us to. ov
`Trials
`571-272-7822
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`Paper 35 ,
`Entered: November 16, 2016
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`APPLE INC. and MOTOROLA MOBILITY LLC,
`
`Petitioner,
`
`V.
`
`GLOBAL TOUCH SOLUTIONS, LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`
`
`Case IPR2015-01175
`
`Patent 8,288,952 B2
`
`Before JUSTIN BUSCH, LYNNE E. PETTIGREW, and
`BETH Z. SHAW, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`BUSCH, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`FINAL WRITTEN DECISION
`
`35 US. C. § 318(a) and 37 CFR. § 42.73
`
`I. INTRODUCTION
`
`In this inter partes review, instituted pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314,
`
`Apple Inc. and Motorola Mobility LLC (collectively, “Petitioner”) challenge
`
`the patentability of claims 1—4, 14, 16, 17, 19, 22—24, 26, 27, and 38—40
`
`(“the challenged claims”) of US. Patent No. 8,288,952 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the
`
`’952 patent”), owned by Global Touch Solutions, LLC (“Patent Owner”).
`
`
`Trials
`571-272-7822
`
`Paper 35 ,
`Entered: November 16, 2016
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`APPLE INC. and MOTOROLA MOBILITY LLC,
`
`Petitioner,
`
`V.
`
`GLOBAL TOUCH SOLUTIONS, LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`
`
`Case IPR2015-01175
`
`Patent 8,288,952 B2
`
`Before JUSTIN BUSCH, LYNNE E. PETTIGREW, and
`BETH Z. SHAW, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`BUSCH, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`FINAL WRITTEN DECISION
`
`35 US. C. § 318(a) and 37 CFR. § 42.73
`
`I. INTRODUCTION
`
`In this inter partes review, instituted pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314,
`
`Apple Inc. and Motorola Mobility LLC (collectively, “Petitioner”) challenge
`
`the patentability of claims 1—4, 14, 16, 17, 19, 22—24, 26, 27, and 38—40
`
`(“the challenged claims”) of US. Patent No. 8,288,952 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the
`
`’952 patent”), owned by Global Touch Solutions, LLC (“Patent Owner”).
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`
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`IPR2015-01175
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`Patent 8,288,952 B2
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`We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6. This Final Written Decision is
`/
`entered pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 CPR. § 42.73. For the
`
`reasons discussed below, Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the
`
`evidence that the challenged claims of the ’952 patent are unpatentable.
`
`A. Procedural History
`
`Petitioner filed a Petition for inter partes review of the challenged
`
`claims of the ’952 patent. Paper 3 (“Pet”). Patent Owner did not file a
`
`Preliminary Response. On November 17, 2015, we instituted an inter partes
`
`review ofthe challenged claims of the ’952 patent. Paper 8 (“Institution
`
`Decision” or “Dec.”). After institution, Patent Owner filed a Patent Owner
`
`Response, Paper 14 (“PO Resp”), and Petitioner filed a Reply to the Patent
`
`Owner Response, Paper 20 (“Pet Reply”). A consolidated oral hearing for
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`this case and several others was held on August 3, 2016. A transcript of the
`
`hearing has been entered into the record. Paper 34 (“Tr.”).
`
`B. Related Matters
`
`The parties identify the following district court proceedings as related
`
`matters: Global Touch Solutions, LLC v. Mcrosoft Corp, No. 3:15-cv-
`I 2750-ID (ND. Cal.); Global Touch Solutions, LLC v. Toshiba Corp, No.
`
`3:15-cv-2746-JD (ND. Cal.); Global Touch Solutions, LLC v. VIZIO Inc,
`
`No. 3:15—cv-2747-ID (ND. Cal); Global Touch Solutions, LLC v. Apple
`
`Inc, No. 3:15—cv—2748-JD (ND. Cal.); and Global Touch Solutions, LLC v.
`
`Motorola Mobility, LLC, No. 3:15-cv-2749—JD (ND. Ca1.). Pet. 3; Paper 6,
`
`2; Paper 7, 1—2. Petitioner also filed petitions for inter partes review of
`
`related US. Patent Nos. 7,994,726 (IPR2015-01171), 7,498,749 (IPR2015-
`
`01172), 7,329,970 (IPR2015-01173), and 7,781,980 (IPR2015-01174). Pet.
`
`3; Paper 7, 2—3. Trials were instituted in those proceedings as well. The
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`' 2
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`IPR2015-01175
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`Patent 8,288,952 B2
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`parties also identify as a related matter IPR2015-01 151, which is an ongoing
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`inter partes review of the ’952 patent filed by a different petitioner. Paper 6,
`
`2; Paper 7, 3.
`
`C. The ’95.? Patent
`
`The ”952 patent is directed to portable electronic devices that operate
`
`on exhauslible power sources such as batteries. Ex. 1001, Abstract. A
`
`visible indicator such as a light emitting diode (LED) can be used to indicate
`
`the condition of the battery. Id. at 9:46—54, Fig. 11.
`
`D. Claims
`
`Independent claim 1 is illustrative and is reproduced below, with
`
`formatting added:
`
`A method of implementing a user interface of a
`1.
`product, the product comprising a power source, or a connection
`for a power source and at least one energy consuming load, said
`method including the step of
`
`using an electronic module comprising an electronic
`circuit including a microchip and a touch sensor forming part of
`the user interface, said microchip at least partially implementing
`the touch sensor functions and said method including the step of
`
`activating a visible indication in response to an activation
`signal received from the user interface, wherein the visible
`indication provides information to a user on at least one item
`from the following group:
`i
`
`a state or condition of the product,
`
`location of the user interface,
`
`a battery power level indication.
`
`
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`IPR2015-01175 ’
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`Patent 8,288,952 B2
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`r
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`E. Grounds of Unpatentabilily Institutedfor Trial
`
`We instituted an inter partes review based on Petitioner’s contentions
`
`that the challenged claims are unpatentable based on the following specific
`
`grounds:
`
`
`
`
`
`2
`
`1
`Beard and Rathmann
`Beard, Rathmann, and
`Danielson3
`
`
`
`
`35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
`-
`35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
`
`1—3 16 17 19 22—24
`a
`a
`a
`9
`26, 27, and 38—40
`
`:
`
`4 and 14
`
`
`
`
`
`Dec. 11.
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`11. DISCUSSION
`
`A. Claim Construction
`
`We construe explicitly only those claim terms or phrases in
`
`controversy, and we do so only to the extent necessary to resolve the
`
`controversy. See Vivid Techs, Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng ’g, Inc, 200 F.3d 795,
`
`803 (Fed. Cir. 1999). We construe claim terms in an unexpired patent
`
`according to their broadest reasonable construction in light of the
`
`specification of the patent in which they appear. 37 CPR. § 42.100(b).
`
`Consistent with the broadest reasonable construction, claim terms are
`
`presumed to have their ordinary and customary meaning as understood by a
`
`person of ordinary skill in the art in the context of the entire patent
`
`disclosure. In re 'I'ranslogic Tech, Inc, 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2007). An inventor may provide a meaning for a term that is different from
`
`1 US. Patent 5,898,290, issued Apr. 27, 1999 (Ex. 1005, “Beard”).
`2 US. Patent 5,955,869, issued Sept. 21, 1999 (Ex. 1006, “Rathmann”).
`3 US. Patent 5,710,728, issued Jan. 20, 1998 (Ex. 1007, “Danielson”).
`
`4
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`IPR2015-01175
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`Patent 8,288,952 B2
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`its ordinary meaning by defining the term in the specification with
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`reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision. In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d
`
`1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Absent such a clear, deliberate and precise
`
`definition, it is one of the “cardinal sins” of patent law to import limitations
`
`from an embodiment in the specification into the claims. Phillips v. A WH
`
`Corp, 415 F.3d 1303, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
`
`In the Petition, Petitioner proposed a construction for “energy
`
`consuming load.” Pet. 8—9. Patent Owner did not file a Preliminary
`
`Response. In the Institution Decision, we determined the term “energy
`
`consuming load” did not require express construction, and we did not
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`expressly construe any other claim terms. Dec. 4—5.
`
`Patent Owner proposes a construction for “energy consuming load”
`
`and for various phrases that include the term “function[s].” PO Resp. 16—30.
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`Patent Owner also proposes a construction for “user interface.” Id. at 15.
`
`As Petitioner points out, Patent Owner “prOposes to construe ‘user
`
`interface,’ but it never applies this construction in its analysis and never
`
`explains why this construction could be relevant to any issue in this
`
`proceeding.” Pet. Reply 20. Accordingly, we determine “user interface”
`
`requires no explicit construction.
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`IPR2015-01175
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`Patent 8,288,952 B2
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`1. “energy consuming load” 4
`
`Patent Owner argues that “energy consuming load,” recited in claims
`
`1 and 26; means “an energy consuming component that receives power from
`
`the power source under the control of the microchip.” PO Resp. 20.
`
`Petitioner disagrees, arguing the claims do not recite using the microchip to
`
`control power to the load. Pet. Reply 3 (citing Ex. 1033, 99:17—22). Thus,
`
`Petitioner asserts, Patent Owner attempts to improperly import limitations
`
`from the Specification into the claims. Id. at 4—5. Moreover, Petitioner
`
`argues Patent Owner’s expert confirms that the ordinary meaning of “energy
`
`consuming load” is “any part of the product that consumes energy when the
`
`product is used.” 1d. at 4 (citing Ex. 1034, 102:1—5 (deposition testimony of
`
`Dr. Robert 11‘. Morley in related matter IPR2015—01 150)). For the following
`
`reasons, we agree with Petitioner that the broadest reasonable construction
`
`of “energy consuming load” is its ordinary meaning, i.e., any part of the
`
`product that consumes energy when the product is used. Pet. 9.
`
`We begin our analysis with the language of the claims. As Petitioner
`
`points out, the claim does not recite a microchip to control power to the load.
`
`Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Morley, agrees that nothing in the claim
`
`4 The “energy consuming load” is recited only in the preamble of claims 1
`and 26 and not recited anywhere else in any of the challenged claims. Claim
`1 is reproduced above. Claim 26 recites, in part, an “electronic module for
`use with a product, the product comprising .
`.
`. at least one energy
`consuming load.” The only other reference in the challenged claims to a
`load is in claim 16, which depends from claim 1 via its direct dependency
`from claim 2, and further recites “the method is applied to a product
`comprising the electronic user interface module, the power source and the
`load, with all enclosed or attached to a single product casing.”
`
`6
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`language requires the energy consuming load to receive power under control
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`ofthe microchip. Ex. 1033, 99:17—22.
`
`We turn now to the written description of the ’952 patent. We note
`
`the written description refers merely to a “load” and does not refer explicitly
`
`to an “energy consuming load,” which appears only in the claims. See Ex.
`
`1001, 6:66—714. At oral argument, Patent Owner acknowledged that there is
`
`“no explicit lexicography definition” for the terms load and energy
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`consuming load. Tr. 93:15, 9426—7.
`Because the patentee has not acted as his own lexicographer, we must
`
`consider whether the patentee has demonstrated an intent to deviate from the
`
`ordinary meaning of the claim term “energy consuming load” by including
`
`in the written description expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction,
`
`representing a clear disavowal of claim scope. See Thomer v. Sony Comput.
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`‘ Entm ’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365—66 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Teleflex, Inc. v.
`
`Ficosa N. Am. Corp, 299 F.3d 1313, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2002). We have
`
`reviewed ‘the portions of the written description cited in the Patent Owner
`
`Response and do not find any expressions of manifest restriction that limit
`
`the scope of “energy consuming load” to a load that receives power under
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`control of the microchip.
`
`Patent Owner argues that a load under the control of the microchip is
`
`the “very character of the invention” that requires us to limit the claims. PO
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`Resp. 16 (citing Alloc, Inc. v. [nt’l Trade Comm ’n, 342 F.3d 1361, 1370
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2003)). Patent Owner further contends “it is this very
`
`configuration that is central to the invention of the ’952 patent, and is
`
`provided in the specification in distinction over the prior art.” Id. (citing Ex.
`
`2002 W 10—15). Patent Owner relies on a statement in the Specification of
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`IPR2015—01175
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`Patent 8,288,952 B2
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`the ’952 patent stating that the invention provides “a microchip controlled
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`switch to manage both the current conducting functions and the MMI [(man-
`
`machine-interface)] functions in an electronic device, such as a
`
`flashlight .
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`.
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`. .” Ex. 1001, 3:61—64; see PO Resp. 16. As Petitioner points
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`out, however, this passage describes only what a “microchip controlled
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`switch” does according to one embodiment; it does not define or otherwise
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`limit the scope of “energy consuming load.” See Pet. Reply 5.
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`Patent Owner also cites portions of the ’952 patent as allegedly
`
`distinguishing devices with microchip-controlled switches from prior art
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`flashlights with conventional mechanical switches that directly connect a
`
`power source to a load. PO Resp. 16—18 (citing Ex. 1001, 3:33—38, 5:8—15,
`
`7:23—29). But again, these passages describe features of switches; they do
`
`not indicate a clear disavowal of scope of the claim term “energy consuming
`
`load.” See Pet. Reply 6.
`
`We cannot redrafi the claims for the Patent Owner to try to cover
`
`unclaimed features described in the Specification, even if the feature was
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`found in every embodiment. See Ventana Med. Sys., Inc. v. BioGenex Labs,
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`Inc, 473 F.3d 1173, 1181 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (refusing to read limitation found
`
`in all embodiments in the specification into the claims because “[w]hen the
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`claim addresses only some of the features disclosed in the specification, it is
`
`improper to limit the claim to other, unclaimed features”); see also E-Pass
`Techs, Inc. v. 3COM Corp, 343 F.3d 1364, 1370 (Fed.‘Cir. 2003) (refusing
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`to read feature of every embodiment from specification into the claims
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`because “[a]n invention may possess a number of advantages or purposes,
`
`and there is no requirement that every claim directed to that invention be
`
`limited to encompass all of them”). In the ’952 patent, the patentee
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`lPR2015-01175
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`Patent 8,288,952 B2
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`expressly claimed a microchip that “at least partially implement[s] the touch
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`sensor functions,” but chose not to claim an energy consuming load that
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`receives power from a power source under control of the microchip.
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`Patent Owner does not allege that any prosecution history is helpful to
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`ascertain the meaning of the “energy consuming load.” See Tr. 72:9—14.
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`Petitioner points out that claims of Patent Owner’s related patents contradict
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`Patent Owner’s proposed construction. Pet. Reply 8—10. When the patentee
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`wanted to include a requirement that the microchip control the flow of
`
`power, it did so expressly and without leaving it implied in the term “energy
`
`consuming load.” For example, claim 52 of related US. Patent No.
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`7,329,970 recites “using the microchip to control the connection of the
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`power source to the load.” Ex. 1035, 16:31—42.
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`We have considered the parties’ arguments and supporting evidence
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`regarding the construction of the recited “energy consuming load.” For the
`
`reasons discussed, we agree with Petitioner that the scope of “energy
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`consuming load” is not limited to a load that is under the control of the
`
`microchip, as asserted by Patent Owner.
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`2.
`
`‘function ”
`
`Claims 1 and 26 recite, in part, a “microchip at least partially
`
`implementing the touch sensor[/sensing] functions.” Claim 1 recites
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`activating “a visible indication in response to an activation signal received
`
`from the user interface,” and claim 26 recites the microchip is “configured to
`
`activate a visible indication in response to an activation signal received from
`
`the user interface.” Ex. 1001, 12:32—36, 14:2—5. Claim 2, which depends
`
`from claim 1, further recites the “method includes the selection and
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`activation of a function or mode ofthe product in response to a further
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`IPR2015-01175
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`Patent 8,288,952 B2
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`activation signal(s) received from the user interface.” Id. at 12:42—45
`
`(emphasis added). Claim 3, which depends from claim 2, and claim 24,
`
`which depends from claim 1, each further recite “automatically deactivating
`
`a function that was activated in response to an activation signal received
`
`from said user interface.” Id. at 12:47—49, 13:56—58 (emphasis added).
`
`Claim 22, which depends from claim 1, further recites “activating or '
`
`deactivating productfunctions in response to signals received from the user
`interface.” Id. at 13:49—50 (emphasis added). The parties dispute whether
`
`“a function,” as recited in claims 2, 3, and 24, or the “product functions,” as
`
`recited in claim 22, encompass activating the visible indicator or whether “a
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`function” and “product functions” must be some function(s) other than
`
`activation of the indicator.
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`Patent Owner first argues for a specific construction of “touch sensor
`
`functions” and “touch sensing functions,” as recited in independent claims 1
`
`and 26, respectively. PO Resp. 20—24. Petitioner states “Global Touch does
`
`not explain how or why this construction is relevant to this proceeding,”
`
`such that “no specific construction is necessary.” Paet. Reply 19.
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`Specifically, Petitioner’s challenges do not depend on a construction of the
`
`recited touch sensor/sensing functions broader than Patent Owner’s
`
`prOposed construction. Accordingly, there is no dispute between the parties
`
`in this proceeding regarding the proper construction of touch sensor/sensing
`
`functions, and we do not construe explicitly those terms.
`
`Patent Owner also argues that “a function or mode of the product,” as
`
`recited in dependent claim 2, should be construed as “function or mode of
`
`the product other than the visible indication.” PO Resp. 26. In support,
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`Patent Owner argues the Specification of the ’952 patent describes the
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`10
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`visible indicator functionality “as a distinct and additional feature of the
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`device in addition to control of other modes or functions,” and that “modes
`
`or functions other than the visible indicator are separately controlled by the
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`user interface.” 1d. at 25—26 (quoting Ex. 1001, 9:46—52, 10:26—35). With
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`respect to claims 3, 22, and 24, Patent Owner again argues that the
`
`“function,” recited in claims 3 and 24, and the “product functions,” recited in
`
`claim 22, must be distinct from activating the Visible indication, recited in
`
`claim 1, to avoid rendering claim language superfluous and because of the
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`use of different terms (i.e., “function” versus “visible indication”). PO Resp.
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`27—28 (asserting “function” excludes activating or deactivating the “visible
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`indication”), 29—30 (asserting “plural functions” should be construed to be
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`different from activation or deactivation of the “visible indication” for
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`similar reasons as argued with respect to the term “function,” recited in
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`claims 3 and 24). Patent Owner also argues the activation signal recited in
`
`claims 3 and 24 is different than the activation signal recited in claim 1
`
`because the recitation of “an activation signal” in claims 3 and 24 has no
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`antecedent basis in any prior claim recitation. Id. at 28.
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`Petitioner agrees that activating a “function” and activating a “visible
`
`indication” have different meanings. Petitioner argues, and we agree, that
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`“function” is a broad term that encompasses any type of function, while
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`“activating a visible indication” is a specific type of function. Pet. Reply 17.
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`Petitioner cites testimony of Patent Owner’s expert in support. Id. at 18
`
`(citing Ex. 1033, 118:21—11923; Ex. 1040 1] 50). Moreover, the
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`Specification refers to “battery strength monitoring” as one example of a
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`function. Id. at 18 (citing Ex. 1001, 1:57—59, 8:58—63).
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`11
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`We agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner’s attempt to narrow the
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`term “function” to exclude activation of a visible indicator is contrary to the
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`claims, the written description of the ’952 patent, and the testimony of
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`Patent Owner’s own expert. Accordingly, we agree with Petitioner that the
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`broadest reasonable interpretation of“function” is not limited to a function
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`other than activating the visible indicator, as asserted by Patent Owner.
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`B. Obviousness of Claims 1—3, 16, 17, 19, 22—24, 26, 27, and 38—40
`over the Combination ofBeard and Rathmann
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`Petitioner contends that claims 1—3, 16, 17, 19, 22—24, 26, 27, and 38—
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`40 are unpatentable under ‘35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Beard and
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`Rathmann. Pet. 30—55. Relying on the declaration testimony of Mr. Paul
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`Beard, Petitioner explains how Beard and Rathmann allegedly teach all the
`
`claim limitations, and asserts an ordinarily skilled artisan would have
`
`combined the asserted teachings. 1d. (citing Ex. 1003).
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`1. Beard
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`Beard describes an intelligent battery pack with a microcontroller and
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`battery indicators for use with a portable electronic device. Ex. 1005, 1:18—
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`21; see Ex. 1003 ‘H 68. The microcontroller responds to a touch-sensing
`
`circuit that detects changes in impedance or capacitance when an operator
`
`touches one or two contacts. Ex. 1005, 11:12—16; see Ex. 1003 1] 68. Figure
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`11 of Beard is reproduced on the following page.
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`12
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`Monitoring
`Circuit
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`Power
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`Regulation /
`Supply
`
`Circuit
`
`Removal
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`Sensing
`Circuitry
`
`Control
`
`infrared
`Transceiver
`
`Interface
`Circuitry
`
`FIG. 11
`
`203
`
`Figure 11 depicts battery pack 201 that provides an operator with an
`
`indication of battery capacity whether or not it is inserted into portable
`
`electronic device 203. Ex. 1005, 11:10—13. When fiJlly inserted, battery
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`pack contacts 241, 243 and 245 engage corresponding contacts 251, 253 and
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`255, and, if sufficient power is available, device 203 may enter a fully
`
`operational state when the operator desires. Id. at 11:67—12z4.
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`2. Rathmann
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`Rathmann describes a ‘Lsmart battery for use in an intelligent device
`having power management capabilities.” Ex. 1006, 1:12—16; 1:65—3:30.
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`Rathmann’s indicator uses LEDs. In response to a signal from the battery
`
`pack’s user interface, four LEDs illuminate sequentially to indicate
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`remaining battery charge. Ex. 1006, Fig. 3, 16:24—36; see Ex. 1003 11 87.
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`13
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`Petitioner asserts the combination of Beard and Rathmann teaches all
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`3. Claim 1
`
`of the limitations of independent claim 1.
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`The Preamble
`
`First, Petitioner contends Beard discloses a “method for implementing
`
`a user interface of a. product” for various reasons, including because Beard
`
`teaches providing “a visible indication of the state of the product’s battery”
`in response to a user touching contacts. ‘Pet. 27—28 (citing Ex. 1005,
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`Abstract; Ex. 1003 fl 122). Patent Owner does not dispute Beard discloses
`
`this limitation.
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`Additionally, Petitioner contends Beard discloses battery pack 201 of
`
`Figure 11 and electrical connections that connect the battery pack to the
`
`energy consuming part of device 203, which teaches “the product
`
`comprising a power source, or a connection for a power source and at least
`
`one energy consuming load,” as recited in claim 1. Pet. 28. Petitioner
`
`contends Beard discloses the product comprises “at least one energy
`
`consuming load” because Beard discloses that the battery pack delivers
`
`electric charge energy to portable electronic device 203, which includes a
`
`load, such as any of the exemplary energy consuming components depicted
`
`in device 203 in Figure 11. Pet. 29 (citing Ex. 1005, 11:57—61). We agree
`
`with and adopt Petitioner’s contentions regarding Beard’s teachings of this
`
`limitation. Id. Patent Owner argues Beard does not teach at least one
`
`“energy consuming load” because the energy consuming components that
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`Petitioner points to do not “receive power from the power supply under the
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`control of the control circuitry 223 (alleged to correspond to the claimed
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`microchip) or user interface of the battery pack 201.” PO Resp. 32. Patent
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`14
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`Owner’s argument, however, depends on its proposed construction of
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`“energy consuming load” as limited to a load under the control of a
`
`microchip, see id. at 30—45, a construction which we have not adopted.
`
`Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Morley, admits that if we do not adopt Patent
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`Owner’s limiting construction, Beard discloses an “energy consuming load”
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`as recited in claim 1. Ex. 1033, 170:2—7. Thus, we find Patent Owner’s
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`argument to be unpersuasive.
`
`The First Method Step
`(The “using an electronic module” Step)
`
`Petitioner further contends Beard discloses “said method including the
`
`step of using an electronic module comprising an electronic circuit including
`
`a microchip and a touch sensor forming part of the user interface, said
`
`microchip at least partially implementing the touch sensor functions”
`
`because Beard discloses “using battery pack 201 of Figure 11 which is an
`
`electronic module comprising electronic circuitry” when a user touches the
`
`contacts. Pet. 30 (citing Ex. 1005, 4:20-24, Fig. 11; Ex. 1003 1] 128), 32.
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`Petitioner further explains that Beard’s battery pack “includes a microchip
`
`and a touch sensor.” 1d. (citing Ex. 1003 1] 129). Petitioner argues Beard
`
`discloses the microchip implementing touch sensor functions because
`
`Beard’s microchip controls “the display of charge status information upon
`
`detecting user input, a request, through the touch sensor.” Id. at 31 (citing
`
`Beard 11:14—22, 11:31—33 Ex. 1003 11l32).
`
`The only aspect of this limitation Patent Owner disputes is whether
`
`Beard discloses a microchip that implements multiple touch sensor
`
`functions. PO Resp. 21—24. Petitioner contends Beard discloses its
`
`microchip activating multiple functions in response to input from the touch
`
`sensor. Pet. Reply 14. Specifically, Petitioner asserts Beard discloses
`
`15
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`IPR2015-01175
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`Patent 8,288,952 B2
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`calculating and displaying battery capacity, calculating and displaying a
`
`remaining time estimate, and using a timer to determine when to deactivate a
`
`display. Id. at 14—15 (citing Ex. 1005, 11:31—40, 11:41—48, 10:51—54).
`Petitioner also points to testimony from Patent Owner’s expert stating that
`
`determining battery capacity and remaining time are two different functions.
`
`1d. at 15 (citing Ex. 1033, 124:6—9, 126:2—14).
`
`After reviewing the submitted arguments and evidence, we agree with
`
`Petitioner. We note Patent Owner’s expert further testified that calculating
`
`battery capacity is a part of calculating a remaining time estimate. Ex. 1033,
`
`127: 1—128220. Nevertheless, even accepting that calculating battery
`
`capacity may be a part of, or required for, calculating a remaining time
`
`estimate, the evidence supports Petitioner’s position that calculating and
`
`displaying a remaining time estimate is a distinct function from calculating
`
`and displaying the battery capacity.
`
`The Second Method Step
`(The “activating a visible indication” Step)
`
`Petitioner asserts the combination of Beard and Rathmann teaches or
`
`suggests the recited step of “activating a visible indication in response to an
`
`activation signal received from the user interface, wherein the visible
`
`indication provides information to a user on at least one” of a “condition of
`
`the product, location of the user interface, [or] a battery power level
`
`indication.” Ex. 1001, 12:34—41. Specifically, Petitioner contends Beard
`
`discloses microchip 223 activating visual display 225 to provide battery
`
`power information in response to a user touching contacts 211 and 213. Pet.
`
`32 (citing Ex. 1005, 7:44—48, 11:14—22, 11:24—26, 11:31—33; Ex. 1003
`
`1[ 135). Petitioner further asserts the display of battery power level is both “a
`
`battery power level indication” and a “state or condition of the product,”
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`16
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`IPR2015-01175
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`Patent 8,288,952 B2
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`satisfying the second portion of the limitation requiring that the Visible
`
`indication provide certain information. 1d. at 31—34. Petitioner also asserts
`
`the LED used to display the battery power level information lights up when
`
`the user touches the contacts, providing the user information regarding the
`
`location of the user interface, which alternatively satisfies the second part of
`
`the limitation. Id. at 34 (citing Ex. 1005, 6:63—7:5, Figs. 5—6; Ex. 1003
`
`11 138).
`
`Petitioner contends Rathmann provides additional detail regarding
`
`how the microchip controls the activation of the Visible indication. Pet. 34—
`
`35. Petitioner articulates reasoning with a rational underpinning for
`
`combining the asserted teachings of Beard and Rathmann. Pet. 17—23.
`
`Patent Owner does not dispute that the combination of Beard and
`
`Rathmann is proper or that the combination of Beard and Rathmann teaches
`
`the activating a Visible indication step. We agree with and adopt Petitioner’s
`
`arguments regarding the specific teachings of Beard and Rathmann and the
`
`respective mapping of those teachings to the activating a visible indication
`
`step. Furthermore, we agree with Petitioner’s contention that an ordinarily
`
`skilled artisan would have looked to Rathmann’s more detailed disclosure
`
`regarding the activation of the Visible indication under the control of the
`
`microchip at least for the reasons proffered by Petitioner. See Pet. 17—23.
`
`Accordingly, we determine Petitioner has demonstrated, by a preponderance
`
`of the evidence, that claim 1 would have been obvious in View of the
`
`combined teachings of Beard and Rathmann.
`
`4. Claim 26
`
`Petitioner argues independent claim 26 recites the same limitations as
`
`independent claim 1, except “in the context of a device claim.” Pet. 47
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`17
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`IPR2015-01175
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`Patent 8,288,952 B2
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`(citing Ex. 1003 11 177). In fact, the structural limitations recited in
`
`independent claim 265 each appear in method claim 1, and Petitioner has
`
`mapped various aspects of Beard and Rathmann to those elements, as
`
`discussed above with respect to claim 1. Therefore, for the same reasons as
`
`discussed above with respect to claim 1, we determine Petitioner has
`
`demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claim 26 would have
`
`been obvious in View of the combined teachings of Beard and Rathmann.
`
`5. Claim 2
`
`Claim 2 depends from claim _1 and further recites “said method
`
`includes the selection and activation of a function or mode of the product in
`
`response to a further activation signal(s) received from the user interface.”
`
`Petitioner contends Beard discloses this additional limitation. Pet. 36—38.
`
`For the following reasons, we agree with and adopt Petitioner’s contentions
`
`regarding Beard’s teachings of this 11m1tation.
`
`Petitioner argues “Beard discloses selecting the function of providing
`
`battery power—level information in response to a further activation signal
`
`received from the user interface” because the user selects the function by
`
`touching contacts 211 and 213, and Beard displays the information on visual
`
`display 225 in response to the user touching the contacts. Pet. 36—37 (citing
`
`Ex. 1005, 7:44—48, 11:14—22, 11:31—33; Ex. 1003 111] 72, 73, 144).
`
`Petitioner further asserts the user may activate the indicator multiple times
`
`5 Some terminology in claim 26 is slightly different than the terminology
`used in claim 1, but neither party argues the claims should be construed
`differently. See Ex. 1001, 12:27—41, 13:64—14:10. The differences in
`terminology in claims 1 and 26 do not affect our analysis of Petitioner’s
`challenges.
`
`18
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`IPR2015-01175
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`Patent 8,288,952 B2
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`and that such repeated action of the user touching the sensors and displaying
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`the information teaches the recited “selection and activation of a function or
`
`mode of the product in response to a further activation signal(s) received
`
`from the user interface.” 1d. at 37—38.
`
`Patent Owner argues the use of different terms (i.e., “function or mode
`
`of the produc ” and “visible indication”) require different constructions. PO
`
`Resp. 24—26. As discussed above, we disagree with Patent Owner’s position
`
`that the proper construction of function excludes activating a Visible
`
`indication. Contrary to Patent Owner’s arguments, id. at 24, such a
`construction does not render claim 2 superfluous. Claim 2 recites an
`
`additional step of selecting and activating “a function or mode of the
`
`product.” Accordingly, although the recited language covers selection and
`
`activation of a function different than the visible indicator, the language of
`
`the method step in dispute also is broad enough to cover a repeated selection
`
`and activation of the visible indicator.
`
`For the foregoing reasons, we determine Petitioner has shown, by a
`
`preponderance of the evidence, that claim 2 of the ’952 patent would have
`
`been obvious in View of the combined teachings of Beard and Rathmann.
`
`6. Claims 3 and 24
`
`Petitioner also contends, Pet. 39—39, 45—46, Beard discloses the
`
`additional limitation of dependent claims 3 and 24, which depend from
`
`claims 2 and 1, respectively, and further recite “automatically deactivating a
`
`function that was activated in response to an activation signal received from
`
`said user interface, a predetermined period of time after it was activated.”
`
`Ex. 1001, 12:46—50, 13:55—59. For the following reasons, we agree with
`
`and adopt Petitioner’s contentions regarding Beard’s teachings of these
`
`19
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`IPR2015-01175
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`Patent 8,288,952 B2
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`limitations. Id. Patent Owner argues the combination of Beard and
`Rathmann does not teach delayed deactivation of a function other than the
`
`activation of the visible indicator. PO Resp. 50—5 1. Patent Owner’s
`
`argument, however, depends on its proposed construction of “function” as
`
`limited to a function other than activation of the visible indicator, see id. at
`
`27—28, a construction which we have not adopted.
`
`» Moreover, even under Patent Owner’s proposed construction
`requiring the function to be something other than deactivating the visible
`
`indication, Petitioner contends Beard discloses the activation, and automatic
`
`deactivation 10 seconds later, of at least two functions in response to a user
`
`pressing the touch sensor, thus disclosing this limitation. Pet. Reply 14—16.
`
`We agree. Specifically, Beard discloses the calculation and display of
`
`battery capacity info
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