Case 2:05-cv-00026-BSJ Document 113 Filed 05/21/07 Page 1 of 14
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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`FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION
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`* * * * * * * * *
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`Civil No. 2:05-CV-26BSJ
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`MEMORANDUM OPINION
`& ORDER
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`FILED
`CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT
`May 21, 2007 (1:27pm)
`DISTRICT OF UTAH
`
`))))))))))))
`
`EMI ENTERTAINMENT WORLD,
`INC., a Delaware company, et al.,
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`Plaintiffs,
`
`vs.
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`PRIDDIS MUSIC , INC., a Nevada
`corporation, RICK PRIDDIS, an
`individual, AND DOES 1 through 50,
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`Defendants.
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`* * * * * * * * *
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`The plaintiffs (collectively, “EMI”) are related companies that own and control the rights
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`to certain copyrighted works, including hundreds of thousands of musical compositions and their
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`associated lyrics. EMI negotiates and grants licenses to others who wish to use the copyrighted
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`works in exchange for the payment of various license fees, depending on the manner in which the
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`licensees are using or reproducing the songs.
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`Defendants Priddis Music and Rick Priddis (collectively, “Priddis”) sell commercial
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`products relating to karaoke, a style of entertainment that originated in Japan in which an
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`amateur singer or singers sing along with recorded music, generally for the amusement of others,
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`often in a private party, public night club or “karaoke bar” setting. 1
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`Karaoke machines play recordings of well-known songs in which the voice of the original
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`1
`The term karaoke is Japanese (kara, empty + oke(sutora), orchestra), suggesting that the music is provided by
`a virtual orchestra rather than a live band. See Webster’s New World College Dictionary 781 (4th ed. 1999); “Karaoke,”
`at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karaoke.
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`Case 2:05-cv-00026-BSJ Document 113 Filed 05/21/07 Page 2 of 14
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`singer is absent or has been reduced in volume, and the machines usually display the lyrics of
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`each song on a video screen to assist the performer in singing along, using a microphone
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`connected to the machine. The display of the lyrics may include text color changes synchronized
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`with the music, and may also display visual images that accompany the musical content.
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`Priddis produces sound recordings designed for use in karaoke machines. As each song
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`on the Priddis recording is played, the karaoke machine also projects the text of the song’s lyrics
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`on a video display against a static blue background in timed relation to the music. To cue the
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`karaoke performer as to the appropriate time to sing the words, the displayed text of the lyrics
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`changes color from white to yellow as the music progresses.
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`Priddis has obtained a number of copyright licenses from EMI pertaining to songs used in
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`its karaoke products, including “compulsory licenses” that entitle Priddis to reproduce the
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`musical composition of the songs pursuant to 17 U.S.C.A. § 115(a)(1), and “reprint licenses” that
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`authorize Priddis to reproduce the lyrics of the songs.
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`EMI insists that Priddis must also obtain so-called “synchronization licenses” for the
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`songs used in its karaoke recordings in order to sell a product that displays the songs’ lyrics in
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`timed relation to the music, in contrast to reprinting the text of the lyrics on a printed paper sheet.
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`The license fees exacted from licensees by EMI for “synchronization licenses” are significantly
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`larger than the statutory fees EMI charges for “compulsory licenses” of songs or the discretionary
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`fees EMI typically negotiates for “reprint licenses” for lyrics. Priddis disputes EMI’s claim that
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`synchronization licenses are required for its karaoke products, which display only the text of the
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`lyrics against a static blue background without any additional visual image content.
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`Case 2:05-cv-00026-BSJ Document 113 Filed 05/21/07 Page 3 of 14
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`Licensing of Rights in Copyrighted Works
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`The Copyright Act of 1976 provides that “[c]opyright protection subsists . . . in original
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`works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . . from which they can be
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`perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine
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`or device.” 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(a) (2005). “Works of authorship” within the meaning of the
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`statute include “literary works,” “musical works, including any accompanying words,” “motion
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`pictures and other audiovisual works,” and “sound recordings,” among others. 17 U.S.C.A. §
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`102(1), (2), (6) & (7). Under the statute, the owner of a copyright in a work of authorship “has
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`the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
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`(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
`(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
`(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by
`sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
`(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
`pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the
`copyrighted work publicly;
`(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
`pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual
`images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted
`work publicly; and
`(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by
`means of a digital audio transmission.
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`17 U.S.C.A. § 106 (2005). And “music—in contrast to most other copyrightable subject
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`matter—can implicate from just one to all five of the rights in the ‘bundle of rights’ granted by
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`copyright law: the reproduction right, the derivative right, the distribution right, the performance
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`right, and the display right.” Don E. Tomlinson & Timothy Neilander, Unchained Melody:
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`Music Licensing in the Digital Age, 6 Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J. 277, 289 (1998) (footnote omitted).
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`Indeed, “[t]he owner of copyright in a musical composition has the exclusive right to, and to
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`Case 2:05-cv-00026-BSJ Document 113 Filed 05/21/07 Page 4 of 14
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`authorize others to, reproduce, distribute, perform, display, and prepare derivative works from
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`the copyrighted composition. 17 U.S.C. § 106.” Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Rhyme Syndicate
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`Music, 376 F.3d 615, 621 (6th Cir. 2004).
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`Once the copyright holder has distributed a music composition to the public, the work
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`becomes subject to the Copyright Act’s compulsory licensing provisions:
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`The Copyright Act provisions that address rights in musical works and the
`compulsory licensing scheme for sound recordings of those musical works
`support the conclusion that when producing and selling a sound recording one
`must secure a license from the copyright owner of the underlying musical work. . .
`.
`The copyright laws . . . attempt to strike a balance between rewarding the creative
`labor of authors of original works, and promoting further creativity by allowing
`public access to their works. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
`U.S. 417, 429, 104 S.Ct. 774, 78 L.Ed.2d 574 (1984). As applied to the present
`case, the most relevant example of this balance is the limitation the Act imposes
`on the exclusive rights of the copyright owner in an original musical work. That
`limitation is set forth in Section 115, which provides that the exclusive rights in
`the musical work under Section 106(1) and (3) are subject to “compulsory
`licensing” under certain specified conditions. See 17 U.S.C. § 115.
`
`Under Section 115, a party intending to make and distribute a sound
`recording of a previously published musical work may obtain a compulsory
`license in that work simply by complying with the statutory requirements,
`including timely and sufficient notice to the owner of the copyright in the musical
`work and payment of statutory, or otherwise negotiated, royalties. 17 U.S.C. §
`115(a)(1), (b), (c). Thus, the exclusive rights of copyright owners of previously
`published musical works are limited only in that they are required (hence the term
`“compulsory”) to license the work to a party who has complied with Section 115.
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`Palladium Music, Inc. v. EatSleepMusic, Inc., 398 F.3d 1193, 1198-99 (10th Cir. 2005) (footnote
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`omitted). Priddis asserts that it has already obtained “compulsory licenses” for any musical
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`compositions as to which EMI holds a copyright. EMI conceded at the June 28, 1006 Pretrial
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`Conference that this is true as to most, if not all of EMI’s works that are at issue in this case.
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`Music publishers own or administer copyrights in the lyrics of songs, and grant separate
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`Case 2:05-cv-00026-BSJ Document 113 Filed 05/21/07 Page 5 of 14
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`licenses to reproduce the text of the lyrics. These licenses are often referred to as lyric
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`permissions or lyric reprint licenses, and Priddis asserts that it has already obtained reprint
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`licenses for the lyrics accompanying the songs licensed to Priddis under the § 115 compulsory
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`license system. Again, EMI conceded at pretrial that in most, if not all cases, this is true.
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`The Copyright Act and “Synchronization Licenses”
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`Though the Copyright Act does not explicitly apply the label, courts have recognized a
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`copyright holder’s right to control the synchronization of sound recordings—in particular, sound
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`recordings of musical compositions—with the content of audiovisual works such as motion
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`pictures and television programs. As the Sixth Circuit explains:
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`“Synchronization” is the process of combining sound recordings of musical
`compositions with visual images. A “synchronization license” is a license for use
`of a composition in a film, pre-recorded radio or television program, or radio or
`television commercial. See 2 Lindey On Entertainment, Publishing And The Arts
`§ 7.01 (2d ed.2000). Under copyright law, an entity wishing to synchronize music
`with visual images in a video, motion picture, etc., must obtain a synchronization
`license from the musical composition copyright holder and must also obtain a
`license from the sound recording copyright holder.
`
`Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Still N The Water Pub., 327 F.3d 472, 481 n.8 (6th Cir. 2003). In Agee
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`v. Paramount Communications, Inc., 59 F.3d 317 (2d Cir. 1995), the Second Circuit concluded
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`that “[a] synchronization of previously recorded sounds onto the soundtrack of an audiovisual
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`work is simply an example of the reproduction right explicitly granted by section 114(b) to the
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`owner of rights in a sound recording.” 59 F.3d at 322. Indeed, “the legislative history indicates
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`that Congress intended to proscribe the unauthorized duplication of sound recordings in the
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`Case 2:05-cv-00026-BSJ Document 113 Filed 05/21/07 Page 6 of 14
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`soundtracks of audiovisual works.” Id. 2
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`EMI argues that the graphical display of the text of lyrics on a video screen in timed
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`relation to the playing of Priddis’ karaoke music recordings renders them “audiovisual works”
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`under the Copyright Act, and that Priddis is thus required to obtain a synchronization license for
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`those songs in addition to the compulsory and reprint licenses for the music and lyrics that
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`Priddis has already been granted. Priddis responds that the courts have recognized
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`synchronization rights only with reference to films, motion pictures, videotapes, television
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`programs and commercials, all of which have significant visual image content, and that the video
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`display of the text of song lyrics not accompanied by such image content falls beyond the scope
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`of synchronization rights as defined by the existing case law. See, e.g., Bridgeport Music, 327
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`F.3d at 481 (quoted above); Agee v. Paramount Communications, Inc., 59 F.3d at 322-23
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`(referring to “synchronization of the sound recording with visual images”); Buffalo Broadcasting
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`Co., Inc. v. American Society of Composers, 744 F.2d 917, 921 (2d Cir. 1984) (“When the
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`producer wishes to use outside music in a film or videotape program, it must obtain from the
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`copyright proprietor the ‘synch’ right in order to record the music on the soundtrack of the film
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`or tape.”); Angel Music, Inc. v. ABC Sports, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 429, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
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`(“synchronization rights . . . are required when copyrighted music is synchronized with visual
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`images”); Freeplay Music, Inc. v. Cox Radio, Inc., 404 F. Supp. 2d 548, 551 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
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`According to the Second Circuit, “A synchronization license is required if a copyright
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`musical composition is to be used in ‘timed-relation’ or synchronization with an audiovisual
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`2
`House Report No. 94-1476 explained that “infringement takes place whenever all or any substantial portion of
`the actual sounds that go to make up a copyrighted sound recording are reproduced . . . in the soundtrack or audio portion
`of a motion picture or other audiovisual work.”
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`Case 2:05-cv-00026-BSJ Document 113 Filed 05/21/07 Page 7 of 14
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`work.” ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Stellar Records, Inc., 96 F.3d 60, 62 n.4 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing 4
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`Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 24.02[f] (1995)). The Copyright
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`Act defines audiovisual works as follows:
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`“Audiovisual works” are works that consist of a series of related images which
`are intrinsically intended to be shown by the use of machines, or devices such as
`projectors, viewers, or electronic equipment, together with accompanying sounds,
`if any, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as films or tapes, in
`which the works are embodied.
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`17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (emphasis added). The Copyright Act distinguishes audiovisual works from
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`literary works:
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`“Literary works” are works, other than audiovisual works, expressed in words,
`numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature
`of the material objects, such as books, periodicals, manuscripts, phonorecords,
`film, tapes, disks, or cards, in which they are embodied.
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`Id. (emphasis added).
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`The Copyright Act protects song lyrics as literary works, and does so regardless of the
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`tangible medium in which the lyrics find expression—including phonorecords, which are
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`“material objects in which sounds, other than those accompanying a motion picture or other
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`audiovisual work, are fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from which the
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`sounds can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid
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`of a machine or device.” 17 U.S.C.A. § 101.
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`As the ABKCO panel observed, “Most commonly, synch licenses are necessary when
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`copyrighted music is included in movies and commercials.” 96 F.3d at 62 n.4 (citing Nimmer on
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`Copyright § 24.04[C][1]). Though EMI tries to minimize the difference between the visual
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`Case 2:05-cv-00026-BSJ Document 113 Filed 05/21/07 Page 8 of 14
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`display of song lyrics and motion pictures, television programs and other audiovisual works, this
`3
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`court is not persuaded that a copyright holder’s synchronization right extends to the graphical
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`display of written text, without more. Cf. Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publishing, 429 F.
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`Supp. 2d 1190, 1194 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (concluding that where “the visual images and lyrics are
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`connected with the music, it is clear that [a karaoke recording] is an audiovisual work”).
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`In ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Stellar Records, Inc., the defendant Performance Tracks, Inc., a
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`compulsory licensee of ABKCO’s music, argued that it had the right to sell “CD+G” compact
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`discs—discs that play instrumental tracks of songs and display the songs’ lyrics on a video screen
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`to assist the karaoke singer in performing the song—based on the compulsory licensing provision
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`governing musical compositions. The Second Circuit disagreed, pointing out that “[s]ong lyrics
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`enjoy independent copyright protection as ‘literary works,’” and that “the right to print a song’s
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`lyrics is exclusively that of the copyright holder under 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)”; “while a compulsory
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`license permits the recording of a ‘cover’ version of a song,” the ABKCO panel explained, “it
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`does not permit the inclusion of a copy of the lyrics. That requires the separate permission of the
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`copyright holder.” 96 F.3d at 64.4
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`3
`In what is perhaps an unintended slight to the art of cinematography, EMI argues that “[f]ilms are nothing more
`than a series of related and changing colors which when dependent upon music for its intended drama and impact, must
`have the changing colors synchronized with the sound track.” (Plaintiffs’ Reply Memorandum in Support of Their
`Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed May 19, 2006, at [1].)
`Indeed, many things may appear to be quite similar if one simply ignores their obvious differences.
`
`4
`In rejecting the defendant’s argument that its music-and-lyrics “CD+G” karaoke recordings were
`“phonorecords” not requiring a separate license for the lyrics, the ABKCO panel opined that rather than being
`phonorecords, “CD+G’s constitute ‘audiovisual works,’ since they ‘consist of a series of related images’—the
`lyrics—‘together with the accompanying sounds’—the music.” 96 F.3d at 65 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101). This dictum
`overlooks the Copyright Act’s explicit distinction between audiovisual works and literary works as well as the Acts’
`express recognition that literary works expressed in words or verbal symbols—such as song lyrics—may be embodied in
`phonorecords, see 17 U.S.C. § 101. The ABKCO panel’s dictum thus appears to be unsound.
`Generally, an ‘image” is a “representation of a person or thing, drawn, painted, photographed, etc.” Webster’s
`New World College Dictionary 712 (4th ed. 1999). If the display of written text equates with a “series of related
`images,” then perhaps printed books should be treated as audiovisual works rather than literary works.
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`Here, Priddis insists that it has obtained the requisite license to reprint the songs’ lyrics,
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`and has simply reprinted copies of those lyrics using a digital medium. To that extent, ABKCO
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`supports Priddis’ view:
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`A time-honored method of facilitating singing along with music has been
`to furnish the singer with a printed copy of the lyrics. Copyright holders have
`always enjoyed exclusive rights over such copies. While projecting lyrics on a
`screen and producing printed copies of the lyrics, of course, have their differences,
`there is no reason to treat them differently for purposes of the Copyright Act.
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`ABKCO, 96 F.3d at 64. This court agrees.
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`Both concepts—synchronization rights and karaoke recordings—have been known for
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`many years, yet none of the cases cited by EMI squarely holds that a synchronization license is
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`required to produce a sound recording of a musical composition accompanied by displayable text
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`of the lyrics, but without the visual image content that characterizes an audiovisual work. 5
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`Priddis’ karaoke recordings embody both a sound recording of musical compositions and a
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`digitized copy of the text of the songs’ lyrics—lyrics protected as literary works by the express
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`terms of the Copyright Act. Absent a series of related visual images, e.g., a motion picture, film
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`or video recording, the display of the lyrics represents the display of a “literary” rather than
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`“audiovisual” work.6
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`Moreover, if Priddis has included a lawful copy of a song’s lyrics on its karaoke discs,
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`Priddis need not be concerned with whether the use of its karaoke products by others implicates
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`5
`The Tenth Circuit has not yet addressed the existence or scope of synchronization rights in a published opinion.
`In this Circuit, at least, EMI’s claim appears to present a case of first impression.
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`6
`The parties stipulate that Priddis had previously obtained three synchronization licenses from EMI as to
`particular songs, authorizing Priddis to reproduce the songs in a music-plus-visual-images-plus-lyrics format. Priddis
`insists that it has not used a format that includes visual image content as well as the text of lyrics in producing its karaoke
`recordings, so that the terms of the synchronization licenses do not apply.
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`the copyright holder’s right to display the song’s lyrics as a literary work under 17 U.S.C. §
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`106(5). A purchaser of a lawful copy of a literary work certainly may read the text of that copy.
`7
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`Moreover, Congress has expressly provided that:
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`(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(5), the owner of a particular
`copy lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is
`entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to display that copy
`publicly, either directly or by the projection of no more than one image at a time,
`to viewers present at the place where the copy is located.
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`17 U.S.C.A. § 109(c) (2005). 8
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`For these reasons, EMI has failed to carry its burden to show that it is entitled to
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`judgment as a matter of law that Priddis is required to obtain a synchronization license for its
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`karaoke products that combine sound recordings with the visual display of song lyrics without
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`the visual image content that would typically constitute an “audiovisual work,” such as a motion
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`picture or video recording. EMI’s motion for partial summary judgment must therefore be
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`denied.
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`Priddis’ Motion for Summary Judgment
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`Priddis has also filed, briefed and argued a motion for summary judgment, asserting that
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`(1) EMI has failed to establish that it owns or controls the copyrights to the songs that are the
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`subject of this litigation; (2) Priddis has already “dutifully obtained proper compulsory licenses
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`to reproduce the musical compositions of each of the subject songs, and reprint licenses for the
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`7
`To “display” a work means “to show a copy of it, either directly or by means of a film, slide, television image,
`or any other device or process or, in the case of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to show individual images
`nonsequentially.” 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (2005).
`
`8
`Actual karaoke performances taking place in a public setting may also implicate the copyright holders’
`performance right, cf. Morganactive Songs v. K&M Fox Inc. 2005 WL 3601973, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d 1064 (S.D. Ind. 2005),
`Broadcast Music, Inc. v. WPBK, Inc., 922 F.Supp. 803 (W.D.N.Y. 1996), but Priddis’ conduct in creating and selling
`sound recordings using the musical compositions for which it holds compulsory licenses, together with a digitized copy of
`the songs’ lyrics for which it holds reprint licenses, does not.
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`Case 2:05-cv-00026-BSJ Document 113 Filed 05/21/07 Page 11 of 14
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`lyrics”; and (3) Priddis does not use any of the formats specified in EMI’s “blanket karaoke
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`synchronization agreement,” and is thus not obligated to obtain such synchronization licenses for
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`its karaoke products. (Defendants’ Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary Judgment, filed
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`March 15, 2006 (dkt. no. 64), at 2.) Consequently, Priddis submits, EMI cannot sustain its
`9
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`copyright infringement claim against Priddis, and Priddis is entitled to summary judgment on
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`EMI’s claim.
`
`To establish copyright infringement, a plaintiff must prove (1) ownership
`of a valid copyright and (2) unauthorized copying of constituent elements of the
`work that are original. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S.
`340, 361, 111 S.Ct. 1282, 113 L.Ed.2d 358 (1991); Jacobsen v. Deseret Book Co.,
`287 F.3d 936, 942 (10th Cir. 2002). A plaintiff’s presentation of a certificate of
`registration from the U.S. Copyright Office usually constitutes prima facie
`evidence of a valid copyright and of the facts stated in the certificate. 17 U.S.C. §
`410(c). Upon presentation of such a certificate, the defendant bears the burden to
`overcome the presumption of validity. Autoskill Inc. v. National Educational
`Support Systems, Inc., 994 F.2d 1476, 1487 (10th Cir. 1993). To rebut the
`presumption, however, a defendant sued for infringement “must simply offer
`some evidence or proof to dispute or deny the plaintiff’s prima facie case of
`infringement.” Entertainment Research Group, Inc. v. Genesis Creative Group,
`Inc., 122 F.3d 1211, 1217 (1997).
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`Palladium Music, Inc. v. EatSleepMusic, Inc., 398 F.3d 1193, 1196 (10th Cir. 2005).
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`Counsel for Priddis asserts that EMI has not established the first element of its
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`infringement claim, ownership or control of a valid copyright in the subject works, yet argues in
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`the very next breath that Priddis has already obtained valid copyright licenses from EMI to
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`reproduce those same works. As noted above, in the context of the Pretrial Conference, counsel
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`for EMI acknowledged that Priddis has already obtained compulsory music and lyric reprint
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`9
`Priddis has also moved to strike EMI’s motion for partial summary judgment as untimely. In effect, Priddis
`and EMI have files cross-motions for summary judgment on the synchronization issue, and having ruled on the merits of
`that issue, the court denies the motion to strike as moot.
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`Case 2:05-cv-00026-BSJ Document 113 Filed 05/21/07 Page 12 of 14
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`licenses covering many of the songs at issue in this litigation. If a synchronization license is not
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`required, Priddis’ lyric reprint licenses should suffice to permit the reproduction of the lyrics as
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`
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`digitized text embodied in Priddis’ karaoke discs. 10
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`At this point, there may be some songs on the extensive list as to which there exists a
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`genuine issue as to copyright ownership, compulsory music licensing or lyric reprint licensing,
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`but this appears to be an appropriate topic for examination at a continued pretrial conference—if
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`in fact anything remains of EMI’s copyright infringement claim in the wake of this court’s ruling
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`on the synchronization issue. For that reason, summary judgment on these questions is denied.
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`Counsel for the parties must shoulder the burden of sifting the haystack for those few infringing
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`needles that may remain, and identify the same in the context of pretrial.
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`Concerning the necessity or applicability of a synchronization license for karaoke
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`recordings in which the text of lyrics is displayed in timed relation to Priddis’ sound recordings
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`of EMI’s musical works, Priddis’ motion shall be granted for the same reasons that EMI’s
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`motion was denied.
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`Defendants having demonstrated that there exists no genuine issue of material fact and
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`that defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,
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`IT IS ORDERED that the defendants' motion for summary judgment (dkt. no. 64) is
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`GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, and plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary
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`judgment (dkt. no. 72) is DENIED; defendants’ motion to strike plaintiffs’ motion for partial
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`summary judgment (dkt. no. 75) is DENIED AS MOOT.
`
`10
`At pretrial, counsel for EMI also acknowledged that under Priddis’ existing lyric reprint licenses, “you could
`still make a graphic image of the lyrics and do whatever you wanted with them,” so long as they are not displayed in
`timed relation to the music. (See Transcript of Hearing, dated June 28, 2006, at 40:3-7 (Mr. Zenger).)
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`IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the above-captioned proceeding is hereby calendared
`
`for a continuing Final Pretrial Conference on Thursday, June 28, 2007 at 9:30 a..m.
`
` DATED this day of May, 2007.
`
`BY THE COURT:
`
`
`BRUCE S. JENKINS
`United States Senior District Judge
`
`-13-
`
`

`
`Case 2:05-cv-00026-BSJ Document 113 Filed 05/21/07 Page 14 of 14
`Case 2:O5—cv—OOO26—BSJ Document 113 Filed 05/21/07 Page 14 of 14
`_4
`
`IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the above—captioned proceeding is hereby calendared
`
`for a continuing Final Pretrial Conference on Thursday, June 28, 2007 at 9:30 a..m.
`
`r"’7z__
`DATED this Q day_ofMay, 2007.