Case 3:14-cv-00757-REP-DJN Document 55 Filed 02/02/15 Page 1 of 22 PageID# 2709
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
`RICHMOND DIVISION
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`Civil Action No. 3:14-cv-757-REP
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`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. and
`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA,
`INC.,
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`Plaintiffs,
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`-v.-
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`NVIDIA CORPORATION, VELOCITY
`MICRO, INC. D/B/A VELOCITY MICRO,
`AND VELOCITY HOLDINGS, LLC,
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`Defendants.
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`REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE
`PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), SEVER, AND STAY
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`Case 3:14-cv-00757-REP-DJN Document 55 Filed 02/02/15 Page 2 of 22 PageID# 2710
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................................1
`
`ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................................3
`
`I.
`
`DEFENDANTS HAVE DEMONSTRATED THAT A TRANSFER OF THE
`CASE AGAINST NVIDIA TO THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
`CALIFORNIA IS WARRANTED UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) ......................................3
`
`A.
`
`The Lack Of Personal Jurisdiction Over Velocity In California Is
`Irrelevant Because Defendants Seek Only To Transfer The Case Against
`NVIDIA ...................................................................................................................3
`
`B.
`
`The Convenience Factors and Interests of Justice Favor Transfer ..........................4
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`4.
`
`Samsung’s Choice Of Forum Is Not Entitled To Deference .......................4
`
`The Convenience Of Third-Party Witnesses Favors Transfer .....................5
`
`Samsung Has Failed To Rebut NVIDIA’s Showing That A
`Transfer Would Be More Convenient For The Parties ................................6
`
`The Interests Of Justice Weigh In Favor Of Transferring This Case
`To California ................................................................................................9
`
`II.
`
`THE CLAIMS AGAINST VELOCITY ARE NOT CENTRAL TO THE CASE
`AND THUS THE CASE AGAINST VELOCITY SHOULD BE SEVERED AND
`STAYED ............................................................................................................................12
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`Samsung Concedes That The Claims Against Velocity For Five Of The
`Six Overlapping Patents At Issue Are Peripheral To And Will Be
`Resolved By The Claims Against NVIDIA ...........................................................12
`
`Samsung’s Allegations Of Infringement Of The ’724 Patent Against
`Velocity Are Peripheral To And Will Resolve Its Claims Against NVIDIA ........13
`
`Samsung’s Allegations Of Infringement Against Velocity Of The ’054
`And The ’854 Patents Arise From Entirely Different Facts Than Any
`Other Claim And Do Not Prevent A Transfer Of The Case Against
`NVIDIA .................................................................................................................14
`
`CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................................16
`
`i
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`

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`Case 3:14-cv-00757-REP-DJN Document 55 Filed 02/02/15 Page 3 of 22 PageID# 2711
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`CASES
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`Adiscov, LLC v. Autonomy Corp.,
`No. 2:11-cv-00201, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157590 (E.D. Va. June 9, 2011) ..........................6
`
`Affinity Labs v. Samsung Electronics Co.,
`968 F. Supp. 2d 852 (E.D. Tex. 2013) .......................................................................................8
`
`Bascom Research, LLC v. Facebook, Inc.,
`No. 1:12-cv-01111, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186712 (E.D. Va. Dec. 11, 2012) ........................6
`
`Bluestone Innovations, LLC v. LG Electronics, Inc.,
`940 F. Supp. 2d 310 (E.D. Va. 2013) ........................................................................................6
`
`Cognitronics Imaging Systems, Inc. v. Recognition Research Inc.,
`83 F. Supp. 2d 689 (E.D. Va. 2000) ....................................................................................9, 11
`
`In re Genentech, Inc.,
`566 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2009)..................................................................................................7
`
`General Foam Plastics Corp. v. Kraemer Export Corp.,
`806 F. Supp. 88 (E.D. Va. 1992) ...............................................................................................9
`
`GTE Wireless, Inc. v. Qualcomm, Inc.,
`71 F. Supp. 2d 517 (E.D. Va. 1999) ....................................................................................4, 10
`
`Hilb Rogal & Hobbs Co. v. Rick Strategy Partners, Inc.,
`No. 3:05-cv-355, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96056 (E.D. Va. Feb. 10, 2006)
`(Payne, J.), aff’d, 230 F. App’x 328 (4th Cir. 2007) ..................................................................9
`
`Intercarrier Communications, LLC v. Glympse, Inc.,
`No. 3:12-CV-767-JAG, 2013 WL 4083318 (E.D. Va. Aug. 12, 2013) .............................4, 5, 8
`
`Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co.,
`313 U.S. 487 (1941) .................................................................................................................10
`
`Koh v. Microtek International, Inc.,
`250 F. Supp. 2d 627 (E.D. Va. 2003) ........................................................................................5
`
`Lugus IP LLC v. Volvo Car Corp.,
`No. 3:11-cv-811-HEH, 2012 WL 1715983 (E.D. Va. May 15, 2012) ............................3, 5, 14
`
`NanoEnTek, Inc. v. Bio-Rad Laboratories, Inc.,
`No. 2:11-cv-427, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138535 (E.D. Va. Dec. 2, 2011) ..............................8
`
`ii
`
`

`

`Case 3:14-cv-00757-REP-DJN Document 55 Filed 02/02/15 Page 4 of 22 PageID# 2712
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`Synthon IP, Inc. v. Pfizer Inc.,
`472 F. Supp. 2d 760 (E.D. Va. 2007) ........................................................................................5
`
`Trustees of Columbia University v. Symantec Corp.,
`No. 3:13-CV-808, 2014 WL 1329417 (E.D. Va. Apr. 2, 2014) ..................................4, 5, 9, 10
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`iii
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`

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`Case 3:14-cv-00757-REP-DJN Document 55 Filed 02/02/15 Page 5 of 22 PageID# 2713
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`INTRODUCTION
`
`Samsung’s opposition is notable for what it does not dispute. Samsung does not dispute
`
`that NVIDIA identified 16 witnesses (and two inventors of the asserted patents and nine
`
`inventors of relevant prior art) located in the Northern District of California; that all of
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`NVIDIA’s sources of proof are located in the Northern District of California; that NVIDIA’s
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`accused products are primarily designed, developed, and manufactured in the Northern District
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`of California; or that NVIDIA will incur great expense for travel, meal, and lodging costs should
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`the case against it remain in Virginia. Nor does Samsung dispute that Virginia is not its home
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`forum or that it could have filed its case against NVIDIA in the Northern District of California.
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`Samsung’s opposition is also notable for its failure to identify a single one of its witnesses that
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`resides in (or even near) Virginia or even allege that the Eastern District of Virginia is somehow
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`more convenient than the Northern District of California. Because Samsung cannot demonstrate
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`any fact that would make Virginia a more convenient forum than California for the case against
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`NVIDIA, the six patents asserted against NVIDIA should be transferred to California.
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`The evidence that Samsung’s opposition does marshal is legally irrelevant to NVIDIA’S
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`transfer motion. Samsung points to the location of the prosecuting attorneys as reason to keep
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`the case against NVIDIA in Virginia, but there are no claims that would require their testimony.
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`NVIDIA has not asserted an inequitable conduct defense and Samsung has not asserted any
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`claims that would require their testimony or identified a reason why it purportedly needs their
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`testimony. The prosecuting attorneys are presently irrelevant to this case. Samsung also claims
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`that its Virginia state law advertising claim should remain in Virginia, but the law is well-settled
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`that state law claims cannot be the determinative factor in resolving transfer motions; federal
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`courts, including those in California, are familiar with applying the laws of other states because
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`of the choice of laws analysis in diversity cases.
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`

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`Case 3:14-cv-00757-REP-DJN Document 55 Filed 02/02/15 Page 6 of 22 PageID# 2714
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`Unable to dispute the relevant facts, Samsung’s opposition focuses on its peripheral
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`allegations against Velocity Micro, Inc. d/b/a Velocity Micro and Velocity Holdings, LLC
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`(“Velocity Holdings”) (collectively “Velocity”), a small Virginia-based reseller of some
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`NVIDIA products, that Samsung plainly sued in an effort to avoid transfer. Samsung argues that
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`its claims against Velocity are “central” to the case, but this argument holds no water. Samsung
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`concedes that five of the six patent claims asserted against both NVIDIA and Velocity are based
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`solely on Velocity’s use of NVIDIA’s accused products. As to the sole remaining claim, related
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`to U.S. Patent No. 6,804,724 (“the ’724 Patent”), Samsung tries to confuse the issues by arguing
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`that Velocity separately infringes because it sells an infringing laptop, but this alleged
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`infringement is centered entirely around an NVIDIA graphics card in the laptop. Indeed, the
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`laptop Velocity sells is just like the other, non-Velocity, laptops that Samsung alleges infringe
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`the ’724 Patent. There is nothing special about Velocity and the ’724 Patent.
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`As to the two patents asserted solely against Velocity based on Velocity’s use of non-
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`NVIDIA products (U.S. Patent Nos. 7,073,054 (“the ’054 Patent”) and 5,777,854 (the
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`’854 Patent”)), those claims are irrelevant to whether the Court should transfer, sever and stay
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`the case with respect to the six patents asserted against both NVIDIA and Velocity. A cursory
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`review of these claims demonstrates that they were included solely to support Samsung’s
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`improper forum shopping. Velocity has never sold a single computer with a hybrid hard drive
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`that Samsung accuses of infringing the ’054 Patent—not one. And Velocity does not design or
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`manufacture the computer cases accused of infringing the ’854 Patent; those are manufactured
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`by a third party in China and Taiwan and are readily available to anyone on the Internet.
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`Velocity could not be more peripheral to this case.
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`2
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`Case 3:14-cv-00757-REP-DJN Document 55 Filed 02/02/15 Page 7 of 22 PageID# 2715
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`There are no facts that justify keeping the case against NVIDIA in Virginia. The Court
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`should transfer the case against NVIDIA to Northern District of California and sever and stay the
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`case against Velocity (or at the least sever and stay the six overlapping claims).
`
`ARGUMENT
`
`I.
`
`DEFENDANTS HAVE DEMONSTRATED THAT A TRANSFER OF THE CASE
`AGAINST NVIDIA TO THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA IS
`WARRANTED UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
`
`A.
`
`The Lack Of Personal Jurisdiction Over Velocity In California Is
`Irrelevant Because Defendants Seek Only To Transfer The Case
`Against NVIDIA
`
`Samsung does not—and cannot—dispute that the case against NVIDIA could have been
`
`brought in the Northern District of California. (See Mot. at 5.) Rather, Samsung argues (for
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`three pages) that the entire case should remain in Virginia because Velocity is not subject to
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`personal jurisdiction in the Northern District of California. (Opp. at 13-15.) But this is
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`irrelevant to Defendants’ motion because it only seeks to transfer the case against NVIDIA. See
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`Lugus IP LLC v. Volvo Car Corp., No. 3:11-cv-811-HEH, 2012 WL 1715983, at *3 (E.D. Va.
`
`May 15, 2012). Defendants have moved to sever and stay the case against Velocity. (Mot. at
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`18-20.) Thus, the case against Velocity would remain in the Eastern District of Virginia, where
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`there is personal jurisdiction, while the primary case between Samsung and NVIDIA would
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`proceed in the proper venue—the Northern District of California.
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`NVIDIA has met the jurisdictional factor in the transfer analysis.
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`3
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`

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`Case 3:14-cv-00757-REP-DJN Document 55 Filed 02/02/15 Page 8 of 22 PageID# 2716
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`B.
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`The Convenience Factors and Interests of Justice Favor Transfer
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`1.
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`Samsung’s Choice Of Forum Is Not Entitled To Deference
`
`Samsung concedes that the Eastern District of Virginia is not its home forum1 and that
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`therefore it “‘loses … some of the deference given its choice of venue.’” (Opp. at 16 (citation
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`omitted).) Samsung nonetheless contends that its choice of forum is entitled to substantial
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`weight because the nucleus of operative facts is where the accused products are designed,
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`developed and manufactured. (Id.) In so arguing, Samsung ignores that NVIDIA—the only
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`relevant defendant for transfer purposes—designs and manufactures the majority of the allegedly
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`infringing products in the Northern District of California. (Mot. at 7.) No NVIDIA design or
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`manufacturing efforts occur in Virginia. (Id. (citing Decl. of Richard Calderwood ¶ 6
`
`[hereinafter Calderwood Decl.]).); see also GTE Wireless, Inc. v. Qualcomm, Inc., 71 F. Supp. 2d
`
`517, 519 (E.D. Va. 1999); Trs. of Columbia Univ. v. Symantec Corp., No. 3:13-CV-808,
`
`2014 WL 1329417, at *6 (E.D. Va. Apr. 2, 2014) (“In patent infringement cases in particular, the
`
`preferred forum is most often where the ‘milieu of the infringing device’ is located.” (citation
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`omitted)).
`
`To make this flawed argument, Samsung focuses solely on Velocity, arguing that it
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`“designs, assembles, and sells its accused products in Virginia.” (Opp. at 16.) But this is
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`irrelevant to transferring the claims against NVIDIA, the real party in interest, because the case
`
`
`1 While conceding that Virginia is not its home forum, Samsung points out that SEA’s
`headquarters is located in Ridgefield Park, New Jersey. But Samsung’s connection to New
`Jersey is irrelevant to its claim of purported connection with the Eastern District of Virginia. See
`Intercarrier Commc’ns, LLC v. Glympse, Inc., No. 3:12-CV-767-JAG, 2013 WL 4083318, at *2
`(E.D. Va. Aug. 12, 2013) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that ties to Maryland and Washington,
`D.C. are a relevant factor in keeping a case in the Eastern District of Virginia because “these
`facts represent ICC’s potential connection with Maryland or Washington, D.C., they do not
`present any connection with Virginia”).
`
`4
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`

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`Case 3:14-cv-00757-REP-DJN Document 55 Filed 02/02/15 Page 9 of 22 PageID# 2717
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`against Velocity would remain in Virginia. See, e.g., Lugus IP, 2012 WL 1715983, at *1
`
`(severing local defendants and transferring real party in interest).
`
`2.
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`The Convenience Of Third-Party Witnesses Favors Transfer
`
`The law in this district is that the convenience of non-party witnesses should be given
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`“greater weight” in deciding a motion to transfer. Koh v. Microtek Int’l, Inc., 250 F. Supp. 2d
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`627, 637 (E.D. Va. 2003). Samsung ignores this well-settled law and summarily disregards that
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`(i) two inventors of the patents-in-suit are located in California, (ii) nine inventors of relevant
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`prior art are located in California, and (iii) the Northern District of California would be more
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`convenient for Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company and ARM, Inc., two third parties
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`involved in the design and manufacture of some of the accused integrated circuits. The location
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`of these relevant third-parties weighs heavily in favor of transfer.
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`In response, Samsung contends that nine prosecuting attorneys are located in Virginia or
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`in nearby Washington, D.C. (Opp. at 19.) But Samsung fails to identify any claims or defenses
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`that would require their testimony. For example, NVIDIA has not asserted an inequitable
`
`conduct defense, which may require the testimony of prosecuting attorneys. See Synthon IP, Inc.
`
`v. Pfizer Inc., 472 F. Supp. 2d 760, 776 (E.D. Va. 2007). Instead, of identifying a reason why
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`testimony from the prosecuting attorneys would be relevant, Samsung points to Trustees of
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`Columbia University. But in that case, inventorship of the patents was disputed and prosecuting
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`attorney testimony was relevant. See Trs. of Columbia Univ., 2014 WL 1329417, at *3. The
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`more analogous cases are those where there are no such issues (like here). Those cases hold that
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`the location of the prosecuting attorneys is essentially irrelevant to the transfer analysis. See,
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`e.g., Intercarrier Commc’ns, LLC v. Glympse, Inc., No. 3:12-CV-767-JAG, 2013 WL 4083318,
`
`at *5 (E.D. Va. Aug. 12, 2013) (“The central issue in the case is the similarity of Glympse’s
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`product to the protected invention. The patent prosecutor … can offer no evidence respecting
`
`5
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`

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`Case 3:14-cv-00757-REP-DJN Document 55 Filed 02/02/15 Page 10 of 22 PageID# 2718
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`these issues.”). Likewise, here, the prosecuting attorneys can provide no fact testimony about
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`whether NVIDIA’s products infringe the asserted patents and Samsung has not otherwise
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`asserted their testimony would be material.
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`Indeed, in patent infringement cases, the Court has transferred cases even when the
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`inventor2 and prosecuting attorney resided in the Eastern District of Virginia because “the
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`overwhelming majority of the sources of proof in th[e] case, both documentary and testimonial,
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`are in the Northern District of California.” Adiscov, LLC v. Autonomy Corp., No. 2:11-cv-
`
`00201, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157590, at *11 (E.D. Va. June 9, 2011); see also Bascom
`
`Research, LLC v. Facebook, Inc., No. 1:12-cv-01111 (LMB/JFA), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
`
`186712, at *5-6 (E.D. Va. Dec. 11, 2012) (granting transfer where the defendant identified
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`“numerous potential witnesses and sources of evidence” in the Northern District of California,
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`even though the plaintiff identified a patent co-inventor in Maryland and prosecuting attorneys in
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`Washington, D.C.); Bluestone Innovations, LLC v. LG Elecs., Inc., 940 F. Supp. 2d 310, 315
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`(E.D. Va. 2013) (granting transfer despite prosecuting attorney residing in Eastern District of
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`Virginia).
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`Thus, even if the location of the prosecuting attorneys was relevant for this case, the
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`location of the witnesses and sources of proof located in the Northern District of California
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`trump the location of the prosecuting attorneys.
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`3.
`
`Samsung Has Failed To Rebut NVIDIA’s Showing That A
`Transfer Would Be More Convenient For The Parties
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`Samsung disregards the fact that NVIDIA has identified sixteen (16) witnesses, all of
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`whom are located in the Northern District of California, and that NVIDIA’s documentation and
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`sources of proof are also in that jurisdiction. (Mot. at 9, 11-12.) Instead, Samsung points out
`
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`2 Here, none of the inventors of the asserted patents are located in Virginia.
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`6
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`

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`Case 3:14-cv-00757-REP-DJN Document 55 Filed 02/02/15 Page 11 of 22 PageID# 2719
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`that NVIDIA sued Samsung and Qualcomm last September in the District of Delaware and in the
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`International Trade Commission (“ITC”) and argues that this proves that California is not a
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`convenient forum for NVIDIA.3 (Opp. at 21.) But the fact that NVIDIA sued Samsung in
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`Delaware and the ITC4 to enforce NVIDIA patents against Samsung products imported from
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`outside the U.S. has no bearing on the most convenient forum for this case in which NVIDIA’s
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`products are at issue. Because the ITC case and the now-stayed Delaware action implicate
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`Samsung products, and because none of the six (6) patents asserted against NVIDIA here are at
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`issue in either the ITC or Delaware, those earlier filed actions have no bearing on the transfer
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`analysis for this case. The relevant sources of proof and the relevant witnesses who will testify
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`about the products and patents at issue in this case are in California. Samsung cannot avoid the
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`importance of these undisputed facts. In re Genentech, Inc., 566 F.3d 1338, 1343 (Fed. Cir.
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`2009) (“The convenience and cost of attendance for witnesses is an import factor in transfer
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`calculus.”).
`
`Samsung contends that the convenience of the parties and witnesses counsel against
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`transfer because the Velocity employees and all discovery related to Velocity are in Virginia.
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`(Opp. at 19.) But this merely repackages Samsung’s flawed arguments regarding the importance
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`of Velocity, discussed below. No Velocity witness has any information about the design,
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`development, or manufacture of NVIDIA’s products that form the basis of the claims against
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`Velocity for six of the eight patents. (See Decl. of Randall Copeland Decl. ¶ 9 (Jan. 11, 2015)
`
`[hereinafter First Copeland Decl.].) And neither NVIDIA nor Velocity seek to transfer the case
`
`against Velocity to the Northern District of California.
`
`3 In making this argument, Samsung urges the Court to disregard the many cases in which it
`previously argued that the Northern District of California would be convenient. (See Opp. at 18.)
`4 NVIDIA sued Samsung in the ITC because of the ITC’s unique remedial jurisdiction. Further,
`NVIDIA is a Delaware corporation.
`
`7
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`

`

`Case 3:14-cv-00757-REP-DJN Document 55 Filed 02/02/15 Page 12 of 22 PageID# 2720
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`Samsung does not deny that all of its witnesses are in Korea or that California is more
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`convenient for its own witnesses. Instead Samsung merely promises that it “will present all of its
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`witnesses live at trial.” (Opp. at 20.) But Samsung’s non-binding promise does not weigh
`
`against transfer because NVIDIA has demonstrated that no Samsung or NVIDIA witnesses are in
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`Virginia and that at least 16 NVIDIA witnesses are located in the Northern District of California.
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`Because Samsung has not alleged that the Northern District of California would be less
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`convenient for its own witnesses, this is not a situation (as Samsung claims) where transfer
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`would “‘merely shift the inconvenience to the other party.’” (Opp. at 22 (citation omitted).)
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`There is no “inconvenience” to shift.
`
`Samsung notes that SEA’s headquarters is in New Jersey. But Samsung does not assert
`
`that any witnesses located in New Jersey will testify at trial, let alone identify such witnesses by
`
`name—as NVIDIA has done. This Court has held multiple times that general allegations about
`
`the location of witnesses is insufficient and deserves no weight. See, e.g., NanoEnTek, Inc. v.
`
`Bio-Rad Labs., Inc., No. 2:11-cv-427, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138535, at *16 (E.D. Va. Dec. 2,
`
`2011) (criticizing plaintiff in opposing defendant’s transfer motion for failing to “identify any
`
`particular employee as being likely to testify, let alone discuss[ing] the materiality of such
`
`testimony”). Regardless, ties to New Jersey do not establish a connection with Virginia. See
`
`Intercarrier, 2013 WL 4083318, at *2. Remarkably, Samsung ignores Defendants’ argument
`
`that both Samsung Research America and Samsung Semiconductor Inc. have facilities in the
`
`Northern District of California, and that courts recognize that Samsung’s facilities in California
`
`“employ a large number of individuals.” Affinity Labs v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 968 F. Supp. 2d
`
`852, 855 (E.D. Tex. 2013).
`
`8
`
`

`

`Case 3:14-cv-00757-REP-DJN Document 55 Filed 02/02/15 Page 13 of 22 PageID# 2721
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`Samsung contends that the fact that “this District is not Samsung’s home forum is
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`irrelevant because neither is the Northern District of California.” (Opp. at 18.) Putting aside the
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`fact of Samsung’s significant presence in the Northern District of California, Samsung is wrong
`
`on the law: “Where a plaintiff files suit in a foreign jurisdiction, this fact ‘militates in favor of a
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`transfer to the district where the defendant resides, because the plaintiff will be inconvenienced
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`by having to travel whether the action is transferred or not.’” Trs. of Columbia Univ., 2014 WL
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`1329417, at *9 (citation omitted).
`
`4.
`
`The Interests Of Justice Weigh In Favor Of Transferring This
`Case To California
`
`Samsung contends that the interests of justice weigh in favor of resolving this matter in
`
`Virginia. (Opp. at 22.) Here too, Samsung is wrong.
`
`Samsung first alleges that its Virginia state law false advertising claim should be
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`adjudicated by a Virginia court. As NVIDIA pointed out in its opening brief, the fact that
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`Samsung brought a Virginia state law claim does not trump transfer. (Mot. at 16-17.) This
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`Court has held that state law claims cannot be the determinative factor in resolving transfer
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`motions, especially where, as here, the other connections to the district are tenuous.5
`
`Cognitronics Imaging Sys., Inc. v. Recognition Research Inc., 83 F. Supp. 2d 689, 696 (E.D. Va.
`
`2000); see also Gen. Foam Plastics Corp. v. Kraemer Export Corp., 806 F. Supp. 88, 90 (E.D.
`
`
`5 Moreover, it is uncertain that under the doctrine of legislative jurisdiction that the Court should
`apply Virginia false advertising law. See Hilb Rogal & Hobbs Co. v. Rick Strategy Partners,
`Inc., No. 3:05-cv-355, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96056 (E.D. Va. Feb. 10, 2006) (Payne, J.), aff’d,
`230 F. App’x 328 (4th Cir. 2007). Whether a state’s laws may be applied extraterritorially to a
`given set of facts depends on whether the state has legislative jurisdiction. For a State to exercise
`legislative jurisdiction, there must be minimum contacts between the State and the regulated
`subject. Id. at *28. Under doctrine of legislative jurisdiction, Virginia law may not apply to
`statements made on the website of a California company that are alleged to have injured a
`Korean company and its subsidiary based in New Jersey, particularly where Samsung’s amended
`complaint nowhere identifies any Virginia citizens implicated or injured by the alleged false
`advertising.
`
`9
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`

`

`Case 3:14-cv-00757-REP-DJN Document 55 Filed 02/02/15 Page 14 of 22 PageID# 2722
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`Va. 1992) (in assessing transfer motion, recognizing that breach of contract claim was alleged
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`but noting that “the choice of law factor is not controlling” in the transfer analysis). In addition,
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`federal courts are quite familiar with applying the laws of other states because of the choice of
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`laws analysis in diversity cases. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).
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`Samsung contends that transferring and severing the case “creates a serious risk of
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`inconsistent results” because two courts would be construing the claims of the same patent and
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`that it would suffer prejudice as a result. (Opp. at 23, 25.) This is a straw man. Defendants have
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`moved not only to sever the case against Velocity but to stay it. This would avoid Samsung’s
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`purported concerns about inconsistent results and any associated prejudice. And because
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`resolution of the case against NVIDIA necessarily resolves the case against Velocity as it relates
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`to the six overlapping patents (explained below), once the case has been litigated in the Northern
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`District of California those claims against Velocity will readily be resolved here.
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`Samsung next argues that “docket conditions can also influence whether the interests of
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`justice are served by transfer” and that “‘the interest[s] of justice are best served by affording the
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`parties to litigation a certain trial date in the shortest period of time ….’” (Opp. at 25 (citation
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`omitted).) The Northern District of California may have a slower median time to trial than the
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`Eastern District of Virginia, but this is a “minor consideration when all other reasonable and
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`logical factors would result in a transfer of venue.” GTE Wireless, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 520
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`(rejecting plaintiff’s argument that the action should stay in the Eastern District of Virginia
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`simply because it would “likely proceed to trial faster” than in the Southern District of
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`California). Additionally, “the interests of justice are not served when docket conditions are the
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`‘primary reason for retaining a case in this district.’” Trs. of Columbia Univ., 2014 WL
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`1329417, at *10 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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`10
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`

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`Case 3:14-cv-00757-REP-DJN Document 55 Filed 02/02/15 Page 15 of 22 PageID# 2723
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`Samsung contends that this motion to transfer reflects NVIDIA’s attempt to “game the
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`system.” (Opp. at 24.) But it is Samsung that chose to sue a small Virginia company with no
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`real stake in the outcome of this case, and it is Samsung that has revealed that the “speed of the
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`Eastern District of Virginia docket” is the reason it selected this venue. (See id. at 6.) Samsung
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`asks the Court to find that NVIDIA is gaming the system because NVIDIA publicly predicted
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`that another suit NVIDIA filed against Samsung two months prior to Samsung’s filing of this
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`case would be decided first. Well, NVIDIA’s earlier suit should be, because a previously filed
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`case should get decided first. Based on these facts, the only party seeking to “game the system”
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`and leap frog a prior-filed case by filing in a fast docket is Samsung.
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`Lastly, Samsung contends that “[t]his is a local controversy involving a local defendant
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`that implicates Virginia citizens and Virginia law.” (Opp. at 26.) That statement is incorrect.6
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`This is instead a national controversy implicating two international graphics chip manufacturers
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`and federal patent law. Samsung should not be permitted to avoid the more convenient forum
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`(California) simply by alleging token patent claims against a small Virginia company and a
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`frivolous false advertising claim under state law against NVIDIA when Samsung’s transparent
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`purpose is to manufacture venue. As noted by this Court many times over:
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`This Court cannot stand as a willing repository for cases which have no real nexus
`to this district. The “rocket docket” certainly attracts plaintiffs, but the Court
`must ensure that this attraction does not dull the ability of the Court to continue to
`act in an expeditious manner.
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`Cognitronics Imaging Sys., 83 F. Supp. 2d at 699 (citation omitted). The Court should not act as
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`a willing repository for Samsung’s case either.
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`6 The only Virginia state law at issue in this case is the false advertising claim that is asserted
`only against NVIDIA (see Am. Compl. ¶¶ 3196-3206; see also Opp. at 6 (acknowledging that
`Samsung asserted “Virginia false advertising claims against NVIDIA”)), which is not a local
`defendant. Samsung’s amended complaint nowhere identifies any Virginia citizens implicated
`by or injured by the alleged false advertising, despite its 3,207 paragraphs of allegations.
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`11
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`

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`Case 3:14-cv-00757-REP-DJN Document 55 Filed 02/02/15 Page 16 of 22 PageID# 2724
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`II.
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`THE CLAIMS AGAINST VELOCITY ARE NOT CENTRAL TO THE CASE
`AND THUS THE CASE AGAINST VELOCITY SHOULD BE SEVERED AND
`STAYED
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`Samsung contends that its claims against Velocity are not “peripheral” to the claims
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`against NVIDIA and thus should not be severed and stayed because:
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`(1) For the ’724 Patent, which is directed to a computer display adapter that can sense
`power in an external monitor, Velocity separately infringes by assembling an
`NVIDIA display adapter with other off-the-shelf non-NVIDIA components, such as a
`laptop’s LCD display, to create the infringing computer system, and;
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`(2) Samsung is alleging infringement of two patents solely against Velocity where the
`infringement occurred only in the Eastern District of Virginia.
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`(Opp. at 10.) These arguments, however, demonstrate just how peripheral Velocity is to the
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`dispute between NVIDIA and Samsung, and this case is just one of several patent suits being
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`litigated across the country between these two companies.
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`A.
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`Samsung Concedes That The Claims Against Velocity For Five Of
`The Six Overlapping Patents At Issue Are Peripheral To And Will Be
`Resolved By The Claims Against NVIDIA
`
`With regard to U.S. Patent Nos. 5,860,158 (“the ’158 Patent”); 6,282,938 (“the ’938
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`Patent”); 6,287,902 (“the ’902 Patent”); 6,819,602 (“the ’602 Patent”); and 8,252,675 (“the ’675
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`Patent”) (five of the six patents asserted against NVIDIA and Velocity), Samsung concedes that
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`resolution of the infringement claims against NVIDIA would be dispositive of the claims for
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`those patents against Velocity. (See Opp. at 6 (“Velocity’s infringement of t