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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
`Alexandria Division
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`MTI ENTERPRISES INC.
`d/b/a MUSIC THEATRE INTERNATIONAL
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`and
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`MUSIC THEATRE INTERNATIONAL, LLC
`d/b/a MUSIC THEATRE INTERNATIONAL
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`Plaintiffs,
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`V.
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`THEATERPALOOZA COMMUNITY
`THEATER PRODUCTIONS, INC.
`d/b/a THEATERPALOOZA
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`Defendant.
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`Case No. l:18-cv-650 (TSE/IDD)
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`REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
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`This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Default Judgment from MTI
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`Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Music Theatre International and Music Theatre International, LLC d/b/a
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`Music Theatre International against Theaterpalooza Community Theater Productions, Inc., d/b/a
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`Theaterpalooza pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2). (Dkt. No. 12).
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`After a licensed attorney for Defendant failed to appear at the hearing on August 10,
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`2018, the undersigned Magistrate Judge took this matter under advisement to issue this Report
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`and Recommendation. Upon consideration of the Complaint, Plaintiffs' Motion for Default
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`Judgment and the memorandum thereto, the undersigned Magistrate Judge makes the following
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`findings and recommends that default judgment be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part
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`against Defendant.
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`

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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
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`On June 1, 2018, Plaintiffs filed this action under Sections 106 and 501 of the Copyright
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`Act of the United States as amended, 17 U.S.C. §§ 106 and 501, alleging copyright infringement.
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`(Compl. ii 11). Plaintiffs allege that Defendant infringed and will infringe on the copyrights for
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`various musical plays in which Plaintiffs have exclusive licensing rights.
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`(Compl.
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`ii 36).
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`Defendant failed to submit responsive pleadings and did not appear at the August 10, 2018
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`hearing on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment. (Dkt. No. 14). Plaintiffs seek a money
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`judgment awarding maximum statutory damages, a permanent injunction, and attomey’s fees
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`and costs. (Dkt. No. 12 at 10).
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`A. Jurisdiction and Venue
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`For a court to render default judgment over a party, it must have subject matter and
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`personal jurisdiction over the party and be the appropriate venue for the action. This Court has
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`subject matter jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because this case arises
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`under federal law, the Copyright Act. (Compl. 111] 8-9). This Court has personal jurisdiction over
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`Defendant because Defendant regularly conducts business in the Commonwealth of Virginia, the
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`infringing acts took place in the Commonwealth of Virginia, and Plaintiffs suffered infringement
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`injury in the Commonwealth of Virginia. (Compl. {I 10). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2),
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`venue is proper in this District because a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims
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`occurred in this District. (Compl. 1H] 7, 11, 22). Therefore, the undersigned recommends a
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`finding that jurisdiction and venue are proper with respect to the Defendant in this action.
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`B. Service of Process
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`Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(h) governs service upon corporations, partnerships,
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`and other unincorporated associations and allows service by following state law where the
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`district court is located. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1)(A). On June 26, 2018, a private process
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`server served Teresa Walker, registered agent for Defendant, by delivering a copy of the
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`Summons and Verified Complaint to 44611 Guilford Drive, #155, Ashbum, Virginia 20147.
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`(Dkt. No. 8). Therefore, properly served Defendant with process.
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`C. Grounds for Default
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`Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on June 1, 2018. (Dkt. No. 1). Defendant failed to appear,
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`answer, or file any responsive pleading in this matter. On July 25, 2018, the Clerk entered default
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`against Defendant upon Plaintiffs’ Request for Entry of Default. (Dkt. Nos. 9-10). On August 1,
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`2018, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Default Judgment, and the Court held a hearing on the matter
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`on August 10, 2018. (Dkt. Nos. 12, 14). After Defendant failed to appear at the August 10, 2018
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`hearing, the undersigned Magistrate Judge took this matter under advisement to issue this Report
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`and Recommendation.
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`11.
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`FACTUAL FINDINGS
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`The undersigned Magistrate Judge makes the following findings of fact based on the
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`Complaint, the Motion for Default Judgment, and memorandum in support thereof.1 Plaintiff
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`MTI Enterprises, Inc. (“MTI”), is a musical licensing agency incorporated in New York. (Compl.
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`11 6). Plaintiff Musical Theatre International, LLC is an affiliate of Plaintiff MTI organized in
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`Delaware.
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`(1d,). Collectively, pursuant
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`to Representation Agreements, Plaintiffs have the
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`exclusive right to license performances of copyrighted musicals, such as Annie, Mama Mia!, and
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`Hairspray. (Compl. 1111 12-21). For small scale amateur productions, Plaintiff MTI charges a
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`licensing fee and materials rental charge ranging from $1,500 to $2,500 per production,
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`1 Because Defendant failed to answer Plaintiffs’ Complaint, Defendant admits Plaintiffs’ factual allegations. Fed R.
`Civ. P. 8(b)(6) (“An allegation—other than one relating to the amount of damages—is admitted if a responsive
`pleading is required and the allegation is not denied”); see also GlobalSamaFe Corp. v. Globalsanlafe.com, 250 F.
`Supp. 2d 610, 612 n.3 (ED. Va. 2003) (“Upon default, facts alleged in the complaint are deemed admitted and the
`appropriate inquiry is whether the facts alleged state a claim”).
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`

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`depending on variables including the number of performances, seats per performance, and
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`amount of admission fees charged for each performance. (Compl. 1H] 15, 18, 21).
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`Defendant, a non-profit Florida corporation, offers children musical theater classes and
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`camps in Ashburn, Virginia, Leesburg, Virginia, and Hagerstown, Maryland. (Compl. 1111 7, 22).
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`Defendant offers after school programs, acting classes, and theater camps, and charges tuition
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`fess up to $600 per child. (Compl. 111] 22, 32). Defendant presents numerous musical theater
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`productions and charges an admission fee of $15 for adults and $12 for children. (Compl. 1111 7,
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`32). Plaintiffs allege that many of Defendant’s musical productions are copyright protected and
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`were performed without a license or authorization, in violation of the Copyright Act. (Compl. 1[
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`23). Prior to filing this pending suit, Plaintiffs attempted to stop Defendant from infringing on its
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`copyrighted musicals by sending Defendant multiple notices informing Defendant of its unlawful
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`activity. (Compl. W 27-31).
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`As early as January 12, 2015, Plaintiff MTI contacted Ms. Walker, owner and principal
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`for Defendant, and informed her that Defendant was infringing on Plaintiffs’ copyrighted work
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`of Mary Poppins and demanded a halt of the performance until a license was obtained. (Compl. 1]
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`27). Ms. Walker responded on the same day and claimed that Defendant was not using any
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`copyrighted materials and that a payment would be made for Mary Poppins. (1d). Plaintiff MTI
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`did not receive a payment for the unauthorized productions of Mary Poppins. (Id).
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`On April 13, 2015, Plaintiff MTI then sent a follow up notice repeating its earlier demand
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`with respect to Defendant’s infringing use of copyrighted works and the outstanding balance of
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`$1,110.00 for Defendant’s Mary Poppins production. (Id. ). Plaintiffs did not receive a payment.
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`(101). On December 1, 2016, Plaintiff MTI sent another notice reiterating the same demands.
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`(Compl.
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`11 28). Despite these notices,
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`in the summer of 2016, Defendant presented an
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`unauthorized production ofAnnie as part of its summer camp. (Compl. 11 24).
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`In February, March, and April of 2017, Plaintiff MTI received notices from customers
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`that Defendant was continuing to advertise and promote unlicensed shows. (Compl.
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`11 29).
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`Accordingly, on May 15, 2017, Plaintiff MTI sent a demand by e-mail and Federal Express
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`indicating that such performances cannot be presented without a valid performance license.
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`(Compl. 1] 29; Compl. Ex. T). On December 12, 2017, Plaintiffs’ legal counsel sent Defendant
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`another letter informing her of the infringements and that the payment of $1,110.00 for Mary
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`Poppins was still outstanding. (Compl. 11 30; Compl. Ex. U). Ms. Walker did not respond to this
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`letter despite being requested to do so. (Compl. 1] 30). Plaintiffs’ legal counsel contacted Ms.
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`Walker again on January 18, 2018, and demanded a response by February 1, 2018. (Compl. 1]
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`31). Ms. Walker did not respond. (Compl. fl 31). In the spring of 2018, Defendant presented a
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`production ofAnnie. (Compl. 11 25).
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`On July 17, 2018, two media reports were published in Loudoun County detailing the
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`pending lawsuit. (Dkt. No. 16 Ex. A-B). In the Loudoun Now publication, Ms. Walker stated that
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`Defendant had “been in talks” with Plaintiffs. (Dkt. No. 16 Ex. A). In the Loudoun Times Mirror
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`publication, Ms. Walker stated, Defendant “has been working with MTI’s attorneys for several
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`weeks to resolve the issue.” (Dkt. No. 16 Ex. B). On July 24, 2018, Ms. Walker sent an email to
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`Defendant’s clients and acknowledged that
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`there is a pending suit against Defendant and
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`admitted that money was owed to Plaintiffs. (Dkt. No. 16 Ex. C). During this time, Defendant
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`advertised unlicensed performances, the most recent being Annie, Mamma Mia!, and Hairspray
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`for July and August 2018. (Compl. 11 32).
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`III.
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`EVALUATION OF PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT
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`Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the entry of default
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`judgment when “a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to
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`plead or otherwise defend.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). A defendant in default concedes the factual
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`allegations of the complaint. See, e.g., DIRECTV, Inc. v. Rawlz'ns, 523 F.3d 318, 322, n.2 (4th
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`Cir. 2008); Partington v. Am. Int ’1 Specialty Lines Ins. C0., 443 F .3d 334, 341 (4th Cir. 2006);
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`Ryan v. Homecomings Fin. Network, 253 F.3d 778, 780 (4th Cir. 2001). Default does not,
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`however, constitute an admission of the adversary’s conclusions of law and is not to be “treated
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`as an absolute confession by the defendant of his liability and of the plaintiffs right to recover.”
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`Ryan, 253 F.3d at 780 (quoting Nishimatsu Constr. Co., Ltd. v. Hous. Nat ’1 Bank, 515 F.2d 1200,
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`1206 (5th Cir. 1975)).
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`Instead, the Court must “determine whether the well—pleaded allegations
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`in [the plaintiffs] complaint support the relief sought in [the] action.” Id.
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`Thus,
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`in issuing this Report and Recommendation, the undersigned Magistrate Judge
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`must evaluate Plaintiffs’ claims against the standards of Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of
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`Civil Procedure to ensure that the Complaint contains plausible claims upon which relief may be
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`granted. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining the analysis for examining a
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`plaintiff’s claims under a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss). To meet this standard, a complaint must
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`set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on
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`its face.” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In determining
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`whether allegations are plausible, the reviewing court may draw on context, judicial experience,
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`and common sense. Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Iqbal, 556
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`U.S. at 679).
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`A. Copyright Infringement
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`Plaintiffs assert a claim of willful copyright infringement against Defendant in violation
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`of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 106 and 501. The Copyright Act allows a copyright owner
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`the “exclusive rights to do and to authorize .
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`.
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`. in the case of .
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`.
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`. musical. .
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`. works, to perform
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`the copyrighted work publicly. .
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`. .” 17 U.S.C. § 106(4). The Copyright Act further provides that
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`anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner is an infringer. 17 U.S.C.
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`§ 501(a). To establish copyright infringement, a plaintiff must prove two things: (1) ownership of
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`a valid copyright and (2) that the defendant copied original elements of the copyrighted work.
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`Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv., C0., 499 US. 340, 361 (1991). A court may determine
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`willfiil infringement from evidence indicating a defendant received notice informing him that a
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`particular material was protected. See Superior Form Builders. Inc. v. Dan Chase Taxidermy
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`Supply Co., 74 F.3d 488, 496 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing to Video Views, Inc. v. Studio 2], Ltd. 925
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`F.2d 1010, 1021 (7th Cir. 1991)). Generally, a prevailing party is entitled to remedies including
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`final injunctions and monetary damages. 17 U.S.C. §§ 502, 504.
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`1. Ownership of Valid Copyright
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`Pursuant
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`to Representation Agreements,
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`the authors of Annie, Mamma Mia], and
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`Hairspray granted Plaintiffs the exclusive right to license the performances of these works.
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`(Compl. 11 12—21). Furthermore, Plaintiffs are presumed to have valid copyrights because the
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`copyrights for Annie, Mamma Mia], and Hairspray musicals are registered with the United
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`States Copyright Office. (Compl. Ex. A—C); see 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (stating that a certificate of
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`registration is “prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright”); Sari v. Am. ’s Home Place,
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`Inc., 129 F. Supp. 3d 317, 326 (ED. Va. 2015) (stating that a copyright registration creates a
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`presumption of a valid copyright and shifts the burden to the defendant to rebut (citing Universal
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`Furniture Int ’1, Inc. v. Collezione Europa USA, Inc, 618 F.3d 417, 428 (4th Cir. 2010))). By
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`failing to answer the Complaint, Defendant has failed to rebut the presumption that Plaintiffs
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`own valid copyrights for Annie, Mamma Mia!, and Hairspray. Therefore,
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`the undersigned
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`concludes that Plaintiffs own valid copyrights for Annie, Mamma Mia!, and Hairspray.
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`2.
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`Infringement
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`Plaintiffs allege that Defendant
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`infringed on Plaintiffs’ copyrights by performing
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`unlicensed versions of Annie as part of its spring and summer theater camps in 2016 and 2018.
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`(Compl.
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`‘11 24—25). Further, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant advertised and promoted
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`performances of Annie, Mamma Mia!, and Hairspray for the summer of 2018. (Compl. 'll 32).
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`Plaintiffs maintain that Defendant did not obtain a performance license or pay a licensing fee for
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`the right to present such productions. (Compl. 11 33). Therefore, Defendant’s conduct constitutes
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`copyright
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`infringement because Defendant publicly performed and promoted future
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`performances of Plaintiffs’ copyrighted material without authorization. The undersigned
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`Magistrate Judge finds that Defendant infringed on Plaintiffs’ copyrights.
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`3. Willful
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`Plaintiffs allege that Defendant’s infringing conduct was willful because Defendant was
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`aware of Plaintiffs’ copyrights. (Dkt. No. 12 at 9). An infringement is willful if the defendant has
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`actual knowledge of the infringement and disregards the copyright owner’s rights. Lyons P ’ship,
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`L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc, 243 F.3d 789, 799 (4th Cir. 2001). “[E]vidence that notice has
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`been accorded to the defendants before the specific facts found to have constituted infringement
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`occurred is perhaps the most persuasive evidence of willfulness.” Superior Form Builders. Inc,
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`74 F.3d at 496. Here, Defendant’s infringement was willful because it had actual knowledge of
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`the infringement and disregarded Plaintiffs’ copyrights.
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`Defendant had actual knowledge of the copyright infringement because not only did
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`Defendant reply to Plaintiffs’ first notice on January 12, 2015, but it also recently commented on
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`the pending lawsuit to the media and Defendant’s clients. In Defendant’s reply e-mail (“Reply E-
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`mail”) to Plaintiffs’ January 12, 2015 notice, Ms. Walker stated, “[w]e had no idea that this is
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`illegal,” and that Defendant would pay the outstanding amount due for Mary Poppins. (Compl.
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`Ex. R). Years later, even though Plaintiffs received no response after the Reply E-mail, Ms.
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`Walker told Loudoun County reporters that she is “in talks with the [Plaintiffs],” and “she has
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`been working with MTI’s attorneys for several weeks to resolve the issue.” (Dkt. No. 16 Ex. A,
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`B). Those statements are untrue. In Ms. Walker’s recent e—mail to her community, she admitted
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`that Defendant is being sued. (Dkt. No. 16 Ex. C). As early as January 12, 2015, Defendant was
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`aware of Plaintiffs’ copyrights and that it was infringing on those rights. Defendant disregarded
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`those rights and continued to perform and advertise copyrighted material. Thus, the undersigned
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`Magistrate Judge finds that Defendant willfully infringed on Plaintiffs’ protected works.
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`IV. REQUESTED RELIEF
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`Plaintiffs request relief for willful copyright
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`infringement. (Compl.
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`1] 42). Plaintiffs
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`request the maximum statutory relief for the registered copyrighted works of Annie, Mama Mia!,
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`and Hairspray, as well as a permanent injunction to prevent further infringement and irreparable
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`harm of Plaintiffs’ copyrights and Plaintiffs themselves. (Dkt. No. 12, at 10). Plaintiffs also
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`request attorney’s fees and costs. (Id).
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`A.
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`Statutory Damages
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`Under
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`the Copyright Act, Plaintiffs may recover
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`statutory damages for willful
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`infringement in an amount between $750 and $150,000 “for any one work.
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`.
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`.
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`.” 17 U.S.C. §
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`504(c)(1)—(2). In the instant action, Plaintiffs have elected to pursue the maximum statutory
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`award for willfiil infringement. (Dkt. No. 12, at 10). As the Court previously found Defendant’s
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`acts were willful, Plaintiffs are entitled to a statutory award for willful infringement.
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`Courts in the Fourth Circuit have wide discretion in determining the appropriate statutory
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`award, particularly where the infringement is willful. Graduate Mgmt. Admission Council v. Lei
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`Shi, No. 1:07cv605 (LMB/BRP), 2008 US. Dist. LEXIS 1621, at *3 (ED. Va. Jan. 7, 2008). In
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`determining the appropriate statutory award, courts consider deterrence of the wrongful conduct.
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`See F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, 344 US. 228, 233 (1952) (“The statutory rule .
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`.
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`. is designed to discourage wrongful conduct”). Courts also consider evidence of the following:
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`a history of copyright
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`infringement; whether defendants are impervious to deterrence or
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`rehabilitation; defendant’s knowledge of copyright laws, any misleading or false statements; or
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`evidence that defendants knew of their infringing conduct and disregarded the copyright owner’s
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`rights. Superior Form Builders, Inc., 74 F.3d at 496. Here, as expressed above, Defendant had
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`actual knowledge of its infringing conduct and disregarded Plaintiffs’ exclusive rights. Instead of
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`attempting to resolve the issue, Defendant continued to advertise and promote Plaintiffs’
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`copyrighted works.
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`(Compl.
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`fil 32).
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`In addition, Defendant essentially ignored Plaintiffs’
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`numerous notices of infringement. Defendant also provided misleading and false statements to
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`Loudoun County newspapers concerning its efforts to resolve the issue with Plaintiffs. The
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`complete disregard of Plaintiffs’ copyright rights supports a significant monetary award to deter
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`Defendant’s infringing conduct in the future. Accordingly, the undersigned Magistrate Judge
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`finds Defendant liable for the maximum statutory award for Annie, Mama Mia!, and Hairspray,
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`in the amount of $450,000.
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`10
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`B.
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`Permanent Injunction
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`This Court has jurisdiction under the Copyright Act to grant a permanent injunction. 17
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`U.S.C. § 502(a). For a court to grant a permanent injunction, the plaintiff must satisfy the four-
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`factor test by demonstrating that: (1) it suffered an irreparable injury; (2) monetary damages are
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`inadequate; (3) the balance of hardships favor the injunction; and (4) the public interest is not
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`disserved by the injunction. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 US. 388, 391 (2006). The
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`decision to grant or deny a permanent injunction is within the “equitable discretion” of the court.
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`Id.
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`1.
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`Irreparable Injm and Adequacy of Moneta_ry Damages
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`Irreparable injury is often a natural consequence of copyright infringement and it merges
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`with the inquiry of whether legal remedies are adequate. Tattoo Art, Inc. v. TAT Int ’1, LLC, 794
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`F. Supp. 2d 634, 660 (ED. Va. 2011) (internal citations omitted); see Christopher Phelps &
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`Assocs. v. Galloway, 492 F.3d 532, 544 (4th Cir. 2007) (stating that irreparable injury can result
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`from the fact
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`that monetary damages are difficult
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`to calculate). Defendant completely
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`disregarded Plaintiffs’ copyrights through its continuous advertisements and promotions of
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`Annie, Mama Mia!, and Hairspray despite numerous cease and desist letters. (Compl. W 27-29,
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`31-32). Accordingly, Plaintiffs have suffered irreparable harm and monetary damages are
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`inadequate.
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`2. Balance of Hardships and Public Interest
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`Plaintiffs have been irreparably harmed by Defendant’s copyright
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`infringements and
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`monetary damages are insufficient to compensate for the injury; Defendant’s unlawful conduct,
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`on the other hand, garners no support. See Splitfish AG v. Bannco Corp, 727 F. Supp. 2d 461,
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`468 (ED. Va. 2010) (finding that the balance of hardships was in plaintiff’s favor even though
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`11
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`an injunction would destroy defendants’ business). Accordingly, the balance of hardships favors
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`the injunction, particularly in a case like the one at bar where Defendant continues to infringe on
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`protected work despite having received multiple notices.
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`Public interest is also served by granting a permanent injunction. Under the Copyright
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`Act, it is in the public interest to uphold the exclusive rights of the copyright owner. Splitfist AG,
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`727 F. Supp. 2d at 469. Therefore,
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`the public interest
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`is not served by permitting further
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`copyright infringement. Accordingly, the undersigned Magistrate Judge finds it appropriate to
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`award a permanent injunction against Defendant.
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`C.
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`Attorney’s Fees
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`The Copyright Act provides that
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`the court may allow the recovery of reasonable
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`attomey’s fees and costs. 17 U.S.C. § 505; see Robinson v. Equifax Info Serv., LLC, 560 F.3d
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`235, 243 (4th Cir. 2009) (outlining a three step framework to calculate reasonable attorney’s
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`fees). Plaintiffs request attomey’s fees in the amount of $70,759.72. (Dkt. No. 16 at 3-4). In
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`support of its request, Plaintiffs submitted an affidavit of Edwin Komen, a partner at Sheppard,
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`Mullin, Richter & Hampton, LLP, who is responsible for overseeing the billing of this case.
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`(Dkt. No. 16). Although his affidavit details the work performed in connection with this case and
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`states the hourly rate for the attorneys of record in the case, the attorneys of record did not
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`submit their own affidavit indicating that their hourly rates coincide with the prevailing market
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`rate in the relevant community. See Grissom v. Mills Corp, 549 F.3d 313, 321 (4th Cir. 2008)
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`(“The fee applicant bears the burden of proving the reasonableness of the hours expended and
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`the requested hourly rates, which generally requires submission of the attorney's own affidavit
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`and timesheets as well as ‘satisfactory specific evidence of the prevailing market rates in the
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`relevant community for the type of work for which [the attorney] seeks an award.” (quoting
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`12
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`Plyler v. Evatt, 902 F.2d 273, 277 (4th Cir. 1990))); Crump v. United States Dep ’t of Navy, 245
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`F.Supp. 3d 692, 699 (ED. Va. 2017) (pointing to the twelve factors outlined by Johnson v.
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`Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974) to determine whether the amount
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`requested for attorney’s fees is a reasonable rate and reasonable number of hours expended).
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`Without such information, the Court cannot make a reasonableness determination. Upon review
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`of the affidavit and having insufficient evidence to determine the reasonableness of the amount
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`of attorney’s fees requested,
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`the undersigned recommends denying Plaintiffs’
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`request for
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`attorney’s fees. In the alternative, the undersigned recommends a reduction in the attorney’s fees
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`to a range of $50,000 to $60,000.
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`Plaintiff also requests costs of this litigation in the amount of $1,532.72. Based on the
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`affidavit submitted, sufficient detail was provided as to how the amount was derived. (Dkt. No.
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`16 Ex. 2 at 9). Therefore, the undersigned recommends awarding Plaintiffs’ costs.
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`I.
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`RECOMMENDATION
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`The undersigned Magistrate Judge recommends entry of default judgment in favor of
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`Plaintiffs and against Defendant for willful copyright infringement. Plaintiffs are entitled to a
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`maximum statutory award for Annie, Mama Mia!, and Hairspray, in the amount of $450,000.
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`Plaintiffs are also entitled to a permanent injunction, enjoining Defendant from further infringing
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`on their exclusive copyrights and trademark rights. Due to insufficient support for attorney’s
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`fees, Plaintiff is either not entitled to attorney’s fees or entitled to a reduction in the fees
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`requested. The Plaintiffs, however, may recover costs in the amount of $1,532.72.
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`11.
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`NOTICE
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`By mailing copies of this Report and Recommendation, the parties are notified as
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`follows. Objections to this Report and Recommendation, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and
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`13
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`Case 1:18-cv-00650-TSE-IDD Document 17 Filed 12/07/18 Page 14 of 14 PageID# 492
`Case 1:18-cv-00650-TSE-IDD Document 17 Filed 12/07/18 Page 14 of 14 Page|D# 492
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`Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, must be filed within fourteen (14) days
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`of service on you of this Report and Recommendation. A failure to file timely objections to
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`this Report and Recommendation waives appellate review of the substance of the Report
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`and Recommendation and waives appellate review of a judgment based on this Report and
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`Recommendation.
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`The Clerk is directed to send a copy ofthis Report and Recommendation to all counsel of
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`record and to Defendants at the following addresses:
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`Theatrepalooza Community Theater Productions, Inc.
`Teresa Walker
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`1484 Gulfto Bay Blvd.
`Suite 14
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`Clearwater, Florida 33755
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`Theatrepalooza Community Theater Productions Inc.
`Teresa Walker
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`44611 Guilford Drive
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`#155
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`Ashburn, Virginia 20147
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`x/QQ (Q /s:I
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`Ivan D. Davis
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`United States Magistrate Judge
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`December 7, 2018
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`Alexandria, Virginia
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`14
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