I'l
`
`Trials@uspto. gov
`571-272-7822
`
`Paper 7
`Entered: June 2, 2015
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`VALEO NORTH AMERICA, INC.; VALEO S.A;
`VALEO GmbH; VALEO SCHALTER UND SENSOREN GmbH;
`
`and CONNAUGHT ELECTRONICS LTD.,
`
`'
`
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`MAGNA ELECTRONICS, INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`
`Case IPR2015-00250
`
`Patent 8,543,330 B2
`
`Before RICHARD E. RICE, JAMES A. TARTAL, and
`BARBARA A. PARVIS, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`TARTAL, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`DECISION
`
`Institution of Inter Partes Review
`37 C.F.R. § 42.108
`
`
`
`Trials@uspto. gov
`571-272-7822
`
`Paper 7
`Entered: June 2, 2015
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`VALEO NORTH AMERICA, INC.; VALEO S.A;
`VALEO GmbH; VALEO SCHALTER UND SENSOREN GmbH;
`
`and CONNAUGHT ELECTRONICS LTD.,
`
`'
`
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`MAGNA ELECTRONICS, INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`
`Case IPR2015-00250
`
`Patent 8,543,330 B2
`
`Before RICHARD E. RICE, JAMES A. TARTAL, and
`BARBARA A. PARVIS, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`TARTAL, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`DECISION
`
`Institution of Inter Partes Review
`37 C.F.R. § 42.108
`
`
`
`IPR2015-00250
`
`Patent 8,543,330 B2
`
`Petitioner, Valeo North America, Inc., Valeo S.A., Valeo GmbH,
`Valeo Schalter und Sensoren GmbH, and Connaught Electronics Ltd., filed a
`
`Petition requesting an inter partes review of claims 1—89 of US. Patent
`
`No. 8,543,330 B2 (“the ’330 patent”). Paper 1 (“Pet”). Patent Owner,
`
`Magna Electronics, Inc., filed a Preliminary Response. Paper 6 (“Prelim
`
`Resp.”). We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that
`
`an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless .
`
`.
`
`. the information
`
`presented in the'petition .
`
`.
`
`. shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that
`
`the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims
`
`challenged in the petition.”
`Upon consideration of the Petition and the Preliminary Response, we
`conclude the information presented shows there is a reasonable likelihood
`
`that Petitioner would prevail in showing the unpatentability of claims 1—7, 9,
`
`10, 13—15, 18, 22—27, 29, 30, 39—41, 43—49, 52, 55—61, 63—69, 72, 75—78,
`
`80—83, and 85—89. Accordingly, we authorize an ‘inter partes review to be
`
`instituted as to claims 1—7, 9, 10, 13—15, 18, 22—27, 29, 30, 39—41, 43—49,
`
`52, 55—61, 63—69, 72, 75—78, 80—83, and 85—89 ofthe ’330 patent. Our
`
`factual findings and conclusions at this stage of the proceeding are based on
`the evidentiary record developed thus far (prior to Patent Owner’s
`Response). This is not a final decision as to patentability of claims for
`
`'
`
`which inter partes review is instituted. Our final decision will be based on
`
`the record, as fully developed during trial.
`
`
`
`IPR2015-00250
`
`Patent 8,543,330 B2
`
`1.
`
`BACKGROUND
`
`A.
`
`The ’330 Patent (Ex. 1001)
`
`The ’330 patent, titled “Driver Assist System for Vehicle,” issued
`
`September 24, 2013, from US. Application No. 13/621,382, filed September
`
`17, 2012. Ex. 1001. Petitioner contends the earliest effective filing date of
`
`the ’330 patent is January 22, 2002. Pet. 13—16. The ’330 patent is directed
`to a system for a vehicle, including a camera with an exterior field of view
`
`and a video display operable to display image data captured by the camera to
`
`the driver of the vehicle. Ex. 1001, Abstract. The system is operable to
`
`detect objects in the exterior field of View and to provide a visual alert and
`
`» an audible alert responsive to detection of an object exterior of the vehicle.
`
`Id.
`
`B.
`
`Illustrative Claim
`
`Claims 1, 39, 59, and 76 of the ’330 patent are independent. Claims
`2—38-ultimately depend from claim 1, claims 40—58 ultimately depend from
`
`claim 39, Claims 60—75 ultimately depend from claim 59, and claims 77—89
`
`ultimately depend from claim 76. Claim 1 of the ’330 patent is illustrative
`
`of the claims at issue:
`
`1. A driver assist system for a vehicle, said driver assist
`system comprising:
`'
`a rearward facing camera disposed at a vehicle equipped
`with said driver assist system and having a rearward'field
`of view relative to the equipped vehicle;
`a video display viewable by a driver of the equipped
`vehicle when normally operating the equipped vehicle,
`wherein said video display is operable to display image
`data captured by said rearward facing camera;
`
`
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`IPR2015-00250
`
`Patent 8,543,330 B2
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`wherein said driver assist system is operable to detect
`objects present in said rearward field of view of said
`rearward facing camera
`.
`wherein said driver assist system is operable to provide a
`display intensity of said displayed image data of at least
`about 200 candelas/sq. meter for viewing by the driver of
`the equipped vehicle;
`wherein said driver assist system is operable to provide a
`visual alert to the driver of the equipped vehicle respbn-
`sive to detection of an object rearward of the equipped
`vehicle during a reversing maneuver of the equipped
`vehicle;
`wherein said driver assist system is operable to provide an
`audible alert to the driver of the equipped vehicle
`responsive to detection of an object rearward of the
`equipped vehicle during a reversing maneuver of the
`equipped vehicle; and
`'
`'
`wherein said visual alert comprises electronically gener-
`ated indicia that overlay said image data displayed by
`said video display, and wherein said electronically gen-
`erated indicia at least one of (i) indicate distance to a
`detected object rearward of the equipped vehicle and (ii)
`highlight a detected object rearward of the equipped
`vehicle.
`
`Ex. 1001, 31:47—32:12.
`
`' C.
`
`Related Proceedings
`
`Petitioner states that the ’330 patent is a subject of the following civil
`
`action: Magna Electronics Inc. v. Valeo, Inc., No. 2:14-cv-10540 (E.D.
`
`Mich.). Pet. 2.
`
`
`
`IPR2015-00250
`
`Patent 8,543,330 B2
`
`D.
`
`Asserted Grounds of Unpatentability
`
`Petitioner contends that claims 1—89 are unpatentable based on the
`
`
`
`' Challenged Claims
`
`1—18, 22—24, 26, 27, 29, 30,
`§ 103(a)
`34—56, 58—74, and 76—88
`§ 103(a) 25, 57, 75, and 89
`.
`§1°3<a> 19 M
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`following grounds (Pet. 6—7):
`
`.
`
`Rflémnceé ‘
`Lemelson, Schofield, and
`Tokito3
`Egygisg’at’fsrihOfield’ TOk‘tO’
`Lemelson, Schofield, Tokito,
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Lemelson, Schofield, Tokito,
`
`§1°3<a>
`
`Lemelson, Schofield, Tokito,
`
`Eagle—21135:}, Schofield, Toklto,
`
`§ 103(a) 31_33
`
`
`
`1 U.S. Patent No. 6,553,130 B1 (“Lemelson,” Ex. 1005), issued
`April 22, 2003, from an application filed June 28, 1996.
`2 U.S. Patent No. 5,670,935 (“Schofield,” Ex. 1007, issued
`September 23, 1997, from an application filed May 22, 1995.
`3 U.S. Patent No. 6,259,423 B1 (“Tokito,” Ex. 1006), issued July 10, 2001,
`from an application filed August 17, 1998. Petitioner misidentifies Tokito as
`U.S. Patent No. 6,226,061 in the Petition, which we understand to be an
`inadvertent mistake in light of the content of Exhibit 1006. See Pet. 5.
`4 U.S. Patent No. 4,731,769 (“Schaefer,” Ex. 1008), issued
`March 15, 1988, from an application filed April 14, 1986.
`5 U.S. Patent No. 5,920,367 (“Kajimoto,” Ex. 1009), issued
`July 6, 1999, from an application filed October 10, 1997.
`6 U.S. Patent No. 6,359,392 B1 (“He,” Ex. 1010), issued March 19, 2002,
`from an application filed January 4, 2001.
`7 U.S. Patent No. 6,593,011 B2 (“Liu,” Ex. 1011), issued July 15, 2003,
`from an application filed July 24, 2001.
`8 U.S. Patent No. 5,289,321 (“Secor,” Ex. 1012), issued February 22, 1994.
`9 U.S. Patent No. 6,100,811 (“Hsu,” Ex. 1013), issued August 8, 2000,
`from an application filed December 22, 1997.
`5
`
`
`
`IPR2015-00250
`
`Patent 8,543,330 B2
`
`II. ANALYSIS
`
`A.
`
`Claim Construction
`
`The Patent Trial and Appeal Board interprets claims of an unexpired
`
`patent using the broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification
`
`of the patent in which they appear.
`
`'37 CPR. § 42.100(b); see In re Cuozzo
`
`Speed Technologies, LLC, 778 F.3d 1271, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“We
`
`conclude that Congress implicitly adopted the broadest reasonable
`
`-
`
`interpretation standard inenacting the AIA.” 10).
`
`1.
`
`“at least one of"
`
`Petitioner contends that, as used in the ’330 patent, “at least one of” a .
`
`. series of elements was intended to signify a disjunctive list of alternatives,
`
`not a requirement of one of each element listed. Pet. 17—19. Petitioner
`
`contrasts this interpretation of “at least one of” from that applied in
`SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTVEnter., Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 885—88 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2004) (requiring “at least one of” each identified element) and supports its
`
`contention by identifying portions of the Specification that make clear the
`
`listed elements are disjunctive alternatives. Pet. 18. Patent Owner does not
`
`address the claim term. See Prelim. Resp. We are persuaded, for purposes
`
`of this Decision, that “at least one of” is used in the ’330 patent to identify a
`
`disjunctive list of alternatives.
`
`10 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (the “AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112—29,
`125 Stat. 284 (2011).
`
`
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`IPR2015-00250
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`Patent 8,543,330 B2
`
`2.
`
`“display intensity ”
`
`Petitioner contends “display intensity” should be construed to mean
`
`“luminance” because the ’330 patent describes values for “display intensity”
`
`in candelas/sq. meter, the International System of Units (“SI”) units for
`
`luminance. Pet. 20. Patent Owner does not address the claim term. See
`
`Prelim. Resp. We are persuaded, for purposes of this Decision, that
`
`“display intensity” is synonymous with “luminance.”
`
`3.
`
`“human machine interface”
`
`‘ Claim 22 requires the driver assist system of claim 1, “comprising a
`
`" human machine interface, said human machine interface comprising at least
`
`one user input.” Ex. 1001, 33:21—23. Claims 55 and 88 contain similar
`
`limitations. Petitioner contends that “human machine interface” should be
`
`interpreted to mean the part of an electronic machine or device which serves
`
`for the information exchange between the operator/user and the
`
`machine/device. The term “human machine interface” does not appear in
`
`the Specification of the ’330 patent outside of the claims. Patent Owner
`
`does not address the term. See Prelim. Resp. Claim 22 recites that the
`
`“human machine interface” accepts user input. Petitioner, however, has not
`
`explained sufficiently why we should adopt its proposed construction
`requiring that the “human machine interface” must “exchange” information
`
`from the device to the user. There is no present dispute that Lemelson
`
`discloses a human machine interface. ‘For purposes of this decision, we
`
`determine no. express construction is necessary for “human machine
`
`interface.”
`
`
`
`IPR2015-00250
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`Patent 8,543,330 B2
`
`B.
`
`Asserted Obviousness Over Lemelson and Other Asserted Prior Art
`
`Petitioner contends that claims 1—89 are unpatentable as obvious over
`
`Lemelson and various additional asserted prior art. According to Petitioner,
`
`Lemelson describes “virtually the entirety of the claimed inventions,” but for
`
`“trivial matters of design choice” and “features already known as being
`
`desirably incorporated into automobiles.” Pet. 20—21.
`
`Lemelson, titled “Motor Vehicle Warning and Control System and
`
`Method,” describes a system and method that use a camera mounted on a
`
`vehicle to scan the roadway. Ex. 1005, Abstract. An image-analyzing
`
`computer processes the Video picture signals generated by the camera to
`
`generate codes that serve to identify obstacles. Id. A decision computer in
`
`the vehicle receives code signals from the image analyzing computer, as
`
`well as the speedometer or other sensors, to generate control signals. Id.
`The code ‘signals may be displayed, and sound generation or warning means
`
`used to warn the driver of approaching and existing hazards. Id. The
`
`‘ control signals may be used to operate the brakes and steering of the vehicles
`
`to lessen the effects of a collision. Id.
`
`Schofield, titled “Rearview Vision System for Vehicle Including
`
`Panoramic View,” describes an image capture device directed rearward of a
`
`vehicle and a display system to display an image synthesized from output of
`
`the image capture devices to the driver. Ex. 1007, Abstract.
`
`Tokito, titled “Display Device Using Organic Electroluminescent
`
`Elements,” describes a luminescent panel that can display an image from
`
`video information. Ex. 1006, Abstract, col. 1:64—67. The measured
`
`luminance in front of the direct-viewing display describedby Tokito is 500
`
`8
`
`
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`IPR2015-00250
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`Patent 8,543,330 B2
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`cd/mz. Id. at 10:44—45. Tokito states that such a display preferably may be
`
`used for an onboard display visible to a driver, and that because a sufficient
`
`luminance is obtainable, “a secure display can be effected even when the sun
`
`shines through the window.” Id. at 10:53-67.
`
`Patent Owner raises several broad arguments against institution of
`
`trial. First Patent Owner asserts the Petition is deficient because it fails to
`
`resolve the level of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 5-6. We find
`
`Patent Owner’s argument not persuasive. It is well-settled that the level of
`
`ordinary skill in the art may be reflected by the prior art of record, as here.
`
`Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC
`
`Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re 0elrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91
`
`(CCPA 1978). A person of ordinary skill is presumed to be aware of all
`
`pertinent prior art. Standard Oil Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 774 F .2d
`
`448, 454 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Kimberly-Clark Co. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745
`
`F.2d 1437, 1449—54 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The Petition addresses the state of the
`
`_ art as of the asserted earliest effective filing date of the ’330 patent. Pet. 10—
`
`11. The Petition also identifies the supporting declaration provided by Dr.
`Ralph V. Wilhelm as discussing the state of the prior art and the level of
`
`ordinary skill in the art. Pet. 8, citing Ex. 1014 W 17—21 and 29—36.
`
`Accordingly, we are not persuaded that the Petition should be denied as
`
`deficient for failing to resolve the level of ordinary skill in the art.
`
`We also are not persuaded that the Wilhelm declaration should be
`
`afforded no weight based on Patent Owner’s contention that it applies an
`
`incorrect standard for determining obviousness. In particular, Patent Owner
`
`argues that Dr. Wilhelm’s opinion addresses whether a given claim is “more
`
`
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`IPR2015-00250
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`Patent 8,543,330 B2
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`likely obvious than not.” Resp. 30—32. According to Patent Owner, this
`
`statement implicates a standard with a lower threshold than whether the
`
`subject matter “would have been obvious.” Id. at 31. Even assuming Patent
`
`Owner’s distinction has merit, we are not persuaded that it warrants
`affording no weight to Dr. Wilhelm’s entire declaration, upon which
`
`Petitioner relies for supporting information and analysis, not merely
`
`conclusory statements of obviousness.
`
`Patent Owner also asserts the Petition should be denied because it
`
`fails to identify how the construed claims are unpatentable, improperly relies
`
`on claim charts for the necessary analysis, incorporates declarant’s analysis
`by reference, fails to address the subject matter as a whole, provides only a
`
`piecemeal analysis of the asserted combination, lacks any explicit analysis of
`
`the asserted combinations, and fails to provide the rationale to support the
`conclusion of obviousness. Prelim. Resp. 7—27. We are not persuaded that
`
`the Petition, in its entirety, should be denied based on generalized
`
`allegations, and instead address the issues raised by Patent Owner in the
`
`context of each set of challenged claims.
`
`1.
`
`Claims 1, 39, 59 and 76
`
`Petitioner asserts that each of the independent claims 1, 39, 59, and 76
`
`is unpatentable as obvious over Lemelson, Schofield, and Tokito. Pet. 21—
`
`27. In particular, Petitioner contends that Lemelson discloses each
`
`limitation of the claims other than: (1) a specific luminance value for the in-
`
`vehicle display, as described by Tokito; and, (2) that the in-vehicle display
`
`shows the image from a rear-facing camera when the vehicle transmission is
`
`in reverse, as described by Schofield. Pet. 21.
`
`10
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`IPR2015-00250
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`Patent 8,543,330 B2
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`Petitioner identifies in a claim chart how it contends each limitation of
`
`claims 1, 39, 59, and 76 is disclosed by the asserted references. Pet. 23—30.
`
`Patent Owner asserts several features of the claims are not disclosed by the
`
`asserted art. First Patent Owner argues that Lemelson does not describe
`
`“electronically generated indicia that overlay said image data displayed by
`
`said video display,” as recited in claims 1, 39, 59 and 76. Prelim. Resp. 33—
`
`35. Petitioner asserts this feature is taught by Lemelson’s statement that:
`
`The image display may include highlighting of hazards, special
`warning images such as flashing lights, alpha-numeric
`messages, distance values, speed indicators and other hazard
`and safety related messages. Simulated displays of symbols
`representing the hazard objects as well as actual video displays
`may also be used to enhance driver recognition of dangerous
`situations.
`'
`
`Pet. 28 quoting Ex. 1005, 6:49-55. Patent Owner focuses on LemelsOn’s
`
`description of “simulated displays of symbols,” but does not address
`
`highlighting of hazards and warning images described in Lemelson. Patent
`
`Owner also asserts Lemelson fails to disclose distance values which
`
`“overlay said image data on the video display.” See Prelim. Resp. 34—35.
`
`‘The statement from Lemelson above is preceded by the statement: “Actual
`
`image data can be displayed in real time using video display 55 via analog—
`
`to-digital converter 54.” Ex. 1005, 6:47—49. Thus, the video display of
`
`Lemelson depicts image data and also “may include distance values.”
`
`Finally, Patent Owner argues Lemelson fails to describe distance values
`
`displayed on an image display which indicate “distance to a detected object
`
`rearward of the equipped vehicle,” or “exterior of the equipped vehicle,” as
`
`claimed. See Prelim. Resp. 36. Patent Owner acknowledges that Lemelson
`
`11
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`Patent 8,543,330 B2
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`discloses a system that can “identify and indicate distances between the
`controlled vehicle and objects ahead of, to the side(s) of, and to the rear of
`
`the controlled vehicle.” Ex. 1005, 6:5—8. The question of obviousness is not
`
`whether Lemelson recites the exact words of the claim in'the order of the
`
`claim, but what a person of ordinary skill in the art, who is also a person of
`
`ordinary creativity, see KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 US. 398,
`
`421- (2007), would have-appreciated from the teachings of Lemelson. We
`
`have considered each of Patent Owner’s arguments and determine Petitioner
`
`has sufficiently shown, for purposes of this Decision, that the asserted prior
`
`art teaches each of the elements of claims 1, 39, 59 and 76.
`
`Patent Owner also argues that the Petition fails to explain why a
`
`person of ordinary skill1n the art would have selected Lemelson, Schofield,
`and Tokito, or how the references fit together or can be combined with each
`
`other. Prelim. Resp. 12—13. In particular, Patent Owner argues, for
`
`example, that Petitioner fails to show why a person of ordinary skill would
`
`have used Tokito to teach the luminescence as claimed or would have
`
`combined Lemelson with Schofield “to display the claimed image data
`
`captured by a rearward facing camera “when the vehicle is in ‘reverse.”’
`
`Prelim. Resp. 14—16. Patent Owner’s arguments can be characterized as
`
`contesting the sufficiency of Petitioner’s rationale for the asserted
`
`combination, rather than supporting a determination that the claimed'subject
`
`matter was not obvious. For purposes of this Decision, we determine the
`
`Petition provides a sufficient rationale for the asserted combination of
`
`Lemelson, Schofield, and Tokito with respect-to claims 1, 39, 59, and 76. A
`
`combination “of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to
`
`12
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`be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.” KSR, 550
`
`U.S. at 401. “If a person of ordinary skill in the art can implement a
`
`predictable variation, and would see the benefit of doing so, §.103 likely bars
`
`its patentability.” Id. In this case, Petitioner’s rationale for the asserted
`
`combination is not, and need not be, complex. In an obviousness analysis, it
`
`is not necessary to find precise teachings in the prior art directed to the
`specific subject matter claimed because inferences and creative steps that a
`
`person of ordinary skill in the art would employ can be taken into account.
`
`KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. Lemelson teaches an in—vehicle display as claimed,
`
`but does not recite a particular luminance value. Tokito teaches a luminance
`value for an in-vehicle display of 500 cd/m2, which is within the recited
`
`range of “at least about 200 candelas/sq. meter” of the ’330 patent. The
`
`Petition also asserts a rationale for combining the teachings of Tokito and
`
`Lemelson to provide an in-vehicle display having sufficient luminance to be
`
`seen in daylight conditions. Pet. 22. That rationale is supported by Tokito.
`
`See Ex 1006, 10:29—67. According to Petitioner, the addition of Schofield to
`
`the Lemelson-Tokito combination is to demonstrate that it was conventional
`to have an in-veh/ible display depict data from a rear facing camera when the
`
`vehicle was in reverse. See Pet. 21. As explained in KSR:
`
`When there is a design need or market pressure to solve a
`problem and there are a finite number of identified, predictable
`solutions, a person of ordinary skill in the art has good reason to
`pursue the known options within his or her technical grasp. If
`this leads to the anticipated success, it is likely the product not
`of innovation but of ordinary skill and common sense.
`
`550 U.S. at 402. On the present record, the activation of a display of a rear
`
`view camera when a vehicle is in reverse as part of a system to assist the
`
`13
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`Patent 8,543,330 B2
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`driver of a motor vehicle in preventing accidents, as described by Lemelson,
`
`is the epitome of common sense. “A person of ordinary 'skill is also a person
`
`of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.” KSR, 550 US. at 421.
`
`Accordingly, Petitioner has provided sufficient rationale for the asserted
`
`combination for purposes of this decisiOn. We determine Petitioner has
`
`demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in showing claims 1, 39,
`
`59 and 76 unpatentable as obvious over Lemelson, Schofield, and Tokito.
`
`2.
`
`Claims 2, 9, 22, 26, 48, 68, and 87.
`
`Petitioner asserts that each of dependent claims 2, 9, 22, 26, 48, 68,
`and 87 is unpatentable as obvious over Lemelson, Schofield, and Tokito.
`
`Pet. 21—30. In particular, Petitioner asserts these dependent claims recite the
`
`same or similar elements as one or more of the four independent claims. Id.
`
`at 23. For example, claim 9 (dependent on claim 1), claim 48 (dependent on
`
`claim 39), and claim 68 (dependent on claim 59) each recite the same
`
`limitation independent claim 76 recites as “wherein, responsive to detection
`
`of an object, the driver’s attention is drawn to an object displayed on said
`
`video display.” Ex. 1001, 32:40—42, 3623—5, 3829—1 1, 39:1—3. Petitioner
`
`relies on Lemelson as teaching the elements recited in claims 2, 9, 22, 26,
`
`48, 68, and 87. Pet. 21—30. Patent Owner has not raised additional specific
`
`arguments with respect to Petitioner’s contentions of unpatentability with
`
`respect to claims 2, 9, 22, 26,48, 68, and 87 beyond the arguments Patent
`
`Owner raised with respect to independent claims 1, 39, 59, and 76. We
`
`determine Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing
`
`in showing claims 2, 9, 22, 26, 48, 68, and 87 unpatentable as obvious over
`
`14
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`IPR2015-00250
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`Patent 8,543,330 B2
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`Lemelson, Schofield, and Tokito for the same reasons discussed above with
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`respect to claims 1, 39, 59, and 76.
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`3.
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`Claims 13, 4042, 60—62, and 7749
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`Petitioner asserts that each of claims 13, 40—42, 60—62, and 77—79 is
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`unpatentable as obvious over Lemelson, Schofield, and Tokito. Pet. 30—33.
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`With regard to claims 13, 40, 60 and 77 Petitioner contends Schofield
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`discloses displaying image data from the rearward facing camera during a
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`reversing maneuver, as claimed. Id. at 31—32. Petitioner also contends
`Lemelson teaches detecting objects present in the rearward field of view of
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`the rearward facing camera during a reversing maneuver as recited in claims
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`41, 61, and 78. Id. at 32. Patent Owner does not raise additional specific
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`arguments with respect to Petitioner’s contentions of unpatentability with
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`respect to claims 40, 41, 60, 61, 77, and 78 beyond the arguments Patent
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`Owner raised with respect to independent claims 1, 39, 59, and 76. We
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`determine Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing
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`in showing claims 40, 41, 60, 61, 77 and 78 unpatentable as obvious over
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`Lemelson, Schofield, and Tokito.
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`Claim 13 further requires “wherein said rearward facing camera is
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`mounted at the rear of the equipped vehicle.’_’ Ex. 1001, 32:53—58.
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`Petitioner relies on Lemelson as teaching that multiple cameras may be used
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`for front, side and rear viewing. Pet. 31. Patent Owner contends the Petition
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`fails to identify any disclosure in Lemelson that a rearview facing camera is
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`actually “mounted at the rear,” as claimed. Prelim. Resp. 38—39. Lemelson,
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`however, teaches “[m]ultiple cameras may be used for front, side, and rear
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`viewing.” Ex. 1005, 6:36—37. As discussed above, inferences and creative
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`15
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`IPR2015-00250
`Patent 8,543,330 B2
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`steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ can be taken
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`into account. We determine Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable
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`likelihood of prevailing in showing claim 13 unpatentable as obvious over
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`Lemelson, Schofield, and Tokito.
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`Claims 42, 62, and 79 require, as one alternative, that the
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`electronically generated indicia indicate distance to a detected object
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`rearward of the vehicle during a reversing maneuver of the vehicle. Ex.
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`1001, 35: 40—45, 37:46—51, 39:15—20. Petitioner relies on Lemelson, as
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`quoted in a claim chart, as disclosing an image display that may include
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`“distance values.” Pet. 33, quoting Ex. 1005, 6:49—51. Petitioner provides
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`no analysis of the disclosure of Lemelson relied upon relative to Schofield
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`despite relying elsewhere on Schofield as disclosing the operation of a
`rearview camera during a reversing maneuver with respect to independent
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`claims 39, 59, and 76. A petition must identify “specific portions of the
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`evidence that support the challenge,” 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(5), and include
`“a detailed explanation of the significance of the evidence.” .37 C.F.R. §
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`42.22(a)(2).’ In the absence of such analysis, as here, we determine
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`Petitioner has failed to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in
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`showing any of claims 42, 62, or 79 unpatentable as obvious over Lemelson,
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`Schofleld, and Tokito.
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`4.
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`Claims 5, 10, 49, 69, and 83
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`Petitioner asserts that each of claims 5, 10, 49, 69, and 83 is
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`unpatentable as obvious over Lemelson, Schofield, and Tokito. Pet.’ 33—34.
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`Each of the claims requires that the electronically generated indicia highlight
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`the detected object. Petitioner contends that Lemelson discloses an image ,
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`l6
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`_ IPR2015-00250
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`Patent 8,543,330 B2
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`display that may include “highlighting hazards.” Id. citing Ex. 1005,
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`6:49—50. We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that Lemelson
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`fails to disclose “that the distance values ‘overlay said image data on the
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`~Video display.” Prelim. Resp.- 37—38. Patent Owner’s contentions are based
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`on recitations in claim 1. For the reasons discussed above, we determine
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`that “at least one of,” as used in claim 1 from which claim 5 depends, is-
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`disjunctive. We also are not persuaded that Lemelson fails to disclose the
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`recited “overlay,” as discussed above. Patent Owner further argues that
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`Lemelson may disclose “highlighting of hazards” in general, but not of “a
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`detected object rearward of the equipped vehicle,” as claimed. Id. at 38. We
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`determine Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing
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`in showing claims 5, 10, 49, 69, and 83 unpatentable as obvious over
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`Lemelson, Schofleld, and Tokito.
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`5.
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`Claims 3, 4, 6, and 7
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`Petitioner asserts that each of claims 3, 4, 6, and 7 is‘unpatentable as
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`obvious over Lemelson, Schofield, and Tokito. Pet. 34—35. According to
`
`Petitioner, each of these claims recites particular responses of the driver
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`assist system to object detection. Id. at 34. For example, claim 3 recites the
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`electronically generated indicia comprise, as one alternative, “a graphic
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`display.” Ex. 1001, 32:16—19. Petitioner has shown where it contends each
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`of the additional features of claims 3, 6, and 7 is disclosed by Lemelson.
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`With respect to claim 4, Petitioner relies on Schofield as disclosing the
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`features of indicia “indicative of an intended path of rearward travel,” as
`recited and fidrther notes that Schofield provides a benefit for including such
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`a feature as it is “useful in assisting the driver in guiding the vehicle in
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`17
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`IPR2015-00250
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`Patent 8,543,330 B2
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`reverse directions.” Pet. 34 quoting Ex. 1007, 325—1 1. Patent Owner does
`not raise additional specific arguments with respect to Petitioner’s
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`contentions of unpatentability with respect to claims 3, 4, 6, and 7 beyond
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`the arguments Patent Owner raised with respect to independent claim 1 from
`which they depend. We determine Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable
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`likelihood of prevailing in showing claims 3, 4, 6, and 7 unpatentable as
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`obvious over Lemelson, Schofield, and Tokito.
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`6.
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`Claims 43, 63, and 80
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`Petitioner asserts that each of claims 43,63, and 80 is unpatentable as
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`obvious over Lemelson, Schofield, and Tokito. Pet. 35—38. Each of the
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`claims require both a visual and audible alert to the driver responsive to
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`detection of an object rearward of the equipped vehicle during a reversing
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`maneuver. Ex. 1001, 35:46—53, 37:52—59, 39:21—28. Petitioner relies on
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`Lemelson and Schofield as disclosing the recited elements. In particular,
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`Lemelson teaches a system with “speakers and display drivers to perform
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`either or both the functions of audible and/or visually informing or warning
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`the driver of the vehicle of a hazardous road condition.” Ex. 1005, 5:24—26.
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`Patent Owner does not raise additional specific arguments with respect to
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`Petitioner’s contentions of unpatentability with respect to claims 43, 63, and
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`80 beyond the arguments Patent Owner raised with respect to independent
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`claims 39, 59, and 76 from which they respectively depend. We determine
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`Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in showing
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`claims 43, 63, and 80 unpatentable as obvious over Lemelson, Schofield,
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`and Tokito.
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`18
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`IPR2015-00250
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`Patent 8,543,330 B2
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`7.
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`Claims 8, 11, 12, 16, 17,50, 51,53, 54, 70, 71, 73, 74, and 84
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`Petitioner asserts that each of claims 8, 11, 12, 16, 17, 50, 51, 53, 54,
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`70, 71, 73, 74, and 84 is unpatentable as obvious over Lemelson, schofield,
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`and Tokito. Pet. 35—40. Each of these claims requires an audible alert that
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`“the equipped vehicle is reversing closer and closer to an object present in
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`the reversing path of the equipped vehicle.” Ex. 1001. According to
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`Petitioner, Lemelson discloses continuous or discrete warning including
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`“continuously variable audible alarms” or other arrangements. Pet. 36
`quoting Ex. 1005, 9:53—65. Petitioner provides no analysis of the disclosure
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`of Lemelson to explain how it teaches the recited element with respect to an
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`audible alert associated with “reversing closer and closer.” As stated above,
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`a petition must identify “specific portions of the evidence that support the~
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`challenge,” 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(5), and include a “detailed explanation of
`
`the significance of the evidence.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.22(a)(2). In the absence of
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`such analysis, as here, we determine Petitioner has failed to demonstrate a
`reasonable likelihood of prevailing in showing any of claims 8, 11, 12, 16,
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`17, 50, 51, 53, 54, 70, 71, 73, 74, and 84 unpatentable as obvious over
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`Lemelson, Schofield, and Tokito.
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`8.
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`Claims 14, 15, 52, and 72
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`Petitioner asserts that each of claims 14, 15, 52 and 72 is unpatentable
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`as obvious over Lemelson, Schofield, and Tokito. Pet. 38—40. Claims 14,
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`52, and 72 require “non-visual object detection” of objects present in the
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`rearward field of view of the rearward facing camera. Claim 15 requires that
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`the non-visual object detection comprises ultrasonic object detection.
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`Petitioner identifies Lemelson as disclosing an “auxiliary range detection
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`19
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`IPR2015-00250
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`Patent 8,543,330 B2
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`means using radar or lidar. Id. at 39 quoting Ex. 1005, 5267—628. Petitioner
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`also identifies Schofield as disclosing a separate distance measuring system
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`which may include “radar, ultrasonic sensing, infrared detection, and other
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`known distance measuring systems.” Id. at 40 quoting Ex. 1007, 11:21—25.
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`Patent Owner argues that interpreted signals, as taught by Lemelson, from
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`radiation receiving means are not “objects.” Prelim. Resp. 40. Patent
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`Owner further argues Lemelson does not teach, specifically, that these
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`signals are representative of objects “present in a rearward field of View of a
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`rearward facing camera.” Id. Patent Owner’s arguments are unpersuasive
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`on the present record. We determine Petitioner has demonstrated
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