throbber
Case: 17-2474
`
`Document:68
`
`Page:1_
`
`Filed: 06/12/2019
`
`Gnited States Court of Appeals
`for the Federal Circuit
`
`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICSCO., LTD., MICRON
`TECHNOLOGY,INC., SK HYNIX INC.,
`Appellants
`
`Vv.
`
`ELM 3DS INNOVATIONS, LLC,
`Appellee
`
`2017-2474, 2017-2475, 2017-2476, 2017-2478, 2017-2479,
`2017-2480, 2017-2482, 2017-2483, 2018-1050, 2018-1079,
`2018-1080, 2018-1081, 2018-1082
`
`Appeals from the United States Patent and Trademark
`Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in Nos. JPR2016-
`00386, IPR2016-00387, IPR2016-00388, IPR2016-00390,
`IPR2016-00391,
`IPR2016-00393,
`IPR2016-00394,
`IPR2016-00395,
`IPR2016-00687,
`IPR2016-00691,
`IPR2016-00708, IPR2016-00770, IPR2016-00786.
`
`Decided: June 12, 2019
`
`RUFFIN B. CORDELL, Fish & Richardson PC, Washing-
`ton, DC, argued for all appellants. Appellants Micron
`Technology,
`Inc., SK Hynix Inc. also represented by
`CHRISTOPHER DRYER, TIMOTHY W. RIFFE, ROBERT ANDREW
`SCHWENTKER, ADAM SHARTZER; CRAIG E. COUNTRYMAN,
`RYAN LYNN FREI, OLIVER RICHARDS, San Diego, CA.
`
`

`

`
`
`Case: 17-2474 Page:2_Filed: 06/12/2019Document:68
`
`
`
`2
`
`SAMSUNGELECTRONICSCO., LTD. v. ELM 3DS INNOVATIONS,
`LLC
`
`NAVEEN MODI, Paul Hastings LLP, Washington, DC,
`for appellant Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Also repre-
`sented by PHILLIP W. CITROEN, ALLAN SOOBERT.
`
`WILLIAM MEUNIER, Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky
`and Popeo, P.C., Boston, MA, argued for appellee. Also rep-
`resented by KEVIN AMENDT, SANDRA BADIN, MATTHEW
`STEPHEN GALICA, MICHAEL NEWMAN, MICHAEL TIMOTHY
`RENAUD, JAMES M. WODARSKI.
`
`Before MOORE, REYNA, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.
`
`MOORE, Circuit Judge.
`
`Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., Micron Technology,
`Inc., and SK Hynix Inc. (collectively, “Petitioners”) appeal
`from the final written decisions of the Patent Trial and Ap-
`peal Board in thirteen inter partes reviews holding that
`they did not establish the unpatentability of 105 claims
`across eleven patents (“Challenged Patents”). Given that
`each challenged claim requires a low-tensile-stress dielec-
`tric, and substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding
`that a person of ordinary skill in the art would not have
`reasonably expected success in combining theprior art to
`meetthis limitation, we affirm.
`
`

`

`Case: 17-2474
`
`Document:68
`
`Page:3
`
`Filed: 06/12/2019
`
`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICSCO., LTD. v. ELM 3DS INNOVATIONS,
`LLC
`
`3
`
`BACKGROUND
`
`Appellee Elm 3DS Innovations LLC (“Elm”) is the
`ownerof the Challenged Patents, which share a specifica-
`tion and all relate to “stacked integrated circuit memory.”
`672 patent at 1:7-8. The Challenged Patents are the sub-
`ject of co-pending litigation between Elm andPetitioners.
`
`The Boardinstituted inter partes review based on thir-
`teen petitionsfiled by Petitioners. Amongothersnotatis-
`sue on appeal,
`the petitions challenged the following
`claims: claims 17-18, 22, 84, 95, 129-32, 145-46, and 152
`of the 672 patent (TPR2016-00386); claims 1-2, 8, 14, 31—
`32, 44, 46, and 52—54 of the ’778 patent (IPR2016-00387);
`claims 10-12, 18-20, 60-63, 67, 70—73, and 77 of the ’239
`patent (PR2016-00388 and IPR2016-00393); claims 1-3,
`30-31, 33, 40-41, and 44 of the ’542 patent (PR2016-
`00390); claims 30, 34, 36, 135-138, and 147 of the ’862 pa-
`tent IPR2016-00391); claims 36 and 51 of the ’617 patent
`(PR2016-00394); claims 1, 10-11, and 13-14 of the ’732
`patent IPR2016-00395); claims 1, 7, 17-18, and 33 of the
`119 patent (PR2016-00687); claims 1 and 20—23 of the
`004 patent (PR2016-00691); claims 1, 12-13, 24, 36-38,
`53, 83, 86-87, and 132 of the 499 patent TPR2016-00708
`and IPR2016-00770); and claims 58, 60-61, and 67 of the
`570 patent (IPR2016-00786). Each ground challenging the
`claims was based on obviousness andasserted either U.S.
`Patent No. 5,202,754 (“Bertin”) or a 1996 article by Kee-Ho
`Yu, et. al.,
`titled “Real-Time Microvision System with
`Three-Dimensional Integration Structure” (“Yu”) as the
`
`issue are U.S. Patent Nos.
`The patents at
`1
`8,653,672; 8,841,778; 7,193,239; 8,629,542; 8,796,862;
`8,410,617; 7,504,732; 8,928,119; 7,474,004; 8,907,499; and
`8,933,570.
`2
`For simplicity, this opinion cites only to the specifi-
`cation of the ’672 patent.
`
`

`

`Case: 17-2474
`
`Document:68
`
`Page:4
`
`Filed: 06/12/2019
`
`4
`
`° SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. v. ELM 3DS INNOVATIONS,
`LLC
`
`primary reference in combination with, relevant here, U.S.
`Patent No. 5,354,695 (““Leedy”).
`
`The Board held that Petitioners had not mettheir bur-
`den of demonstrating that the claims were unpatentable.
`Specifically, it found that the prior art did not disclose the
`“substantially flexible” limitation. It also found that Peti-
`tioners did not demonstrate a motivation to combine Bertin
`or Yu with Leedy or a reasonable expectation of success in
`doing so. Petitioners timely filed notices of appeal, and the
`appeals were consolidated. We havejurisdiction pursuant
`to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A).
`
`DISCUSSION
`
`I. Claim Construction
`
`“We review the Board’s constructions based on intrin-
`sic evidence de novo andits factual findings based on ex-
`trinsic evidence for substantial evidence.” HTC Corp. v.
`Cellular Comme’ns Equip., LLC, 877 F.3d 1361, 1367 (Fed.
`Cir. 2017). The Board construes claims in an unexpired
`patent according to their broadest reasonable interpreta-
`tion in light of the specification.
`37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b)
`(2017).4 Claimsof an expired patent are construed accord-
`ing to the standard applied by district courts. See In re
`CSB-Sys. Intl, Inc., 832 F.3d 1335, 13841 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
`(referencing Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed.
`
`Claim 1 of the ’499 patent was challenged based on
`3
`U.S. Patent No. 5,731,945, which contains the same disclo-
`sure as Bertin and addsdetails not relevant to this appeal.
`4
`The Board’s decisions issued prior to the effective
`date of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s change to
`the claim construction standard applied in interpartes re-
`view. See Changes to the Claim Construction Standardfor
`Interpreting Claims in Trial Proceedings Before the Patent
`Trial and Appeal Board, 83 Fed. Reg. 51,340 (Oct. 11,
`2018).
`
`

`

`Case: 17-2474
`
`Document:68
`
`Page:5
`
`Filed: 06/12/2019
`
`SAMSUNGELECTRONICS CO., LTD. v. ELM 3DS INNOVATIONS,
`LLC
`
`5
`
`Cir. 2005) (en banc)). While some patents were expired at
`the time of the Board’s final written decision and others
`were not, the parties agree that the different claim con-
`struction standards do not impact the outcome. Appel-
`lants’ Br. 44; Appellee’s Br. 41. The parties have not
`contested the Board’s application of the Phillips claim con-
`struction standard.
`
`All challenged claims except for claims 1 and 14 of the
`°778 patentuse “substantially flexible” in at least one of two
`ways. Thefirst is to modify the term “semiconductor sub-
`strate.” Claim 129 of the ’672 patent illustrates the use in
`this context (emphasis added):
`
`An integrated circuit structure comprising:
`
`a first substrate comprising a first surface
`supporting interconnect contacts;
`
`a substantially flexible semiconductor sec-
`ond substrate comprising a first surface
`and a second surface at least one of which
`supports interconnect contacts, wherein
`the second surfaceis opposite the first sur-
`face and wherein the second surface of the
`second substrate is formed by removal of
`semiconductor material from the second
`substrate and is smoothedorpolished after
`removal of the semiconductor material; and
`
`conductive paths between the interconnect
`contacts supported by the first surface. of
`the first substrate and of the interconnect
`contacts supported by the second sub-
`strate;
`
`wherein thefirst substrate and the second
`substrate overlap fully or partially in a
`stacked relationship; and
`
`

`

`Document: 68 Page:6_Filed: 06/12/2019
`Case: 17-2474
`
`
`
`6
`
`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICSCO., LTD. v. ELM 3DS INNOVATIONS,
`LLC
`
`wherein the integrated circuit structure
`further comprises a low-stress_ silicon-
`based dielectric material having a stress of
`5x108 dynes/cm? tensile or less.
`
`“Substantially flexible” is also used to modify “circuit lay-
`ers,” and other similar terms.’ Claim 30 of the 862 patent
`illustrates how “substantially flexible” is used in this con-
`text (emphasis added):
`
`A stacked circuit structure comprising:
`
`a plurality of stacked, thin, substantially
`flexible circuit layers at least one of which
`comprises a thinned, substantially flexible
`monocrystalline semiconductor -substrate
`of one piece;
`
`wherein at least one of the substantially
`flexible circuit layers comprises at least one
`memory array comprising memory cells
`and a low stress silicon-based dielectric .
`material; and
`
`at least one vertical interconnection that
`passes throughat least one of the plurality
`of stacked, thin, substantially flexible cir-
`cuit layers.
`
`See, eg., 239 patent at Claim 60 (“substantially
`5
`flexible” die); 004 patent at Claim 1 (“substantially flexible
`integrated circuits”); ’732 patent at Claim 1 (“substantially
`flexible integrated circuit layer”). The parties do nottreat
`this difference in terminology as affecting the construction
`of “substantially flexible.” Accordingly, our construction of
`“substantially flexible” applies acrossall its uses.
`
`

`

`Case: 17-2474
`
`Document:68
`
`Page:7
`
`Filed: 06/12/2019
`
`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICSCO., LTD. v. ELM 3DS INNOVATIONS,
`LLC
`
`q
`
`In each context, the Boardrelied on a general-purpose dic-
`tionary to construe “substantially flexible” to mean “largely
`able to bend without breaking.” E.g., J.A. 31.
`
`“Claim terms generally are construed in accordance
`with the ordinary and customary meaning they would have
`to one of ordinary skill in the artin light of the specification
`and the prosecution history.” Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Hos-
`pira, Inc., 675 F.3d 1324, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing Phil-
`lips, 415 F.3d at 1812). Extrinsic evidence may also be
`considered in construing a claim, though “it is less signifi-
`cant than the intrinsic record in determining the legally
`operative meaning of claim language.” Phillips, 415 F.3d
`at 1317 Gnternal quotation marks omitted). Wewill devi-
`ate from a claim term’s ordinary meaning “whena patentee
`sets out a definition and acts as its own lexicographer”or
`“when the patentee disavowsthe full scope of a claim term
`either in the specification or during prosecution.” Aventis,
`675 F.3d at 1330 (quoting Thorner v. Sony Computer
`Enim’t Am. L.L.C., 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).
`
`The parties dispute the meaning of “substantially flex-
`ible.” “Where multiple patents derive from the same par-
`ent application and share many common terms, we must
`interpret the claims consistently across all asserted pa-
`tents.” SightSound Techs., LLC v. Apple Inc., 809 F.3d
`1307, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2015) Gnternal quotation marks omit-
`ted). The parties do not argue that the definition of “sub-
`stantially flexible” depends on the patent or claim in which
`itis used. Because the Challenged Patents derive from the
`same parent application and use “substantially flexible”
`throughout, we construe that term the same way for each
`Challenged Patent.
`
`Petitioners argue the intrinsic record supports a con-
`struction of “substantially flexible” substrate as a “sub-
`strate that has been thinned to a thickness of less than 50
`uum and subsequently polished or smoothed.” Appellants’
`
`

`

`Case: 17-2474
`
`Document:68
`
`Page:8
`
`Filed: 06/12/2019
`
`8
`
`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICSCO., LTD. v. ELM 3DS INNOVATIONS,
`LLC
`
`Br. 36. Specifically, they rely on the specification’s disclo-
`sure of step “2A” in a fabrication sequence for a “3DS
`memory circuit,” which states: “Grind the backsideor ex-
`posed surface of the secondcircuit substrate to a thickness
`of less than 50 pm and then polish or smooth the surface.
`The thinned substrate is now a substantially flexible sub-
`strate.” 672 patent at 9:3-6; see also id. at 2:66-67, 3:5-8
`(stating that a feature of the stacked circuit assembly tech-
`nology includes “[t]hinning of the memory circuit to less
`than about50 pm in thickness forming a substantially flex-
`ible substrate”). Though these disclosuresrefer to the sub-
`strate being substantially flexible, Petitioners argue they
`apply with equalforce to the claimsreciting “substantially
`flexible” circuit layers, and similar limitations, because the
`prosecution history requires that a substantially flexible
`circuit layer includes a substantially flexible substrate.
`
`Elm responds that the Board’s construction is con-
`sistent with the ordinary meaning of “substantially flexi-
`ble” and the specification’s distinction between flexible and
`rigid substrates.
`It criticizes Petitioners’ proposed con-
`struction as departing from the ordinary meaning, since
`the flexibility of a material depends on more than how thin
`andpolished it is. Citing the declaration of Petitioners’ ex-
`pert Dr. Paul Franzon, Elm arguesthe flexibility of a sem-
`iconductor substrate depends on the substrate’s elastic
`modulus, crystal orientation, and dimensions. Appellee’s
`Br. 48—49 (citing J.A. 2191-92 4 71).
`
`Neither party’s construction is quite right. We begin
`our analysis with the claim language. The claimsindicate
`that, at least in some situations, thinning and polishing a
`substrate is one way of forming a substantially flexible sub-
`strate. For example, claim 31 of the ’778 patent recites “the
`semiconductor substrate is
`thinned and polished or
`smoothed such that the semiconductor substrate is sub-
`stantially flexible.” See also ’862 patent at Claim 147 (re-
`citing “the polished or smoothed backside [of a thinned,
`monocrystalline semiconductor substrate] enables the...
`
`

`

`Case: 17-2474
`
`Document:68
`
`Page:9
`
`Filed: 06/12/2019
`
`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICSCO., LTD. v. ELM 3DS INNOVATIONS,
`LLC
`
`9
`
`substrate to be substantially flexible, and the polished or
`smoothed backside reduces the vulnerability of the .
`.
`. sub-
`strate to fracture as a result of flexing”). But that does not
`meanthis is the only way to achieve substantialflexibility.
`The claim on which claim 31 dependsrecites “the semicon-
`ductor substrate is substantially flexible,” ’778 patent at
`Claim 2, implying that it covers substantially flexible sub-
`strates formed in ways other than the onerecited in claim
`31, Clearstream Wastewater Sys., Inc. v. Hydro-Action,
`Inc., 206 F.3d 1440, 1446 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“Under the doc-
`trine of claim differentiation, it is presumed that different
`words used in different claims result in a difference in
`meaning and scope for each of the claims.”). Claim 51 of
`the ’617 patent recites “the bottomside of the first substrate
`is polished to make the substrate substantially flexible,”
`with nospecific “thinned” limitation. Conversely, claim 8
`of the ’778 patent lacks a polishing limitation, reciting a
`substrate that “is formed from a semiconductor wafer and
`is thinned and substantially flexible.” The claims alone do
`not supportlimiting “substantially flexible” to Petitioners’
`proposed construction.
`
`The prosecution history, on the other hand, shows that
`“substantially flexible” is narrower than the Board’s con-
`struction of “largely able to bend without breaking.”
`E.g., J.A. 31. During prosecution of the application that
`led to the ’499 patent, the examiner objected to the use of
`the term “substantially flexible” because it rendered the
`claim’s scope unclear. J.A. 10260. Elm responded that “the
`meaningof [substantially flexible] as used in the claimsis
`clearly explained in the specification,” citing to step 2A in
`the fabrication sequence. J.A. 10275. “As described in this
`passage,” Elm continued, “a semiconductor substrate is
`causedto be substantially flexible by thinning it to 50 m1-
`cronsor less and polishing or smoothing the thinned semi-
`conductor
`substrate to relieve
`stress.
`The phrase
`‘substantially flexible’ is used in the claims consistent with
`this description, which is unambiguous.” Id. To overcome
`
`

`

`Case: 17-2474
`
`Document:68
`
`Page:10
`
`Filed: 06/12/2019
`
`10
`
`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. v. ELM 3DS INNOVATIONS,
`LLC
`
`the examiner’s objection, Elm clearly and unambiguously
`disclaimed claim scope. For a semiconductor substrate to
`be “substantially flexible” according to the claims, it must
`be thinned to 50 microns or less and polished or smoothed.
`
`This definition of “substantially flexible” applies to all
`its uses. In responseto a rejection of claims reciting a sub-
`stantially flexible circuit layer in an application related to
`the Challenged Patents, Elm stated that “a substantially
`flexible semiconductor substrate is a necessary but not a
`sufficient condition for a substantially flexible circuit
`layer.” J.A. 10316 (emphasis in original). Reinforcing this
`point, Elm in a response involving anotherrelated applica-
`tion explained:
`
`Two features are required to achieve substantial
`flexibility. One is that the semiconductor material
`must be sufficiently thin, e.g., 50 microns or
`less.... The other is that the dielectric material
`used in processing the semiconductor material
`must be sufficiently low stress. Otherwise, sub-
`stantial flexibility is defeated. As set forth in the
`present specification, stress of 5 x 108 dynes/cm?2or
`less has been demonstratedto satisfy this require-
`ment.
`
`J.A. 16038 (emphasis added). See also J.A. 10314 (“[A] cir-
`cuit layer requires one or more dielectric layers.... For a
`circuit layer to be substantially flexible, Applicant has
`found that the dielectric material must have low tensile
`stress, for example, 5 x 108 dynes/cm? tensile.”). Consid-
`ered in its entirety, the prosecution history clearly and un-
`ambiguously demonstrates that a substantially flexible
`circuit layer, and similar terms, must contain a substan-
`tially flexible semiconductor substrate and a sufficiently
`low tensile stress dielectric material. We see nothingin the
`specification or prosecution history that limits the dielec-
`tric to a particular stress value. Both merely provide as an
`
`

`

`Case: 17-2474
`
`Document:68
`
`Page: 11
`
`Filed: 06/12/2019
`
`SAMSUNGELECTRONICSCO., LTD. v. ELM 3DS INNOVATIONS,
`LLC
`
`11
`
`example that a tensile stress of 5 x 108 dynes/cm?is suffi-
`cient.
`
`This is not, however, the end of the construction. The
`prosecution history makes clear that “substantially flexi-
`ble” cannot be read to coverrigid substrates and circuit lay-
`ers.
`See J.A. 15397 (criticizing the prior art substrate
`because it is “rigid”); J.A. 16039 (stating the prior art “de-
`scribe[s] a stacked integrated circuit formed on a rigid car-
`rier ..., suggesting that the stacked integrated circuit is
`in fact inflexible” (emphasis in original)). Based on expert
`testimony from Dr. Franzon, the Board found that “there
`are a numberof factors that, within the context of semicon-
`ductor processing, determine the flexibility of a semicon-
`ductor substrate,” including the type of semiconductor
`substrate, the crystal orientation of the material, and the
`physical dimensions of the substrate. E.g., J.A. 27 (citing
`J.A. 2191-92 § 71). This suggests thinning the semicon-
`ductor substrate to 50 pm and subsequently polishing or
`smoothing it is necessary but not necessarily sufficient to
`make the substrate substantially flexible. To ensure that
`the construction of “substantially flexible” cannot be read
`to cover a rigid substrate or circuit layer, we interpret a
`substantially flexible semiconductor substrate as a semi-
`conductor substrate that is thinned to 50 um and subse-
`quently polished or smoothed such that it is largely able to
`bend without breaking. Likewise, we interpret a substan-
`tially flexible circuit layer as a circuit layer that is largely
`able to bend without breaking and contains a substantially
`flexible semiconductor substrate and a sufficiently low ten-
`sile stress dielectric material.
`
`II. Obviousness
`
`We review the Board’s legal determinations de novo
`and its underlying factual findings for substantial evi-
`dence. Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1073
`(Fed. Cir. 2013). Obviousnessis a question of law based on
`underlying facts. Id. Whether there was a motivation to
`
`

`

`Case: 17-2474
`
`Document:68
`
`Page:12
`
`Filed: 06/12/2019
`
`12
`
`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. v. ELM 3DS INNOVATIONS,
`LLC
`
`combine references and a reasonable expectation of success
`in doing so to meetthe limitations of the claimed invention
`are questionsof fact. Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc. v. Illumina
`Cambridge Litd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1367-68 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
`
`Each ground of unpatentability relied on either Bertin
`or Yu in combination with Leedy, along with other refer-
`ences not relevant on appeal. Bertin discloses “[a] fabrica-
`tion method and resultant three-dimensional multichip
`package having a densely stacked array of semiconductor
`chips interconnected at least partially by meansof a plu-
`rality of metallized trenches.”
`J.A.1206 at Abstract.
`“{P]rocessing begins with a semiconductor device 50 (pref-
`erably comprising a wafer) having a substrate 52 and an
`active layer 54, which is typically positioned at least par-
`tially therein.” J.A. 1216 at 3:50-53. A dielectric layer is
`grownover the active layer. Id. at 3:60-62.6 Yu discloses
`a fabrication process for a 3D integration structure in
`whicha silicon waferis glued to quartz glass, thinned and
`polished, and bonded to a thick wafer. The structure in-
`cludes a “field oxide,” depicted in two figures as silicon di-
`oxide. J.A. 1350. Leedy discloses a methodof fabricating
`“integrated circuits from flexible membranes formed of
`very thin low stress dielectric materials, such as silicon di-
`oxide or
`silicon nitride,
`and semiconductor
`layers.”
`J.A. 1229 at Abstract.
`
`Regarding the Bertin-Leedy combinations, Petitioners
`proposed depositing a low-stress dielectric material using |
`plasma-enhanced chemical vapor deposition (“PECVD”), as
`disclosed in Leedy, instead of growing the dielectric layer,
`as disclosed in Bertin. The Board found that a person of
`ordinary skill in the art would not have been motivated to
`make such a combination and would not have had a rea-
`sonable expectation of success in doing so. It credited the
`
`6 A dielectric is an insulator used inelectric circuits.
`J.A. 2375 J 33.
`
`

`

`Case: 17-2474
`
`Document:68
`
`Page: 13
`
`Filed: 06/12/2019
`
`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. v. ELM 83DS INNOVATIONS,
`LLC
`
`13
`
`testimony of Elm’s expert Dr. Alexander Glew that PECVD
`was incompatible with Bertin’s integrated circuit. Given
`the complexity involved in integrated circuit fabrication,it
`found Dr. Franzon’s testimony that PECVD had certain
`benefits and that Leedy and Bertin are in the same techno-
`logical field was insufficient to meet Petitioners’ burden.
`As a result, it found Petitioners failed to adequately ex-
`plain “how [Bertin’s] fabrication process would be changed
`to use [Leedy’s] dielectric material, which is formed in a
`quite different manner than [Bertin’s] dielectric layer.”
`J.A. 77. The Board’s finding as to a lack of reasonable ex-
`pectation of success is supported by substantial evidence.
`
`Bertin discloses that “[a] dielectric layer 60, for exam-
`ple, [silicon dioxide], is grown over active layer 54 of device
`50.” J.A. 1216 at 3:60-62. Dr. Glew testified that a silicon
`dioxide dielectric that is grown directly over circuit compo-
`nents must be high-purity to not damage thecircuit com-
`ponents. J.A. 2415 § 128. Asaresult, one of ordinary skill
`in the art would have knownfrom Bertin’s description that
`the dielectric layer 60 “was grown at high temperatures us-
`ing thermal oxidation.”
`J.A. 2415-16 { 128; see also
`J.A. 1527 (acknowledging in the Petition that Bertin dis-
`closes “thermally grown oxides”). Thermal oxidation is a
`process in which silicon at the surface of a wafer is con-
`verted to high-purity silicon dioxide by exposingit to oxy-
`gen at high temperatures, typically between 900 °C and
`1200 °C. J.A. 2387-88 {| 66-67.
`
`Substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding that
`Petitioners did not adequately explain how Bertin’s fabri-
`cation process would be changed to use Leedy’s dielectric
`material. The Petition asserted that Leedy’s dielectric ma-
`terial could “easily be used in place of’ Bertin’s dielectric
`using PECVD.
`J.A. 1527.
`In support of this argument,
`Dr. Franzontestified that PECVD “was a commonly avail-
`able deposition technique that could have been used in
`place of’ Bertin’s
`technique for growing dielectrics.
`J.A. 2207 J 101. He also testified that Leedy explains that
`
`

`

`Case: 17-2474
`
`Document:68
`
`Page:14
`
`Filed: 06/12/2019
`
`14
`
`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICSCO., LTD. v. ELM 3DS INNOVATIONS,
`LLC
`
`“its dielectric deposition processes are compatible with con-
`ventional
`integrated
`circuit
`fabrication methods.”
`J.A. 2206-07 § 101. For example, Leedy states that “[t]he
`dielectric membrane is compatible with most higher tem-
`perature
`[integrated circuit]
`processing techniques.”
`J.A. 1296 at 5:32-33.
`
`Evidence shows that selecting a dielectric and a
`methodof forming that dielectric is more complicated than
`Petitioners suggest. A specific dielectric, like silicon diox-
`ide, can have “vastly different characteristics and behav- °
`iors” depending on how it
`is made.
`J.A.2386 { 63.
`Dr. Glew identified eighteen factors to be considered when
`selecting a dielectric and method of formation. Those fac-
`tors include:
`
`field
`(2)breakdown
`constant,
`(1) dielectric
`(4) surface
`conductance,
`-strength,
`(3) leakage,
`(5) moisture absorption or permeability to mois- '
`ture, (6) stress, (7) adhesion to aluminum, (8) ad-
`hesion to dielectric
`layers
`above or below,
`(9) stability, (10) etch rate, (11) permeability to hy-
`’ drogen,
`(12) amount of
`incorporated electrical
`charge or dipoles,
`(13)amount of
`impurities,
`(14) quality of step coverage, (15) the thickness and
`uniformity of the film, (16) ability to provide good
`doped uniformity across a wafer, (17) defect den-
`sity,
`[and]
`(18) amount of residual constituents
`that outgas during later processing.
`
`J.A. 2421 § 139. Dr. Glew stated that most of these factors
`are unknown here with respect to Leedy’s dielectric, so a
`person of ordinary skill in the art could not conclude that
`it would have been obvious to make the proposed substitu-
`tion.
`In light of the complexity of semiconductor fabrica-
`tion, the Board found Petitioners’ explanation lacking.
`
`The Board’s finding that PECVD is “quite different”
`from thermal oxidation is supported by substantial evi-
`
`

`

`Case: 17-2474
`
`Document:68
`
`Page:15
`
`Filed: 06/12/2019
`
`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. v. ELM 3DS INNOVATIONS,
`LLC
`
`15
`
`dence. J.A. 77. As the name suggests, PECVD is a deposi-
`tion process, unlike thermal oxidation, which is a growth
`process. PECVD is performed at 400 °C or less and uses
`plasma to create a reaction between the surface of a wafer
`and chemical vapors that include the atomsor molecules to
`be deposited.
`In contrast to thermal oxidation, which
`yields a high-purity dielectric, Dr. Glew testified that die-
`lectrics deposited using PECVD “include impurities that
`make them unusable for a variety of applications requiring
`higher purity.” J.A. 2392 § 77. According to Dr. Glew,this
`creates a problem when attempting to implement Leedy’s
`dielectric into Bertin using PECVD becausethe dielectric
`layer of Bertin must be highly pure to not damage thecir-
`cuit components. J.A. 2415-16 § 128. The dielectric pro-
`duced using PECVD would not be sufficiently pure.
`J.A. 2416 J 130. He also testified that PECVD “cannot be
`used becausepositive ions present in the plasmacanstrike
`and damage the wafer and the exposed active components
`in and on its surface.” J.A. 2423 { 142.
`
`Petitioners argue the Board erred whenit declined to
`resolve a dispute about front-end-of-line and back-end-of-
`line processing steps,
`especially when it
`relied on
`Dr. Glew’s testimony that assumed Bertin’s dielectric was
`grown during the front-end-of-line phase of the fabrication
`process. Dr. Glew’s testimony wasthat if Leedy’s dielectric
`replaced Bertin’s at the same phasein the fabrication pro-
`cess, PECVD could not be used “because the resulting die-
`lectric would not
`(1) be sufficiently pure;
`(2) have the
`ability to adhere sufficiently to the semiconductor wafer;
`and (3) be able to withstand high temperaturesof the re-
`maining [front-end-of-line] steps,” which generally occur at
`higher
`temperatures than the back-end-of-line steps,
`“without changing its form.” J.A. 2422-23 4 142. We see
`no legal error in the Board’s decision. First, the Board
`found that even assuming Petitioners’ contentions were ac-
`curate, their explanation was lacking. Second, we under-
`stand the Board’s opinion as finding it unnecessary to
`
`

`

`Case: 17-2474
`
`Document:68
`
`Page: 16
`
`Filed: 06/12/2019
`
`16
`
`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICSCO., LTD. v. ELM 3DS INNOVATIONS,
`LLC
`
`decide this issue because, at least as to Dr. Glew’s first two
`points, the timing would not matter. Though Petitioners
`disputed these facts in their Reply below, they did so based
`on attorney argument without premising that argument on
`the timing of applying PECVD. J.A. 1811-12. Moreover,
`“t]he possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions
`from the evidence does not prevent an administrative
`agency’s finding from being supported by substantial evi-
`dence.” In re Applied Materials, Inc., 692 F.3d 1289, 1294
`(Fed. Cir. 2012).
`
`Petitioners also argue the Board improperly required
`proof that unclaimed elements were combinable.
`“It is
`well-established that a determination of obviousness based
`on teachings from multiple references does not require an
`actual, physical substitution of elements.” In re Mouttet,
`686 F.3d 1322, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2012). “What matters in the
`§ 103 nonobviousness determination is whethera person of
`ordinary skill in the art, having all the teachingsoftheref-
`erences before him, is able to produce the structure defined
`by the claim.” Orthopedic Equip. Co., Inc. v. United States,
`702 F.2d 1005, 1013 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The Board did not
`require unclaimed elements be combinable. Rather,it re-
`peatedly stated that integrated-circuit technology is com-
`plex and, as such, looked for specific evidence that a person
`of ordinary skill in the art would have reasonably expected
`success in combining Bertin’s fabrication process and
`Leedy’s dielectric material. Petitioners specifically argued
`in its Petition that “PECVD ... could have been used in
`place of the dielectric growing techniques described in Ber-
`tin to obtain the predictable result of stacked [integrated
`circuits] having low tensile stress dielectrics.” J.A. 1528.
`The Board ultimately determined that Petitioners’ evi-
`dence in support of that combination wasinsufficient. We
`will not fault the Board for analyzing Petitioners’ obvious-
`ness grounds in the way presented in the Petition.
`
`

`

`Case: 17-2474
`
`Document:68
`
`Page:17
`
`Filed: 06/12/2019
`
`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICSCO., LTD. v. ELM 3DS INNOVATIONS,
`LLC
`
`17
`
`Finally, Petitioners argue there was a reasonable éx-
`pectation of success because the Challenged Patents incor-
`porate Leedy by reference.
`The patents state that
`“dielectrics in low stress .
`.
`. such as low stress silicon diox-
`ide and silicon nitride ... are discussed at length in
`[Leedy], incorporated herein by reference.” ’672 patent at
`8:46—-53. Petitioners argue that the failure to mention any
`technical problems with using Leedy’s dielectrics indicates
`that doing so wastrivial. The Board considered this argu-
`ment and rejected it. We find the Petitioners’ argument too
`speculative to warrant a conclusion that the Board’s fac-
`tual finding lacked substantial evidence.
`
`The arguments related to the Yu-Leedy combinations
`were substantially similar to the Bertin-Leedy combina-
`tions. According to the Petition, it would have been obvious
`to replace Yu’s silicon dioxide and processes for formingit
`with the dielectric and deposition process taught by Leedy.
`“Using [Leedy’s] dielectric materials and deposition tech-
`niques in the manufacture of Yu’s 3D LSI results in” the
`combination disclosing the low-tensile-stress-dielectric
`limitation. J.A. 1558. Dr. Franzen’s testimony in support
`of this combination wasidentical to the combination in the
`Bertin-Leedy grounds. See J.A. 2206-08 {J 99-103. The
`Board found that Petitioners failed to meet their burden for
`substantially the same reasons.
`
`The evidence discussed as to why a personof ordinary
`skill in the art would not have reasonably expected success
`in making the proposed combination applies equally here.
`Dr. Glewtestified that Yu identifies its dielectric as a “field
`oxide,” which one of ordinary skill in the art would have
`understoodis a highly pure dielectric grown directly on the
`silicon substrate at high temperatures using thermal oxi-
`dation. J.A. 2418-19 Jf 134-35 (citing J.A. 1350). His tes-
`timony about why a person of ordinary skill in the art
`would not have reasonably expected success using PECVD
`to deposit Leedy’s dielectric was likewise the same. Peti-
`tioners raise no argumenton appeal that distinguishes the
`
`

`

`Case: 17-2474
`
`Document:68
`
`Page: 18
`
`Filed: 06/12/2019
`
`18
`
`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. v. ELM 3DS INNOVATIONS,
`LLC
`
`Bert

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

throbber

A few More Minutes ... Still Working

It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.

Thank you for your continued patience.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket