Case 1:22-cv-01331-MSN-JFA Document 105 Filed 07/19/23 Page 1 of 34 PageID# 1998
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
`EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
`Alexandria Division
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`
`
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` No: 1:22-cv-01331-MSN-JFA
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`GEOSCOPE TECHNOLOGIES PTE. LTD,
` Plaintiff,
`
` v.
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`GOOGLE LLC,
` Defendant.
`
`
`MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
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`This matter comes before the Court for claim construction. Geoscope Technologies Pte.
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`Ltd. (“Geoscope”) is the owner of six patents1 (“Asserted Patents”) purporting to improve the
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`accuracy, efficiency, and speed of mobile device geolocation. Geoscope has sued Google LLC
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`(“Google”) and Apple Inc. (“Apple,” together with Google, “Defendants”) alleging infringement
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`of the Asserted Patents.2
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`The parties have submitted stipulations as to six claims. The Court adopts those
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`constructions as listed in the parties’ stipulations. See (Geoscope v. Google, Dkt. Nos. 72, 73, 100)
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`(Geoscope v. Apple, Dkt. Nos. 70, 71, 89). The parties have not reached agreement on ten claim
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`terms and have asked this Court to construe those terms.3 Opening claim construction briefs were
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`filed on May 26, 2023 and responsive briefs were filed on June 9, 2023. See (Geoscope v. Google,
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`
`1
`The six patents are: U.S. Patent Nos. 7,561,104 (“the ’104 Patent”); 8,400,358 (“the ’358 Patent”); 8,786,494
`(“the ’494 Patent”); 8,406,753 (“the ’753 Patent); 9,097,784 (“the ’784 Patent”); and 8,320,264 (“the ’264 Patent”).
`The Court will collectively refer to these six patents as the “Asserted Patents.”
`2
`Geoscope has sued Google and Apple in two separate actions alleging infringement of the Asserted Patents.
`The lawsuit against Apple, referenced herein as “Geoscope v. Apple,” is case number 22-cv-1373. The lawsuit against
`Google, referenced herein as “Geoscope v. Google,” is case number 22-cv-1331. For the purposes of claim
`construction, however, Google and Apple have submitted identical claim construction briefs in this action and made
`a joint presentation at the Markman hearing.
`3
`The parties claim construction briefing addressed eleven disputed claim terms, but the parties subsequently
`reached an agreement on one of the disputed claim terms. See (Geoscope v. Google, Dkt. No. 100) (Geoscope v. Apple,
`Dkt. No. 89)
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`Case 1:22-cv-01331-MSN-JFA Document 105 Filed 07/19/23 Page 2 of 34 PageID# 1999
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`Dkt. Nos. 74, 75, 83, 84) (Geoscope v. Apple, Dkt. Nos. 72, 73, 77, 78). The Court held a Markman
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`hearing on July 6, 2023. Having considered the briefs, the exhibits attached thereto, and the
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`argument of counsel at the hearing, the Court now construes the ten disputed claim terms as set
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`forth below.
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`I.
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`LEGAL STANDARDS
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`A.
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`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
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`The purpose of the claim construction process is to “determin[e] the meaning and scope of
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`the patent claims asserted to be infringed.” Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967,
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`976 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). The question of the proper construction
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`of a patent is a question of law, although courts must sometimes engage in subsidiary fact-finding.
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`Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 837–38 (2015). Terms contained in claims
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`“are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning.” Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc.,
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`90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996). “[T]he ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is
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`the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art [(“POSA”)] in question
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`at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date of the patent application.” Phillips
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`v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). When determining the ordinary
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`meaning of claim terms, courts do not derive meaning of terns devoid of the context from which
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`they arose. Id. at 1321. Rather, courts endeavor to reflect their “meaning to the ordinary artisan
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`after reading the entire patent.” Id.
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`“When construing claim terms, the court first looks to, and primarily rel[ies] on, the
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`intrinsic evidence, including the claims themselves, the specification, and the prosecution history
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`of the patent.” Sunovion Pharms., Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 731 F.3d 1271, 1276 (Fed. Cir.
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`2013). “The claims themselves provide substantial guidance as to the meaning of particular claim
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`terms.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. “[T]he context in which a term is used in the asserted claim can
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`be highly instructive.” Id. “Other claims of the patent in question, both asserted and unasserted,
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`can [also] be valuable” in discerning the meaning of a disputed claim term. Phillips, 415 F.3d at
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`1314. That is so because “claim terms are normally used consistently throughout the patent,” and
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`so “the usage of a term in one claim can often illuminate the meaning of the same term in other
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`claims.” Id.
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`Moreover, a patent’s “claims ‘must be read in view of the specification, of which they are
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`a part.’” Id. at 1315 (quoting Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582). Not only is the specification “always
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`highly relevant to the claim construction analysis” but “[u]sually, it is dispositive [as] it is the
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`single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.” Id. Courts should also consider the patent’s
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`prosecution history, as it may “inform the meaning of the claim language by demonstrating how
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`the inventor understood the invention and whether the inventor limited the invention in the course
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`of prosecution.” Id. at 1317.
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`In certain instances, the Court may also consider extrinsic evidence, which “consists of all
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`evidence external to the patent and prosecution history, including expert and inventor testimony,
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`dictionaries, and learned treatises.” Markman, 52 F.3d at 980. For instance, courts may “need to
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`look beyond the patent’s intrinsic evidence and to consult extrinsic evidence in order to understand
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`. . . the background science or the meaning of a term in the relevant art during the relevant time
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`period.” Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 841. While extrinsic evidence may be useful, it is “less significant than
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`the intrinsic record in determining the legally operative meaning of claim language.” Phillips, 415
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`F.3d at 1317 (cleaned up).
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`B.
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`INDEFINITENESS
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`Section 112 of Title 35 imposes a definiteness requirement on patent claims. It requires
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`that the claims “particularly point[] out and distinctly claim[] the subject matter which the inventor
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`. . . regards as the invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 112(b). “The primary purpose of the definiteness
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`requirement is to ensure that the claims are written in such a way that they give notice to the public
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`of the extent of the legal protection afforded by the patent, so that interested members of the public,
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`e.g., competitors of the patent owner, can determine whether or not they infringe.” All Dental
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`Prodx, LLC v. Advantage Dental Prod., Inc., 309 F.3d 774, 779–80 (Fed. Cir. 2002). “A patent is
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`invalid for indefiniteness if its claims, read in light of the specification delineating the patent, and
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`the prosecution history, fail to inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the
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`scope of the invention.” Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 901 (2014). As
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`with claim construction, definiteness should be assessed from the viewpoint of a person of ordinary
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`skill in the art at the time the patent was filed. Id. at 908. The party asserting indefiniteness must
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`prove it by clear and convincing evidence. BASF Corp. v. Johnson Matthey Inc., 875 F.3d 1360,
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`1365 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Courts, including those in this District, routinely make determinations about
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`indefiniteness at the claim construction stage. E.g., Bushnell Hawthorne, LLC v. Cisco Sys., 2019
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`WL 2745735, at *9 (E.D. Va. July 1, 2019).
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`C. MEANS-PLUS-FUNCTION
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`A patent claim may be expressed using functional language. Williamson v. Citrix Online,
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`LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1347–49 & n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6, a structure may
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`be claimed as a “means . . . for performing a specified function” and an act may be claimed as a
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`“step for performing a specified function.” Masco Corp. v. United States, 303 F.3d 1316, 1326
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`(Fed. Cir. 2002). When it applies, § 112 ¶ 6 limits the scope of the functional term “to only the
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`structure, materials, or acts described in the specification as corresponding to the claimed function
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`and equivalents thereof.” Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1347.
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`“The overall means-plus-function analysis is a two-step process.” Dyfan, LLC v. Target
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`Corp., 28 F.4th 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2022). First, the Court must “determine whether a claim
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`limitation is drafted in means-plus-function format, which requires [the Court] to construe the
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`limitation to determine whether it connotes sufficiently definite structure to a person of ordinary
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`skill in the art.” Id. There is a rebuttable presumption that § 112 ¶ 6 applies when the claim
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`language includes “means” or “step for” terms, and a rebuttable presumption it does not apply in
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`the absence of those terms. Masco Corp., 303 F.3d at 1326. The essential inquiry is “whether the
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`words of the claim are understood by persons of ordinary skill in the art to have a sufficiently
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`definite meaning as the name for structure.” Id. at 1348. Such an inquiry turns on “[i]ntrinsic
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`evidence, such as the claims themselves and the prosecution history,” as well as extrinsic evidence.
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`Dyfan, 28 F.4th at 1365–66.
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`If the limitation is drafted in a means-plus-function format under step one, the Court
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`proceeds to step two, in which the Court then “determine[s] ‘what structure, if any, disclosed in
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`the specification corresponds to the claimed function.’” Dyfan, 28 F.4th at 1365 (quoting
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`Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1351). A means-plus-function claim is indefinite if the specification fails
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`to disclose adequate corresponding structure to perform the claimed function. Williamson, 792
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`F.3d at 1351–52.
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`II.
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`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
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`D.
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`The ’104, ’358, and ’494 Patents
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`The ’104, ’358, and ’494 Patents share the same specification. These three patents generally
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`relate to determining the location of a mobile device by comparing previously collected
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`“calibration data” with network measurement data observed by that mobile device. Geoscope’s
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`alleged improvement over prior art involves modifying the observed data to account for varying
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`factors that lessen the accuracy of that data.
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`5
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`Case 1:22-cv-01331-MSN-JFA Document 105 Filed 07/19/23 Page 6 of 34 PageID# 2003
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`1.
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`“calibration data”
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`The first disputed term, “calibration data,” appears in several claims in the ’104 Patent,
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`’358 Patent, ’494 Patent, and ’753 Patent (which is addressed in the subsequent section below).
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`The parties have proposed the following constructions:
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`Plaintiff’s Construction
`Plain and ordinary meaning (no
`construction necessary)
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`In the alternative, “information based
`on prior network measurements”
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`Defendants’ Construction
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`“network measurement data associated
`with a defined geographic location”
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`Geoscope argues that calibration data is a term readily understood by a POSA and requires
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`no construction. Geoscope argues that if the Court were to construe the term, its alternative
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`proposal finds supports in the intrinsic evidence. See (Geoscope v. Google, Dkt. No. 75) (“Pl. Br.”
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`at 10–12).4 Specifically, Geoscope contends that the ’104, ’358, and ’494 Patents provide different
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`examples of calibration data—signal strength, round trip time, time difference of arrival—that are
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`not network measurement data itself. Geoscope also argues that Defendants’ construction does not
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`capture that calibration data can be modified or altered. Defendants contend that the intrinsic
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`record supports that “calibration data” is itself “network measurement data” that must be associated
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`with a known or defined geographic location. See (Geoscope v. Google, Dkt. No. 74) (“Defs. Br.”
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`at 3–4); see also (Geoscope v. Google, Dkt. No. 78) (“Defs. Resp.” at 4). The parties’ disagreement
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`turns on two distinct issues: (1) whether “calibration data” is limited to “network measurement
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`data” only, as opposed to encompassing information that is based on network measurements, and
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`(2) whether the data must be associated with a geographic location.
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`Regarding the first of these disagreements, the intrinsic record supports the construction
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`4
`As noted above, Defendants filed identical briefs on claim construction. Plaintiff has also filed identical briefs
`in the Google and Apple actions. For ease of reference, the citations to claim construction briefing in this Order are
`only to the briefs filed in the Google docket.
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`6
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`Case 1:22-cv-01331-MSN-JFA Document 105 Filed 07/19/23 Page 7 of 34 PageID# 2004
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`that the disputed claim term refers to “network measurement data.” That “calibration data” refers
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`to “network measurement data” is consistent with how the technology functions as described in
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`the claims and specification. The patents purport to improve the location accuracy of a mobile
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`device by collecting “calibration data” at defined, known locations, which are then stored in a
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`database for further use. See Ex. B at 1:21–3:11, 11:65–12:15. When network measurement data
`is then collected at unknown locations, it is compared to the calibration database at the known
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`location as a means to estimate the mobile device’s location. As Defendants argue, the
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`specification contemplates that this comparison be an apples-to-apples comparison—that is, the
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`network measurement data from an unknown location can only be compared to other previously
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`collected network measurement data.
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`Plaintiff asserts that the patent contemplates several examples of calibration data. The
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`language identified by Plaintiff suggests that the geolocation of a mobile device “may require one
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`or more types of calibration data associated with the mobile station (e.g., signal strength, round
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`trip time, time difference of arrival (TDOA), etc.).” Pl. Br. at 10 (citing Ex. B at 1:23–24). But
`these examples of calibration data are all network measurement data; Plaintiff has not identified
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`calibration data that is not network measurement data. Accordingly, contrary to Plaintiff’s
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`assertion, Defendants’ construction does not exclude disclosed embodiments. Moreover, network
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`measurement data need not be unaltered; indeed, Defendants concede that such data can be
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`modified and still fall within their construction. At the hearing, Defendants proffered a clarification
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`on their construction that would account for this distinction: “modified or unmodified network
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`measurement data . . . .” (Geoscope v. Google, Dkt. No. 104) (“Hrg. Tr.” at 148:13). Plaintiff also
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`suggests that a statement made during prosecution confirms “calibration data” and “network
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`measurement data” are not the same. Pl. Br. at 11. But the passage Plaintiff cites distinguishes
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`between observed network measurement data from calibration data; such a distinction makes sense
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`because observed data is in fact distinct from the data that has already been collected and stored.
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`With respect to the second of the parties’ disagreements—whether calibration data must
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`be associated with a defined geographic location—the intrinsic evidence supports a construction
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`that tethers data to a geographic location. Reading the claim in light of the specification and the
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`purpose of the patent, calibration data must be associated with a known geographic location.
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`Indeed, the very purpose of calibration data is to inform what location to report when a match is
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`found. Plaintiff’s construction, however, would read the meaning of the term “calibration” out of
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`the term. A construction associating calibration data with a geographic location finds ample
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`support in the specification, which the Federal Circuit has explained is the “single best guide to
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`the meaning of a disputed term.” See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315. The specification for the ’104
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`Patent describes, for example, the calibration database as “a collection of data from . . . grids that
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`contain network measurements with associated location estimates.” Ex. B at 10:55–58. This
`language also supports the fact that calibration data need not be associated with a defined
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`geographic location, as it contemplates such data can be associated with location estimates.
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`Defendants appear to recognize that distinction in their Response brief. See Defs. Resp. at 5 (stating
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`that quoted passage supports Defendants’ position that calibration data is network measurement
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`data associated with specified locations, “whether precisely defined or estimated.”). Accordingly,
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`the Court adopts Defendants’ construction in part, with the modifications indicated below, for the
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`reasons stated above.
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`Final Construction
`“modified or unmodified network
`measurement data associated with a
`geographic location”
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`8
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`Case 1:22-cv-01331-MSN-JFA Document 105 Filed 07/19/23 Page 9 of 34 PageID# 2006
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`2.
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`“observed network measurement data”
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`The second disputed term, “observed network measurement data,” appears in several
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`claims of the ’104 Patent, ’358 Patent, and ’494 Patent. The parties have proposed the following
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`constructions:
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`Plaintiff’s Construction
`Plain and ordinary meaning (no
`construction necessary)
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`In the alternative, “measurement data
`representing at least one network
`characteristic observed by a mobile
`device”
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`Defendants’ Construction
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`“measurement data from a network
`measurement report (i.e., a report used
`in cellular networks which provides the
`results of a measurement from a mobile
`device on one or more cells)”
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`Plaintiff argues that this claim term requires no construction. In the alternative, Plaintiff
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`proposes a construction it believes to comport with the intrinsic evidence. See Pl. Br. at 6–7 (citing
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`language from the specification of the ’104 Patent and statements made during reexamination
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`before the USPTO). Defendants argue that their construction is also supported by the intrinsic
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`evidence, which they argue makes clear that the purported invention of the ’104 Patent Family is
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`the use of a “network measurement report” (“NMR”) obtained by a cellular device to determine a
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`mobile device’s location. Def. Br. at 5–8.
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`The core disagreement between the parties is whether “observed network measurement
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`data” encompasses more than just cellular network data. Looking at the word “network” in
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`isolation could certainly lend itself to encompass networks other than cellular networks. Plaintiff’s
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`construction requires the Court to interpret the word “network” in isolation, devoid of the context
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`of the teachings of the patent. But the Court’s “inquiry is not limited to an analysis of the phrase
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`in isolation.” Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 21 F.4th 784, 793 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (cautioning against
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`“break[ing] down a phrase and giv[ing] it an interpretation that is merely the sum of its parts”).
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`Here, the specification frequently uses “network measurement data” interchangeably with a
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`“network measurement report.” For instance, in describing figure 6 of the ’104 Patent, the
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`specification states that operation 601 refers to when “A NMR may be obtained.” Ex. B 10:26
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`(emphasis added). The corresponding step 601 in Figure 6 states “Obtaining NM Data.” Ex. B,
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`Fig. 6 (emphasis added). A POSA would therefore understand that the “observed network
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`measurement data” is obtained from NMRs. See Mosaic Brands, Inc. v. Ridge Wallet LLC, 55
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`F.4th 1354, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (finding “lip” to mean “extrudable plastic materials” where the
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`patent made clear that the device “is constructed of extrudable plastic materials”); Kaken v. Pharm.
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`Co. v. Iancu, 952 F.3d 1346, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“A patent’s statement of the described
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`invention’s purpose informs the proper construction of claim terms.”). And the testimony of one
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`of the inventors—agreeing that observed network measurement data refers to “data from a network
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`measurement report”—supports this conclusion. See Ex. R at 231:20–232:10.
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`Plaintiff asserts that “observed network measurement data” cannot merely consist of data
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`in the NMR because the specification of the ’104 Patent states that “[t]he observed data would
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`typically be the same or similar to the data in a network measurement report (NMR).” Pl. Br. at 8
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`(citing Ex. B at 9:42–44). This, Plaintiff argues, suggests that the observed data would not be
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`limited to just the data in the NMR. But, as Defendants argued at the hearing, reading this in light
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`of the claim and specification as a whole, the intent behind the language is to convey to a POSA
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`that the observed data need not include all the data in the NMR—that is, it need not be precisely
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`the same as the data from an NMR. Accordingly, the Court adopts the Defendants’ construction:
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`Final Construction
`“measurement data from a network
`measurement report (i.e., a report used in
`cellular networks which provides the results
`of a measurement from a mobile device on
`one or more cells)”
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`10
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`
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`3.
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`“positioning determining equipment”
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`The third disputed term, “positioning determining equipment,” appears in claims 1 and 41
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`of the ’358 Patent. The parties have proposed the following constructions:
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`Defendants’ Construction
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`Subject to 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6.
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`Function: “comparing said modified
`network measurement data with said
`database of calibration data”
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`Structure: Indefinite
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`Plaintiff’s Construction
`“equipment that processes received
`information to locate a position of a
`mobile device”
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`Should 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 apply:
`
`Function: comparing said modified
`network measurement data with said
`database of calibration data to thereby
`determine the location of the mobile
`station
`
`Structure: a processor, microprocessor
`or ASICS, including but not limited to
`those implementing the algorithms of
`Figs. 2-3, 7-10, specifically steps 202-
`203, 303, 304, 307, 309, 707, 807, 909,
`1005, 1007, 1009, and described
`textually at 2:12-14, 2:24-28, 2:38-40,
`2:63-67, 3:2-13, 4:49-61, 6:20-21,
`6:60-62, 7:44-48, 8:4-9:16, 9:26-34,
`9:35-50, 9:58-64, 10:3-8, 11:13-17,
`11:29-31, 11:40-44 and 11:50-61, and
`structural equivalents
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`11
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`
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`Claim 1 of the ’358 Patent states:
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`What is claimed is:
`1. A method for determining a location of a mobile station, comprising:
`providing a database of previously-gathered calibration data for a predetermined region
`in a wireless network;
`collecting observed network measurement data;
`modifying said observed network measurement data; and
`comparing said modified network measurement data with said database of calibration
`data by positioning determining equipment to thereby determine the location of the
`mobile station.
`
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`Defendants argue that “positioning determining equipment” in the “comparing” step of
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`claim 1 is a means-plus-function term that must be construed under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6.
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`Defendants argue that the term is described in purely functional terms, and that “equipment” is not
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`sufficiently detailed to render the terms sufficient—or, in other words, the disclosed structure is
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`not sufficient to reasonably associate with the claimed function. Indeed, the term could refer to
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`any structure that is capable of performing the claimed function. See Defs. Br. at 10–12. Plaintiff
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`argues that the specification describes how positioning determining equipment receives modified
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`NMD and compares that NMD with a database of calibration data to determine the location of a
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`mobile device. Under Plaintiff’s theory, a POSA would understand the term to mean “equipment
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`that processes received information to locate a position of a mobile device.” Pl. Br. at 12–13.
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`As discussed above, the means-plus-function analysis is a two-step process. The first step
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`requires the Court to “determine whether a claim limitation is drafted in means-plus-function
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`format, which requires [the Court] to construe the limitation to determine whether it connotes
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`sufficiently definite structure to a person of ordinary skill in the art.” Dyfan, 28 F.4th at 1365. On
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`this first question, the Court finds that the claim term at issue here—“positioning determining
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`equipment”—is drafted in a means-plus-format function. At the outset, the Court presumes that
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`§ 112 ¶ 6 does not apply because the disputed limitation does not recite “means.” Williamson, 792
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`F.3d at 1348. In the absence of the word “means,” Defendants therefore bear the burden of
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`demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that the “positioning determining equipment”
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`term fails to recite sufficiently definite structure. When a patent claim term lacks the word
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`“means,” “the presumption can be overcome and § 112, para. 6 will apply if the challenger
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`demonstrates that the claim term fails to recite sufficiently definite structure or else recites function
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`without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function.” Williamson, 729 F.3d at 1348.
`“[E]ven in the absence of terms such as ‘means,’ claims are nevertheless subject to § 112 ¶ 6 when
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`the limitation in question has ‘no commonly understood meaning and is not generally viewed by
`
`one skilled in the art to connote a particular structure.’” Dyfan, 28 F.4th at 1366 (quoting Media
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`Rights Techs., Inc. v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 800 F.3d 1366, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). Indeed,
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`“[g]eneric terms such as ‘mechanism,’ ‘element,’ ‘device,’ and other nonce words that reflect
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`nothing more than verbal constructs may be used in a claim in a manner that is tantamount to using
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`the word ‘means’ because they ‘typically do not connote sufficiently definite structure’ and
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`therefore may invoke § 112, para. 6.” Williamson, 729 F.3d at 1350. Here, the term “equipment”
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`is a generic term similar to the terms “mechanism,” “element,” and “device,” which the Federal
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`Circuit has described as nonce words. Accordingly, although the disputed term does not recite
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`“means” and thus is presumed not to be a means-plus-function limitation, that presumption is much
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`weaker given the use of the nonce word “equipment.” Moreover, the parties have offered no
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`evidence that the term has a commonly understood meaning and is not generally viewed by one
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`skilled in the art to connote a particular structure. And the ’358 Patent’s claims and specification
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`describe the claim term in functional terms without any corresponding structure: the “positioning
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`determining equipment” term is recited several times in the specification, but those disclosures do
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`not “connote[] sufficiently definite structure to a person of ordinary skill in the art.” See Dyfan, 28
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`F.4th at 1365. The Court finds that Defendants have demonstrated by a preponderance of evidence
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`that the disputed term, “positioning determining equipment,” is drafted in a means-plus-function
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`format.
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`Having so concluded, the Court moves to the second step, which requires it to determine
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`“what structure, if any, disclosed in the specification corresponds to the claimed function.”
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`Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1351. Here, the parties appear to generally agree on the claimed function:
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`“comparing said modified network measurement data with said database of calibration data.” Hrg.
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`Tr. at 72:6–11; Defs. Br. at 8; Pl. Br. at 12. The Federal Circuit has stated that “[i]f the function is
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`performed by a general-purpose computer or microprocessor, then th[is] second step generally
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`further requires that the specification disclose the algorithm that the computer performs to
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`accomplish that function.” Rain Computing, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.3d 1002, 1007
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`(Fed. Cir. 2021). Here, Plaintiff identifies the corresponding structure to be a general-purpose
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`computer—a “processor, microprocessor, or ASICS”—as well as algorithms represented in
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`multiple figures in the specification and described in the text of the specification. See Pl. Br. at 12.
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`At the hearing, Plaintiff referred to the specification discussing “a number of different formats,
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`different algorithms that could be performed on that competing structure to accomplish the claimed
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`function.” Hrg. Tr. at 72:18–20. But the parts of the specification Plaintiff identified are not
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`algorithms that a general-purpose computer can execute. For instance, Plaintiff identifies “the
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`algorithms of Figs. 2–3, 7–10,” as providing the structure for this means-plus-function term. Some
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`of these figures are reproduced below.
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`
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`These figures are merely flow charts describing other functions to be executed. At the hearing,
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`Plaintiff referred to these flow charts as representing “higher level” structures that provided
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`corresponding structure to the function, but it is unclear how a POSA would understand these flow
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`charts to provide any semblance of structure by which the claimed function is to be performed.
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`And the textual descriptions identified by Plaintiff fare no better. For instance, the excerpted
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`language from the specification at ’384 Patent depicted by Plaintiff at the Markman hearing and
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`referenced in its brief refers to “confidence measures” that “may be based on one or more
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`calculated parameters, including, but not limited to: a probability density function (PDF), a joint
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`PDF, Mahalanobis distance, distortion measure, ordered number parameter, timing advance (TA)
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`parameter, mobile orientation etc.” Ex. D at 8:34–38. As with the figures, these are not algorithms.
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`Because the intrinsic evidence therefore fails to disclose adequate corresponding structure to
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`perform the claimed function,” the term “positioning determining equipment” is indefinite. See
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`Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1351–52. Accordingly, the Court adopts the following construction.
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`Final Construction
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`Subject to 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6.
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`Function: “comparing said modified
`network measurement data with said
`database of calibration data”
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`Structure: Indefinite
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`E.
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`’753 Patent
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`The ’753 Patent involves purported improvements to routine and conventional methods of
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`geolocation using “grid points” based on calibration data. The purported improvement upon
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`conventional techniques is that the claimed invention uses calibration data to generate additional
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`grid points that could be selected from and used to determine the location of a mobile device.
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`Specifically, the ’753 Patent first provides a set of “calibration data” at specific “calibration points”
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`in a given region. Ex. E, 2:21–50. The system then generates one or more “grid points” from the
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`calibration data. Id. Using these grid points, the system determines the location of a mobile device.
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`1.
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`“network measurement report”
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`The fourth disputed term, “network measurement reports,” appears in claims 1, 7, and 32
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`of the ’753 Patent. The parties have proposed the following constructions:
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`Plaintiff’s Construction
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`“collection of data associated with a
`wireless communication network or
`mobile device”
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`Defendants’ Construction
`“a report used in cellular networks
`which provides the results of a
`measurement from a mobile device on
`one or more cells”
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`
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`Plaintiff argues that its definition tracks the purpose of the ’753 Patent—that the claimed
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`invention relates to the “problem of