Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 904 Filed 01/21/22 Page 1 of 14 PageID# 25490
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
`ALEXANDRIA DIVISION
`
`
`
`RAI STRATEGIC HOLDINGS, INC. AND R.J.
`REYNOLDS VAPOR COMPANY
`
`
`Plaintiffs and Counterclaim
`Defendants,
`
`
`v.
`
`ALTRIA CLIENT SERVICES LLC; PHILIP
`MORRIS USA, INC.; and PHILIP MORRIS
`PRODUCTS S.A.
`
`
`Defendants and Counterclaim
`Plaintiffs.
`
`Case No. 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB
`
`ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PMI/ALTRIA’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE OPINIONS OF
`RJR’S EXPERTS BASED ON REJECTED CLAIM CONSTRUCTIONS
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 904 Filed 01/21/22 Page 2 of 14 PageID# 25491
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1
`
`FACTUAL BACKGROUND ..............................................................................................1
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`D.
`
`’265 Patent ...............................................................................................................2
`
`’556 Patent ...............................................................................................................3
`
`’374 Patent ...............................................................................................................4
`
`’911 Patent. ..............................................................................................................5
`
`III.
`
`LEGAL STANDARD ..........................................................................................................6
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`Admissibility of Expert Testimony Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 ..............6
`
`Experts Must Apply The Court’s Claim Constructions ...........................................6
`
`IV.
`
`V.
`
`ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................................7
`
`CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................9
`
`
`
`
`
`i
`
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 904 Filed 01/21/22 Page 3 of 14 PageID# 25492
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`CASES
`
`Cordis Corp. v. Boston Sci. Corp.,
`658 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ................................................................................................... 6
`
`CytoLogix Corp. v. Ventana Med. Sys., Inc.,
`424 F.3d 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ............................................................................................... 6, 8
`
`Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc.,
`509 U.S. 579 (1993) .................................................................................................................... 6
`
`Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
`575 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ........................................................................................... 1, 6, 8
`
`Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,
`526 U.S. 137 (1999) .................................................................................................................... 6
`
`Liquid Dynamics Corp. v. Vaughan Co.,
`449 F.3d 1209 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ............................................................................................... 6, 7
`
`MarcTec, LLC v. Johnson & Johnson,
`664 F.3d 907 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ................................................................................................. 7, 9
`
`YETI Coolers, LLC v. RTIC Coolers, LLC,
`No. 15-cv-597, 2017 WL 404519 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 27, 2017) ..................................................... 7
`
`
`
`ii
`
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 904 Filed 01/21/22 Page 4 of 14 PageID# 25493
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`RJR’s experts should be precluded from relying on rejected claim constructions. During
`
`the claim construction process, RJR argued that several claim terms in the Asserted Patents should
`
`not be given their plain and ordinary meaning, and proposed constructions of the terms based on
`
`purported limitations and disclaimers from the specifications and file histories. See generally Dkt.
`
`223. In its November 24, 2020 claim construction order, the Court rejected RJR’s proposals,
`
`finding that the disputed terms “are all well known common English words” that should be “given
`
`their common meaning.” Dkt. 360. RJR’s technical experts, however, continue to rely on RJR’s
`
`rejected constructions under the pretext that RJR’s rejected constructions now are somehow the
`
`plain meaning. That is plainly false, contradicts what RJR argued during claim construction, and
`
`is an impermissible end run around the Court’s claim construction order. As the Federal Circuit
`
`has held, “[o]nce a district court has construed the relevant claim terms, and unless altered by the
`
`district court, then that legal determination governs for purposes of trial. No party may contradict
`
`the court’s construction to a jury.” Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1321
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2009). The Court should follow this controlling law and preclude RJR’s technical
`
`experts from misapplying the Court’s claim construction order to rely on RJR’s rejected
`
`constructions at trial.
`
`II.
`
`FACTUAL BACKGROUND
`
`During the claim construction process, RJR argued that the following terms required
`
`construction and, because of alleged disclaimers from the prosecution history and in the
`
`specification, should not be given their plain meaning:
`
`• “dimensions substantially as a cross-section of a cigarette or a cigar” (’265 Patent)
`
`• “provided in a vicinity of the opening of the housing” (’556 Patent)
`
`1
`
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 904 Filed 01/21/22 Page 5 of 14 PageID# 25494
`
`• “second capillary material . . . spaced apart from the opening by the first capillary material”
`(’556 Patent)
`• “detect a blowing action” (’374 Patent)
`
`• “capacitor consisting essentially of a flexible conductive membrane and a rigid conductive
`plate spaced apart by an insulating ring spacer . . . and an air dielectric between the flexible
`conductive membrane and the rigid conductive plate” (’374 Patent)
`
`• “at least one cavity in a wall of the aerosol-forming chamber” (’911 Patent)
`
`• “recessed in the wall of the aerosol-forming chamber” (’911 Patent)
`
`Dkt. 223 at 12-15, 19-21, 26-31, 33-40.
`
`The Court rejected RJR’s proposed constructions, holding that none of the disputed terms
`
`from the ’265, ’556, ’374, and ’911 Patents were subject to disclaimers or other restrictions on
`
`claim scope. Dkt. 360. As shown below, however, RJR continues to rely on its rejected
`
`constructions. The Court also declined to construe those terms, affording them their plain and
`
`ordinary meaning. See id.
`
`A.
`
`’265 Patent
`
`The ’265 Patent discloses a novel vaporizer device with a heater in the shape of a dual coil
`
`and/or sinuous line. See, e.g., Dkt. 199-1, ’265 Patent at cl. 1. During claim construction, RJR
`
`argued that the term “dimensions substantially as a cross-section of a cigarette or a cigar” should
`
`not be construed according to its plain meaning and is either indefinite or limited to “an essentially
`
`circular shape.” Dkt. 223 at 19. The Court rejected RJR’s proposed construction. Dkt. 360. Yet
`
`Dr. Suhling seeks to testify that “a POSITA would understand ‘dimensions substantially the same
`
`as a cross-section of a cigarette or cigar’ to define an essentially circular shape”—the very
`
`limitation that RJR tried to import and the Court rejected. Ex. 1 (Suhling Rbt.) ¶ 82; see also id.
`
`at ¶ 81 (opining that “‘dimensions substantially the same as a cross-section of a cigarette or cigar’
`
`are dimensions of a circle.”).
`
`2
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 904 Filed 01/21/22 Page 6 of 14 PageID# 25495
`
`B.
`
`’556 Patent
`
`The ’556 Patent discloses a vaporizer device with a unique arrangement of capillary
`
`materials. See, e.g., Dkt. 199-2, ’556 Patent at Abst. During claim construction, RJR argued that
`
`the term “opening” should be limited to “a passage or hole through which liquid aerosol-forming
`
`substrate can flow.” See, e.g., Dkt. 226 at 10-11. The Court rejected RJR’s proposed construction.
`
`Dkt. 360. Mr. Kodama now seeks to testify that the Accused Products (i.e., the VUSE Solo, Vibe,
`
`Ciro, and Alto e-vapor products) purportedly do not infringe because
`
`
`
`
`
` Ex. 2 (Kodama 556 Rbt.) ¶ 66.
`
`
`
`RJR also argued during claim construction that the term “spaced apart” in the ’556 patent
`
`should not be construed according to its plain meaning and, instead, should require the second
`
`capillary material to be “separated from the opening by a distance defined by the thickness of the
`
`first capillary material,” citing the discussion of a prior art reference called Dubief. Dkt. 309 at
`
`18, 20. The Court rejected RJR’s proposed construction. Dkt. 360. Mr. Kodama, however, seeks
`
`to testify that
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` Here,
`
`again, Mr. Kodama’s opinions rest on RJR’s erroneous and rejected construction preventing
`
`anything except a “first capillary material” to divide the “second capillary material” and
`
`“opening.”
`
`3
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 904 Filed 01/21/22 Page 7 of 14 PageID# 25496
`
`C.
`
`’374 Patent
`
`The ’374 Patent discloses an electronic vaping device including a novel puff detection
`
`mechanism. See e.g., Dkt. 194-2, ’374 Patent at cl. 1. During claim construction, RJR argued that
`
`the term “detect a blowing action” should be narrowly construed to mean “determine the presence
`
`of a blowing action.” Dkt. 223 at 38-39. RJR, however, withdrew that proposed construction,
`
`representing to the Court at the Markman hearing that RJR was “fine with the plain and ordinary
`
`meaning” of “detect.” Ex. 3 (Markman Hr’g Tr.) at 95:5-15 (representing that if PMI/Altria is
`
`“going to stand by the representations in their responsive claim construction brief that the device
`
`really does have to detect something, then we’re fine with the plain and ordinary meaning of the
`
`claim term[.]”).1 Based on RJR’s representation, the Court afforded the term “detect a blowing
`
`action” its plain and ordinary meaning. Id. at 97:12-13. Dr. Blalock, however, seeks to testify at
`
`trial that
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`RJR also argued that the “capacitor” limitation in the ’374 Patent should be construed to
`
`“exclud[e] any other layer or material between the membrane and the plate,” citing an alleged
`
`disclaimer in the prosecution history. Dkt. 223 at 35-37. The Court rejected this construction,
`
`finding that “[n]one of the terms were modified by a clear disclaimer in the prosecution.” Dkt.
`
`360 at 1. Dr. Blalock, however, contends that
`
`
`
`
`1 All emphases added unless noted otherwise.
`
`4
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 904 Filed 01/21/22 Page 8 of 14 PageID# 25497
`
`—transparently citing to the exact same portions of the file history
`
`that RJR relied on during claim construction to advance its rejected construction. Cf. Ex. 4
`
`
`
`(Blalock Rbt.) ¶¶ 103, 110-113 with Dkt. 223 at 35-37.
`
`D.
`
`’911 Patent.
`
` The ’911 Patent describes a leak prevention mechanism for electronic vaporizers. See
`
`Dkt. 199-3, ’911 Patent at Abstract. During claim construction, RJR sought to narrow various
`
`claim terms, including “at least one cavity in a wall of the aerosol-forming chamber” and “recessed
`
`in the wall of the aerosol-forming chamber,” based on purported disclaimers from the file history
`
`in relation to the Rose prior art reference. Dkt. 223 at 27, 30 (citing the discussion of “Rose” in
`
`the prosecution history). The Court rejected RJR’s proposed constructions. Dkt. 360 at 1. Yet
`
`Mr. Kodama now cites the same statements about Rose in the prosecution history to attempt to
`
`limit the same claim terms of the ’911 Patent, brazenly opining that
`
`
`
`79
`
`
`
`
`
` See, e.g., Ex. 5 (Kodama ’911 5/14 Rpt.) at ¶¶ 65-
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`; Ex. 5 (Kodama ’911 5/14 Rpt.) ¶¶ 47-56; see also Ex. 6
`
`(Kodama Dep.) at 154:8-155:6.
`
`***
`
`
`2 This opinion is also improper because it is a legal determination that must be made by the
`Court.
`
`5
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 904 Filed 01/21/22 Page 9 of 14 PageID# 25498
`
`Notwithstanding the above, RJR contends that it is justified in relying on its rejected
`
`proposed constructions because they are the plain meaning and supposedly consistent with the
`
`Court’s order giving the terms their plain and ordinary meaning. However, RJR’s experts are
`
`merely applying the Court’s rejected constructions, and thus, those opinions should be excluded.
`
`III. LEGAL STANDARD
`A.
`
`Admissibility of Expert Testimony Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702
`
`Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony. Rule 702 only
`
`permits expert testimony based on “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge” if it is
`
`reliable and “will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”
`
`Faced with the proffer of expert testimony, a court must determine “whether the expert is proposing
`
`to testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine
`
`a fact in issue.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993); see also Kumho
`
`Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999). This determination requires assessing whether
`
`the expert’s testimony is “scientifically valid.” Id. RJR, as the party offering the testimony, has
`
`the burden to show that its expert’s testimony is admissible. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
`
`B.
`
`Experts Must Apply The Court’s Claim Constructions
`
`Parties and their experts must apply the Court’s constructions of disputed claim terms. See
`
`Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1321. The Federal Circuit has repeatedly held that where—as here—an
`
`expert’s testimony is based on an “incorrect understanding of the claim construction,” the Court
`
`“must disregard the testimony.” Cordis Corp. v. Boston Sci. Corp., 658 F.3d 1347, 1357 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2011); see also, e.g., Liquid Dynamics Corp. v. Vaughan Co., 449 F.3d 1209, 1224 n.2 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2006) (affirming exclusion of expert testimony because it “was based on an impermissible claim
`
`construction”); CytoLogix Corp. v. Ventana Med. Sys., Inc., 424 F.3d 1168, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
`
`(“The risk of confusing the jury is high when experts opine on claim construction before the
`
`6
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 904 Filed 01/21/22 Page 10 of 14 PageID# 25499
`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 904 Filed 01/21/22 Page 10 of 14 PagelD# 25499
`
`jury[.]”); MarcTec, LLC v. Johnson & Johnson, 664 F.3d 907, 913 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (explaining
`
`that “expert testimonyto the contrary ignor[ing] the court’s claim construction ‘is irrelevant to the
`
`question of infringement’ and is inadmissible under Daubert’); LiquidDynamics, 449 F.3d at 1224
`
`n.2 (affirming exclusion of expert testimony as irrelevant where it was based on an impermissible
`
`claim construction). Other Courts are in accord. YETI Coolers, LLC v. RTIC Coolers, LLC, No.
`
`15-cv-597, 2017 WL 404519, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 27, 2017) (finding an “attempt to have [the
`
`expert] ‘explain’ the plain and ordinary meaningof claim terms is a rather poorly disguised attempt
`
`to offer the jury constructions different from the Court’s” that is a “blatant attempt to ‘back door’
`
`[the] rejected claim construction into the trial, and is wholly inappropriate.”).
`
`IV.
`
`ARGUMENT
`
`RJR’s technical experts, Dr. Suhling, Mr. Kodama and Dr. Blalock, seek to present non-
`
`infringementpositionsattrial that are contrary to the Court’s claim construction order. See supra
`
`§ Il. As shown in the chart below, these opinions are improper and should be excluded.
`
`RJR’s Rejected Claim
`Construction
`
`
`RJR’s Expert’s Opinion
`
`
`
`
`
`556
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`“dimensions substantially as a cross- would—understand“[A] POSITA
`
`section of a cigarette or a cigar” is
`‘dimensions substantially the same as a
`
`"265 either indefinite or limited to “an|cross-section of a cigarette or cigar’ to
`
`
`essentiallycircular shape.” Dkt. 223|define an essentially circular shape.” Ex.
`
`at 19.
`1 (Suhling Rbt.) § 82.
`
`
`
`“opening” means “a passage or hole
`
`liquid aerosol-
`through which
`forming substrate can flow.” Dkt.
`
`226 at 11.
` The second capillary material must
`
`be “separated from the opening by a
`
`distance ‘defined by’ the thickness of
`
`the first capillary material.” Dkt. 226
`at 14-15.
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 904 Filed 01/21/22 Page 11 of 14 PageID# 25500
`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 904 Filed 01/21/22 Page 11 of 14 PagelD# 25500
`
`
`
`
`
`°374
`
`374
`
`
`
`“detect a blowing action” means
`“determine the presence of a blowing
`action” Dkt. 223 at 38-39.
`
`“any other
`excludes
`“capacitor”
`layer or material between
`the
`membraneandthe plate.” Dkt. 223
`at 35-37.
`
`With respect to the ?911 Patent, RJR’s expert intends to testify to the jury that PMP
`
`allegedly disclaimed claim scope during prosecution of the ’911 Patent based on statements
`
`concerning the Rose reference. Kodama ’911 5/14 Rpt. at §§ 47-56, 65-79. But RJR made the
`
`same disclaimer arguments based on the same reference during claim construction, which the
`
`Court rejected because “/njone of the terms were modified by a clear disclaimer in the
`
`prosecution” Dkt. 360.
`
`At bottom, RJR’s attempt to have its expert present opinions that are inconsistent with the
`
`Court’s claim construction orderflouts controlling law holding that “[n]o party may contradict the
`
`court’s construction to a jury.” Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1321. Such opinions are unreliable,
`
`unhelpful, and risk confusing and misleading the jury into deciding infringement and validity
`
`issues based on an incorrect understanding of the scope of the asserted claims. CyfoLogix, 424
`
`3 RJR’s experttries to hide the fact that he is simply applyingthe rejected construction by arguing
`that “there are multiple components, other than the first capillary material” in the space, but at
`bottom, he is simply applying RJR’s rejected construction, notably relying on the same purported
`“disclaimer”in the file history that the Court determined wasnota disclaimer.
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 904 Filed 01/21/22 Page 12 of 14 PageID# 25501
`
`F.3d at 1172 (“The risk of confusing the jury is high when experts opine on claim construction
`
`before the jury.”). They are inadmissible and should be excluded. See MarcTec, LLC, 664 F.3d
`
`at 913 (“[E]xpert testimony to the contrary ignor[ing] the court’s claim construction ‘is irrelevant
`
`to the question of infringement’ and is inadmissible under Daubert.”).
`
`V.
`
`CONCLUSION
`
`PMI/Altria respectfully request that the Court exclude the portions of the reports and
`
`testimony of Dr. Suhling, Mr. Kodama and Dr. Blalock that are inconsistent with the Court’s
`
`constructions.
`
`
`
`Dated: January 21, 2022
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`By: /s/ Maximilian A. Grant
`Maximilian A. Grant (VSB No. 91792)
`(max.grant@lw.com)
`Matthew J. Moore (pro hac vice)
`matthew.moore@lw.com
`Latham & Watkins LLP
`555 Eleventh Street, N.W., Suite 1000
`Washington, DC 20004
`Telephone: (202) 637-2200
`Facsimile: (202) 637-2201
`
`Clement J. Naples (pro hac vice)
`clement.naples@lw.com
`LATHAM & WATKINS LLP
`885 Third Avenue
`New York, NY 10022-4834
`Tel: (212) 906-1200; Fax: (212) 751-4864
`
`Gregory J. Sobolski (pro hac vice)
`greg.sobolski@lw.com
`Latham & Watkins LLP
`505 Montgomery Street, Suite 2000
`San Francisco, CA 94111
`Telephone: (415) 391-0600
`Facsimile: (415) 395-8095
`
`Brenda L. Danek (pro hac vice)
`brenda.danek@lw.com
`
`9
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 904 Filed 01/21/22 Page 13 of 14 PageID# 25502
`
`LATHAM & WATKINS LLP
`330 North Wabash Avenue, Suite 2800
`Chicago, IL 60611
`Tel: (312) 876-7700; Fax: (312) 993-9767
`
`Counsel for Defendants Altria Client Services LLC,
`Philip Morris USA Inc., and Philip Morris Products
`S.A.
`
`
`
`10
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00393-LO-TCB Document 904 Filed 01/21/22 Page 14 of 14 PageID# 25503
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`
`
`I hereby certify that on this 21st day of January, 2022, a true and correct copy of the
`
`foregoing was served using the Court’s CM/ECF system, with electronic notification of such
`
`filing to all counsel of record:
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`/s/ Maximilian A. Grant
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Maximilian A. Grant (VSB No. 91792)
`LATHAM & WATKINS LLP
`555 Eleventh Street, N.W., Suite 1000
`Washington, DC 20004
`Telephone: (202) 637-2200
`Facsimile: (202) 637-2201
`Email: max.grant@lw.com
`
`Counsel for Defendants Altria Client
`Services LLC, Philip Morris USA Inc., and
`Philip Morris Products S.A.
`
`
`
`11
`
`