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`Case No. 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB
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`ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
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`RAI STRATEGIC HOLDINGS, INC. AND
`R.J. REYNOLDS VAPOR COMPANY
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`Plaintiffs and
`Counterclaim Defendants,
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`v.
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`ALTRIA CLIENT SERVICES LLC; PHILIP
`MORRIS USA INC.; and PHILIP MORRIS
`PRODUCTS S.A.
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`Defendants and
`Counterclaim Plaintiffs.
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`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 977 Filed 02/11/22 Page 1 of 9 PageID# 27556
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
`ALEXANDRIA DIVISION
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`PMI/ALTRIA’S OPPOSITION TO RJR’S MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 6
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`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 977 Filed 02/11/22 Page 2 of 9 PageID# 27557
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Page
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`RJR’S MIL #6: PMI/Altria Should Be Allowed To Reference The Lack Of An Opinion
`Of Counsel And Legal Advice If RJR Opens The Door At Trial ........................................1
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`i
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`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 977 Filed 02/11/22 Page 3 of 9 PageID# 27558
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`CASES
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`Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Marvell Tech. Group, Ltd.,
`No. 09-cv-290, 2013 WL 4511293 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 23, 2013) ................................................... 3
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`Dentsply Sirona Inc. v. Edge Endo, LLC,
`No. 17-cv-1041, 2020 WL 6392764 (D.N.M. Nov. 2, 2020) ...................................................... 2
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`Hologic, Inc. v. Minerva Surgical, Inc.,
`No. 15-cv-1031, 2018 WL 3348998 (D. Del. July 9, 2018) ........................................................ 1
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`IUOE Local 324 Ret. Trust Fund v. LGC Global FM, LLC,
`No. 17-cv-13921, 2020 WL 6391622 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 2, 2020) .......................................... 3, 4
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`Pac. Biosciences of Cal., Inc. v. Oxford Nanopore Techs., Inc.,
`No. 17-cv-275, 2020 WL 954938 (D. Del. Feb. 27, 2020) ......................................................... 2
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`Steves & Sons, Inc. v. JELD-WEN, Inc.,
`No. 16-cv-545, 2018 WL 4171496 (E.D. Va. Aug. 30, 2018). ................................................... 4
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`TecSec v. Adobe Inc.,
`No. 10-cv-115, 2018 WL 11388472 (E.D. Va. Nov. 21, 2018) .................................................. 4
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`Ultratec, Inc. v. Sorenson Commc’ns, Inc.,
`No. 13-cv-346, 2014 WL 4976596 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 3, 2014) .................................................... 1
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`Visteon Global Techs., Inc. v. Garmin Int’l, Inc.,
`No. 10-cv-10578, 2016 WL 4396085 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 18, 2016) ............................................ 3
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`Whitesell Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp.,
`No. 05-cv-679, 2009 WL 3711608 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 3, 2009) ................................................. 4
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`STATUTES
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`35 U.S.C. § 298 ........................................................................................................................... 1, 4
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`RULES
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`FED. R. CIV. P. 26(e)(1)(A) ............................................................................................................. 3
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`FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c)(1) ....................................................................................................................4
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`ii
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`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 977 Filed 02/11/22 Page 4 of 9 PageID# 27559
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`RJR’S MIL #6: PMI/Altria Should Be Allowed To Reference The Lack Of An Opinion Of
`Counsel And Legal Advice If RJR Opens The Door At Trial
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`RJR seeks to preclude references to opinions of counsel under 35 U.S.C. § 298. But “[t]he
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`protection granted by 35 U.S.C. § 298 dissolves in the event [RJR] open[s] the door by attempting
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`to … imply[] that they relied on the advice of counsel.”1 Hologic, Inc. v. Minerva Surgical, Inc.,
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`No. 15-cv-1031, 2018 WL 3348998, at *2 (D. Del. July 9, 2018); Ultratec, Inc. v. Sorenson
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`Commc’ns, Inc., No. 13-cv-346, 2014 WL 4976596, at *2 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 3, 2014) (same). Here,
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`PMI/Altria does not intend to support its inducement or willfulness claims by relying on the lack
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`of advice of counsel, so long as RJR does not suggest at trial that it relied on legal advice, sought
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`or obtained an opinion of counsel, or otherwise had some good faith belief of non-infringement.
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`PMI/Altria explained its position to RJR, who refused to provide such confirmation and
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`seeks to have its fact witnesses provide testimony
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`.2 See
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`Ex. A. If RJR’s lawyers or witnesses make such a suggestion, PMI/Altria should be permitted to
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`raise RJR’s failure to obtain a competent legal opinion and to otherwise challenge the good-faith
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`basis and competency of any non-infringement opinions, lay or otherwise. For example, should
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`an RJR fact witness offer testimony that RJR had a good faith belief of non-infringement,
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`PMI/Altria should be able to challenge the competency of such opinion, including through cross-
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`examination that such witness is not a lawyer, is not competent to analyze infringement, and that
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`RJR never obtained any competent opinion from counsel, thus negating the purported “good faith”
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`of any such belief.
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`1 All emphasis added, and internal citations and quotation marks omitted, unless otherwise noted.
`2 RJR represents that “[t]he parties were unable to reach a resolution on these issues,” Dkt. 839 at
`2, but fails to inform the Court that RJR never proposed a stipulation or even followed up after
`PMI/Altria confirmed it would not rely on the lack of an opinion to prove inducement or
`willfulness at trial so long as RJR does not make arguments implying otherwise to the jury.
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`1
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`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 977 Filed 02/11/22 Page 5 of 9 PageID# 27560
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`RJR apparently intends to have its employees testify about
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`.
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`Dkt. 895-18 (6/24/21 Figlar Dep.) at 10:1-22, 11:1-13; Ex. B (6/24/21 Figlar Dep.) at 83:19-84:5
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` While these improper lay
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`opinions should be excluded for the reasons in PMI/Altria’s MIL #7, Dkt. 895 at 10-11, RJR should
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`not be permitted to “dress up” lay legal opinions of non-infringement as non-lawyer fact testimony
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`and leave PMI/Altria unable to rebut the competence or “good faith” of such lay opinions.
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`Allowing such implications, without allowing PMI/Altria to (i) explain to the jury that RJR never
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`sought or produced a competent legal opinion of counsel or (ii) test the bona fides of RJR’s
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`purported “good faith,” would present a serious risk that the jury would erroneously presume that
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`RJR had a competent “opinion” that it did not infringe. It would also hamstring PMI/Altria’s
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`ability to challenge RJR’s purported lay opinion by demonstrating that, if it truly had the courage
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`of those convictions, RJR would have obtained a legal opinion and waived privilege. Such a result
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`would be “manifestly unfair” to PMI/Altria. See Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 543 F.3d
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`683, 699 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“It would be manifestly unfair to allow opinion-of-counsel evidence to
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`serve an exculpatory function ... and yet not permit patentees to identify failures to procure such
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`advice as circumstantial evidence of intent to infringe.”). That is why courts allow patentees to
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`explore and expose the absence of a competent opinion of counsel in situations like this. See, e.g.,
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`Dentsply Sirona Inc. v. Edge Endo, LLC, No. 17-cv-1041, 2020 WL 6392764, at *5 (D.N.M. Nov.
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`2, 2020) (denying MIL and allowing plaintiff to argue that defendant had “an obligation to obtain
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`an opinion from counsel prior to launching the [accused product],” finding Section 298 did “not
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`apply” because “defendants have opened the door”); Pac. Biosciences of Cal., Inc. v. Oxford
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`Nanopore Techs., Inc., No. 17-cv-275, 2020 WL 954938, at *1 (D. Del. Feb. 27, 2020)
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`2
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`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 977 Filed 02/11/22 Page 6 of 9 PageID# 27561
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`(“[A]llow[ing] jurors to speculate about ONT receiving [legal] advice would open the door to
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`PacBio telling the jury that ONT withheld any legal advice.”).
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`None of RJR’s cited cases support permitting RJR to rely on the lay non-infringement
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`opinion of its employees while failing to obtain advice of counsel, without opening the door on
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`the absence of competent legal advice. Dkt. 839 at 2-6. Three of them (Carnegie Mellon, Visteon,
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`and McKesson) were decided under the abrogated Seagate test and do not address the admissibility
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`of evidence under Section 298. To the extent they are relevant, they support PMI/Altria. For
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`example, in Carnegie Mellon University v. Marvell Technology Group, Ltd., the court denied a
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`“motion for a new trial on the basis of advice of counsel arguments in [p]laintiff’s closing.” No.
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`09-cv-290, 2013 WL 4511293, at *8 & n.13 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 23, 2013). In Visteon Global
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`Technologies, Inc. v. Garmin International, Inc., the court allowed the patentee “to submit
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`evidence of [the] failure to provide an opinion of counsel at trial.” No. 10-cv-10578, 2016 WL
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`4396085, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 18, 2016). And all of RJR’s cited cases are inapt because, unlike
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`RJR, the defendants never implied they received legal advice or introduced improper lay opinion
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`testimony to support any good-faith belief of non-infringement. Accordingly, they all support
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`PMI/Altria’s position.
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`In a footnote, RJR suggests (without citation to law) that preclusion is also warranted
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`because PMI/Altria did not disclose the absence of an opinion of counsel in response to RJR’s
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`Interrogatory 8. Dkt. 839 at n.1. RJR is wrong. “According to the plain language of Rule 26(e),
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`a party need not supplement” an interrogatory response to identify information that “has otherwise
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`been made known to the other parties during the discovery process or in writing.” IUOE Local
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`324 Ret. Trust Fund v. LGC Global FM, LLC, No. 17-cv-13921, 2020 WL 6391622, at *7 (E.D.
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`Mich. Nov. 2, 2020) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(e)(1)(A)). Here, RJR admits that PMI/Altria
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`3
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`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 977 Filed 02/11/22 Page 7 of 9 PageID# 27562
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`disclosed the fact that RJR never produced an opinion of counsel both “during the discovery
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`process” and in writing. Dkt. 839 at 4. Accordingly, this argument fails. See TecSec v. Adobe
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`Inc., No. 10-cv-115, 2018 WL 11388472, at *9 (E.D. Va. Nov. 21, 2018) (finding failure to identify
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`witness in initial disclosures “is not fatal to calling him because his identity and knowledge were
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`made known to the other parties during the discovery process”) (citation omitted); Whitesell Corp.
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`v. Whirlpool Corp., No. 05-cv-679, 2009 WL 3711608, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 3, 2009) (finding
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`plaintiff was not required to disclose information in interrogatory response as defendant “became
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`aware” of the information in expert discovery); IUOE, 2020 WL 6391622, at *7. Moreover, any
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`alleged “non-disclosure” is harmless—RJR does not (and cannot) allege surprise or prejudice and
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`allowing PMI/Altria to present this evidence would not disrupt trial. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c)(1).
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`Instead, it would facilitate trial on the merits. See Steves & Sons, Inc. v. JELD-WEN, Inc., No. 16-
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`cv-545, 2018 WL 4171496, at *8-9 (E.D. Va. Aug. 30, 2018).
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`*****
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`To the extent RJR’s lay witnesses open the door at trial by testifying
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`, PMI/Altria should be
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`permitted to test the competence of that opinion/belief by cross-examining such RJR witnesses on
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`their failure to obtain or produce a competent legal opinion of counsel. The Court should also
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`preclude RJR from suggesting that it (i) is relying on legal advice; (ii) sought or obtained an
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`opinion of counsel; or (iii) had a good faith belief of non-infringement.3 Accordingly, RJR’s MIL
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`#6 should be denied.
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`3 Because Section 298 only addresses inducement and willfulness, the Court may rely on the lack
`of an opinion of counsel when deciding whether to enhance damages. 35 U.S.C. § 298.
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`4
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`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 977 Filed 02/11/22 Page 8 of 9 PageID# 27563
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`Dated: February 11, 2022
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`By: /s/ Maximilian A. Grant
`Maximilian A. Grant (VSB No. 91792)
`max.grant@lw.com
`Lawrence J. Gotts (VSB No. 25337)
`lawrence.gotts@lw.com
`Matthew J. Moore (pro hac vice)
`matthew.moore@lw.com
`Jamdie Underwood (pro hac vice)
`jamie.underwood@lw.com
`LATHAM & WATKINS LLP
`555 Eleventh Street, N.W., Suite 1000
`Washington, DC 20004
`Telephone: (202) 637-2200
`Facsimile: (202) 637-2201
`
`Clement J. Naples (pro hac vice)
`clement.naples@lw.com
`LATHAM & WATKINS LLP
`885 Third Avenue
`New York, NY 10022-4834
`Tel: (212) 906-1200; Fax: (212) 751-4864
`
`Gregory J. Sobolski (pro hac vice)
`greg.sobolski@lw.com
`LATHAM & WATKINS LLP
`505 Montgomery Street, Suite 2000
`San Francisco, CA 94111
`Telephone: (415) 391-0600
`Facsimile: (415) 395-8095
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`Brenda L. Danek (pro hac vice)
`brenda.danek@lw.com
`LATHAM & WATKINS LLP
`330 North Wabash Avenue, Suite 2800
`Chicago, IL 60611
`Tel: (312) 876-7700
`Fax: (312) 993-9767
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`Counsel for Plaintiffs Altria Client Services
`LLC, Philip Morris USA Inc., and Philip
`Morris Products S.A.
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`5
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`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 977 Filed 02/11/22 Page 9 of 9 PageID# 27564
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`I hereby certify that on this 11th day of February, 2022, a true and correct copy of the
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`foregoing was served using the Court’s CM/ECF filing system, with electronic notification of
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`such filing to all counsel of record.
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`
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`/s/ Maximilian A. Grant
`Maximilian A. Grant (VSB No. 91792)
` LATHAM & WATKINS LLP
`555 Eleventh Street, N.W., Suite 1000
`Washington, DC 20004
`Telephone: (202) 637-2200
`Facsimile: (202) 637-2201
`Email: max.grant@lw.com
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`Counsel for Plaintiffs Altria Client
`Services LLC, Philip Morris USA Inc.,
`and Philip Morris Products S.A.
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`6
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