throbber
Trials@uspto.gov
`571-272-7822
`
`Paper 42
`Date Entered: August 1, 2016
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`MAKO SURGICAL CORP.,
`Petitioner,
`
`Vv.
`
`BLUE BELT TECHNOLOGIES,INC. and
`CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY
`Exclusive Licensee and Patent Owner.
`
`Case IPR2015 00630
`Patent 6,205,411 Bl
`
`Before SALLY C. MEDLEY, KEVIN F. TURNER,and
`WILLIAM M.FINK, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`TURNER,Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`FINAL WRITTEN DECISION
`Inter Partes Review
`35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F-R. § 42.73
`
`

`

`IPR2015-00630
`Patent 6,205,411 B1
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Wehavejurisdiction to decide this inter partes review under
`
`35 U.S.C. § 6(c). This Final Written Decision is issued pursuant to
`
`35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73. For the reasons discussed herein,
`
`Petitioner has shown by a preponderanceofthe evidence that claims 1-17 of
`
`U.S. Patent No. 6,205,411 B1 (Ex. 1001, “the ’411 Patent”) are
`
`unpatentable. Additionally, Patent Owner has not shownby a
`preponderanceof the evidencethe patentability of its proposed substitute
`
`claims.
`
`A. Procedural History
`
`Petitioner, Mako Surgical Corporation, filed a Petition requesting an
`inter partes review of claims 1-17 of the ’411 Patent. Paper 2 (“Pet.”). No
`Preliminary Response wasfiled. Upon consideration of the Petition, on
`
`August 4, 2015, we instituted an inter partes review of claims 1-17,
`
`pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314. Paper 6 (“Dec.”).
`Blue Belt Technologies, Inc., the named Patent Owner, sought
`
`authorization to file a motion to terminate because the Petition failed to
`
`namethe true patent owneras a real party in interest, where the true patent
`owner was argued to be Carnegie Mellon University. We provided no
`
`authorization to file the motion to terminate because we found no
`
`requirementfor Petitioner to name a patent owner’s real parties-in-interest.
`Paper 13, 2. We further determined that that the filing of mandatory notice
`(Paper5), indicating that Blue Belt Technologies, Inc. is the exclusive
`licensee of the ’411 Patcnt and that Carnegie Mellon University is the owner
`
`of that patent, was sufficientto clarify the record in this proceeding. Paper
`13, 2-3. We determined that Carnegie Mellon University was namedasthe
`
`2
`
`

`

`IPR2015-00630
`Patent 6,205,411 Bl
`
`patent ownerin this proceedingandis a party to the proceeding suchthatit
`would be bound by any judgmentadverse to Blue Belt Technologies,Inc.
`
`Id. at 4. Therefore, herein, we collectively refer to the Patent Owner and the
`
`Exclusive Licensee as “Patent Owner.”
`
`After institution, Blue Belt Technologies, Inc., filed a Patent Owner
`
`Response (“PO Resp.”), indicating that it was being filed on behalf of the
`paily named as Patent Owner. Paper 11. Petitioner filed a Reply to the
`Patent Owner Response. Paper 23 (“Reply”). Patent Owneralso filed a
`contingent Motion to Amend(Paper12, “Mot.’), to which Petitioner filed an
`Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Amend (Paper 25, “Opp. Mot.”),
`and Patent Ownerfiled a Reply to Petitioner’s Opposition (Paper 30, “Reply
`
`Mot.”). An oral hearing was held on April 7, 2016, with the transcript of the
`
`hearing included in the record. Paper 41 (“Tr.”).
`
`Patent Ownerfiled a Motion to Exclude (Paper 33; “PO Mot. to
`
`Exclude”) certain portions of Exhibit 2006. Petitioner filed an Opposition to
`the Motion to Exclude (Paper 34; “Pet. Exclude Opp.”), and Patent Owner
`
`filed a Reply (Paper 38; “PO Exclude Reply”).
`
`B. Related Proceedings
`
`The ’411 Patent is involved in the following lawsuit: Mako Surgical
`Corp. v. Blue Belt Technologies, Inc., No. 0:14-cv-61263-MGC(S.D.Fla.).
`
`Pet. 1; Paper5, 2.
`
`C. The ’411 Patent
`
`The °411 Patent relates to an apparatusfor facilitating the
`implantation of an artificial component ofa body joint. Ex. 1001, Abstract.
`The Specification of the °411 Patent describes a system that provides a
`medical practitioner with a tool to precisely determine an optimal size and
`
`3
`
`

`

`IPR2015-00630
`Patent 6,205,411 Bl
`
`position of the artificial componentsin a joint to provide the desired range of
`motion of the joint following surgery. Jd. at 4:66—-5:2. The apparatus
`
`includes geometric pre-operative planner 12, which is used to create
`geometric models of the joint and the components to be implanted based on
`geometric data received from skeletal structure data source 13. The
`geometric pre-operative planneris interfaced with pre-operative kinematic
`biomechanical simulator 14 that simulates movementofthe joint using the
`
`geometric models for use in determining implant positions, including
`
`angular orientations, for the components. Jd. at 5:63—-6:5.
`
`D.Illustrative Claim
`
`Claims 1, 10, and 17 are independent claims. Claims 2-9 directly or
`
`indirectly depend from claim 1, and claims 11-16 directly depend from
`
`.
`independent claim 10. Claim 1 is reproduced below.
`1. An apparatus forfacilitating the implantation of an artificial
`
`componentin one ofa hip joint, a knee joint, a hand and wrist
`joint, an elbow joint, a shoulderjoint, and a foot and anklejoint,
`
`comprising:
`
`a pre-operative geometric planner; and
`
`a pre-operative kinematic biomechanical simulator in
`communication with said pre-operative geometric planner wherein
`said pre-operative geometric planner outputs at least one geometric
`model of the joint and the pre-operative kinematic biomechanical
`simulator outputs a position for implantation of the artificial
`
`component.
`
`Ex. 1001, 13:16—27.
`
`

`

`IPR2015-00630
`Patent 6,205,411 Bl
`
`E. Grounds of Unpatentability
`
`Weinstituted an inter partes review of claims 1-17 on the following
`
`grounds (Dec. 11):
`[Claim(s)[Basis[Reference(s)
`
`
`
`
`
`1-15 and 17
`
`
`
`
`
`DiGioia I and DiGoioia I’
`
`
`
`II.
`
`ANALYSIS
`
`A. Principles ofLaw
`
`A patent claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) if the
`
`differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that
`
`the subject matter, as a whole, would have been obviousat the time the
`invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
`
`subject matter.pertains. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406
`(2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying
`factual determinations including: (1) the scope and contentofthe priorart;
`
`(2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the priorart;
`(3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) objective evidence of
`nonobviousness. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966).
`
`In that regard, an obviousness analysis “need not seek out precise
`teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim,for
`
`1 A.M. DiGioiaet al., “HipNav: Pre-operative Planning and Intra-operative
`Navigational Guidance for Acetabular Implant Placementin Total Hip
`Replacement Surgery,” 2nd CAOS Symposium (1996) (Ex. 1005)
`(“DiGioia IP’).
`4 A.M. DiGioiaet al., “An Integrated Approach to Medical Robotics and
`Computer Assisted Surgery in Orthopaedics,” PROC. 1ST INT’L SYMPOSIUM
`ON MEDICAL ROBOTICS AND COMPUTER ASSISTED SURGERY 106-111 (1995)
`(Ex. 1006) (“DiGioia IT”).
`
`

`

`IPR2015-00630
`Patent 6,205,411 Bl
`
`a court can take accountofthe inferences and creative steps that a person of
`
`ordinary skill in the art would employ.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418; see In re
`Translogic, Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2007). A primafacie case
`
`of obviousnessis established whenthepriorart itself would appear to have
`
`suggested the claimed subject matter to a person of ordinary skill in theart.
`
`In re Rinehart, 531 F.2d 1048, 1051 (CCPA 1976).
`
`Thelevel of ordinary skill in the art is reflected by the prior art of
`
`record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001);
`
`Inre GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich,
`
`579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).
`
`B. Claim Interpretation
`
`In aninter partes review, we construc claim terms in an unexpired
`patent according to their broadest reasonable construction in light of the
`specification of the patent in which they appear. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b);see
`also In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1277-78 (Fed.Cir.
`2015) (“We conclude that Congress implicitly approved the broadest
`reasonable interpretation standard in enacting the AIA.”), aff'd sub nom.
`Cuozzo Speed Techs. LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144-46 (2016).
`Consistent with the broadest reasonable interpretation, claim terms are
`presumed to havetheir ordinary and customary meaning as understood by a
`person of ordinary skill in the art in the context of the entire patent
`disclosure. Translogic, 504 F.3d at 1257. Also, we must be careful notto
`read a particular embodiment appearingin the written description into the
`claim if the claim language is broader than the embodiment. See In re Van
`Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“[L]imitationsare not to be
`
`read into the claims from the specification.”). However, an inventor may
`
`6
`
`

`

`IPR2015-00630
`Patent 6,205,411 Bl
`
`provide a meaningfor a term thatis different from its ordinary meaning by
`defining the term in the specification with reasonable clarity, deliberateness,
`and precision. In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
`Petitioner proposed no specific constructions for any claim terms.
`Therefore, for the purposesoftheinstitution decision, we determined that no
`claim term needs expressinterpretation. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. &
`Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (only those terms which are
`in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to
`
`resolve the controversy).
`
`Neither Patent OwnernorPetitioner asserts any specific claim
`
`constructions in their responsive papers. See PO Resp.; Reply. As such, no
`
`termsin this proceeding will receive express interpretation.
`
`C. Obviousness of Claims 1-15 and 17 over DiGioia I
`
`Petitioner contends that claims 1-15 and 17 are obvious over
`
`DiGioiaI. Pet. 10-28. To support its contentions, Petitioner provides
`detailed explanations as to how DiGioia I meets or renders obvious each
`claim limitation. Jd. Petitioner also relies upon a Declaration of Robert D.
`
`Howe, whohasbeenretained as an expert witness by Petitioner for the
`
`instant proceeding. Ex. 1004.
`
`i. DiGioia I, Petitioner’s Contentions
`
`DiGioia I describes a system and methods to determine optimal
`implant placement during hip replacementsurgery through the useof pre-
`operative planning, a range of motion simulator, and intra-operative
`navigational tracking and guidance. Ex. 1005, Abstract. The pre-operative
`planner allows the surgeon to manually specify the position of the acetabular
`component within the pelvis based upon pre-operative CT images. Id. at 2.
`
`7
`
`

`

`IPR2015-00630
`Patent 6,205,411 B1
`
`Fig. 3 of DiGioia I, reproduced below,illustrates connections between the
`
`pre-operative planner and a range of motion simulator.
`
`Pre-operative
`Planner
`
`Simulator
`
`Range of Motion
`
`Intra-operative
`Tracking &
`Guidance
`
`Figure 3 HipNav system overview
`
`Fig. 3 of DiGioia I provides a system overview.
`The pre-operative CT scan is used to determine the patient’s specific
`
`bone geometry and different orthogonal viewsare presented to the surgeon.
`Id. at 3. The range of motion simulator performs a kinematic analysis which
`determines an “envelope”for the safe range of motions of the implant. Jd.
`During the surgery, the system permits the surgeon to knowthe positions of
`the pelvis and acetabulum atall times, and optical tracking through a camera
`tracks the positions of special light emitting diodes, which may be attached
`
`to bones, tools, or other pieces of operating equipment. Jd. at 4—5.
`Petitioner acknowledgesthat specific elements of independent claims
`1, 10, and 17 are not explicitly disclosed in DiGioia I, but are minor, obvious
`variations. Pet. 14-15. Specifically, DiGioia I discloses that feedback from
`the simulator can aid the surgeon in determining optimal implant placement,
`and Petitioner alleges that it would have been obviousto utilize the feedback
`to modify the position of an implant, re-run the simulation to determine
`
`8
`
`

`

`IPR2015-00630
`Patent 6,205,411 Bl
`
`optimal position, and output that position to the pre-operative planner. Jd. at
`
`15 (citing Ex. 1004 4 38).
`Additionally, claim 17 requires the system to determine an implant
`position based on a predetermined range of motion andthe calculated range
`of motion. Petitioner points out that DiGioia I discloses the calculation of a
`range of motion andstates that the surgeon may choose to modify a selected
`position to achieve optimal implant positioning. Pet. 15. Petitioner alleges
`that it would have been obviousto considerthe specific patient’s functional
`
`needs and the range of motion needed to perform those functional needs,
`which could be predetermined, to help in determining optimal implant
`
`positioning. Jd. at 15 (citing Ex. 1004 { 38).
`Petitioner also asserts that dependent claims 2—9 and 11-15 are also
`
`obvious over DiGioiaI. Pet. 15-20. Claims 2 and 15 recite that the system
`
`also includes an intra-operative navigational module in communication with
`the pre-operative kinematic biomechanical simulator. Petitioner urges that
`DiGioia I’s disclosure of an “inter-operative guidance system,” which uses
`“pre-operative information,” to provide “navigational feedback to the
`surgeon” as meeting these limitations. Pet. 15-16, Ex. 1005, 5-6.
`Additionally, claims 6 and7recite that the geometric planner outputs
`a geometric model of the component and/oran implantposition based on
`that model. Petitioner urges that DiGioia I discloses that “{t]he range of
`motion simulator estimates femoral range of motion based upon the implant
`placement parameters providedby the pre-operative planner” andthatit
`would have been obviousto a personofskill in the art to utilize the
`
`simulator feedback to modify the position ofan implant, rerun the
`
`

`

`IPR2015-00630
`Patent 6,205,411 Bl
`
`simulation to determine optimal position, and outputthat position to the pre-
`operative planner. Pet. 16-17 (quoting Ex. 1005, 2); Ex. 1004 q 38.
`With respect to claims 11 and 12, those claimsrecite that the system
`also includes at least one display monitoror at least one controller, in
`
`communication with the system. Petitioner urges that DiGioia I discloses
`that “the surgeon can position cross sections of the acetabular implant upon
`orthogonal viewsofthe pelvis,” andit “allows the surgeon to manually
`specify the position of the acetabular componentwithin the pelvis.” Pet. 19
`
`(quoting Ex. 1005, 2-3).
`
`it. Patent Owner’s Contentions
`
`a) Prior Art Status ofDiGioia I
`Patent Ownerargues that DiGioia I is not priorart to the °411 claims
`under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). PO Resp. 18-27. First, Patent Owner contends
`that DiGioia I is not a publication “by others,” despite differences in named
`authorship and inventorship. Jd. at 19-27(citing Jn re Katz, 687 F.2d 450,
`455 (Fed.Cir. 1982)). Relying on testimony of Dr. Branislav Jaramaz (Ex.
`2002), listed both as an inventor on the ’411 Patent and as an author on
`DiGioia I, Patent Ownerarguesthat the authorship of DiGioiaI listed
`“everyone who hadbeenrecently involved in the day-to-day operations
`developing the HipNav system,”but the contributions of the authors not
`listed as inventors are not reflected in claims 1-17 ofthe 411 Patent. Jd, at
`19-20 (citing Ex. 2002 Jf 11, 13-17). Additionally, Patent Owner argues
`that there is an inventor notlisted as an author because “by the time DiGioia
`
`I was published, Dr. Kanade had assumedan advisory role,” but that his
`original contributions supported the claims of the instant patent. Jd. at 20-
`21 (citing Ex. 2002
`15; Ex. 2006, 52:10-53:19, 86:7-10).
`
`10
`
`

`

`IPR2015-00630
`Patent 6,205,411 Bl
`
`In response, Petitioner contends that Dr. Jaramaz’s declaration lacks
`
`foundation andis not reliable. Reply 11-17. Petitioner points out that Dr.
`
`Jaramaz does not know whodecided to omit Dr. Kanadeas an author of
`DiGioia I and “in describing Mr. Kischell’s role in the article, Dr. Jaramaz
`was simply providing his opinion about what might have happened, rather
`than whatdid in fact happen.” Jd. at 11-13 (citing Ex. 1011, 25:14-26:5,
`
`26:6—29:18, 27:14-18, 47:9-19). Petitioner also provides a declaration of
`
`Mr. Kischell (Ex. 1013) and argues that the testimony evidences that Mr.
`
`Kischell’s contributions were important to the project’s success and were not
`
`insubstantial. Jd. at 13-14. As such, Petitioner contends that the inventive
`
`entities are different, such that DiGioiaI is prior art to the °411 claims under
`
`35 U.S.C. § 102(a).
`
`We mustreview the totality of circumstances in determining if a
`
`sufficient showing has been made that DiGioia I is not the work of the
`inventors of the °411 Patent. See Katz, 687 F.2d at 45 5-56. Although we
`acknowledgethe points raised by Dr. Jaramaz, we are persuadedthathis
`testimony provides more opinion than facts. The testimony of Mr. Kischell
`makesclear that he provided substantial and important portions to the
`overall disclosure of DiGioia I. However, it is not our role to determine
`
`whether Mr. Kischell should have been namedas an inventorof the
`
`invention claimed in the °411 Patent; we assumethat the inventorship listed
`
`on the 411 Patent is correct. As such, we are not persuadedthat the
`inventive entity of the ’411 Patent is the same as the authorship of DiGioiaI,’
`or that DiGioia I represents only the work of the inventors of the °411
`Patent. Accordingly, we determine that DiGioia I qualifies as prior art under
`
`11
`
`

`

`IPR2015-00630
`Patent 6,205,411 Bl
`
`35 U.S.C. § 102(a). In any event, we also consider whether DiGioia I is
`
`prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as Petitioner asserts.
`Patent Ownerarguesthat the claims of the ’411 Patent are entitled to
`
`the benefit of the filing date of U.S. Patent No. 5,880,976 (“the 976
`
`Patent”), thus negating the application of DiGioia I under 35 U.S.C. §
`102(b). PO Resp. 21-22. Patent Ownercontinuesthatthe filing date of the
`°976 Patent was February 21, 1997, and thefirst public disclosure of
`
`DiGioia I was February 22, 1996, where the application that matured into
`
`the °411 Patent was a continuation-in-part of the application that matured
`
`into the °976 Patent. Jd. Patent Owneralso argues that to support the instant
`
`claims, there is no need of a verbatim list ofjoints, such as those found in
`
`the preambles of the independentclaims, and that the joint disclosedin the
`976 Patentis “representative of a class of surgeries.” Jd. at 22-25 (citing
`
`Ex. 2003 ff 32-38). Petitioner contends that there is no support for other
`
`joints in 976 disclosure and that a general disclosure of a genus cannot
`provide written description support for the species. Reply 4-8. We agree
`
`with Petitioner that Patent Owneris not entitled to the benefit of the °976
`
`Patent because the ’976 Patent does not provide written description support
`
`for the claimed subject matter in the °411 Patent.
`
`“To satisfy the written description requirement, the applicant must
`convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing
`date sought, he or she wasin possession of the invention, and demonstrate
`that by disclosure in the specification of the patent.” Centocor Ortho
`Biotech, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 636 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (internal
`
`quotationsandcitations omitted). Additionally, the disclosure of a broad
`genus doesnot necessarily provide written description support for a
`
`12
`
`

`

`IPR2015-00630
`Patent 6,205,411 Bl
`
`particular subgenusor species claimed. Novozymes A/S v. DuPont Nutrition
`Biosciences APS, 723 F.3d 1336, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S.
`
`Ct. 1501 (2014).
`In the instant case, we agree with Petitioner that the disclosure of the
`
`976 Patent does not explicitly recite the myriad ofjoints recited in the
`
`claims of the ’411 Patent, which are only found in the disclosure of the °411
`
`Patent; Patent Owner does not argue otherwise. PO Resp. 22-23; Reply 5.
`
`Evenif the total hip replacement surgery,disclosed in the ’976 Patent, is
`representative of a class of surgeries, that would not necessarily provide
`written description support for specific surgeries in that class. Even
`assuming “one of ordinary skill in the art would have been able to apply the
`techniques described in the ’976 Patent to surgeries involving a knee joint, a
`hand and wrist joint, an elbow joint, a shoulder joint, or a foot and ankle
`joint without undue experimentation” (PO Resp. 25 (citing Ex. 2004 {| 37)),
`such an observation goesto the obviousness of those other surgeries and not
`
`their disclosures.
`
`In any event, even considering the arguments on the merits and that
`Petitioner has the burden of persuasion, Patent Ownerhas not provided
`sufficient evidence that the hip replacement surgery is representative as to
`
`the claimed joints that are claimed in the ’411 patent. Dr. Cleary’s
`testimony is conclusory because he does not explain sufficiently why all of
`the joints being claimed in the ’411 patent would have beenpredictable from
`the example of hip surgery disclosed in the 976 Patent. Even Dr. Cleary
`recognizesthat eachjoint has a different geometry. Ex. 2003 27. Based
`on the record presented, we do not give substantial weight to Dr. Cleary’s
`testimony that oneofordinary skill in the art would have recognized that
`
`13
`
`

`

`IPR2015-00630
`Patent 6,205,411 Bl
`
`Patent Ownerhad possession of the genus claimed in the ’411 patent from
`
`the species of the hip joint described in the ’976 Patent.
`Patent Owneralsoalleges that the Examiner disagreed with the
`proposition that there was no support for new claimsin the continuation. PO
`Resp. 26-27. Patent Ownerpoints to the Examiner’s language in the April
`5, 2000, Office Action stating that “[a]n apparatus for facilitating the
`
`implantation of an artificial componentin one ofa hip joint, a kneejoint[,] a
`hand and wristjoint, an elbow joint, a shoulder joint, and a foot and ankle
`joint, comprising,” as recited in claim 1 of the °411 Patent, was “fully
`disclosed in patent no[.] 5,880,976.” PO Resp. 26 (quoting Ex. 1002, 265).
`
`However,as Petitioner points out, the presence of the obviousness-type
`
`double patenting rejection does not demonstrate support for the recited
`joints. Nothing in this rejection showsthat the specific joints claimed were
`adequately disclosed in the earlier specification for written description
`purposes. As such, we remain persuaded that DiGioiaI is prior art to the
`’411 Patent claims under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) or (b).
`
`b) Obviousness ofclaims 1-15 and 17 over DiGioia I
`Patent Owneralso arguesthat Petitioner has not demonstrated that
`
`DiGioia I, or DiGioia I in view of DiGioiaII, renders claims 1-17 obvious.
`
`PO Resp. 28. Patent Owner argues that DiGioia I does not disclose
`outputting a position for implantation, as provided in claims 1 and 10,
`because no rationale underpinningis provided by Petitioner. Jd. at 28-31.
`Patent Ownercontinues that the first part of Petitioner’s rationale to modify
`DiGioia I is conclusory, and Petitioner does not provide any reason why
`such a modification,i.e., to utilize feedback to re-run the simulation and
`output that position, would have been obvious. Jd. at 29-30. Additionally,
`
`14
`
`

`

`IPR2015-00630
`Patent 6,205,411 Bl
`
`Patent Ownerarguesthat the secondpart of Petitioner’s rationale to modify
`DiGioiaI, based on the arrowsillustrated in Fig. 3 of DiGioiaI, is faulty
`
`because the arrowssignify participation by the surgeon, and notbidirectional
`
`communication independent of the surgeon. Jd. at 29-33.
`In responding to Patent Owner, Petitioner points to portions of the
`Petition where DiGioia I discloses that “feedback from the simulator can aid
`
`the surgeon in determining optimal implant placement.” Reply 17 (citing
`Pet. 14-15; Ex. 1005, 2). We agree with Petitioner that portions of DiGioia
`I suggest this feedback process, as well as the system allowing forthe
`system to “accurately place the implant in the predetermined optimal
`position.” Ex. 1005, 2. Although DiGioiaI doesnot explicitly detail re-
`running the simulation, we are persuaded that such a repetition would have
`
`been understood as an obviouspart of optimizing the placement.
`
`Petitioner also notes that a modification can be madein a
`
`semiautonomoussystem that allows for surgeon input, i.e., that the output of
`a position for implantation does not negate surgeon involvementin
`placement. Reply 19-20. Weagree that Petitioner’s modification of
`DiGioia I does not require the formation of an autonomoussystem, without
`surgeon control. The independent claims merely require the outputting of a
`position for implantation,not a singular position that disallows surgical
`
`input.
`
`With respect to the interpretation of DiGioia I’s Fig. 3, Petitioner
`notes that Patent Owner’s own declarants acknowledged that the units
`
`disclosed in DiGioia I pass information back andforth. Jd. at 18-19 (citing
`Ex. 1010, 31:6-32:7; Ex. 1011 at 37:10—24, 41:1-4.). As well, Petitioner
`points to testimony of Dr. Jaramazthat, without his personal knowledge of
`
`15
`
`

`

`IPR2015-00630
`Patent 6,205,411 Bl
`
`the system of DiGioiaI, a person reading the article would not believe that
`
`the communication between the pre-operative planner and the range of
`
`motion simulator was narrowly limited. Reply 19 (citing Ex. 1011, 43:24—
`
`44:17). We agree and weare persuadedthat one of ordinary skill in the art
`
`would haveinterpreted Fig. 3 as Petitioner suggests. See Pet. 15.
`
`Additionally, although Patent Owner argues that Fig. 3 need not connote
`
`bidirectional communication independentof the surgeon, such specificity is
`
`not necessary. Claim 10, for example, merely details that the simulatoris
`
`“in communication with” the planner, and any independencefrom the
`
`surgeon, as discussed above, is a matter of supposition by Patent Owner.
`
`Patent Owneralso arguesthat Petitioner’s declarant contradicts
`
`himself such that he professes that computers are superior to humansin
`
`processing quantitative data, but has also explained that a strength of
`humansis that they exercise good judgment and a weakness of computersis
`that they have poor judgment. PO Resp. 33-34(citing Ex. 2006, 66:9-13;
`Ex. 2001, 212-213). We do not agree. Rather, we agree with Petitionerthat
`the article (Ex. 2001) authored by Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Howe,also
`
`addresses semiautonomouscapabilities and is not necessarily contradictory
`
`of Dr. Howe’s declaration. Reply 21 (citing Ex. 2006 at 66:14—72:4).
`
`Patent Owneralso argues that Petitioner has failed to provide
`evidence that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable
`expectation that the system of DiGioia I could be modified to utilize
`feedback to determine and output an optimal position. PO Resp. 34-35. To
`that point, Patent Ownernotes that DiGioia I provides no algorithm or
`mathematical formula that would allow oneof ordinary skill in theart to
`
`relate the 3-D implant location to the estimated femoral range of motion. Jd.
`
`16
`
`

`

`IPR2015-00630
`Patent 6,205,411 Bl
`
`However, weare not persuadedthat Petitioner need provide an algorithm or
`
`mathematical formula to show obviousness. As discussed above, we are
`
`persuadedthat Petitioner has sufficiently demonstrated how the system of
`DiGioia I could be modified to supply the claimed position for implantation.
`
`Patent Owneralso argues that DiGioia I’s pre-operative planner
`
`doesn’t necessarily output the geometric model and that there are other ways
`
`of receiving that model. Jd. at 35-37 (citing Ex. 2003 {J 50-51). Petitioner
`
`asserts that Patent Owner’s characterization amounts to an obviousvariation,
`
`and doesnot distinguish the claims from the disclosure of DiGioiaI. Reply
`23. We agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner has acknowledgedthat the
`geometric model wasan input to both the preoperative planner and the range
`of motion simulator (PO Resp. 36 (citing Ex. 2002 10)), such that
`
`receiving the at least one geometric model of the joint from the pre-operative
`geometric planner would have been an obviousvariation.
`Patent Owneralso argues that Petitioner has provided no teaching or
`
`suggestion that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have sought to use
`a 3D model, per claim 17, instead of 2D cross sections, as disclosed in
`DiGioia I. PO Resp. 37-38. Petitioner responds that the three orthogonal
`views, provided in DiGioia I, would have been understoodto represent a 3D
`model. Reply 23-25. We agree with Petitioner that a 3D model can be
`represented by two-dimensional views of that model, and that one of
`ordinary skill in the art viewing Fig. 4 of DiGioia I would have interpreted
`the positioning of the implant across three orthogonal viewsofthe pelvis as
`
`representing a three dimensional model.
`
`17
`
`

`

`IPR2015-00630
`Patent 6,205,411 Bl
`
`Forall of the above reasons, and based on the record before us,
`
`Petitioner has shownsufficiently, by a preponderance of the evidence,that
`
`DiGioia I renders the subject matter of claims 1-15 and 17 obvious.
`
`D. Obviousness ofClaim 16 over DiGioia I and DiGioia Ll
`Petitioner contends that claim 16 is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C.
`
`§ 103(a) as obvious over DiGioia I and DiGioia II. Pet. 20, 26. To support
`
`its contentions, Petitioner provides detailed explanations as to how the prior
`art meets each claim limitation of claim 16. Jd. Petitioner also relies upon
`the Declaration of Robert D. Howe for support. Ex. 1004. Patent Owner
`
`disputes this ground on the same basis as Patent Owner disputes the ground
`
`uver DiGivia I above.
`
`Claim 16 dependsdirectly from claim 10 and specifies that the system
`
`further comprises a robotic device in communication with the computer
`
`system anda surgical tool connected to the robotic device.
`DiGioia II discloses an approach to improvedsurgical techniques
`
`incorporating pre-operative planning with biomechanical analysis and
`computeror robot-assisted surgery. Ex. 1006, 107-108. Fig. 1 of DiGioia II
`illustrates a robotic arm with a surgical tool. /d. Petitioner relies on these
`
`disclosures, and concludesthat it would have been obvious to modify the
`system in DiGioia I to incorporate the robotic arm with the surgicaltool of
`DiGioia II because they describe similar systems by the same authors,
`
`addressing the same problems, in the same approximate timeframe. Pet. 20.
`Patent Ownerdoesnot separately contest this ground against claim
`
`16, relying on the arguments discussed above with respectto the first
`obviousness ground. As we do notfind those arguments persuasive, we are
`persuadedthatone ofordinary skill in the art would have combined
`
`18
`
`

`

`IPR2015-00630
`Patent 6,205,411 Bl
`
`DiGioia I and DiGioia II as described with respect to 16, and we determine
`
`that Petitioner has shown, by a preponderanceof the evidence, that claim 16
`
`is obvious over DiGioia I and DiGioia II.
`
`E. Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude
`Patent Owner movesto exclude certain portions of Dr. Howe’s
`redirect testimony (Exhibit 2006), alleging that this redirect testimony seeks
`
`to introduce concepts that could have been in the Petition or his original
`
`declaration. PO Mot. to Exclude, 1. Although not specified by page and
`
`line numbers in the Motion, we presume that Patent Owner seeks to exclude
`
`the specific questions asked on redirect and the answers to those questions
`
`(Ex. 2006, 86:21-91:3). Id. at 4.
`
`In rendering the Final Written Decision, we do not rely on those
`
`portions of Howe’s testimony that Patent Ownerseeks to exclude.
`
`Accordingly, we dismiss Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude as moot.
`
`III. MOTION TO AMEND
`
`Patent Ownerrequests, should we find claims 1-17 to be
`
`unpatentable, cancellation of claims 1-17, and entry of substitute claims 18—
`
`34. Mot. 1-17 (citing, e.g., Exs. 1001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2007, 2008).
`Petitioner opposes the request (Opp. Mot. 1-24), and Patent Ownerreplies
`
`(Reply Mot. 1-11).
`
`A. Procedural Burdens
`
`Patent Ownerhas the burden of proving patentability of a proposed
`
`substitute claim. See Nike, Inc. v. Adidas AG, 812 F.3d 1326, 1334 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2015) (“the Board permissibly interpreted [37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c)] as
`imposing the burden of proving patentability of a proposed substitute claim
`
`19
`
`

`

`IPR2015-00630
`Patent 6,205,411 Bl
`
`on the movant: the patent owner.”). Accordingly, at a minimum,Patent
`
`Ownerhas the burden of showingthat (1) the substitute claims overcomeall
`
`the grounds under which independent claims 1-17 were determinedto be
`unpatentable, namely, 35 U.S.C. § 103 and (2)its request meetsall the
`procedural requirements concerning motions to amendset forth, for
`example, in our rules, Idle Free Systems, Inc. v Bergstrom, Inc., Case
`IPR2012-00027 (PTAB June 11, 2013) (Paper 26) (informative), and
`MasterImage 3D, Inc. v. RealD Inc., Case IPR2015-00040 (PTAB July 15,
`
`2015) (Paper 42) (precedential).
`
`B.
`
`Nature ofSubstitute Claims
`
`Patent Ownerasserts substitute claims 18—34 in its Motion to Amend,
`
`wi

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

throbber

A few More Minutes ... Still Working

It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.

Thank you for your continued patience.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket