throbber
Trials@uspto. gov
`571-272-7822
`
`Paper 18
`Entered: May 26, 2016
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`VALEO NORTH AMERICA, INC; VALEO S.A;
`VALEO GmbH; VALEO SCHALTER UND SENSOREN GmbH;
`
`and CONNAUGHT ELECTRONICS LTD.,
`
`Petitioner,
`
`V.
`
`MAGNA ELECTRONICS, INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`
`Case IPR2015-00250
`
`Patent 8,543,330 B2
`
`Before RICHARD E. RICE, JAMES A. TARTAL, and
`BARBARA A. PARVIS, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`TARTAL, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`FINAL WRITTEN DECISION
`
`35 US. C. 55' 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73
`
`

`

`IPR2015-00250
`
`Patent 8,543,330 B2
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Petitioner Valeo North America, Inc., Valeo S.A., Valeo GmbH,
`
`Valeo Schalter und Sensoren GmbH, and Connaught Electronics Ltd., filed a
`
`Petition requesting an inter partes review of claims 1—89 of US. Patent
`
`No. 8,543,330 B2 (“the ’330 patent”). Paper 1 (“Pet”). Patent Owner
`
`Magna Electronics, Inc. filed a Preliminary Response. Paper 6 (“Prelim
`
`Resp”). We instituted an inter partes review of: (1) claims 1—7, 9, 10,
`
`13-15, 18, 22—24, 26, 27, 29, 30, 39—41, 43—49, 52, 55, 56, 58—61, 63—69,
`
`72, 76—78, 80—83, and 85—88 as obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over
`
`Lemelson,1 Schofield,2 and Tokito;3 and (2) claims 25, 57, 75, and 89 as
`
`obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Lemelson, Schofield, Tokito, and
`
`Schaefer.4 Paper 7.
`
`After institution of trial, Patent Owner filed a Response (Paper 9, “PO
`
`Resp”), to which Petitioner replied (Paper 10, “Reply”). Absent a request
`
`from either party, an oral hearing was not held. See Paper 16.
`
`We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(c). In this Final Written
`
`Decision, issued pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 CPR. § 42.73, we
`
`determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that
`
`1 US. Patent No. 6,553,130 B1 (“Lemelson,” Ex. 1005), issued
`April 22, 2003, from an application filed June 28, 1996.
`7' US. Patent No. 5,670,935 (“Schofield,” EX. 1007), issued
`September 23, 1997, from an application filed May 22, 1995.
`3 US. Patent No. 6,259,423 B1 (“'l'okito,” Ex. 1006), issued July 10, 2001,
`from an application filed August 17, 1998. Petitioner misidentifies Tokito as
`US. Patent No. 6,226,061 in the Petition, which we understand to be an
`inadvertent mistake in light of the content of Exhibit 1006. See Pet. 5.
`4 US. Patent No. 4,731,769 (“Schaefer,” Ex. 1008), issued
`March 15, 1988, from an application filed April 14, 1986.
`2
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`

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`IPR2015-00250
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`Patent 8,543,330 B2
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`claims 1—7, 9, 10, 13—15, 18, 22—27, 29, 30, 39—41, 43-49, 52, 55—61, 63—
`
`69, 72, '/b—'/8, 80—83, and 85—89 are unpatentable.
`
`II.
`
`BACKGROUND
`
`A.
`
`The '330 Patent (Ex. 1001)
`
`The ’330 patent, titled “Driver Assist System for Vehicle,” issued
`
`September 24, 2013, from US. Application No. 13/621,382, filed September
`
`17, 2012. Ex. 1001. Petitioner contends the earliest effective filing date of
`
`the ’330 patent is January 22, 2002. Pet. 13—16. Patent Owner states that
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`“the earliest priority date of the ’330 patent” is March 2, 2000. PO Resp. 30.
`
`March 2, 2000, is the date that provisional application No. 60/186,520 (“the
`
`’520 application”) was filed, the earliest of fifteen provisional applications
`
`identified on the face of the ’330 patent. With respect to the claims of the
`
`’330 patent under review, Patent Owner offers no argument or evidence to
`
`demonstrate either that any claim is entitled to priority to the ’520
`
`application or that any asserted reference is not prior art. Accordingly, we
`
`determine based on the evidence and argument presented that each of the
`
`asserted references is prior art to the ’330 patent.
`
`The ’330 patent is directed to a driver assist system for a vehicle,
`
`including a camera with an exterior field of view and a video display
`
`operable to display image data captured by the camera to the driver of the
`
`vehicle. Ex. 1001, Abstract. The system is operable to detect objects in the
`
`exterior field of view and to provide a visual alert and an audible alert
`
`responsive to detection of an object exterior of the vehicle. Id. According to
`
`Patent Owner, “[t]he driver assist systems having electronically generated
`
`indicia overlaying the video image of the rearward scene described in the
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`

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`IPR2015-00250
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`Patent 8,543,330 B2
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`’330 patent were a significant advance over prior reversing systems.”
`
`PO Resp. 2 (citing Ex. 1001, 27:4—10); see also Ex. 2001 Will 17—19.
`
`B.
`
`Illustrative Claim
`
`Claims 1, 39, 59, and 76 of the ’330 patent are independent. Claims
`
`2—7, 9, 10, 13—15, 18, 22—27, 29, and 30 ultimately depend from claim 1;
`
`claims 40, 41, 43—49, 52, and 55—58 ultimately depend from claim 39;
`
`claims 60, 61, 63—69, 72, and 75 ultimately depend from claim 59, and
`
`claims 77, 78, 80—83, and 85—89 ultimately depend from claim 76. Claim 1
`
`of the ’330 patent is illustrative of the claims at issue:
`
`1. A driver assist system for a vehicle, said driver assist
`system comprising:
`a rearward facing camera disposed at a vehicle equipped with
`said driver assist system and having a rearward field of
`View relative to the equipped vehicle;
`a video display viewable by a driver of the equipped
`vehicle when normally operating the equipped vehicle,
`wherein said Video display is operable to display image
`data captured by said rearward facing camera;
`wherein said driver assist system is operable to detect objects
`present in said rearward field of view of said rearward
`facing camera
`wherein said driver assist system is operable to provide a.
`display intensity of said displayed image data of at least
`about 200 candelas/sq. meter for viewing by the driver of
`thc equipped vehicle;
`wherein said driver assist system is operable to provide a
`visual alert to the driver ofthe equipped vehicle responsive
`to detection of an object rearward of the equipped vehicle
`during a reversing maneuver of the equipped vehicle;
`wherein said driver assist system is operable to provide an
`audible alert
`to the driver of the equipped vehicle
`responsive to detection of an object rearward of the
`
`

`

`IPR2015-00250
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`Patent 8,543,330 BZ
`
`equipped vehicle during a reversing maneuver of the
`equipped vehicle; and
`wherein said visual alert comprises electronically generated
`indicia that overlay said image data displayed by said
`video display, and wherein said electronically generated
`indicia at least one of (i) indicate distance to a detected
`object rearward of the equipped vehicle and (ii) highlight
`a detected object rearward of the equipped vehicle.
`
`Ex. 1001, 31:47—32:12.
`
`III. ANALYSIS
`
`A.
`
`Claim Construction
`
`Only terms which are in controversy need to be construed, and then
`
`only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Vivid Techs., Inc. v.
`
`Am. Sci. & Eng ’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
`
`I.
`
`“at least one of”
`
`Petitioner contends that, as used in the ’330 patent, “at least one of” a
`
`series of elements was intended to signify a disjunctive list of alternatives,
`
`not a requirement of one of each element listed. Pet. 17—19. Petitioner
`
`contrasts this interpretation of “at least one of” from that applied in
`
`SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTVEnterprises, Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 885—88 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2004) (requiring “at least one of” each identified element), and supports
`
`its contention by identifying portions of the specification that make clear the
`
`listed elements are disjunctive altematives. Pet. 18. Patent Owner does not
`
`address the claim term. For the reasons provided by Petitioner, we are
`
`persuaded that “at least one of” is used in the ’330 patent to identify a
`
`disjunctive list of alternatives.
`
`

`

`IPR2015—00250
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`Patent 8,543,330 B2
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`2.
`
`”display intensity ”
`
`Petitioner contends “display intensity” should be construed to mean
`
`“luminance” because the ’330 patent describes values for “display intensity”
`
`in candelas/sq. meter, the International System of Units (“SI”) units for
`
`luminance. Pet. 20. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s contention.
`
`PO Resp. 3; Ex. 2001 11 20. We agree with Petitioner that “display
`
`intensity,” as used in the ’330 patent, is synonymous with “luminance.”
`
`3.
`
`“human machine interface ”
`
`Claim 22 requires the driver assist system of claim 1, “comprising a
`
`human machine interface, said human machine interface cOmprising at least
`
`one user input.” Ex. 1001, 33:21—23. Claims 55 and 88 contain similar
`
`limitations. Petitioner contends that “human machine interface” should be
`
`interpreted to mean the part of an electronic machine or device which serves
`
`for the information exchange between the operator/user and the
`
`machine/device. The term “human machine interface” does not appear in
`
`the specification of the ’330 patent outside of the claims. Claim 22 recites
`
`that the “human machine interface” accepts user input. Petitioner, however,
`
`has not explained sufficiently why we should adopt its proposed
`
`construction requiring that the “human machine interface” must “exchange”
`
`information from the device to the user. However, there is no dispute that
`
`Lemelson discloses a human machine interface, and Patent Owner does not
`
`argue that the term requires an express construction. PO Resp. 3; see also
`
`Ex. 2001 11 21. Accordingly, we determine no express construction is
`
`necessary for “human machine interface.”
`
`

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`IPR2015-00250
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`Patent 8,543,330 B2
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`4.
`
`”electronically generated overlay ”
`
`Patent Owner contends that “electronically generated overlay” should
`
`be construed to mean “electronically-generated indicia superimposed upon
`
`and overlaying a displayed video image.” PO Resp. 4._ “Electronically
`
`generated overlay,” however, is not a claim term. As Patent Owner notes,
`
`independent claims 1, 39, 59, and 76 recite “electronically generated indicia
`
`that overlay said image data displayed by said video display.” Thus, Patent
`
`Owner’s contentions with respect to a term, “electronically generated
`
`overlay,” that does not appear in any claim are not persuasive.
`
`Additionally, a comparison of Patent Owner’s proposed definition to
`
`the actual claim language suggests Patent Owner is largely repeating the
`
`claim language, not providing a useful definition. Patent Owner seeks to
`
`insert “superimposed” into the claim language by arguing that there is a
`
`statement in the specification that “a distance grid can be electronically
`
`superimposed upon the video image.” PO Resp. 4 (quoting Ex. 1001,
`
`27:3 0—34). Had Patent Owner shown there is a'difference between
`
`“overlay” and “superimposed,” we would not have been persuaded to adopt
`
`Patent Owner’s proposed construction because limitations are not imported
`
`into a claim from the written description. SuperGuide, 358 F.3d at 875
`
`(“[t]hough understanding the claim language may be aided by explanations
`
`contained in the written description, it is important not to import into a claim
`
`limitations that are not part of the claim”). In this case, however, there is no
`
`substantive dispute between the parties over the meaning of “overlay.”
`
`Petitioner notes an ordinary and customary definition of “overlay” is “to lay
`
`or spread over or across: superimpose.” Reply 5 (quoting Ex. 1022). Thus
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`

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`IPR2015—00250
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`Patent 8,543,330 B2
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`“overlay” and “superimpose” mean the same thing. For the foregoing
`
`reasons, to the extent Patent Owner implies any difference between
`
`“overlay” and “superimpose” by including both terms in its proposed
`
`construction, we are not persuaded. We determine that “electronically
`
`generated indicia that overlay said image data displayed by said video
`
`display,” does not require an express definition, and we apply its ordinary
`
`and customary meaning.
`
`B.
`
`Obviousness Over Lemelson and Other Asserted Prior Art
`
`Petitioner contends that claims 1—7, 9, 10, 13—15, 18, 22—27, 29, 30,
`
`39—41, 43—49, 52, 55—61, 63—69, 72, 75—78, 80—83, and 85—89 are
`
`unpatentable as obvious over Lemelson and various additional asserted prior
`
`art. According to Petitioner, Lemelson describes “virtually the entirety of
`
`the claimed inventions,” but for “trivial matters of design choice” and
`
`“features already known as being desirably incorporated into automobiles.”
`
`Pet. 20—21. Petitioner’s contentions are supported by the Declaration of
`
`Dr. Ralph V. Wilhelm (EX. 1014), and a second Declaration from Dr.
`
`Wilhelm filed in reply (EX. 1021).5 In opposition to Petitioner’s contentions,
`
`Patent Owner relies on the Declaration of Dr. Matthew A. Turk. Ex. 2001.
`
`5 According to Patent Owner, Dr. Wilhelm’s Declaration should be afforded
`no weight because his opinions consider whether a claim “would more likely
`than not have been obvious” to a person of ordinary skill, rather than
`“whether the subject matter ‘would have been obvious.”’ PO Resp. 47—49.
`As an initial matter, Patent Owner misrepresents the Institution Decision by
`stating it “acknowledges that Dr. Wilhelm’s Declaration uses an improper
`obviousness standard,” when that decision does no such thing, and instead
`states “[ejven assuming Patent Owner’s distinction has merit, we are not
`persuaded that it warrants affording no weight to Dr. Wilhelm’s entire
`declaration.” Paper 7, 10 (emphasis added). According to Petitioner
`8
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`

`

`IPR2015—00250
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`Patent 8,543,330 B2
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`1 .
`
`Scope and Content of the Prior Art
`
`(0)
`
`Lemelson (Ex. 1005)
`
`Lemelson, titled “Motor Vehicle Warning and Control System and
`
`Method,” describes a system and method that use a camera mounted on a
`
`vehicle to scan the roadway to assist the driver of a vehicle in preventing or
`
`minimizing accidents. EX. 1005, Abstract. An image-analyzing computer
`
`processes the video picture signals generated by the camera to generate
`
`codes that serve to identify obstacles. Id. A decision computer in the
`
`vehicle receives code signals from the image analyzing computer, as well as
`
`the speedometer or other sensors, to generate control signals. Id. The code
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`signals may be displayed, and sound generation or warning means used to
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`warn the driver of approaching and existing hazards. Id. The control signals
`
`may be used to operate the brakes and steering of the vehicle to lessen the
`
`effects of a collision. Id.
`
`“Dr. Wilhelm combined into a single statement the standard for determining
`obviousness (whether the claimed subject matter as a whole would have
`been obvious to a [person of ordinary skill in the art]) with the
`preponderance of the evidence (i.e., more likely than not) burden of proof
`applicable in this inter partes review.” Reply 2. We find no merit to Patent
`Owner’s contention that an expert’s testimony is entitled to no weight
`merely because his opinions discuss what, more likely than not, would have
`been obvious to a person of ordinary skill. Similarly, we find no basis for
`Patent Owner’s contention that Dr. Wilhelm’s Declaration should be
`
`afforded no weight because he “relies on information in the claim charts that
`is not actually there.” See PO Resp. 43—47.
`
`9
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`

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`IPR2015-00250
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`Patent 8,543,330 B2
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`(b)
`
`Schofield (Ex. 1007)
`
`Schofield, titled “Rearview Vision System for Vehicle Including
`
`Panoramic View,” describes an image capture device directed rearward of a
`
`vehicle and a display system to display an image synthesized from output of
`
`the image capture devices to the driver. Ex. 1007, Abstract. Schofield
`
`explains that:
`
`In order to further enhance the driver’s understanding of
`what is occurring in the area surrounding the vehicle, a
`rearview vision system 12’” includes a display 20’” having
`image enhancements (FIG. 6). In the illustrative embodiment,
`such image enhancements include graphic overlays 70a, 70b
`which are hash marks intended to illustrate to the driver the
`
`anticipated path of movement of vehicle 10. In the illustrated
`embodiment, the anticipated vehicle motion is a fiinction of the
`vehicle direction of travel as well as the rate of turn of the
`
`vehicle. The forward or rearward direction of vehicle travel is
`
`determined in response to the operator placing the gear
`selection device (not shown) in the reverse gear position.
`
`Id. at 10:29—41.
`
`(c)
`
`Tokito (Ex. 1006)
`
`Tokito, titled “Display Device Using Organic Electroluminescent
`
`Elements,” describes a luminescent panel that can display an image from
`
`video information. Ex. 1006, Abstract, col. 1:64—67. The measured
`
`luminance in front of the direct-viewing display described by Tokito is 500
`
`candelas/sq. meter. Id. at 10:44-45. Tokito states that such a display
`
`preferably may be used for an onboard display visible to a driver, and that
`
`because a sufficient luminance is obtainable, “a secure display can be
`
`effected even when the sun shines through the window.” Id. at 10:53—67.
`
`10
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`

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`IPR2015-00250
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`Patent 8,543,330 B2
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`(61')
`
`Schaefer (Ex. 1008)
`
`Schaefer relates to “a central operating input and information system
`
`for the control of a plurality of optional instruments in a vehicle,” and
`
`teaches a “touch-sensitive display screen where a place of touch can be
`
`localized on its surface (“touch screen”) so that the control keys can be
`
`shown individually on the screen as virtual touch keys or touch fields.”
`
`Ex. 1008, 1:8—13, 5:40—44.
`
`2.
`
`Level ofSkill in the Art
`
`In the Petition, Petitioner refers to the Declaration of Dr. Wilhelm as
`
`providing his opinion of the level of skill of a person having ordinary skill in
`
`the art at the time of the invention. Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1014 1111 17—21).
`
`According to Dr. Wilhelm, a person of ordinary skill in 2002 would have
`
`had: (1) “at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer
`
`science, or physics, and would have had at least 2—5 years of experience with
`
`human factors for automotive design, i.e., for how humans interact with a
`
`display in a vehicle,” and (2) “a working understanding of microprocessor-
`
`driven controls for displays, actuators, and elementary decision making, and
`
`would have been comfortable working in a systems environment relating to
`
`instrumentation displays for new vehicles.” Ex. 1014 1111 20-21.
`
`Patent Owner argues that Petitioner has failed to set forth how the
`
`claims are unpatentable because “the Petition does not resolve or even
`address the level of ordinary skill in the art,” and does not show “how the
`
`purported art reflects the level of ordinary skill in the art.” PO Resp. 30—3 1.
`
`We disagree.
`
`11
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`IPR2015-00250
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`Patent 8,543,330 B2
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`Patent Owner fails to identify any substantive deficiency in the level
`
`of ordinary skill in the art articulated by Dr. Wilhelm, upon which the
`Petition relies. See Pet. 8. Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Turk, states that a
`
`person of ordinary skill “would have had at least a Bachelor’s degree in
`
`electrical, electronic, or mechanical engineering, or equivalent experience,
`
`and at least two years of experience in the relevant field, such as imaging
`
`systems for vehicles.” Ex. 2001 11 12. Contrary to Patent Owner’s
`
`unsupported argument that the level of ordinary skill in the art isunresolved,
`
`Dr. Turk’s testimony is largely consistent with Dr. Wilhelm’s testimony, and
`
`Patent Owner does not argue otherwise. Because we discern no
`
`substantively significant difference between the proposed levels of skill, we
`
`further agree with Petitioner that the patentability of the claims does not turn
`
`on whether Dr. Wilhelm’s or Dr. Turk’s express identification of the level of
`
`ordinary skill is adopted. See Reply 21.
`
`Moreover, it is well-settled that the level of ordinary skill in the art
`
`may be reflected by the prior art of record. qufima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d
`
`1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPACInc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir.
`
`1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). We find the level of
`
`ordinary skill in the art to be reflected in the cited references, and discern no
`
`reason why Petitioner in this case must expressly state in the Petition “how”
`
`it is reflected. A person of ordinary skill is presumed to be aware of all
`
`pertinent prior art. Standard Oil Co. v. Am. Cyanamid C0., 774 F.2d 448,
`
`454 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d
`
`1437, 1449—54 (Fed. Cir. 1984). In this case, the level of ordinary skill in
`
`the art is evidenced by the references themselves.
`
`12
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`IPR2015—00250
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`Patent 8,543,330 B2
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`3.
`
`Differences Between the Claimed Subject
`Matter and the Prior Art
`,
`
`(a)
`
`Obviousness Over Lemelson, Schofield, and Tokito
`
`(1')
`
`Independent Claims I, 39, 59, and 76
`
`Petitioner contends that Lemelson discloses nearly all of the features
`
`of claims 1, 39, 59, and 76, with the only substantive difference being the
`
`specifically claimed luminance value for the insv’ehicle display, for which
`
`Petitioner relies on Tokito. Pet. 21. Petitioner further relies on the express
`
`teachings of Schofield to confirm what it contends is implicit in Lemelson
`
`with regard to displaying a video image from the rear—facing camera when
`
`the vehicle is in reverse. Id. Many of the limitations of claims 1, 39, 59, and
`
`76 are substantially similar, and Petitioner provides a claim chart identifying
`
`how each feature of each claim is disclosed by the asserted references. Id. at
`
`23—30.
`
`There is no dispute that Lemelson discloses the limitations of claims
`
`1, 39, 59, and 76 corresponding to “a rearward facing camera” or “a
`3, “
`
`camera,
`
`a video display viewable by a driver .
`
`.
`
`. operable to display image
`
`data” captured by the camera, and a driver assist system “operable to detect
`
`objects” in the field of View of the camera. See Pet. 23—25. There also is no
`
`dispute that Tokito discloses a display intensity of “at least about 200
`
`candelas/sq. meter,” as required by claims 1, 39, 59 and 76. See id. at 25—
`
`26.
`
`Claims 39, 59, and 76 further require that the system provide a “visual
`
`alert” and an “audible alert” “to the driver .
`
`.
`
`. responsive to detection of an
`
`object exterior of the equipped vehicle.” Petitioner’s contention that
`
`Lemelson discloses these features is not disputed by Patent Owner.
`
`13
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`IPR2015-00250
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`Lemelson discloses an image display that “may include highlighting of
`
`hazards,” which we agree with Petitioner corresponds to the claimed “visual
`
`alert.” See Pet. 26 (quoting Ex. 1005, 6:49—55). We also agree with
`
`Petitioner that Lemelson discloses warnings, including “audible alarms”
`
`which “can be combined with actual video displays of vehicle situations
`
`including hazards and nearby objects.” Pet. 27 (quoting Ex. 1005 9:55—65).
`
`Claim 1 likewise requires a “visual alert” and an “audible alert,” but
`
`further requires that they are “responsive to detection of an object rearward
`
`of the equipped vehicle during a reversing maneuver.” Petitioner contends
`
`Lemelson implicitly discloses this feature, and that Schofield further
`
`expressly confirms that such a feature was known in the art. Pet. 21. With
`
`regard to Lemelson, the question of obviousness does not turn on whether
`
`Lemelson recites the exact words of the claim in the order of the claim, but
`
`what a person of ordinary skill in the art, who is also a person of ordinary
`
`creativity, would have appreciated from the teachings of Lemelson. See
`
`KSR Int ’1 Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 US. 398, 421 (2007). There is no dispute
`
`that Lemelson discloses the use of cameras for rear viewing “to further
`
`improve hazard detection capabilities.” Ex. 1005, 6:37—42. We agree with
`
`Petitioner that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood from
`
`Lemelson that a visual or audible alert would be provided when an object is
`
`detected rearward of the vehicle, and that if a purpose of Lemelson is to
`
`avoid hazards, common sense dictates that such an alert would be
`
`operational when the vehicle is operated in reverse “during a reversing
`
`maneuver,” as claimed. See Pet. 21, Ex. 1014 1] 38.
`
`14
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`IPR2015-00250
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`Patent 8,543,330 BZ
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`Patent Owner disputes the sufficiency of Lemelson’s disclosure with
`
`respect to a “reversing maneuver,” but fails to explain what is missing from
`
`Lemelson, or what aspect of any claimed feature would not have been
`
`obvious to one of ordinary skill in light of all that Lemelson teaches. See PO
`
`Resp. 13—14.
`
`Additionally, we further agree with Petitioner that Schofield also
`
`expressly discloses operation during a reversing maneuver, as claimed. See
`
`Pet 26 (citing Ex. 1007 10:29—55 (describing a “rearview vision system” in
`
`which hash marks illustrate the “the anticipated path of movement” of the
`
`vehicle and the direction of travel “is determined in response to the operator
`
`placing the gear selection device .
`
`.
`
`. in the reverse gear position”).
`
`Patent Owner does not dispute the substance of Schofield’s disclosure,
`
`but instead argues that Petitioner did not sufficiently discuss how
`
`Schofield’s disclosure corresponds to the claimed alerts. PO Resp. 14.
`
`Similarly, Patent Owner argues that Petitioner did not consider all elements
`
`of the claim because Petitioner did not expressly construe “during a
`
`reversing maneuver” to mean “when the vehicle is in ‘reverse.’” Id. Patent
`
`Owner’s arguments are not persuasive because Patent Owner does not
`
`explain what “during a reversing maneuver” requires that is not disclosed by
`
`Schofield (or Lemelson), and offers no explanation of what is incorrect with
`
`Petitioner equating the term to operating a vehicle in reverse. We see no
`
`need for further explanation to establish that “during a reversing maneuver”
`
`encompasses an operation that occurs “when the vehicle is in reverse.”
`
`Indeed, Patent Owner does not explain what else it could possibly mean. To
`
`be clear, the burden is on Petitioner to show unpatentability, and, here,
`
`15
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`

`

`IPR2015-00250
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`Patent 8,543,330 B2
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`Petitioner has made an adequate showing that the claimed features were
`
`disclosed and would have been obvious. See Pet. 26—27. Patent Owner’s
`
`conclusory and unsupported asscrtion that Petitioner’s “broad
`
`characterizations” are insufficient does not persuasively rebut Petitioner’s
`
`evidence of obviousness and the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the
`
`art. See PO Resp. 14—15 (arguing, for example, that Petitioner “provides no
`
`discussion as to how this disclosure discloses a visual alert or audible alert
`
`that is responsive to detection ofan object rearward 0fthe equipped vehicle
`
`during a reversing maneuver of the equipped vehicle,” but failing to address
`
`what Lemelson and Schofield actually disclose, or fail to disclose).
`
`Finally, claims 1, 39, 59, and 76 require that the visual alert include
`
`“electronically generated indicia that overlay” the image data displayed on
`
`the video display, and either “indicate distance to a detected object rearward
`
`of the equipped vehicle,” or “highlight a detected object rearward of the
`
`equipped vehicle.” Petitioner has shown that Lemelson discloses an image
`
`display that may include “highlighting of hazards” and “distance values.”
`
`More specifically, Lemelson states that “video scanning .
`
`.
`
`. may be .
`
`.
`
`.
`
`employed to identify and indicate distances between the controlled vehicle
`
`and objects ahead of, to the side(s) of, and to the rear of the controlled
`
`vehicle,” and that “[t]he image display may include .
`
`.
`
`. distance values.”
`
`Pet. 28 (quoting Ex. 1005, 6:5—8, 49—51). We find unpersuasive Patent
`
`Owner’s arguments that the disclosure of Lemelson is insufficient. PO
`
`Resp. 7—13. First, Patent Owner identifies no support from the ’330 patent
`
`for its proposition that “visual alert” should be read “to require the likes of
`
`guidelines or other markings,” other than Dr. Turk’s testimony, which is
`
`16
`
`

`

`IPR2015-00250
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`Patent 8,543,330 B2
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`speculative, conclusory, and based on no identified information or evidence.
`
`See Ex. 2001 11 29. To the contrary, the claim language only requires that
`
`the Visual alert be “electronically generated,” “overlay” the image data, and
`
`“indicate distance to a detected object.” None of these features requires
`
`“guidelines or other markings,” which is beyond the scope of the claims.
`
`See Reply 7—8.
`
`Next Patent Owner argues that Lemelson’s disclosure of visual alerts,
`
`including distance values, could be displayed separate from the video
`
`images, for example, “above, below, to the right or to the left.” PO Resp.
`
`12. Again, Patent Owner’s argument is supported by nothing more than the
`
`speculation of Dr. Turk. See Ex. 2001 1] 29. Patent Owner’s argument is not
`
`supported by the disclosure of Lemelson, which states that the image display
`
`may include distance values, and further fails to address what would have
`
`been obvious to one of ordinary skill, arguing instead that any number of
`
`undisclosed configurations was possible. Lemelson states that the “image
`
`display may include the highlighting of hazards,” and “simulated displays of
`symbols representing the hazard objects as well as actual video displays.”
`
`Ex. 1005, 6:49—55. Patent Owner offers no plausible reason why the
`
`highlighting, symbols, and distance information Lemelson describes as
`
`being displayed on the video display would be understood by one of
`
`ordinary skill to mean anything but that it overlays the image data. See Ex.
`
`2001 1111 26—37. There is nothing in Lemelson Patent Owner has identified to
`
`suggest that the Visual alerts appear on a split screen or above, below, to the
`
`left, or to the right of the image data. See id. Nor has Patent Owner shown
`
`anything in Lemelson to support Patent Owner’s argument that the visual
`
`l7
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`

`

`IPR2015-00250
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`Patent 8,543,330 B2
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`cues disclosed by Lemelson might not overlay image data because it “could
`
`mask, confuse, or obscure image data in the video images.” See PO Resp.
`
`8—9. For example, Patent Owner offers no plausible explanation of how an
`
`object could be highlighted in a video image, as disclosed by Lemelson,
`
`without using an overlay. We also find more persuasive Dr. Wilhelm’s
`
`testimony that Lemelson discloses to one of ordinary skill the claimed
`
`“electronically generated indicia that overlay.” See Ex. 1021 W 17-18, 20—
`
`24, 26—34.
`
`Claim 59 further requires at least one user input, which, among
`
`several alternatives, may comprise an input for a navigational system of the
`
`equipped vehicle. Corresponding to this limitation, we agree that Lemelson
`
`discloses a keyboard or microphone with a speech recognition computer
`
`employed by the driver to generate command control signals for controlling
`
`the navigational computer. See Pet. 29—30 (citing Ex. 1005, 16:11—19,
`
`15:45—16:38).
`
`Claim 76 further requires that “responsive to detection of an object,
`
`the driver’s attention is drawn to an object displayed on said video display.”
`
`We agree with Petitioner that Lemelson discloses this limitation. See Pet. 30
`
`(quoting Ex. 1005, 6:47—55 (describing images, including highlighting of
`
`hazards, which may be displayed “to enhance driver recognition of
`
`dangerous situations”)).
`
`In consideration of the evidence and arguments presented in the
`
`Petition, Patent Owner’s Response, and Petitioner’s Reply regarding claims
`
`1, 39, 59, and 76, we agree with Petitioner that the combination of
`
`18
`
`

`

`IPR2015-00250
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`Patent 8,543,330 B2
`
`Lemelson, Schofleld, and Tokito discloses every limitation of each of those
`
`claims as shown in Claim Chart 1 of the Petition. See Pet. 23—30.
`
`(ii)
`
`Claims 2—4, 9, 18, 22—24, 26, 27, 48, 55, 56, 58,
`68, 87 and 88
`
`Petitioner asserts that each of claims 2—4, 9, 18, 22—24, 26, 27, 48, 55,
`
`56, 58, 68, 87, and 88 is unpatentable as obvious over Lemelson, Schofield,
`
`and Tokito. Pet. 21—30, 34, 41—43, 45-46, 53.
`
`We agree with Petitioner that dependent claims 2, 9, 22, 26, 48, 68,
`
`and 87 recite the same or similar elements as one or more of the four
`
`independent claims 1, 39, 59, and-76. See Pet. 21—30. Claim 2 limits the
`
`electronically generated indicia recited in claim 1 to one of the two
`
`alternatives recited in claim 1 (i.e., to “indicate distance to a detected object
`
`rearward of the equipped vehicle”), a limitation shown above to be disclosed
`
`by Lemelson with respect to claim 1. Claim 9 (dependent on claim 1), claim
`
`48 (dependent on claim 39), and claim 68 (dependent on claim 59) each
`
`recite the same limitation independent claim 76 recites as “wherein,
`
`responsive to detection of an object, the driver’s attention is drawn to an
`
`object displayed on said video display.” As discussed above with respect to
`
`claim 76, this limitation is disclosed by Lemelson. See Ex. 1005, 6:47—55.
`
`We also agree with Petitioner that Lemelson and Schofield disclose
`
`the features further recited in claims 3 and 4. See Pet. 34. Claim 3 recites
`
`the electronically generated indicia comprise, as one alternative, “a graphic
`
`display.” Ex. 1001, 32:16—19. Lemelson discloses a graphic display as
`
`claimed. See Pet. 34 (quoting Ex. 1005, 6:49—55). With respect to claim 4,
`
`Schofield discloses the features of electronically generated indicia
`
`“indicative of an intended path of rearward travel,” as claimed. See id.
`
`19
`
`

`

`IPR201

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