`NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
`To be cited only in accordance with
`To be cited only in accordance with
`Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
`Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
`
`United States Court of Appeals
`For the Seventh Circuit
`Chicago, Illinois 60604
`
`Submitted September 22, 2014*
`Decided September 22, 2014
`
`Before
`
` RICHARD D. CUDAHY, Circuit Judge
`
` RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge
`
` MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge
`
`
`
`
`
`No. 14‐1796
`
`MARYAM BENNETT,
`Plaintiff‐Appellant,
`
`v.
`
`BAYER HEALTHCARE
`PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.,
`Defendant‐Appellee.
`
`Appeal from the United States District
`Court for the Southern District of Illinois.
`
`No. 13‐cv‐20026‐DRH
`
`David R. Herndon,
`Chief Judge.
`
`O R D E R
`
`After using the oral contraceptive Yasmin, Maryam Bennett developed
`gallbladder disease and brought this personal‐injury action against Yasmin’s
`manufacturer, Bayer Healthcare Pharmaceuticals. The district court dismissed the
`
`* After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral
`argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record.
`See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
`
`
`
`No. 14‐1796
`
`Page 2
`
`action with prejudice for failure to comply with discovery. Because the district court’s
`decision was a reasonable exercise of its discretion, we affirm the judgment.
`
`The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation has centralized for pretrial
`proceedings more than 1,000 suits concerning the safety of Yasmin and Yaz (a similar
`contraceptive). After Bennett sued in the Northern District of Georgia, the Panel
`determined that her suit appeared to involve questions of fact common to the others. It
`entered a conditional transfer order of Bennett’s action to the federal court in the
`Southern District of Illinois for centralized, pretrial proceedings on its multidistrict
`litigation docket. See MULTIDISTRICT LIT. R. 7.1(b). Concerned that inclusion in these
`centralized proceedings “could possibly add extra cost and undue stress” and cause
`unnecessary delay, Bennett moved to vacate the Panel’s order. See id. 7.1(c), (f). The
`Panel determined, however, that transfer would not inconvenience Bennett; rather, the
`transfer would afford her “access to the substantial discovery already conducted” in the
`Southern District of Illinois and the benefit of “a judge highly familiar with the factual
`allegations underlying [her] claims.”
`
`Pretrial discovery in multidistrict litigation imposes obligations on each plaintiff:
`In this case, a plaintiff alleging a gallbladder injury is required to notify her healthcare
`providers that they must preserve any records they have that are relevant to her claims.
`Within 45 days of the case’s transfer to the federal court in Illinois, the plaintiff must
`serve defense counsel with copies of those notices. If the plaintiff fails to comply, a
`ten‐day “cure period” follows. If the plaintiff still does not comply, the court, on the
`defendant’s motion, may order the plaintiff to show cause why the gallbladder claim
`should not be dismissed with prejudice. The claim will be dismissed unless the plaintiff
`has good cause for her noncompliance. The district court notified Bennett of these
`duties and the penalty for noncompliance.
`
`Nonetheless Bennett refused to serve preservation notices initially and during
`the cure period. Instead she flooded the court with motions, including for summary
`judgment, to stay discovery, and to remand the case to Georgia. She also argued that,
`while her suit was pending in Georgia, she had served Bayer with “all the information
`the defense needed to get the information for discovery.“ That information consisted of
`contact information for her health insurer, pharmacy, physicians, and surgeon;
`pharmacy records of her Yasmin prescription; and a one‐page radiology report.
`Following Bayer’s motion to show cause, the district court admonished Bennett that her
`torrent of motions, now denied, did not justify disobedience of the order to request that
`her providers preserve records. Chief Judge Herndon also warned her that she
`
`
`
`No. 14‐1796
`
`Page 3
`
`disregarded the preservation order “at her own peril” and she risked dismissal with
`prejudice unless she established good cause for her noncompliance.
`
`Bennett responded, not by requesting that her providers preserve records, but by
`seeking Chief Judge Herndon’s recusal. Bennett listed four reasons why she believed
`that the judge was biased against her: (1) When she emailed him a request to take
`“special notice” of her case, he concluded that the email was ex parte; (2) he “failed to
`carefully review [her] motions before ruling”; (3) his “rapport” with Bayer had
`“prejudice[d] him” against Bennett; and (4) he required Bennett to “repeat steps, waste
`more time, money and resources” without explaining his reasoning. The judge’s
`partiality, Bennett added, gave her good cause for disregarding his discovery orders.
`
`The district court had had enough. First it rejected Bennett’s motion for recusal.
`“[D]ispleasure” with its rulings, the court explained, is “not an adequate basis for
`recusal.” The court then dismissed Bennett’s claims with prejudice, explaining that
`despite the warnings to her, she had not issued preservation notices or shown good
`cause for failing to do so.
`
`On appeal Bennett raises only three principal challenges that we need discuss.
`First she contests the Panel’s transfer of her case to the multidistrict litigation docket in
`Illinois. We may review an order of the Panel only by extraordinary writ, 28 U.S.C.
`§ 1407(e); FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc. v. U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litig., 662
`F.3d 887, 890 (7th Cir. 2011), which Bennett has not sought. Her failure arguably
`precludes our review of the Panel’s determination. See In re Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys.,
`Inc., 754 F.3d 772, 780 (9th Cir. 2014).
`
`But even if, because she is pro se, we were to construe Bennett’s notice of appeal
`as a petition for a writ of mandamus, see, e.g., United States v. White, 582 F.3d 787, 793
`(7th Cir. 2009), her challenge would lose on the merits. The Panel may centralize for
`pretrial proceedings actions that involve “common questions of fact” if doing so “will
`be for the convenience of parties and witnesses and will promote the just and efficient
`conduct of such actions.” 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a). Only an outlandish decision justifies
`reversing the Panel’s order. See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380
`(2004) (“[O]nly exceptional circumstances amounting to a judicial usurpation of power
`or a clear abuse of discretion” justify mandamus relief.) (internal quotation marks and
`citations omitted); FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 662 F.3d at 890–91. Here Bennett’s
`claim—that her gallbladder injuries arise from her use of Yasmin—appears to share
`factual questions in common with the other suits alleging that Yasmin or Yaz caused
`
`
`
`No. 14‐1796
`
`Page 4
`
`other gallbladder injuries. See Grispino v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 358 F.3d 16, 19
`n.3 (1st Cir. 2004). The Panel thus reasonably concluded that transfer to the multidistrict
`litigation docket in Illinois would benefit the parties, including Bennett who would gain
`access to the discovery already conducted on these common questions.
`
`Bennett next argues without merit that Chief Judge Herndon should have
`recused himself because of personal bias; his refusal to recuse, she contends, renders his
`adverse rulings, such as denying her request to remand the case to Georgia, suspect.
`See 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1). To establish bias, Bennett needed to present “evidence that
`would lead a reasonable observer to believe that the judge was incapable of ruling
`fairly.” Collins v. Illinois, 554 F.3d 693, 697 (7th Cir. 2009). All Bennett puts forth is her
`general dissatisfaction with the district court’s rulings, but adverse rulings by
`themselves do not evince favoritism or antagonism. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S.
`540, 555 (1994); White, 582 F.3d at 807.
`
`Finally Bennett asserts that the district court abused its discretion by dismissing
`the action as a sanction for refusing to comply with its order requiring her to request
`preservation of her records. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(v); e360 Insight, Inc. v.
`Spamhaus Project, 658 F.3d 637, 642 (7th Cir. 2011). As best we can tell, Bennett believes
`that the disclosures that she provided when her case was in Georgia (her provider
`contact information, prescription records, and radiology report) complied with the
`court’s order. But the court ordered her to ask her providers to preserve everything
`relevant to her claim in their records, and she defied that order. An order to preserve
`records is reasonable because it maintains potentially relevant evidence that an
`adversary may need to litigate a claim or defense. See, e.g., Palmer v. City of Chicago, 755
`F.2d 560, 573 (7th Cir. 1985); Moore v. CITGO Ref. & Chemicals Co., L.P., 735 F.3d 309,
`314–17 (5th Cir. 2013). By defying this reasonable discovery order, Bennett unjustifiably
`imperiled Bayer’s defense to her claim. Furthermore, the district court repeatedly
`warned Bennett that she risked dismissal if she continued to flout the
`preservation‐notice requirement. See In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Products Liab.
`Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1237 (9th Cir. 2006). But despite notice, warning, and ample
`opportunity to cure, Bennett obstinately persisted, showed no prospect of obedience,
`and furnished no sound excuse for her intransigence. Under theses circumstances the
`court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that her defiance was willful and
`dismissing the action with prejudice. See Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 727 F.3d
`751, 778–79 (7th Cir. 2013) (explaining that willful defiance of court discovery order can
`warrant dismissal); Brown v. Columbia Sussex Corp., 664 F.3d 182, 190–91 (7th Cir. 2011)
`(same); In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Products Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d at 1233 (same).
`
`
`
`No. 14‐1796
`
`Page 5
`
`We have considered Bennett’s remaining arguments, and none merits further
`discussion. Therefore, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.