`
`
`
`In the
`United States Court of Appeals
`For the Seventh Circuit
`____________________
`
`No. 19-1701
`STEPHANIE DORRIS,
`
`v.
`
`UNUM LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
`OF AMERICA,
`
`Plaintiff-Appellant,
`
`Defendant-Appellee.
`
`____________________
`
`Appeal from the United States District Court for the
`Southern District of Illinois.
`No. 3:16-cv-00508 — Staci M. Yandle, Judge.
`____________________
`
`ARGUED NOVEMBER 7, 2019 — DECIDED FEBRUARY 3, 2020
`____________________
`
`Before HAMILTON, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.
`ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Courts and practitioners frequently
`say that § 502 of the Employee Retirement Income Security
`Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), provides for “de novo
`review” of certain decisions relating to welfare plan benefits.
`That phrase is really a misnomer. At least in this circuit,
`ERISA de novo review requires no review at all, but an inde-
`pendent decision. In such a case, the plaintiff bears the burden
`
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`No. 19-1701
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`of proving not that the plan administrator erred, but that she
`is entitled to the benefits she seeks.
`Stephanie Dorris did not fully recognize her burden. After
`her disability insurance provider, Unum Life Insurance Com-
`pany of America, terminated her benefits, she fought hard to
`prove that Unum’s explanation for its decision was wrong.
`She convinced the district court that it was, so the court pro-
`ceeded to decide whether Dorris was then entitled to benefits.
`It saw barely a thing in the administrative record going to that
`question, and no attempt from Dorris to supplement the rec-
`ord. Based on this lack of evidence, the court entered judg-
`ment in Unum’s favor. On appeal, Dorris contends that some
`of the evidence proved her entitlement to benefits, or alterna-
`tively, that the district court should have given her the oppor-
`tunity to supplement the record after judgment. Because we
`see no clear error in the district court’s factual findings nor an
`abuse of discretion in its decision to limit itself to the record
`before it, we affirm the judgment.
`I. Background
`About two decades ago, Dorris served as the president of
`Beans Plus, Inc., which offered its employees a long-term dis-
`ability insurance plan through Unum. The plan covered em-
`ployees who met a three-pronged definition of disability.
`Under the first prong, the employee had to demonstrate
`that, “because of injury or sickness,” she “cannot perform
`each of the material duties of [her] regular occupation.” This
`showing alone would be enough for the employee to obtain
`benefits for the first two years of her disability.
`To maintain benefits after two years, an employee was re-
`quired to provide Unum proof of continued disability under
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`No. 19-1701
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`3
`
`either one of the remaining two prongs. If she proceeded un-
`der the second, she would have to show that she “cannot per-
`form each of the material duties of any gainful occupation for
`which [she is] reasonably fitted by training, education, or ex-
`perience.” We refer to this as the “any occupation” option. Al-
`ternatively, under the third prong, she could show that she is
`(a) “[p]erforming at least one of the material duties of [her]
`regular occupation or another occupation on a part-time or
`full-time basis,” and (b) “[c]urrently earning at least 20% less
`per month than [her pre-disability income] due to that same
`injury or sickness.” This we call the “20% less” option.
`A. Dorris’s Disability
`Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, Dorris suffered from se-
`vere pain linked to endometriosis. This pain eventually be-
`came disabling, which prevented her from continuing her du-
`ties as Beans Plus’s president, and Unum started paying her
`benefits in 2002. A few years later, a doctor diagnosed Dorris
`with Lyme disease as well. By 2007, the Social Security Ad-
`ministration agreed that her Lyme disease, endometriosis,
`and other impairments were disabling and granted benefits.
`As far as the record shows, the Social Security Administration
`never sought additional evidence from Dorris after 2007.
`Unum, in contrast, would frequently review Dorris’s case
`to check for her continued disability. In 2013, its review led it
`to maintain benefits, but its consultant noted that Dorris’s
`functional abilities were improving and, if this persisted, she
`might be able to return to work. By this point her endometri-
`osis symptoms had subsided and her primary diagnosis had
`shifted to Lyme disease.
`
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`No. 19-1701
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`Unum reviewed Dorris’s case again in 2015, starting with
`a phone call to Dorris to ask how she was faring. She told
`Unum that she was improving and had started golfing nine
`holes a week and volunteering. She had a three-hour weekly
`shift as a docent for the St. Louis Zoo and a position as treas-
`urer of a non-profit called Art on the Square, which ran an
`annual art show. Unum’s sleuthing revealed she was also an
`active member of a group protesting a hospital’s decision to
`move out of Belleville, Illinois.
`Dorris’s doctors also provided information to Unum. Her
`Lyme disease specialist, Dr. Steven Harris, informed Unum
`that Dorris was still experiencing fatigue, headaches, nausea,
`dizziness, insomnia, and joint and muscle pain because of her
`Lyme disease. His records noted both improvements and re-
`gressions in Dorris’s self-reports.
`Unum later sent a letter to Dr. Harris in which it defined
`the terms “light” and “sedentary” work consistent with the
`Department of Labor’s Dictionary of Occupational Titles and
`the Social Security Administration’s regulations, 20 CFR
`§ 404.1567(a)–(b), and asked if Dorris could work at either
`level of exertion. He responded that she could perform sed-
`entary work part-time, no more than four hours a day and
`with frequent breaks and absences. Under a line asking him
`to identify the limitations supporting his opinion, Dr. Harris
`wrote “N/A.” When Unum followed up, Dr. Harris elabo-
`rated that Dorris suffered from “extreme fatigue” and “major
`memory and cognitive issues” (as well as nausea, migraines,
`cramps, and aches), so she could not work at all, for fear of
`stress exacerbating her symptoms. Dorris’s other doctors, in-
`cluding her primary care physician, deferred to Dr. Harris.
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`With Dorris’s medical records in hand, Unum hired two
`consulting physicians to review the file to see whether she
`could return to her regular occupation as a president—a sed-
`entary job that required, among other things, the frequent use
`of mental functions. The first doctor determined that the evi-
`dence did not show limitations that would preclude such
`work. He acknowledged that Dorris continued to complain of
`fatigue and pain, but thought her reported activities were out
`of proportion to her complaints. He ruled out ongoing Lyme
`disease as a disabling impairment because he saw no evi-
`dence of an active infection. The second consulting physician
`concurred. He too doubted that Dorris had Lyme disease and
`found that whatever fatigue she had did not preclude her ac-
`tive lifestyle. Shortly thereafter, Unum ended Dorris’s bene-
`fits because it concluded that she could perform the duties of
`her regular occupation.
`B. Administrative Appeal
`Dorris appealed, criticizing Unum’s apparent focus on
`only the physical demands of being a president. She had
`worked 70-hour weeks, she asserted, and needed constant
`mental focus during that time. Furthermore, she noted that
`Unum had never considered whether she could meet the
`standards of the any occupation or 20% less options.
`In her appeal, she offered new evidence and qualified her
`activities. She explained that she missed golf matches, docent
`shifts, and protests frequently. And, as treasurer for Art on the
`Square, she worked only one hour a week, with no deadlines.
`Fellow volunteers wrote letters to support her story. Dr. Har-
`ris also supplemented his opinion of Dorris’s limitations. Re-
`turning to the long hours and stressful work of a president
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`No. 19-1701
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`would increase Dorris’s symptoms, he said, and her limited
`activities did not undermine that conclusion.
`Unum obtained another consulting physician, Dr. Scott
`Norris, for its appeal review. He agreed with the prior con-
`sultants that Dorris likely was not suffering from Lyme dis-
`ease and could work as a president. Unum’s vocational con-
`sultant, Richard Byard, then updated the definition of the ma-
`terial duties of a president to reflect a need to work more than
`forty hours a week and to travel occasionally. Dr. Norris
`maintained his assessment after considering this change.
`Months after Dorris submitted her appeal, Unum re-
`quested that she participate in an independent medical exam-
`ination at its expense. Dorris objected to this request because
`Unum was taking longer to resolve her appeal than regula-
`tions permitted. See 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(i). Unum asked one
`more time for an extension to perform an examination, re-
`ceived a similar answer, and then two days later (a day before
`the regulatory deadline) denied Dorris’s appeal, concluding
`that she could return to her job as president.
`C. District Court Proceedings
`Dorris then proceeded to the district court with this suit to
`recover benefits under ERISA § 502, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
`Early in the case, Dorris asked to depose Byard (the voca-
`tional consultant), Dr. Norris, and three others who worked
`for Unum, as well as Dr. Harris and her fellow volunteers on
`her side. Unum objected and sought a protective order be-
`cause these depositions would rehash evidence already in the
`administrative record. Dorris admitted she wanted to depose
`the witnesses for clarification purposes, and the magistrate
`judge understood that to mean that Dorris was not looking to
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`No. 19-1701
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`7
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`introduce new evidence. Dorris could use her briefs to high-
`light any problems in the record, the judge decided, and he
`granted the protective order, carefully noting that his ruling
`did not prevent Dorris from requesting any other discovery
`consistent with Rule 26. Dorris, however, never sought any
`further discovery; nor did she object to the magistrate judge’s
`ruling before the district judge.
`Eventually, the parties filed cross-motions for judgment
`on the administrative record under Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
`cedure 52. They vigorously disputed the merits of the medical
`evidence and whether Dorris was disabled from her regular
`occupation as president. Unum argued that Dr. Harris was
`exaggerating (if not fabricating) his assessment; Dorris criti-
`cized Unum’s doctors for lacking expertise in Lyme disease.
`The other prongs of the plan’s disability definition fell to the
`wayside. Unum all but ignored the 20% less option and re-
`ferred only occasionally to the any occupation option. It
`rested on its physician’s conclusions that Dorris could per-
`form the duties of president and emphasized that it was Dor-
`ris who carried the burden of proof on all issues.
`Dorris did not dispute the placement of this burden, but
`nevertheless drew attention to the lack of vocational evidence
`in the record. Unum had never considered what occupations
`for which she was reasonably fitted or, for that matter, the ma-
`terial duties of any job other than president, as relevant to the
`any occupation option. She offered nothing of her own on
`these points. Her resume was the only evidence she cited, and
`it essentially listed job titles: president, staff accountant, sen-
`ior litigation consultant, chief financial officer, corporate con-
`troller, and vice president of finance. She asserted, without
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`No. 19-1701
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`evidence, that each of these jobs required “working 55–70
`hours a week, 5–7 days a week, 48–50 weeks per year.”
`Her arguments based on the 20% less option were conclu-
`sory—she simply declared that she met that definition with-
`out identifying how. The closest she came to an explanation
`was a single line, in the fact section of her response brief,
`where she said her treasurer work “included a few of the ma-
`terial duties of a CPA/Accountant, such as paying bill[s] and
`reconciling bank accounts.” The remainder of her factual ac-
`count, like her administrative appeal, focused on how little—
`not what—she did as a volunteer.
`Besides the administrative record, the only other evidence
`either party submitted related to Dr. Harris’s qualifications.
`Unum provided documents regarding another patient’s accu-
`sation that he had committed malpractice in the treatment of
`Lyme disease and Dorris responded with evidence that the
`claim was unfounded.
`The district court recognized that it could consider this ad-
`ditional evidence, but elected not to do so, as it did not shed
`any light on any of the dispositive issues in the case. The
`court, thus, limited its review to the administrative record.
`The parties agreed that this review would be de novo, because
`the plan gave Unum no discretion.
`The court first found that Dorris could not perform the du-
`ties of her regular occupation. It afforded more weight to Dr.
`Harris’s opinions than those of Unum’s physicians, as Dr.
`Harris was Dorris’s treating physician and had seen his pa-
`tient, not just her records. Based on this evidence, the court
`found that Dorris could not perform the material duties of a
`president—especially the frequent use of high-level mental
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`No. 19-1701
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`9
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`functions for more than forty hours per week. She therefore
`met the initial requirement for continuing disability.
`But that did not end the court’s analysis. Looking to the
`other two prongs of the plan definition, the court found noth-
`ing of significance in the record. It acknowledged Dorris’s
`point that Unum had not conducted a vocational analysis but
`emphasized that she, not Unum, carried the burden of proof.
`Dorris could have possibly met her burden with a vocational
`analysis or other evidence describing the demands of other
`occupations, the court said, but she produced nothing of the
`sort. Her conclusory assertions were not enough for the court
`to find that she met either the any occupation or 20% less op-
`tions, and so it entered judgment for Unum.
`Dorris timely moved to amend the judgment. Fed. R. Civ.
`P. 59. She argued that the court had overlooked that both Dr.
`Harris and the Social Security Administration had found her
`incapable of any work, and, thus, by implication, from a gain-
`ful occupation. Alternatively, she asked to reopen discovery.
`The district court denied the motion. It explained that it
`had not overlooked the Social Security decision nor Dr. Har-
`ris’s opinions, neither of which provided the vocational evi-
`dence the court was looking for and found lacking. They did
`not identify the demands of relevant gainful occupations or
`show that those demands were prohibitive. Regarding dis-
`covery, the court found no error in its decisions. Rather, the
`error Dorris was seeking to correct was her own because she
`had never objected to the magistrate judge’s order.
`II. Discussion
`The parties do not quarrel about the general framework of
`this appeal. Because the plan did not give Unum discretion,
`
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`No. 19-1701
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`the district court appropriately reviewed the administrative
`record de novo under the Supreme Court’s decision in Fire-
`stone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989). In turn,
`we accept the district court’s factual findings unless clearly
`erroneous. Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6); Cheney v. Standard Ins. Co.,
`831 F.3d 445, 450 (7th Cir. 2016).
`Unum does not challenge the district court’s finding that
`Dorris was incapable of working as a president. We, therefore,
`accept that finding. The question then is what happens next.
`The plan definition of disability does not stop at whether Dor-
`ris can return to her regular occupation. It also asks about her
`capacity to work other occupations. Neither party seriously
`addressed these issues in the administrative proceedings or in
`the district court, so the record is essentially silent on them.
`We, like the district court, must decide who that impacts.
`The answer lies in the concept of ERISA de novo review,
`which we have described as a “misleading phrase.” Krolnik v.
`Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 570 F.3d 841, 843 (7th Cir. 2009). The
`confusion comes from the word review, “[f]or what Firestone
`requires is not ‘review’ of any kind; it is an independent deci-
`sion,” akin to a contract dispute. Id.; Diaz v. Prudential Ins. Co.
`of Am., 499 F.3d 640, 643 (7th Cir. 2007); see also Cheney, 831
`F.3d at 450 (interpreting policy terms under federal common
`law and general principles of contract interpretation). So, we
`have said that what happened before the plan administrator
`is irrelevant in a de novo review case. Marantz v. Permanente
`Med. Grp., Inc. Long Term Disability Plan, 687 F.3d 320, 328 (7th
`Cir. 2012); Diaz, 499 F.3d at 643. The court can limit itself to
`deciding the case on the administrative record but should also
`freely allow the parties to introduce relevant extra-record ev-
`idence and seek appropriate discovery. Marantz, 687 F.3d at
`
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`11
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`328; Krolnik, 570 F.3d at 843; Patton v. MFS/Sun Life Fin. Dis-
`tribs., Inc., 480 F.3d 478, 490 (7th Cir. 2007). The plaintiff is the
`one who is obligated to prove she is entitled to benefits, so any
`gaps in the record cut against her claim. Cheney, 831 F.3d at
`451; Ruttenberg v. U.S. Life Ins. Co., 413 F.3d 652, 663 (7th Cir.
`2005). She should be permitted to patch these gaps before the
`court reaches final judgment.1
`By contrast, in ERISA benefits claims subject to arbitrary
`and capricious review because the plan gives the administra-
`tor discretion, we generally do not look to any evidence be-
`yond what the administrator considered. E.g., Dragus v. Reli-
`ance Standard Life Ins. Co., 882 F.3d 667, 674 (7th Cir. 2018). In
`such a case, it is the administrator’s burden to provide an ex-
`planation for its decision consistent with the record and
`ERISA. Tate v. Long Term Disability Plan for Salaried Emps. of
`Champion Intʹl Corp. No. 506, 545 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 2008),
`abrogated on other grounds by Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins.
`Co., 560 U.S. 242 (2010). If the administrator did not explore
`an issue that it should have, a court typically does not enter
`final judgment on the underlying claim but remands so that
`the administrator can reconsider. Id. at 563.
`The consequences of the different approaches are easily
`demonstrated. In Pakovich v. Broadspire Services, Inc., 535 F.3d
`601 (7th Cir. 2008), we addressed a case in a nearly identical
`
`1 The Courts of Appeals have divergent views of how and when a dis-
`trict court can accept evidence outside of the administrative record in de
`novo review cases and some prohibit it entirely. See, e.g., Ariana M. v. Hu-
`mana Health Plan of Tex., Inc., 884 F.3d 246, 256 (5th Cir. 2018) (en banc)
`(describing circuit split and prohibiting extra-record evidence); Patton, 480
`F.3d at 490 & n.7 (collecting cases). Our position is settled and Dorris does
`not argue otherwise or ask us to revisit this issue.
`
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`No. 19-1701
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`posture to this one except under arbitrary and capricious re-
`view. Like Unum, the administrator had terminated disability
`benefits because it concluded that Pakovich could perform
`her own occupation. Id. at 603. As here, the district court dis-
`agreed and moved on to the second requirement of disability
`under the plan: whether Pakovich could perform the func-
`tions of “any occupation.” Id. The administrator had not con-
`sidered or addressed this issue, and the district court found
`no evidence in the record supporting such a finding, so it en-
`tered judgment for the defendant. Id. We reversed. Because
`the administrator had not reached the issue of Pakovich’s eli-
`gibility under the “any occupation” standard, the record was
`undeveloped on this point, and the district court had “noth-
`ing to review.” Id. at 607. We therefore sent the case back to
`the administrator to address the issue in the first instance. Id.
`The district court here, too, had an undeveloped record re-
`garding the any occupation and 20% less options. But unlike
`in Pakovich, the court’s lack of a decision to review was not a
`hindrance, because it was not tasked with reviewing anything
`in the first place. The question it had to answer was whether
`Dorris was entitled to benefits. In addressing that question,
`Dorris, as the plaintiff, carried the burden of proof, absent
`contrary language in the plan. Accordingly, the court could
`not resolve any gaps in the record in her favor. Cheney, 831
`F.3d at 451. If neither party sought to produce necessary evi-
`dence, then judgment was properly entered in Unum’s favor.
`Dorris contends that vocational evidence was not neces-
`sary to satisfy the any occupation prong and, so, the district
`court erred in demanding it. She relies on our decision in Tate,
`where we said that “there is nothing in our case law” requir-
`ing a claimant to provide vocational evidence “as long as she
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`No. 19-1701
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`provides evidence that she has an impairment that affects her
`ability to work.” 545 F.3d at 562. In her view, she met this re-
`quirement through Dr. Harris’s opinion that she could not
`perform any sedentary work and the Social Security Admin-
`istration’s 2007 benefits decision, finding the same.
`Dorris may be right that the district court could have ruled
`in her favor even absent vocational evidence. If the medical
`evidence showed that Dorris was utterly immobile and inco-
`herent, we would not affirm the denial of benefits simply be-
`cause a vocational expert never opined that mobility and co-
`herence are valued in the job market. To demonstrate clear er-
`ror, though, it is not enough for an appellant to point to evi-
`dence in the record that supports her claim. Mathin v. Kerry,
`782 F.3d 804, 810 (7th Cir. 2015). Dr. Harris’s opinion comes
`close enough to declaring complete disability, and the Social
`Security opinion does declare it, so either could have carried
`Dorris’s burden. But the district court found they did not. On
`clear-error review, we will affirm that finding if it is “plausible
`in light of the record viewed in its entirety.” Anderson v. City
`of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573–74 (1985).
`The district court’s findings were not only plausible but
`eminently reasonable on this limited record. Even in the best
`of circumstances, a Social Security decision is only “one more
`factor for consideration in an ERISA benefits determination.”
`Black v. Long Term Disability Ins., 582 F.3d 738, 748 (7th Cir.
`2009). The decision here was nearly a decade old and relied
`on Dorris’s endometriosis, which is no longer debilitating, so
`the court justifiably discredited it.
`Dr. Harris’s opinion was more recent, but the court was
`not obligated to adopt it wholesale and exclude Dorris from
`all sedentary jobs just because the doctor did. Instead, the
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`No. 19-1701
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`court gave Dr. Harris’s opinion more weight than Unum’s
`doctors’ opinions only to the extent that his was supported by
`evidence and explanation. Dr. Harris drew special attention
`to how stress would increase Dorris’s symptoms. Without
`such stress, his opinion has little else to stand on. The occupa-
`tion of president is a demanding one, so the court found that
`Dorris could not reliably handle it. Not all jobs are so taxing,
`however, and Dorris may not have been foreclosed from some
`other, easier sedentary job.
`This gap is where vocational evidence became necessary.
`Perhaps all “gainful” occupations for which Dorris is “reason-
`ably fitted” are just as stressful as company president. She of-
`fered no evidence, only assertions, on that question. She con-
`tinues to insist that the only jobs for which she is reasonably
`fitted are those in her resume, and that each of these jobs is
`either “sedentary” or “light.” Even if she is right, no evidence
`in the record shows that a “staff accountant,” for example, is
`required to work any more than 40 hours a week or use her
`high-level mental functions on a frequent basis, as a president
`must. The job might demand that much (or more), or those
`staff accountant positions that require less might pay too little
`to be “gainful” for Dorris. The district court had no evidence
`either way. Neither do we, so we cannot say the district court
`clearly erred in finding that Dorris failed to carry her burden
`under the any occupation option.2
`
`
`2 Given the complete lack of vocational evidence here, we need not
`consider how far a claimant’s burden goes on an “any occupation” stand-
`ard or whether the burden would ever shift to the administrator to iden-
`tify a job the plaintiff could perform.
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`Dorris next argues that, even if her evidence falls short un-
`der the any occupation option, she meets the 20% less option.
`She notes she was unemployed, so she obviously made less
`than 80% of her pre-disability salary. The plan requires that
`she perform “at least one of the material duties of [her] regu-
`lar occupation or another occupation on a part-time or full-
`time basis.” Any duty, she argues, is tautologically either a
`duty of her regular occupation or another occupation. She
`points to her hour a week as a volunteer treasurer as meeting
`this standard. If her duties there were not those of a president,
`she reasons, then they must have been the duties of some
`other job. Alternatively, in her reply brief, she compares her
`three-hour weekly shift as a docent to her job as a corporate
`president because both require “dealing with people.”
`Dorris, however, never presented an argument along
`these lines to the district court. Unum, thus, contends that she
`waived any argument under the 20% less option. We agree
`and do not decide whether Dorris’s interpretation of the plan
`is correct. See CNH Indus. Am. LLC v. Jones Lang LaSalle Ams.,
`Inc, 882 F.3d 692, 704–06 (7th Cir. 2018) (declining to interpret
`contractual provision not argued to district court).
`A party generally waives arguments raised for the first
`time on appeal. See Villas at Winding Ridge v. State Farm Fire &
`Cas. Co., 942 F.3d 824, 832 (7th Cir. 2019). Even arguments that
`a party presented to the district court can be waived, if they
`were “underdeveloped, conclusory, or unsupported by law.”
`Puffer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 675 F.3d 709, 718 (7th Cir. 2012). Dor-
`ris’s argument under the 20% less option was all three.
`Although she asserted that she met the requirements for
`the 20% less option, the district court noted that she provided
`“no evidence or explanation” to support that assertion. She
`
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`No. 19-1701
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`cited no legal authority and included only one sentence of jus-
`tification in the fact section of her response brief. Burying an
`argument in one’s brief does not preserve it for appellate re-
`view. See United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir.
`1991) (per curiam) (“Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truf-
`fles buried in briefs.”); cf. Ajayi v. Aramark Bus. Servs., Inc., 336
`F.3d 520, 529 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding appellate issue waived
`when it was addressed only in statement of facts). We decline
`to find that the district court clearly erred in its assessment of
`an argument never actually argued to it and thereby “under-
`mine the essential function of the district court.” Barnes v. City
`of Centralia, 943 F.3d 826, 832 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Econ.
`Folding Box Corp. v. Anchor Frozen Foods Corp., 515 F.3d 718,
`720 (7th Cir. 2008)).
`Finally, Dorris challenges the district court’s decision to
`limit itself to the administrative record and to deny her mo-
`tion to amend the judgment. We review both decisions for an
`abuse of discretion. See Barrington Music Prod., Inc. v. Music &
`Arts Ctr., 924 F.3d 966, 968 (7th Cir. 2019) (motion to amend
`judgment); Patton, 480 F.3d at 490 (limitation of record).
`According to Dorris, it was inconsistent for the district
`court to find that the administrative record provided an ade-
`quate basis for its decision and to then rule against her be-
`cause the record was underdeveloped. We see no incon-
`sistency because Dorris never offered—and the court never
`rejected—relevant extra-record evidence. All the court had
`before it was the extraneous evidence of Dr. Harris’s alleged
`malpractice. No one argues that it was error to exclude that.
`This is not a case like Krolnik, where the district court de-
`nied reasonable discovery and refused to consider even evi-
`dence the plaintiff procured at his own expense. 570 F.3d at
`
`
`
`No. 19-1701
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`17
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`843. Dorris offered nothing and sought only duplicative dis-
`covery, which the magistrate judge properly denied. See id. In
`doing so, he noted that the protective order would not stop
`Dorris from seeking any other discovery consistent with the
`rules of civil procedure. She elected not to seek anything fur-
`ther. Moreover, Dorris never objected to the protective order,
`and ʺ[a] party may not assign as error a defect in the [magis-
`trate judge’s] order not timely objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
`72(a); Davis v. Kayira, 938 F.3d 910, 916 (7th Cir. 2019).
`The district court also was not obligated to reopen discov-
`ery after the judgment. A motion to amend the judgment un-
`der Rule 59 is not “a vehicle for a party to undo its own pro-
`cedural failures.” Barrington Music Prods., 924 F.3d at 968
`(quoting Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Beyrer, 722 F.3d 939, 954 (7th
`Cir. 2013)). Dorris appears to have believed that the lack of
`vocational evidence in the record favored her. She was wrong.
`Unum’s motion for judgment emphasized that it was her bur-
`den to prove entitlement to benefits under the plan and ar-
`gued that she failed to meet that burden. If this burden was a
`surprise, she could have moved to reopen discovery when
`Unum sought judgment. She was not entitled to wait until af-
`ter Unum won. See Cincinnati Life, 722 F.3d at 954 (affirming
`denial of Rule 59 motion when appellant mistakenly believed
`issue was outside scope of district court proceedings).
`III. Conclusion
`The district court was presented with an underdeveloped
`administrative record. From this record, it concluded that
`Dorris failed to carry her burden, as the plaintiff, to demon-
`strate she was entitled to benefits. We see no clear error in that
`finding or abuse of discretion in the limitation of its review to
`the administrative record. We therefore affirm the judgment.
`
`