Case 2:16-cv-00658-RSM Document 9 Filed 07/11/16 Page 1 of 13
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
`AT SEATTLE
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`CASE NO. C16-0658RSM
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`ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’
`MOTION TO DISMISS
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`LEOPONA, INC. (d/b/a AUDIOSOCKET),
`a Delaware corporation; SARAH
`SCHACHNER, a California resident; and
`BRAD COUTURE, a New Hampshire
`resident,
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`Plaintiffs,
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`v.
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`CRUZ FOR PRESIDENT, a Texas nonprofit
`coporation; and MADISON MCQUEEN, a
`California limited liability company,
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`Defendants.
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
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`This matter comes before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss under Federal
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`Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), 12(c) and/or 12(f). Dkt. #4. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’
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`claims fail as a matter of law because: 1) Plaintiffs do not allege their copyrights are valid, and
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`offer no information about their filings with the U.S. Copyright Office; 2) Plaintiffs cannot
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`support their claim for liquidated damages; 3) Plaintiffs’ contract claims are preempted by the
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`Copyright Act; and 4) Plaintiffs’ request for an injunction is moot. Id. Plaintiffs oppose the
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`motion, arguing that they have met the liberal pleading standards under Rule 12(b)(6) and
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`related case law, and no alternative Rule permits dismissal of the Complaint at this stage of the
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`ORDER
`PAGE - 1
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`

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`Case 2:16-cv-00658-RSM Document 9 Filed 07/11/16 Page 2 of 13
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`proceedings. Dkt. #7. For the reasons set forth below, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs and
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`DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
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`II.
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`BACKGROUND
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`This copyright infringement/breach of contract matter arises from the use of certain
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`musical compositions used in ads run by the Presidential campaign for Ted Cruz. Dkt. #1. For
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`purposes of this motion, Defendants have accepted the following allegations by Plaintiffs as
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`true. Dkt. #4 at 3.
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`On September 17, 2015, an employee of the advertising company Madison McQueen,
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`Robert Perkins, downloaded an Audiosocket-licensed music track called “Lens,” which was
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`created by Sarah Schachner. Ms. Schachner has filed a US copyright application for the “Lens”
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`music composition and sound recording. Dkt. #1 at ¶ 20. On December 23, 2015, Defendant
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`Madison McQueen entered into Audiosocket’s standard Small Business License Agreement.
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`Under the License Agreement, Madison McQueen agreed to use “Lens” for the limited permitted
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`purposes outlined in that Agreement. Id. at ¶ 21. The License Agreement contained permitted
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`uses and restrictions on use of the “Lens” composition and sound recording. Id. at ¶ 22. The
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`Agreement expressly prohibited Madison McQueen from using “Lens”:
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`In any broadcast, cable, web
`1.
`applications, or radio;
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`television, video games, mobile
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` .
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` . .
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`3. For political purposes (including, but not limited to, supporting or
`opposing any government policy, government official, political action, or
`candidate for political office).
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`Id. at ¶ 23. Madison McQueen also agreed to pay liquidated damages of $25,000 for any
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`breach of the Agreement. Id. at ¶ 24.
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`ORDER
`PAGE - 2
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`Case 2:16-cv-00658-RSM Document 9 Filed 07/11/16 Page 3 of 13
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`Prior to filing the instant lawsuit, Audiosocket confirmed that three days after entering
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`into the License Agreement, and despite the agreement not to use “Lens” for any political
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`purposes, Defendants Cruz for President (“Cruz”) and Madison McQueen began broadcasting
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`“Victories,” an acclaimed political ad promoting and supporting U.S. Presidential candidate Ted
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`Cruz, on YouTube. The political ad used “Lens” as its soundtrack throughout the entirety of the
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`video. Dkt. #1 at ¶ 25. Audiosocket also confirmed that “Victories” used Audiosocket’s unique
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`watermarked version of “Lens,” which reveals that it was the licensed version downloaded by Mr.
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`Perkins. The “Victories” video has been viewed over 78,000 times on YouTube. Id. at ¶ 26.
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`On February 24, 2016, nearly two months after Madison McQueen and Cruz first went
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`live with their unauthorized political use of “Lens,” but before they broadcast “Lens” on cable
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`television, Madison McQueen admitted it had no right to use “Lens” on cable television.
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`Although Audiosocket advised Madison McQueen that political use of “Lens” was not approved,
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`Madison McQueen ignored the restriction and proceeded to cause “Lens” to be broadcast on
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`cable channel Fox Business News no fewer than 86 times. Id. at ¶ 27.
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`On September 17, 2015, Mr. Perkins downloaded an Audiosocket-licensed song called
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`“Fear of Complacency,” which was created by Brad Couture. Mr. Couture has filed a U.S.
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`copyright application for the “Fear of Complacency” sound recording and music composition. Id.
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`at ¶ 28. On January 25, 2016, Defendant Madison McQueen, entered into another Small
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`Business Licensing Agreement with Audiosocket. Under that Licensing Agreement, Madison
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`McQueen agreed to use “Fear of Complacency” for the limited permitted purposes outlined in the
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`Agreement. Dkt. #1 at ¶ 29. That License Agreement contained the same permitted uses and
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`restrictions as the “Lens” License Agreement, including that Madison McQueen was expressly
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`prohibited from publishing or performing “Fear of Complacency” for political purposes,
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`ORDER
`PAGE - 3
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`

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`Case 2:16-cv-00658-RSM Document 9 Filed 07/11/16 Page 4 of 13
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`including, but not limited to, supporting or opposing any government policy, government
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`official, political action, or candidate for political office. Dkt. #1 at ¶ 30. Madison McQueen
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`also agreed to pay liquidated damages of $25,000 for any breach of the “Fear of Complacency”
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`License Agreement. Id. at ¶ 31.
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`Prior to filing the instant lawsuit, Audiosocket confirmed that on January 24, 2016,
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`Defendants Cruz and Madison McQueen began broadcasting on YouTube a political
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`commercial for candidate Cruz entitled “Best to Come,” which used “Fear of Complacency” as its
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`soundtrack. Audiosocket also confirmed that “Best to Come” used Audiosocket’s unique
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`watermarked version of “Fear of Complacency,” which reveals that it was the licensed version
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`downloaded by Mr. Perkins. The “Best to Come” video has been viewed over 12,000 times on
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`YouTube. Id. at ¶ 32.
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`The instant law suit followed, and Defendants have now moved to dismiss it.
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`A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c)
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`III. DISCUSSION
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`Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), “[a]fter the pleadings are closed – but early
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`enough not to delay trial – a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
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`12(c). As an initial matter, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to the extent that it was
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`brought under this Rule. As Defendants should be aware, such a motion is premature given
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`that no Answer has been filed in this matter. Doe v. United States, 419 F.3d 1058, 1061 (9th
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`Cir. 2005) (holding that Rule 12(c) motion is premature if no answer has been filed). Thus the
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`Court turns to Defendants’ motion under 12(b)(6).
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`B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
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`ORDER
`PAGE - 4
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`Case 2:16-cv-00658-RSM Document 9 Filed 07/11/16 Page 5 of 13
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`On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
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`12(b)(6), all allegations of material fact must be accepted as true and construed in the light
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`most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38
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`(9th Cir. 1996). However, the Court is not required to accept as true a “legal conclusion
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`couched as a factual allegation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
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`Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). The Complaint “must contain sufficient factual
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`matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 678. This
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`requirement is met when the Plaintiff “pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
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`reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Absent facial
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`plausibility, Plaintiff’s claim must be dismissed. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
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`Though the Court limits its Rule 12(b)(6) review to allegations of material fact set forth
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`in the Complaint, the Court may properly take judicial notice of facts not subject to reasonable
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`dispute. See FRE 201(b). Here, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that Ted Cruz
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`suspended his Presidential campaign on or about May 4, 2016. Dkt. #4 at 7 fn. 20.
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`1. Plainitffs Schachner’s and Couture’s Copyright Claims
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`Defendants first argue that Plaintiffs Schachner and Couture have failed to allege facts
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`sufficient to support their copyright infringement claims. Dkt. #4 at 9-11. Specifically,
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`Defendants argue that Plaintiffs Schachner and Couture fail to allege sufficient facts to prove
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`ownership of a valid copyright. Dkt. #4 at 10. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has
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`expressly held that “receipt by the Copyright Office of a complete application satisfies the
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`registration requirement of § 411(a).” Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/InteractiveCorp, 606 F.3d
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`612, 621 (9th Cir. 2010). Defendants have accepted for purposes of this motion that Ms.
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`Schachner and Mr. Couture filed U.S. Copyright applications; however, they complain that
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`ORDER
`PAGE - 5
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`Case 2:16-cv-00658-RSM Document 9 Filed 07/11/16 Page 6 of 13
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`Plaintiffs have failed to allege or otherwise demonstrate that the U.S. Copyright Office received
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`those applications. Dkt. #4 at 3, 5 and 10. The Court is not persuaded by this argument, and
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`agrees with Plaintiffs that Defendants are attempting to improperly broaden settled pleading
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`principles through their motion. See Dkt. #7 at 9-11.
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`Ms. Schachner and Mr. Couture specifically pleaded that they are the sole owners of
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`their respective sound recordings and copyrights, and that they have filed US copyright
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`applications. Dkt. #1 at ¶ ¶ 20, 28, 44 and 49. The Court agrees that the only reasonable
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`inference from those allegations is that the Copyright Office has received those applications.
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`This is because, as Plaintiffs point out, a copyright application may only be filed with the
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`Copyright Office, and filing with the Copyright Office is the only way one can complete the
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`application process. Thus, the Court rejects Defendants argument that Plaintiffs Schachner and
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`Couture have failed to allege facts sufficient to support their copyright claims at this stage of
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`the proceedings.
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`2. Audiosocket’s Request for Liquidated Damages
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`Defendants next argue that Plaintiff Audiosocket has failed to allege facts sufficient to
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`support its ultimate request for liquidated damages. Dkt. #4 at 11-13. Defendants argue that
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`Audiosocket unreasonably claims more than $2 billion in damages and fails to support the
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`request by attaching the contract to the Complaint or by quoting the liquidated damages
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`language. Id. The Court finds this argument disingenuous.
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`First, Defendants have admitted for purposes of this motion that Madison McQueen
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`agreed to pay liquidated damages of $25,000 for any breach of the License Agreements. Dkt.
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`#4 at 4 and 6. Second, Defendants misconstrue the posture of this matter and the applicable
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`standard at this stage of the proceedings. Plaintiffs assert that they are not seeking $2 billion in
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`ORDER
`PAGE - 6
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`Case 2:16-cv-00658-RSM Document 9 Filed 07/11/16 Page 7 of 13
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`damages, and acknowledge that they must prove an amount of damages later in this litigation.
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`Dkt. #7 at 17-19. At this stage of the proceedings, however, all that is necessary is that
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`Plaintiffs have pleaded a plausible claim. They have done so. Plaintiffs pleaded, and
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`Defendants accept as true, that Madison McQueen agreed to pay liquidated damages for a
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`breach of the contract it entered into. Nothing in the pleadings demonstrates to the Court at this
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`time that such a clause would be unenforceable. Moreover, the Court will not limit the
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`damages claim in any way at this time. See Dkt. #4 at 13-14. The amount of damages will
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`require a factual inquiry and determination as to how many breaches occurred. Accordingly,
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`Defendants’ arguments with respect to liquidated damages will also be rejected.
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`3. Copyright Act Preemption
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`Defendants next argue that the Copyright Act preempts Audiosocket’s contract claims.
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`Dkt. #4 at 15-18. The Court disagrees. Express preemption under § 301(a) involves a two-part
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`analysis. The Court must first “determine whether the ‘subject matter’ of the state law claim falls
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`within the subject matter of copyright as described in 17 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103.” Laws v. Sony
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`Music Entm’t, Inc., 448 F.3d 1134, 1137 (9th Cir. 2006). If it does, the Court must then assess
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`“whether the rights asserted under state law are equivalent to the rights contained in 17 U.S.C. §
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`106, which articulates the exclusive rights of copyright holders.” Id. To survive preemption, the
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`“‘state claim must have an extra element which changes the nature of action.’” Id. at 1144 (quoting
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`Del Madera Props. v. Rhodes & Gardner, 820 F.2d 973, 977 (9th Cir.1987)). Courts “take a
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`restrictive view of what extra elements transform an otherwise equivalent claim into one that is
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`qualitatively different from a copyright infringement claim.” See Briarpatch Ltd., L.P. v.
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`Phoenix Pictures, Inc., 373 F.3d 296, 306 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that § 301(a) preempted an
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`unjust enrichment claim based on the defendant’s adaptation of a copyrighted screenplay and
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`ORDER
`PAGE - 7
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`Case 2:16-cv-00658-RSM Document 9 Filed 07/11/16 Page 8 of 13
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`book into a motion picture). That the claim has additional elements does not save it from
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`preemption as long as it is, in essence, a copyright claim. Laws, 448 F.3d at 1144.
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`The parties primarily focus on the second part of the analysis. As Plaintiffs highlight,
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`the exclusive rights of copyright owners granted by Congress under 17 U.S.C. § 106 of the
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`Copyright Act may only be enforced by an owner or exclusive licensor of the right. 17 U.S.C.
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`§ 501 (b) (providing that “the legal or beneficial owner of exclusive right under copyright is
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`entitled . . . to institute an action for any infringement”); Sybersound Records, Inc. v. UAV
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`Corp., 517 F.3d 1137, 1150 (9th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). Plaintiffs have alleged in their
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`Complaint that Audiosocket is not an owner or exclusive licensor of the right to the “Lens” and
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`“Fear of Complacency” works. Dkt. #1 at ¶ 8. Rather, Audiosocket is a music promotion,
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`distribution and licensing service for owners of copyrights and those who wish to locate and
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`use copyrighted music. Id. Thus, Audiosocket has no standing to bring a copyright claim and
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`its only remedy for the alleged contract breaches is to bring the contract claims it has pleaded in
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`the Complaint. Moreover, the copyright owners, Ms. Schachner and Mr. Couture, have not
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`brought any contract claims with their copyright claims.
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`Defendants argue that Audiosocket’s claims arise from Ms. Schachner’s and Mr.
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`Couture’s copyright rights, and are therefore in essence copyright infringement claims. Dkt. #8
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`at 7-11. But this misconstrues preemption law. Indeed, in one of the cases on which they rely,
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`Del Madera Props. v. Rhodes & Gardner, Inc., 820 F.2d 973, 976 (9th Cir. 1987), the Ninth
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`Circuit Court of Appeals found the state law claims to be preempted because the copyright
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`holder brought both copyright infringement claims and separate state law claims, but could not
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`demonstrate any “extra element” that would distinguish their state law claims from the copyright
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`claims.
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`ORDER
`PAGE - 8
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`Case 2:16-cv-00658-RSM Document 9 Filed 07/11/16 Page 9 of 13
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`The instant case is distinguishable. The Ninth Circuit has found in other licensing
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`agreement actions that preemption does not apply. For example, in Altera Corp. v. Clear
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`Logic, Inc., 424 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2005), the plaintiff manufactured semiconductor chips
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`which customers, using the plaintiff’s software, could program to perform various logic
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`functions. Id. at 1081-82. In order to use the software, customers agreed to the terms of a
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`license agreement that limited the use of the software to “the sole purpose of programming logic
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`devices manufactured by [the plaintiff] and sold by [the plaintiff] or its authorized
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`distributors[.]” Id. at 1082. Customers using the plaintiff’s software created a bitstream, a file
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`containing information on the chip’s use. Id. The defendant was a competing manufacturer of
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`semiconductor chips, but used a different business model. Id. Rather than using its own
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`software to program customers’ chips, the defendant asked its customers to use the plaintiff’s
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`software and send the bitstream to the defendant, which the defendant then used to create a chip
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`that was compatible with the plaintiff’s products. Id. The plaintiff asserted, among others, a
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`copyright infringement claim and a state law claim of intentional interference with contractual
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`relations. Id. The latter claim was based on the plaintiff’s allegation that the defendant caused
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`customers to use the plaintiff’s software in violation of the license agreement by providing the
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`bitstream to the defendant. Id. at 1089.
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`The Ninth Circuit held that the Copyright Act did not preempt the plaintiff’s intentional
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`interference with contract claim. Id. at 1089. Specifically, the Court explained:
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`Most courts have held that the Copyright Act does not preempt the
`enforcement of contractual rights. See Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1324-25 (noting
`that “most courts to examine this issue have found that the Copyright Act
`does not preempt contractual constraints on copyrighted articles”); Nat’l Car
`Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, 991 F.2d 426, 431 (8th Cir.
`1993) (“National’s use of the licensed programs constitutes an extra element
`in addition to the copyright rights making this cause of action qualitatively
`different from an action for copyright.”); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d
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`ORDER
`PAGE - 9
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`Case 2:16-cv-00658-RSM Document 9 Filed 07/11/16 Page 10 of 13
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`1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that “courts usually read preemption clauses to
`leave private contracts unaffected”). We find the logic of these cases
`persuasive here.
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`In ProCD, the Seventh Circuit considered a situation similar to the
`circumstances of this case. A consumer purchased ProCD’s software and
`used it in a manner contrary to the terms of the shrinkwrap license; he put
`the information on a website and made it available to companies at a fee
`lower than ProCD’s rate, although the terms of the license allowed only for
`private use. 86 F.3d at 1454-55. Likewise, Altera’s customers use software
`to create a bitstream (which is essentially information) and provide that
`information to Clear Logic, despite the terms of the agreement that restrict
`the customers to using that information for programming Altera products.
`The right at issue is not the reproduction of the software as Clear Logic
`argues, but is more appropriately characterized as the use of the bitstream.
`Similarly, the Eighth Circuit distinguished between use and reproduction in
`National Car Rental Systems, 991 F.2d at 432, specifically holding that use
`is a qualitatively different right. Id.
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`We find these cases compelling. A state law tort claim concerning the
`unauthorized use of the software’s end-product is not within the rights
`protected by the federal Copyright Act, and accordingly, we affirm the
`district court’s ruling rejecting preemption.
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`Altera, 424 F.3d at 1089-1090 (emphasis in original). In sum, the court determined that the
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`heart of the state claim was a licensing violation rather than a copyright violation.
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`Likewise, in MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 957 (9th Cir.
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`2010), as amended on denial of reh’g (Feb. 17, 2011), opinion amended and superseded on
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`denial of reh’g, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 3427, 2011 WL 538748 (9th Cir. Feb. 17, 2011), the
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`Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a preemption argument. MDY Industries involved a
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`license agreement which prohibited users of an online computer game from using robots or “bot”
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`to play the game. Id. at 938. The defendant, the game’s creator, filed a countersuit against the
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`plaintiff, a distributor of a software bot that played early levels of the game, and alleged
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`copyright infringement and tortious interference with a contract. Id. at 935-36. The court
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`concluded:
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`ORDER
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`we have previously addressed a similar tortious interference cause of action
`under California law and found it not preempted. See Altera Corp. v. Clear
`Logic, Inc., 424 F.3d 1079, 1089-90 (9th Cir. 2005). In so holding, we
`relied on the Seventh Circuit'’ analysis in ProCD, 86 F.3d 1447, which
`explained that because contractual rights are not equivalent to the exclusive
`rights of copyright, the Copyright Act’s preemption clause usually does not
`affect private contracts. Altera, 424 F.3d at 1089; see ProCD, 86 F.3d at
`1454 (“A copyright is a right against the world. Contracts, by contrast,
`generally affect only their parties; strangers may do as they please, so
`contracts do not create ‘exclusive rights.’”). The Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth
`Circuits have also held that the Copyright Act does not preempt a party’s
`enforcement of its contractual rights. See Nat’l Car Rental Sys., Inc. v.
`Comp. Assoc. Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 433 (8th Cir. 1993); Taquino v.
`Teledyne Monarch Rubber, 893 F.2d 1488, 1501 (5th Cir. 1990); Acorn
`Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923, 926 (4th Cir. 1988).
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`This action concerns the anti-bot provisions of ToU § 4(b)(ii) and (iii),
`which we have held are contract-enforceable covenants rather than
`copyright-enforceable conditions. We conclude that since Blizzard seeks to
`enforce contractual rights that are not equivalent to any of its exclusive
`rights of copyright, the Copyright Act does not preempt its tortious
`interference claim. Cf. Altera, 424 F.3d at 1089-90.
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`MDY Indus., 629 F.3d at 957.
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`This Court finds that the reasoning of Altera Corporation and MDY Industries is
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`applicable in the instant action. In both of those cases, the Ninth Circuit found the contractual
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`rights at issue to be qualitatively different and not the equivalent of a copyright infringement
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`claim; thus, the Copyright Act did not preempt such state law claims. See Altera Corp., 424
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`F.3d at 1089; MDY Indus., 629 F.3d at 957; 17 U.S.C. § 106. In this case, Audiosocket seeks to
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`hold Defendants liable for alleged breaches of their Licensing Agreements, specifically the use
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`of the musical compositions for political purposes and cable television ads, both of which were
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`prohibited by the Agreements. For the reasons discussed above, the Court is not convinced that
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`such claims are preempted by the Copyright Act.
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`///
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`///
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`ORDER
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`Case 2:16-cv-00658-RSM Document 9 Filed 07/11/16 Page 12 of 13
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`4. Plaintiffs’ Claim for Injunctive Relief
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`Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ claim for injunctive relief is moot because the
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`Cruz campaign is over. Dkt. #4 at 18-20. The Court does not agree. Plaintiffs have alleged
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`that: 1) Defendants caused the advertisements at issue to be played on YouTube; 2) those ads
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`continue to be available “live” to this day; and 3) “Victories” remains as a “Featured Video” on the
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`home page for Cruz for President website. Dkt. #1 at ¶ ¶ 26 and 32. The fact that Senator Cruz
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`has suspended his Presidential campaign does not change Plaintiffs’ allegation that Defendants
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`are responsible for the continued use of the musical compositions in ads that remain accessible
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`to the public. Thus, the Court will not dismiss that portion of Plaintiffs’ complaint seeking
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`injunctive relief at this time.
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`For all of these reasons, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion under Rule 12(b)(6) and
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`turns to Defendants’ motion under Rule 12(f).
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`C. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f)
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`Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), the Court “may strike from a pleading an
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`insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” The
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`function of a 12(f) motion is to avoid the expenditure of time and money that must arise from
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`litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior to trial. Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty,
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`984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993), rev’d on other grounds, 510 U.S. 517, 114 S. Ct. 1023,
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`127 L. Ed. 2d 455 (1994). Immaterial matter is that which has no essential or important
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`relationship to the claim for relief or the defenses being pleaded, and impertinent matter
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`consists of statements that do not pertain, and are not necessary, to the issues in question. Id.
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`Motions to strike are disfavored and should not be granted unless “it is clear that the matter to be
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`stricken could have no possible bearing on the subject matter of the litigation.” In re New
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`ORDER
`PAGE - 12
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`Case 2:16-cv-00658-RSM Document 9 Filed 07/11/16 Page 13 of 13
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`Century, 588 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1220 (C.D. Cal. 2008). Courts will not grant motions to strike
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`unless “there are no questions of fact, . . . any questions of law are clear and not in dispute, and .
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`. . under no set of circumstances could the claim or defense succeed.” RDF Media Ltd. v. Fox
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`Broad. Co., 372 F. Supp. 2d 556, 561 (C.D. Cal. 2005). For the reasons discussed above,
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`Defendants have failed to persuade the Court that it should strike any material from the
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`Complaint and therefore the Court DENIES the motion to the extent it was brought under this
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`Rule.
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`IV. CONCLUSION
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`Having reviewed Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiffs’ Opposition thereto and
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`Defendants’ Reply in support thereof, along with the remainder of the record, the Court hereby
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`ORDERS that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. #4) is DENIED for the reasons discussed
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`DATED this 11th day of July, 2016.
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`above.
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`A
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`RICARDO S. MARTINEZ
`CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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`ORDER
`PAGE - 13