Case 23-910, Document 32, 07/17/2023, 3542786, Page1 of 37
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`No. 23-910
`In the United States Court of Appeals
`for the Second Circuit
`
`In re Google LLC,
`Petitioner.
`
`On Petition for Writ of Mandamus
`to the United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
`Litigation
`
`Response to petition for mandamus
`
`Brent Webster
`First Assistant Attorney General
`
`Lanora C. Pettit
`Principal Deputy Solicitor General
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`Office of the Attorney General
`P.O. Box 12548 (MC 059)
`Austin, Texas 78711-2548
`Tel.: (512) 936-1700
`Fax: (512) 474-2697
`Lanora.Pettit@oag.texas.gov
`
`Counsel for Respondents
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`

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`Case 23-910, Document 32, 07/17/2023, 3542786, Page2 of 37
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`Corporate Disclosure Statement
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`No. 23-910
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`IN RE GOOGLE LLC,
`Petitioner,
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`As sovereign entities, respondents have no shareholders to be disclosed under
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`Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1(a).
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`/s/ Lanora C. Pettit
`Lanora C. Pettit
`Counsel of Record for Respondents
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`i
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`Case 23-910, Document 32, 07/17/2023, 3542786, Page3 of 37
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`Statement Regarding Oral Argument
`This case calls for the straightforward application of Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55
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`(1949), and United States v. National City Lines, Inc., 337 U.S. 78 (1949), where the
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`Supreme Court squarely held that because “[n]o one has a vested right in any given
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`mode of procedure,” changes to venue rules apply to cases pending at the time those
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`rules become effective. Collett, 337 U.S. at 71. Because the Judicial Panel on Multi-
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`District Litigation (“JPML”) correctly concluded that Google forfeited any attempt
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`to distinguish Collett and National City Lines by “ma[king] no attempt to address”
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`them,1 oral argument is unnecessary for the disposition of Google’s petition for a writ
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`of mandamus. Should the Court conclude that oral argument would aid in its deci-
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`sional process, the respondent States request the opportunity to participate.
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`1 In re Google Digit. Advert. Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 3010 (J.P.M.L. June 5,
`2023), ECF No. 250 (“Remand Order”) at 3.
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`ii
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`Case 23-910, Document 32, 07/17/2023, 3542786, Page4 of 37
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`Table of Contents
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`Page
`Corporate Disclosure Statement ............................................................................... i
`Statement Regarding Oral Argument ....................................................................... ii
`Table of Authorities ................................................................................................ iv
`Introduction ............................................................................................................. 1
`Statement of Jurisdiction ......................................................................................... 3
`Issue Presented ........................................................................................................ 3
`Statement of the Case .............................................................................................. 3
`Standard of Review .................................................................................................. 7
`Summary of the Argument ....................................................................................... 8
`Argument ............................................................................................................... 10
`I. Google Has Not Shown a Clear Entitlement to Mandamus Relief. .......... 10
`A. The JPML correctly concluded that Congress did not
`displace ordinary presumptions that the Venue Act applies to
`pending cases. ..................................................................................... 11
`1. The text of the Venue Act applies to pending cases. .................... 11
`2. Google’s attempt to rewrite the Venue Act through cherry-
`picked legislative history is unavailing. ........................................ 14
`B. Under Landgraf step two, the JPML correctly concluded that
`the Venue Act is a procedural rule that applies to pending
`cases. .................................................................................................. 18
`II. Google Cannot Show That Mandamus Is Appropriate Under the
`Circumstances. ......................................................................................... 24
`Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 27
`Certificate of Service .............................................................................................. 28
`Certificate of Compliance ...................................................................................... 28
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`iii
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`Case 23-910, Document 32, 07/17/2023, 3542786, Page5 of 37
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`
`Table of Authorities
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`
`Page(s)
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`Cases:
`Albemarle Corp. v. AstraZeneca UK Ltd.,
`628 F.3d 643 (4th Cir. 2010) ............................................................................. 20
`Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. v. Bank of Am. Corp.,
`712 F.3d 775 (2d Cir. 2013) ................................................................................ 11
`BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States,
`541 U.S. 176 (2004) ............................................................................................ 11
`Blaz v. Belfer,
`368 F.3d 501 (5th Cir. 2004) .............................................................................. 19
`Bragdon v. Abbott,
`524 U.S. 624 (1998) ............................................................................................ 2
`Centurion v. Holder,
`755 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 2014) ............................................................................... 10
`Chavez v. Martinez,
`538 U.S. 760 (2003) .......................................................................................... 20
`Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C.,
`542 U.S. 367 (2004) .................................................................................... passim
`Coinbase, Inc. v. Bielski,
`143 S. Ct. 1915 (2023) .............................................................................. 9, 21, 26
`Ex parte Collett,
`337 U.S. 55 (1949) ....................................................................................... passim
`Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain,
`503 U.S. 249 (1992) .......................................................................................... 14
`In re Cooper Tire & Rubber Co.,
`568 F.3d 1180 (10th Cir. 2009) ..................................................................... 2, 22
`Crane v. Hahlo,
`258 U.S. 142 (1922) ........................................................................................... 23
`In re Depuy Orthopaedics, Inc.,
`870 F.3d 345 (5th Cir. 2017)........................................................................ 24, 26
`In re Digital Advert. Antitrust Litig.,
`555 F. Supp. 3d 1372 (J.P.M.L 2021) ................................................................ 3, 5
`Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll.,
`535 U.S. 106 (2002) ........................................................................................... 13
`
`iv
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`Case 23-910, Document 32, 07/17/2023, 3542786, Page6 of 37
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`
`
`Enter. Mortg. Acceptance Co., LLC, Sec. Litig. v. Enter. Mortg.
`Acceptance Co.,
`391 F.3d 401 (2d Cir. 2004) ..................................................................... 9, 11, 18
`F.T.C. v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal.,
`449 U.S. 232 (1980) .......................................................................................... 21
`Ex parte Fahey,
`332 U.S. 258 (1947) ............................................................................................. 7
`Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media,
`139 S. Ct. 2356 (2019) ........................................................................................ 15
`Ford Motor Co. v. Ryan,
`182 F.2d 329 (2d Cir. 1950) .......................................................................... 22-23
`Gemsco, Inc. v. Walling,
`324 U.S. 244 (1945) ........................................................................................... 16
`In re Google Digit. Advert. Antitrust Litig.,
`627 F. Supp. 3d 346 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) ................................................................. 5
`In re Google LLC,
`No. 2021-171, 2021 WL 4592280 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 6, 2021) (per
`curiam) .............................................................................................................. 25
`Hadlich v. Am. Mail Line,
`82 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. Cal. 1949) ...................................................................... 20
`Hallowell v. Commons,
`239 U.S. 506 (1916) ...................................................................................... 17, 21
`Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
`548 U.S. 557 (2006) .................................................................................... passim
`Hughes Aircraft Co. v. U.S. ex rel. Schumer,
`520 U.S. 939 (1997) ........................................................................................... 12
`Jingrong v. Chinese Anti-Cult World All. Inc.,
`16 F.4th 47 (2d Cir. 2021) .................................................................................. 11
`Lamar Archer & Cofrin, LLP v. Appling,
`138 S. Ct. 1752 (2018) ....................................................................................... 12
`Landgraf v. USI Film Products,
`511 U.S. 244 (1994) ..................................................................................... passim
`Legal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers v. Dep’t of State, Bureau
`of Consular Affairs,
`104 F.3d 1349 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ........................................................................... 19
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`v
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`
`Lindh v. Murphy,
`521 U.S. 320 (1997) ................................................................................. 14, 17, 19
`Martin v. Hadix,
`527 U.S. 343 (1999) ............................................................................................ 16
`Martinez v. I.N.S.,
`523 F.3d 365 (2d Cir. 2008) .................................................................... 10, 11, 15
`Maryland v. Soper,
`270 U.S. 9 (1926) .............................................................................................. 24
`Merck & Co. v. Reynolds,
`559 U.S. 633 (2010) ............................................................................................ 13
`Milner v. Dep’t of Navy,
`562 U.S. 562 (2011) ............................................................................................ 15
`Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter,
`558 U.S. 100 (2009) .................................................................................... 24, 25
`North Star Steel Co. v. Thomas,
`515 U.S. 29 (1995) .............................................................................................. 13
`In re Paxton,
`60 F.4th 252 (5th Cir. 2023) ............................................................................. 24
`Ex parte Peru,
`318 U.S. 578 (1943) ........................................................................................... 24
`Ramos v. Town of Vernon,
`208 F.3d 203, 2000 WL 287698 (2d Cir. 2000) ................................................ 22
`Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC,
`395 U.S. 367 (1969) ............................................................................................ 15
`Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc.,
`511 U.S. 298 (1994) ............................................................................................ 16
`Russello v. United States,
`464 U.S. 16 (1983) .............................................................................................. 17
`Schoen v. Mountain Producers Corp.,
`170 F.2d 707 (3d Cir. 1948) ............................................................................... 20
`Seay v. Kaplan,
`35 F.R.D. 118 (S.D. Iowa 1964) ......................................................................... 20
`In re The City of New York,
`607 F.3d 923 (2d Cir. 2010) ................................................................................ 8
`T.M. ex rel. A.M. v. Cornwall Cent. Sch. Dist.,
`752 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2014) ............................................................................... 22
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`Toibb v. Radloff,
`501 U.S. 157 (1991) ............................................................................................. 15
`In re TS Tech USA Corp.,
`551 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2008) .......................................................................... 23
`United States v. Gonzales,
`520 U.S. 1 (1997) ................................................................................................ 15
`United States v. Krug,
`868 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2017) ................................................................................ 20
`United States v. Nat’l City Lines, Inc.,
`80 F. Supp. 734 (S.D. Cal. 1948) ........................................................................ 13
`United States v. National City Lines,
`334 U.S. 573 (1948) ........................................................................................... 23
`United States v. National City Lines, Inc.,
`337 U.S. 78 (1949) ....................................................................................... passim
`United States v. Schooner Peggy,
`5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 103 (1801) ............................................................................. 13
`Vill. of Barrington v. Surface Transp. Bd.,
`636 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 2011) ............................................................................ 15
`In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc.,
`545 F.3d 304 (5th Cir.2008) (en banc) ......................................................... 23, 25
`Will v. United States,
`389 U.S. 90 (1967) ..................................................................................24, 25, 26
`Ysleta del sur Pueblo v. Texas,
`142 S. Ct. 1929 (2022) ........................................................................................ 15
`Zall v. Standard Ins. Co.,
`58 F.4th 284 (7th Cir. 2023) .............................................................................. 19
`Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, and Rules:
`1 U.S.C. § 1 ............................................................................................................ 12
`15 U.S.C.
`§ 15(a) ............................................................................................................... 21
`28 U.S.C.:
`§ 1292(a)(1) ....................................................................................................... 22
`§ 1404 ............................................................................................................... 23
`§ 1407 .................................................................................................................. 4
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` § 1407(a) ....................................................................................................... 9, 26
`§ 1407(g) ..................................................................................................... passim
`§ 1651(a) .............................................................................................................. 3
`Act of April 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-296, § 1, 82 Stat. 109 ..................................... 4
`Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023, Pub. L. No. 117-328, Div.
`GG, Title III,   301, 136 Stat. 4459 (Dec. 29, 2022) ............................................. 5
`136 Stat. 4459 Title III, § 301 (Dec. 29, 2022) ....................................................... 12
`Other Authorities:
`168 Cong. Rec. S7328 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 2022) ..................................................... 18
`Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: Interpretation of Legal
`Texts 266 (2012) .......................................................................................... passim
`16 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and
`Procedure § 3935.4 (3d. ed.) .................................................................... 9-10, 25
`Complaint, United States v. Google, No. 1:23-cv-00108 (E.D. Va. Jan.
`24, 2023) ............................................................................................................. 4
`In re: Google Digit. Advert. Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 3010 (J.P.M.L.
`Mar. 22, 2023), ECF No. 229-1 .......................................................................... 7
`In re Google Digit. Advert. Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 3010 (J.P.M.L.
`June 5, 2023), ECF No. 250 ........................................................................ passim
`In re: Google Digit. Advert. Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 3010 (J.P.M.L.
`Mar. 22, 2023), ECF No. 238 ........................................................................... 27
`Jt. Letter, In re Digit. Advert. Antitrust Litig., No. 1:21-md-03010-PKC
`(S.D.N.Y. 2021), ECF No. 468 (Feb. 21, 2023) .................................................. 5
`Letter from Attorney General Phil Weiser, et al., to Sen. Amy
`Klobuchar (June 18, 2021), https://tinyurl.com/2p8a5c38; ............................... 4
`Letter from Sen. Amy Klobuchar, et al., to Judge Roslynn R.
`Mauskopf (July 28, 2021), https://tinyurl.com/rajzhdvd ...................... 1, 4, 5, 26
`Spencer Weber Waller, The Past, Present, and Future of Monopolization
`Remedies, 76 Antitrust L.J. 11 (2009) ................................................................. 21
`State Antitrust Enforcement Venue Act of 2021, H.R. 3460 and S.
`1787, 117th Cong. (2021) ..................................................................................... 4
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`Case 23-910, Document 32, 07/17/2023, 3542786, Page10 of 37
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`Introduction
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`This case was always going back to the Eastern District of Texas, and Google
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`has always known it. The only question is when. When read (as it must be) in con-
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`junction with ordinary rules of statutory construction, Congress’s amendment to
`28 U.S.C. § 1407(g) resolves that question: so that States would not “be hamstrung
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`in their efforts to halt antitrust violations or protect their citizens from anticompeti-
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`tive conduct,”2 Congress provided that “[n]othing in [the Multidistrict Litigation
`statute] shall apply to any action in which . . . a State is a complainant arising under
`the antitrust laws.” 28 U.S.C. § 1407(g). Recognizing that this type of procedural
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`rule creates no retroactivity concerns and respecting the legislative choice to limit its
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`authority, the JPML remanded this case to Texas. Google’s effort to undo that deci-
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`sion through the “drastic and extraordinary remed[y]” of a writ of mandamus is en-
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`tirely without merit. Collett, 377 U.S. at 72.
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`Google acknowledges (at 14) that the JPML applied the correct two-part test
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`from Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994). That test requires
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`courts to examine first “whether Congress has expressly prescribed the statute’s
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`proper reach,” then “whether the new statute would have retroactive effect” such
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`as “impair[ing] rights a party possessed when he acted, increase[ing] a party’s liabil-
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`ity for past conduct, or impos[ing] new duties with respect to transactions already
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`completed.” Id. at 280. Here, that analysis was easy: the Supreme Court has already
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`2 Letter from Sen. Amy Klobuchar, et al., to Judge Roslynn R. Mauskopf (July
`28, 2021), https://tinyurl.com/rajzhdvd.
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`Case 23-910, Document 32, 07/17/2023, 3542786, Page11 of 37
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`held that because a venue statute is “a remedial provision,” changes to such a statute
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`are “applicable to pending actions.” Collett, 337 U.S. at 71; see also, e.g., Landgraf,
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`511 U.S. at 275 (relying on Collett in fashioning its rule). And Google “ma[de] no
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`attempt” to distinguish these cases. Remand Order 3.
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`Google’s belated attempt to develop contrary arguments here turn the law on its
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`head. A writ of mandamus is proper only when the petitioner establishes that his
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`“right to issuance of the writ is ‘clear and indisputable,’” and that principles of eq-
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`uity favor the extraordinary remedy. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C., 542 U.S. 367,
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`380-81 (2004). On Google’s telling (at 10), it is indisputable that because Congress
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`removed a provision that would have made the act “take effect on June 1, 2021,”
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`that Congress expressly prescribed the statute not reach cases still pending on Janu-
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`ary 1, 2023. This is a non-sequitur. Moreover, legislative history Google cites cannot
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`bear the weight placed on it—particularly given that Congress is presumed to have
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`been aware of Collett and National City Lines when it passed the Venue Act. See, e.g.,
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`Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 648 (1998).
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`Even if Google could establish a clear right to relief on the merits, it cannot es-
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`tablish that equity favors its requested relief, which must be “appropriate under the
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`circumstances.” Cheney, 542 U.S. at 380-81. Mandamus relief is inappropriate for
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`many reasons—even apart from the fact that appellate courts do “not use mandamus
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`to hold the district court responsible for failing to address arguments that were not
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`before it.” In re Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 568 F.3d 1180, 1196 (10th Cir. 2009). Per-
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`haps most significant is that in passing the Venue Act, Congress knew it was sacri-
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`ficing potential efficiencies. Congress did it anyway because of the significant societal
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`2
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`Case 23-910, Document 32, 07/17/2023, 3542786, Page12 of 37
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`costs that inhere in allowing state antitrust-enforcement action to be tied to—and
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`potentially bogged down by—private litigants whose private incentives may not align
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`with the public good.
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`Statement of Jurisdiction
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`Pursuant to the All Writs Act, this Court may entertain a petition for writ of
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`mandamus “in aid of [its own] jurisdiction” or as “agreeable to the usages and prin-
`ciples of law.” 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). Google does not maintain that it seeks a manda-
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`mus petition in aid of this Court’s jurisdiction in an underlying appeal.
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`Issue Presented
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`Whether Google has demonstrated a clear and indisputable right to mandamus
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`relief where the JPML remanded this case to the Eastern District of Texas based on
`an amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1407(g) providing that antitrust actions brought by
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`States are not subject to MDL proceedings.
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`Statement of the Case
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`In December 2020, Plaintiff States filed suit against Google in the Eastern Dis-
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`trict of Texas, alleging that Google violated federal and state antitrust laws by engag-
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`ing in anticompetitive conduct across various online advertising technology markets.
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`Many private lawsuits against Google followed on the heels of the Plaintiff States’
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`suit. Facing nearly two dozen efforts to hold it accountable for its misconduct,
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`Google successfully sought to consolidate “19 actions” brought by States or private
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`individuals, which were then “pending in 16 districts” across the country. In re Dig-
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`ital Advert. Antitrust Litig., 555 F. Supp. 3d 1372, 1374 (J.P.M.L 2021) (“Transfer
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`3
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`

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`Order”). Regardless of how this Court rules on the petition, this consolidated action
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`will not include all claims based on Google’s anti-competitive behavior: since 1968,
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`Congress has exempted from the multi-district litigation statue “any action in which
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`the United States is a complainant arising under the antitrust laws.” Act of April 29,
`1968, Pub. L. No. 90-296, §  1, 82 Stat. 109, 110 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
`§ 1407). Pursuant to that exemption, the United States is separately litigating its own
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`claims under the Sherman Act in the Eastern District of Virginia. Complaint, United
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`States v. Google, No. 1:23-cv-00108 (E.D. Va. Jan. 24, 2023).
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`Before this case left Texas, the States informed the JPML that Congress was in
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`the process of extending the United States’ antitrust exemption to States. State An-
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`titrust Enforcement Venue Act of 2021, H.R. 3460 and S. 1787, 117th Cong. (2021)
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`(the “Venue Act”). As supporters explained, when transferred, these actions, which
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`are “brought in the public interest,” are “typically postponed and may be joined
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`with numerous other lawsuits brought by private plaintiffs.”3 The result is often de-
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`lay in States’ ability to “protect consumers, workers, and competition” as States
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`“need to coordinate—and possibly consolidate—with slower-moving private ac-
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`tions.” Klobuchar, supra n.1, at 1.4 The JPML acknowledged this legislative effort,
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`and agreed that the “proposed legislation, if enacted would effectuate” the States’
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`3 Letter from Attorney General Phil Weiser, et al., to Sen. Amy Klobuchar (June
`18, 2021), https://tinyurl.com/2p8a5c38; see also Klobuchar, supra n.1.
`4 For the avoidance of doubt, the States do not think the Court needs to look at
`these legislative materials to resolve the straightforward issue of statutory construc-
`tion. Infra Part I.A.1. They are included here to give context to those cherry-picked
`aspects of the statute’s history on which Google repeatedly relies.
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`4
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`Case 23-910, Document 32, 07/17/2023, 3542786, Page14 of 37
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`“desired outcome”—that is for the case to remain in the Eastern District of Texas.
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`Transfer Order, 555 F. Supp. 3d at 1379. But, the JPML concluded, it “must apply
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`the law currently in effect, without speculating about what future legislation might
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`be passed.” Id. at 1379. On this basis, the case was transferred.
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`In the nearly two years since transfer, this case has proven the fears of Congress
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`right: the States’ action has been encumbered by “slower-moving private actions”
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`to the detriment of the States’ citizens. Klobuchar, supra n.1, at 1. It was over a year
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`from the time the case arrived in the Southern District of New York before the court
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`denied Google’s request to dismiss the States’ tying, monopolization, and attempted
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`monopolization counts. See In re Google Digit. Advert. Antitrust Litig., 627 F. Supp.
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`3d 346 (S.D.N.Y. 2022). And when the States’ sought transfer of this case back to
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`the Eastern District of Texas nearly six months later, discovery remained in its in-
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`fancy. See Jt. Letter, In re Digit. Advert. Antitrust Litig., No. 1:21-md-03010-PKC
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`(S.D.N.Y. 2021), ECF No. 468 (Feb. 21, 2023).
`
`Congress has now passed a revised version of the Venue Act as part of the Con-
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`solidated Appropriations Act of 2023. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023, Pub.
`L. No. 117-328, Div. GG, Title III, § 301, 136 Stat. 4459, 5970 (Dec. 29, 2022). That
`law amended 28 U.S.C. § 1407(g)—which provides for transfer to MDL proceed-
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`ings—to state: “Nothing in this section shall apply to any action in which the United
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`States or a State is a complainant arising under the antitrust laws.” 28 U.S.C.
`§ 1407(g) (emphasis added). Section 1407(g) thus exempts antitrust actions filed by
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`states from MDL proceedings in the same way that it has exempted such actions filed
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`by the federal government since 1968.
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`5
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`Case 23-910, Document 32, 07/17/2023, 3542786, Page15 of 37
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`Relying on this provision, the States sought to transfer this case back to the East-
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`ern District of Texas. Remand Order, In Re: Google Digit. Advert. Antitrust Litig.,
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`MDL No. 3010, ECF No. 250. As it did when it made its original transfer decision,
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`the JPML looked to then-existing law. Id. This time, recognizing that Congress had
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`changed the procedural rules applicable to multi-district litigation, the JPML held
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`“that the recent amendment to Section 1407(g) applies to pending state antitrust
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`enforcement actions and, absent a state’s waiver of its venue rights, the Panel must
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`grant the motion for remand.” Id. at 2.
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`In reaching its decision that this case should return to Texas now rather than at
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`the conclusion of pre-trial proceedings, the JPML stated that “Landgraf provides the
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`well-settled framework for determining the reach of a newly enacted statute.” Id.
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`The JPML identified Landgraf’s two-part test for determining whether a law could
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`be retroactively applied: “(1) does the statute contain an express command as to its
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`retroactive application; and (2) if the answer is no, would application of the new
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`statue to the action have a genuinely retroactive effect.” Id. (internal quotation
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`marks omitted). And it noted that though “there is a long-established ‘presumption
`against retroactive legislation,’” the Supreme Court has “emphasized . . . that
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`‘[c]hanges in procedural rules may often be applied in suits arising before their en-
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`actment without raising concerns about retroactivity.’” Id. (quoting Landgraf, 511
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`U.S. at 265).
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`Applying Landgraf, the JPML first held that “the express language of the Sec-
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`tion 1407(g) amendment does not provide an answer to its temporal reach.” Id.
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`Then, moving to the second step of the Landgraf analysis, the JPML concluded that
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`“[t]he Section 1407(g) amendment is a plainly procedural rule” because “Section
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`1407 is in the nature of a venue provision for pretrial proceedings,” “Congress la-
`beled the Section 1407(g) amendment . . . a ‘venue’ provision,” and “[t]he venue of
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`an action cannot be characterized as impairing rights that a party had when it acted,
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`increasing a party’s liability for past conduct, or imposing new duties.” Id. at 3. The
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`JPML reasoned that “Landgraf leaves no doubt on this matter,” and it rejected
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`“Google’s reliance on legislative history to support its prospective-only interpreta-
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`tion of the amendment” as “unpersuasive.” Id. “Having determined that the
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`amendment to Section 1407(g) applies to state antitrust enforcement actions pend-
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`ing in MDLs” the JPML found “that remand [to the Eastern District of Texas] is
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`required.” Id. As a result, the JPML did not reach alternative grounds the States
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`asserted for transfer. In re: Google Digit. Advert. Antitrust Litig., Memorandum in
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`Support of Remand to the Eastern District of Texas, ECF No. 229-1. Google subse-
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`quently sought and obtained a temporary administrative stay from the JPML and
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`brought its petition for a writ of mandamus in this Court.
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`Standard of Review
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`“As extraordinary remedies,” writs of mandamus or prohibition against a judge
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`“are reserved for really extraordinary causes.” Collett, 337 U.S. at 72 (quoting Ex
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`parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 259 (1947)). As petitioner, it is Google’s burden to show
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`that its “right to issuance of the writ is ‘clear and indisputable,’” and that it “ha[s]
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`no other adequate means to attain the relief [it] desires.” Cheney, 542 U.S. at 380-
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`81. Moreover, because mandamus “is one of the most potent weapons in the judicial
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`arsenal,” the Supreme Court has explained, “even if [those] two prerequisites have
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`been met, the issuing court, in the exercise of its discretion, must be satisfied that
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`the writ is appropriate under the circumstances.” Id.; In re The City of New York, 607
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`F.3d 923, 932-33 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Cheney, 542 U.S. 380-81, as establishing a
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`three-part test).
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`Summary of the Argument
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`Google is not entitled to the extraordinary relief it seeks because it has demon-
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`strated neither that its entitlement to relief is clear and indisputable, nor that man-
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`damus is appropriate under these circumstances.
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`I. Google’s petition for a writ of mandamus must be denied at the outset be-
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`cause the JPML correctly identified existing Supreme Court precedent that changes
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`to venue may be applied to pending cases. See National City Lines, 337 U.S. at 78;
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`Collett, 337 U.S. at 71. But even if it were writing on a blank slate, the JPML correctly
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`applied both of Landgraf’s two steps to conclude that, as a procedural rule, the
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`Venue Act “takes away no substantive right but simply changes the tribunal that is
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`to hear the case.” Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 577 (2006).
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`First, the text of the Venue Act requires that it apply in pending cases, particu-
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`larly when read in the light of ordinary canons of statutory construction. Section
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`1407(g) states that “[n]othing in this section shall apply to any action in which the
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`United States or a State is a complainant arising under the antitrust laws.” 28 U.S.C.
`§ 1407(g) (emphasis added). That plain text controls here because the States are
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`complaining parties in a case arising under the antitrust laws, and thus th