020-00236
`Patent 9,369,539 B2
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`‘module,’ ‘a manager,’ a ‘handler,’ a ‘detector,’ and ‘interface,’ or an
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`‘engine’ includes a general purpose, dedicated or shared processorand,
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`typically, firmware or software modules that are executed by the processor.”
`
`Ex. 1001, 10:16-19 (emphasis added). The specification also discloses
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`“computer programs typically comprise one or moreinstructionsset at
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`various times in various memory and storage devices in a computer,”
`wherein, “when read and executed by one or more processing units or
`processors in a computer, [the computer programs] cause the computerto
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`perform operations to execute elements.” Ex. 1001, 29:66—-30:4. Therefore,
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`in the context of the ’539 patent, a person of ordinary skill in the art would
`
`have understood the “processor”as a sufficiently definite meaning as a name
`
`for structure.
`
`Onthis record, we do notinterpret the “processor” limitation as a
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`means-plus-function limitation under § 112, § 6, and interpret “processor” to
`
`mean the computational and control unit of a computer.
`
`2. Remaining Terms
`
`Based on the current record, no other terms require explicit
`
`construction. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean
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`Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (““[W]Je need only construe
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`terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the
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`controversy’... .” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200
`
`F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).
`
`D.
`
`Obviousness, Adriazola and Lee, Claims 1, 3—7, 9-13, and 15-17
`
`Petitioner contends the subject matter of claims 1, 3-7, 9-13, and 15-
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`17 would have been obvious over the combination of Adriazola and Lee.
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`
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`Pet. 10-34. Patent Ownerdisputes Petitioner’s contentions. Prelim.
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`Resp. 1-12.
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`1.
`
`Adriazola
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`Adriazola describes a system for downloading selected content to
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`multiple user devices registered with the same account. Ex. 1004, code (57),
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`Fig. 1, Fig. 2, Jf 15, 25. For example, Adriazola describes two devices
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`104A and 104B that may download the same content. Jd. § 15. Adriazola
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`describes “conventional implementations” wherein “a user cannotutilize
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`the first device 104A to download the content 112 directly to the
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`second device 104B.
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`Ifthe user wants the content 112 on the second
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`device 105B, the user can independently access the second device
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`104B and downloadthe content 112 to the second device 104B.” Id.
`
`q 17.
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`Adriazola describes in one example, a customer using mobile
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`device 104A to request content 112 from content server 102. Ex.
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`1004 9 25. Proxy module 122 determinesif both devices 104A and
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`104Bregistered to the same account “are active on the network 106.”
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`Id. The “customerchoses to have the content 112 sent to both of the
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`devices.” Jd. In arelated example, “the first device 104A replies that
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`the transfer was successful, but the second device 104B responds that
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`the content 112 was not received.” Id. § 26.
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`2.
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`Lee
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`Lee describes a system for managing power on a device. Ex. 1005
`
`4 1. According to Lee, “power-intensive applications can quickly drain the
`
`battery of the mobile device.” Jd. § 2. According to Lee, in one
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`embodiment, “the meeting software is allowed to disable some software
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`IPR2020-00236
`Patent 9,369,539 B2
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`such as IM and email during the meeting and this could be given to the
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`mobile meeting participant as an option to reduce power consumption.” Jd.
`
`q 25.
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`Lee also describes disabling transmissions to reduce power
`
`consumption:
`
`[L]ogic 106 may disable transceivers (such as a third generation
`cell phone “3G”, WFi, and/or Blue tooth transceivers) which are
`not being employed for a scheduled event such as a meeting.
`Other examples
`including disabling supplication such as
`electronic mail, instant messaging (IM), SMS messaging, etc.
`Still other examples include extending the polling time of
`applications such as calendaring or electronic mail.
`
`Ex. 1005 4 45.
`
`3.
`
`Claims 1, 3—7, 9-13, and 15-17
`
`The preamble of claim 1 recites “[a] method fortransferring data
`
`between a mobile device and a server, comprising, with a processor ofthe
`
`mobile device, controlling the mobile device for.” Petitioner relies on
`
`Adriazola’s descriptions of downloading requests via one mobile device for
`
`content from a content server that downloads the requested content to mobile
`
`devices that share an account, including the requesting mobile device. See
`
`Pet. 17 (citing Ex. 1004, code (57), J] 6-9, 18-19). Petitioner also contends
`
`employing a processorin the mobile devices of Adriazola would have been
`
`obviousin order to control power saving operations in the mobile device.
`
`Petitioner relies on Adriazola’s descriptions of mobile telephone processors
`
`and similar descriptions in Lee. Jd. (citing Ex. 1003 { 66; Ex. 1004
`
`q 7; Ex. 1005 J 14-15, 53, 70).
`
`Claim 1 also recites “querying a userof a first mobile device by
`
`displaying a notification on a userinterface of the first mobile device to
`
`10
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`IPR2020-00236
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`select whether to enter a power save mode.” Petitioner contends Lee’s
`
`system prompts a user to enter into a power saving mode. Pet. 17 (citing Ex.
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`1005 9 20-24, 27, 50-51, 65; Ex. 1003 7 67). Petitioner contends it would
`
`have been obvious to combine Lee’s power saving mode with Adriazola’s
`
`similar techniques of delaying downloadsto offline devices in order to
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`enhance battery life, render the devices useful for a longer period of time,
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`and avoid unnecessary attempts to download data to devices unable to
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`complete the download. See id. at 13-16 (citing Ex. 1003 [{ 59-62; Ex.
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`1004 ¥ 21; Ex. 1005 4] 2, 10-13, 15, 25, 34-36; Ex. 1010 4 10, 47, 72).
`
`Claim 1 also recites “wherein a second mobile device shares a samc
`
`user account withthe first mobile device.” Petitioner relies on Adriazola’s
`
`disclosure that “account information 128 indicates that the customer has two
`
`registered devices: the first device 104A and the second device 104B.” Pet.
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`18-19 (quoting Ex. 1004 § 23 (“registered devices 104 maybestored in the
`
`user’s account information 128”)).
`
`Claim 1 further recites “upon selection by a user of entering the power
`
`save modeat the first mobile device, optimizingtraffic at the first mobile
`
`device by blocking transmission ofat least sometraffic from the first mobile
`
`device.” As noted above,Petitioner relies on combined teachings in Lee and
`
`Adriazola to suggest using Lee’s power saving mode in Adriazola’s system.
`
`See Pet. 17-18. Petitioner contends that upon a user selecting Lee’s power
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`saving mode in Adriazola’s mobile device, the mobile device blocks
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`transmissions by adjusting polling times, disabling wireless transceivers in
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`the device, and preventing transmissions requested by one or more mobile
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`applications. See Pet. 19 (citing Ex. 1003 J 70; Ex. 1005 {ff 45, 48, 75).
`
`According to Petitioner, these actions, which include disabling the
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`11
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`transceivers, optimizestraffic. Petitioner notes that Adriazola states
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`“transceiver 204 is used to communicate with other devices.” Jd. at 19-20
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`(quoting Ex. 1005 7 48). Petitioner further explains that Lee’s system blocks
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`transmissions in a low powerstate by disabling the transmissions from
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`“(s]ome ... applications” such as “calendar” “Instant Messaging,” or
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`“email” that otherwise “request transmissions in the ordinary course of
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`execution.” Jd. at 20 (citing Ex. 1003 9§ 71-72; Ex. 1005 § 75).
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`Petitioner also contends “[t]he traffic optimization techniques
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`described by Lee(e.g., ‘disabling’ device transceivers, extending polling
`
`times of applications (EX1005, [0045], [0049], [0075]; infra [1.3]-{1.4]))
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`are similar to those of the ’539 patent, which describes turning the ‘radio on
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`or off,’ adjusting polling times, etc.” Jd. at 21 (citing Ex. 1001, Fig. 6, 4:29-
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`30, 11:64-66). Accordingto Petitioner, disabling the wireless transceivers
`
`upon entering a power save mode andoptimizingtraffic would have been
`
`obvious for similar reasons advanced above (for example, saving battery life
`
`and gain power saving benefits). See Pet. 14-16 (motivation), 21.
`
`Patent Ownerargues“blockingall traffic would not ‘optimizetraffic,’
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`it would preventit.” Prelim. Resp. 5. Patent Owner explains “New Jersey
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`commuters did not believe traffic had been ‘optimized’ when Governor
`
`Chris Christie’s administration closed down the George Washington
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`Bridge.” Jd. Patent Owneralso argues that reading “blocking all traffic”as
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`necessarily optimizingtraffic “improperly erases ‘optimizing traffic’ from
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`the claims.” See id. at 4—-5(citing Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water
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`Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“all claim terms are
`
`presumed to have meaning in a claim”); Baxter Diagnostics Inc. v. PB
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`Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 57 F.3d 1082 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (similar)).
`
`12
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`Claim | recites “optimizing traffic at the first mobile device by
`blocking transmission ofat least sometraffic from the first mobile device.”
`
`Patent Owner’s arguments do not accountfor this plain claim language that
`
`does not preclude optimizingtraffic by blockingall traffic (“at least some
`
`traffic”)—-which reduces use of available bandwidth and minimizes spurious
`
`noise or interference, etc. See Ex. 1001, 4:35-40 (“Embodiments .
`
`.
`
`.
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`considerably lower[] device battery/power consumption, radio channel
`
`signaling, and bandwith usage.” Blockingtraffic is a result effective
`
`variable for optimization. See In re Boesch, 617 F.2d 272, 276 (CCPA
`
`1980) (“|DJiscovery of an optimum value ofa result effective variable in a
`
`knownprocessis ordinarily within the skill of the art.”). Moreover, as
`
`described above, the ’539 patent admits that “standards” “partially
`
`addressed”“lack of bandwidth”on the “data channel,” but contends “a key
`
`problem that remains is lack of bandwidth on the signaling channel.” Ex.
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`1001 4:25-27. Claim 1 does not limit optimization to the signaling channel.
`
`Rather, optimization includes reducing “network consumption”including
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`“bandwidth utilization.” See Ex. 1001, 6:13-16 (“The traffic can be
`
`managed such that network consumption, for example, use ofthe cellular
`
`networkis conserved for effective and efficient bandwidth utilization.”).
`
`With respect to Patent Owner’s analogy to bridge traffic in New
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`Jersey, traffic on the other side of the bridge would have been muchlighter
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`(i.e., optimized), analogousto lightertraffic on a network when some
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`devices do not transmit. In addition, Petitioner does not rely necessarily on
`
`blocking all traffic, but discusses extending polling times for some
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`applications. See Pet. 21.
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`13
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`Patent Owneralso argues that embodiments disclosed in the ’539
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`patent concern “aligning requests,” but it does not “blindly align all
`
`requests,” becauseit “utilizes a priority engine to assign levels of priority”to
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`_ determine what transmissions to block. See Prelim. Resp. 7. Patent Owner
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`explains that “{o]ne can readily see how aligning requests from multiple
`
`applications in a mannerthat minimizes the need for several polling requests
`
`could ‘optimizetraffic.’” See id. (citing Pet. 20; Ex. 1001, 4:29-30). Patent
`
`Owneralso contendsthat “in the ’539 patent, the radio is ‘turned on or off
`
`based upon useractivity,” and “Petitioner .
`
`.
`
`. does not point to anything in
`
`the ’539 patent suggesting that merely turningoff the radio, in and ofitself,
`
`would ‘optimizetraffic.’” See id. at 7-8.
`
`Contrary to these arguments, and similar arguments based on certain
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`embodiments in the ’539 patent specification (e.g., user activity, see Prelim.
`
`Resp. 7-8), claim 1 does not recite assigning priority levels or analyzing
`
`user activity as part of its required optimizing. Rather, claim 1 broadly
`
`defines how to optimize traffic—i.e., this optimizing result occurs “by
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`blocking transmission of at least sometraffic from the first mobile device.”
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`As indicated above, the specification supports this interpretation by limiting
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`bandwidth and network consumption.
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`Onthe other hand, blocking sometraffic from a mobile device may
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`not necessarily optimizetraffic if the mobile device transmitsa net traffic
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`gain—for example, transmits moretraffic than it blocked during a certain
`
`period. Nevertheless, Petitioner does not read out optimizing traffic because
`
`Petitioner relies on the combined Adriazola-Lee system that blocks net
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`traffic (i.e., blocking more than it otherwise transmits by turning some
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`applications off) or delays polling (whichresults in less traffic between
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`polling bursts). This traffic blocking necessarily reduces bandwidth usage.
`
`Onthis preliminary record, as indicated above, the °539 patent
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`broadly describes “mobile application traffic optimization” without
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`necessarily prioritizing communications from the mobile device or analyzing
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`user activity. See Ex. 1001, 4:1-5:10; supra Section I.C. For example, the
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`’539 patentstates “the disclosed technology allows elimination of
`
`unnecessary chatter from the network, benefitting the operators trying to
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`optimize the wireless spectrum usage.” Ex. 1001, 5:8-10. The °539 patent
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`also generally describes “alignment of requests from multiple applications to
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`minimize the need for several polling requests” and “lowering device
`
`battery/power consumption, radio channel signaling, and bandwidth usage.”
`
`Id. at 4:29-30, 4:38-40. The ’539 patentalso states that as part ofits
`
`optimization, “the mobile device .
`
`.
`
`. does not need to open up(e.g., thus
`
`powering onthe radio) or use a data connection.” Jd. at 4:55-57. Also, in
`
`general, “[e]mbodiments [of the ’539 patent] .
`
`.
`
`. considerably lower[] device
`
`battery/power consumption, radio channel signaling, and bandwidth usage.”
`
`Id. at 4:35-40. And “{t]he traffic can be managed such that network
`
`consumption, for example, use of the cellular network is conserved for
`
`effective and efficient bandwidth utilization.” See id. at 6:13-16.
`
`In other words, on this preliminary record, the ’539 patent generally
`
`describes optimizing traffic by reducing traffic (reducing bandwidth usage,
`network usage, radio signals, chatter, etc.) by or from the mobile device.’ In
`any event, as Petitioner argues, Lee’s power save modeprioritizes traffic by
`
`7 The panelinvites the parties to provide further input on claim construction
`of “optimizingtraffic ... by blocking transmission” duringthetrial.
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`shutting off unnecessary “cell phone ‘3G,’ WiFi, and/or Bluetooth
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`transceivers[] which are not being deployed for a scheduled event such as a
`
`meeting.” Ex. 1005 4 45 (emphases added), 48; see Pet. 21 (arguing the
`
`’539 patent and Lee employsimilar optimization techniques (citing Ex. 1005
`{7 45, 49, 75; Ex. 1001, Fig. 6, 4:29-30, 11:64-66)). Accordingly, even if
`optimization requires one or moreofprioritization or other considerations
`
`such as analyzing user activity, on this preliminary record, Petitioner
`
`sufficiently shows for purposesofinstitution that Adriazola and Lee suggest
`
`optimizing traffic at a mobile device by blocking at least sometraffic
`
`transmissionsfor a nettraffic reduction.
`
`Claim 11 further recites “wherein content selected for download from
`
`the server at the second mobile device is delayed for downloadatthe first
`
`mobile device whenthefirst mobile device is in the power save mode.”
`
`Petitioner relies on the following passage in Adriazola:
`
`If the second device 104Bis not online ..., the proxy module
`122 maystore an indication to retry the download in a download
`queue 132. The proxy module 122 may instruct the download
`manager110 to direct the transmission of the content 112 to the
`second device 104B at a later time, such as when the devices
`104 are online.
`
`Pet. 21 (quoting Ex. 1004 § 21) (emphasis by Petitioner). As indicated
`
`above,Petitioner relies on Lee’s power save mode teachings and Adriazola’s
`
`off-line device teachings as suggesting Adriazola’s off-line device in a
`
`powersave mode. See id. at 13-22. Petitioner reads the claimed “first
`
`mobile device” onto Adriazola’s “second device 104B.” See id.
`
`Petitioner contends the combined teachings suggest that when the
`
`claimed second mobile device (Adriazola’s device 104A) selects content for
`
`download during an off-line power saving mode ofthe claimed first mobile
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`device (Adriazola’s device 104B), the system downloadsthe content to the
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`claimed second device (Adriazola’s on-line device 104A) and delays
`
`downloadof that content to the claimedfirst device (Adriazola’s off-line
`
`device 104B). See Pet. 22 (citing Ex. 1004 4§ 21, 22, 25; Ex. 1003 J 75—
`
`76). Petitioner also cites to Adriazola’s teaching of providing the same
`
`selected content to multiple devices. See id. at 23 (quoting Ex. 1004 { 24
`
`(“automatic redundancy by directing content to multiple destinations”)).
`
`Claim 1 also recites “wherein the content selected for downloadat the
`
`second mobile device is downloaded at the second mobile device when the
`
`second mobile device is not in the power save mode.” As noted above,
`
`Petitioner relies on Adriazola’s device 104A as the claimed second device.
`
`Petitioner contends device 104A selects content for download. See Pet. 23
`
`(citing Ex. 1004 J 15). Petitioner contends that based on the combined
`teachings of Adriazola and Lee, it would have been obvious to download
`“the content... to... device [104A], at a time when the deviceis ‘online’
`
`and not in the power save mode.” Jd. (citing Ex. 1003 § 71; Ex. 1004 9 15,
`
`17).
`
`Patent Owner contends“Petitioner fails to .
`
`.
`
`. identify a disclosure in
`
`Adriazola wherein contentis selected for download by one mobile device
`and delayed for download at another device because the another mobile
`
`device is in a power save mode.” Prelim. Resp. 9-10. Patent Owner
`
`similarly argues “nothing in paragraph [21 of Adriazola] suggests that the
`
`content in question wasselected by a different device, e.g., Adriazola’s first
`
`mobile device 104A.” Jd. at 10 (alteration added). Patent Owneralso
`
`argues “[c]ritically .. . paragraph [0021] doesnotstate that first mobile
`
`device 104A selected the content to be downloaded.” Jd. at 11.
`
`17
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`IPR2020-00236
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`Contrary to Patent Owner’s arguments, claim 1 does not specify
`
`which device selects the content. Rather, claim 1 recites “wherein content
`
`selectedfor download from the server at the second mobile device is delayed
`
`for downloadat the first mobile device when the first mobile device is in the
`
`power save mode.” (Emphasis added). This clause specifies which device
`
`receives the content—i.e., “content selected for download .. . at the second
`
`device”—instead of which device requests the content—i.e., it does not
`
`recite “content selected for download... by the second device.” In contrast,
`
`claim 13 recites which device requests the content: “receiving a request for
`
`content from a first mobile device.”
`In any event, even if claim 1 somehow implies that the claimed
`second device requests the content, Petitioner sufficiently showsthat
`
`Adriazola teaches that feature. For example, Petitioner quotes Adriazola to
`
`showthat the claimed second device, Adriazola’s device 104A,selects
`
`content: “For example, Adriazola’s ‘[] device 104A may download the
`
`content 112 by accessing a download interface 114 througha first access
`
`module 116A.’ EX1004, [0015]. The ‘[] device 104A’ is usedto select
`
`content, and the content is downloadedto that device, at a time when the
`
`device is ‘online’ and not in the power save mode. /d.; EX1004, [0017].”
`
`Pet. 23 (quoting Ex. 1004 ff 15, 17). And Petitioner cites to Adriazola’s
`
`teachings that directing content to multiple devices(i.e., including non-
`
`requesting devices) reduces redundancy.
`
`/d. (citing Ex. 1004 { 24).
`
`Patent Owner doesnot address this showing or the cited teachings of
`
`Adriazola. At paragraph 17, Adriazola states “the user can access .
`
`.
`
`. device
`
`104A and download the content 112 to the first device 104A.” Ex. 1004
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`IPR2020-00236
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`q 17. At paragraph 21, Adriazola states “download modules 126 download
`
`the content 112 whena userat [any of] the devices 104 authorizes the
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`download.” Id. J 21; see also id. J] 24-26 (describing downloads requested
`
`by 104A sent to multiple devices including device 104B).
`
`Contrary to Patent Owner’s argumentthat Petitioner fails to show that
`
`Adriazola’s system does not delay the content downloadto “another device”
`
`in the power save mode, Adriazola states the user may “‘select[] one or more
`
`of the alternate or additional destinations” to receive the selected download
`
`after “determin[ing] whether the devices 104 are online.” See id. J 22.
`
`Petitioner cites paragraph 22 and contends Adriazola’s system determines
`
`“whether the devices 104 are online” and delays downloads until “‘a later
`
`time” when any such device becomesonline. See Pet. 22 —23 (citing Ex.
`
`1004 § 22). As discussed above,Petitioner relies on Lee’s and Adriazola’s
`
`combinedteachings to suggest putting Adriazola’s offline devices in a
`
`powersave mode.
`
`Based on the foregoing, Petitioner sufficiently establishes for
`
`purposesofinstitution that the combination of Adriazola and Lee renders
`
`claim obvious for purposes ofinstitution. Relying partly on its showing
`with respectto claim 1, Petitioner provides a similar showing for
`independent claims 7 and 13, which largely track limitations recited in claim
`
`1 and also recite known communication hardware limitations (e.g., memory,
`
`processor, radio, server). See Pet. 24-30. Petitioner also presents a
`
`sufficient showing supported by the record with respect to dependent claims
`
`3-6, 9-12, 15-17. See Pet. 30-34. Patent Owner does not address the
`
`independent or dependent claims separately.
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`19
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`Based on a review ofthe record, for purposesofinstitution, Petitioner
`
`sufficiently shows that the combination of Adriazola and Lee renders
`
`obvious the subject matter
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