throbber
22-592-cv
`The National Academy of Television Arts and Sciences, Inc. v. Goodman
`
`UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
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`SUMMARY ORDER
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`RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
`ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
`APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
`ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
`APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
`CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
`COUNSEL.
`
`
`
`
`At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
`Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in
`the City of New York, on the 14th day of June, two thousand twenty-three.
`
`PRESENT:
`
`
`ROSEMARY S. POOLER
`RICHARD C. WESLEY,
`MICHAEL H. PARK,
`Circuit Judges.
`_____________________________________
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`The National Academy of Television Arts and
`Sciences, Inc., Academy of Television Arts &
`Sciences,
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`Plaintiffs-Appellees,
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`v.
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`Jason Goodman,
`
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`Counter-Claimant-Counter-
`Defendant-Appellant.*
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`22-592
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`* The Clerk is respectfully directed to amend the caption accordingly.
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`_____________________________________
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`FOR GOODMAN:
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`Jason Goodman, pro se, New York, NY.
`
`Margaret A. Esquenet , B. Brett
`Heavner, Mary Kate Brennan, Finnegan,
`Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner,
`LLP, Washington, DC.
`
`D. George Sweigert, pro se, Box Elder,
`SD.
`
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`FOR THE ACADEMIES:
`
`
`FOR AMICUS CURIAE:
`
`
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`Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern
`
`District of New York (Caproni, J.).
`
`UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
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`AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED and the motion to
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`strike is DENIED as moot.
`
`Appellant Jason Goodman, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court’s
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`sanctions order against him and denial of his motion to intervene. Appellees, the
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`Academy of Television Arts & Sciences and the National Academy of Television Arts and
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`Sciences, Inc. (together, the “Academies”), brought a copyright- and trademark-
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`infringement suit against Multimedia System Design, Inc. (“MSD”). Goodman, the sole
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`owner and employee of MSD, sought to intervene on his own behalf. The district court
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`denied that motion and imposed sanctions on Goodman for willfully violating a
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`protective order by exposing a confidential email address. We assume the parties’
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`familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on
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`appeal.
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`Pro se filings are liberally construed “to raise the strongest arguments they
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`suggest.” McLeod v. Jewish Guild for the Blind, 864 F.3d 154, 156 (2d Cir. 2017).
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`I.
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`Sanctions
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`We review sanctions orders for abuse of discretion. Wolters Kluwer Fin. Servs., Inc.
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`v. Scivantage, 564 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2009). “Imposition of sanctions under a court’s
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`inherent powers requires a specific finding that an attorney [or party] acted in bad faith”
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`and is “appropriate only if there is clear evidence that the conduct at issue is (1) entirely
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`without color and (2) motivated by improper purposes.” Id. at 114. Conduct is
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`“entirely without color when it lacks any legal or factual basis.” Id. “A finding of bad
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`faith, and a finding that conduct is without color or for an improper purpose, must be
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`supported by a high degree of specificity in the factual findings.” Id.
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`The district court did not abuse its discretion by ordering sanctions based on its
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`finding that Goodman acted in bad faith. Goodman knew of the protective order
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`prohibiting disclosure of confidential discovery material, understood that the
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`confidential email address was protected by that order, and decided to reveal the email
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`address anyway. The court determined that “Goodman’s violation of the Protective
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`Order was done willfully, with no legitimate purpose, to satisfy Mr. Goodman’s desire
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`to prove that Mr. Sweigert was behind the confidential email address,” and Goodman
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`willfully disregarded the authority of the district court in establishing a protective order.
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`Order at 5–6 , Nat’l Acad. of Television Arts & Scis., Inc., No. 20-cv-7269 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22,
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`2022), ECF No. 156. Indeed, Goodman made clear that he understood his behavior could
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`have led to sanctions for an attorney but assumed he was protected from reprisal because
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`he was neither a pro se litigant nor represented by counsel. See Letter exhibit A at 2,
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`Nat’l Acad. of Television Arts & Scis., Inc., No. 20-cv-7269 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2021), ECF No.
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`113-1 (“Now that I don’t have an attorney whatever I do my attorney can’t get sanctioned
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`and I’m not even Pro Se so they could just yell at me and tell me not to do it again.”).
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`Moreover, at a show-cause hearing on the matter, the court rejected Goodman’s claim
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`that he did not realize the email address was subject to the protective order, specifically
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`finding that this explanation for his conduct was not credible. We afford the district
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`court’s credibility determinations significant deference, see United States v. Iodice, 525 F.3d
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`179, 185 (2d Cir. 2008), and the record fully supports the district court’s assessment of
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`Goodman’s bad faith.
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`Furthermore, the requirement to notify other courts of the order against Goodman
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`is not a particularly onerous sanction. “A district court may, in its discretion, impose
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`sanctions against litigants who abuse the judicial process,” including “an injunction
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`forbidding further litigation.” Shafii v. Brit. Airways, PLC, 83 F.3d 566, 571 (2d Cir. 1996).
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`Goodman has engaged in many lawsuits with Sweigert, including at least six others that
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`have reached this Court. See 2d Cir. 21-78, 21-2005, 21-3101, 22-40, 22-682, 22-1414. The
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`district court’s order is limited to two years and serves only to notify other courts that
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`Goodman has previously violated a protective order. The order did not bar Goodman
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`from further litigation and so was less of an imposition than a filing injunction. Cf. Shafii,
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`83 F.3d at 571. And we have approved similar orders against attorneys who have been
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`sanctioned. See Gallop v. Cheney, 667 F.3d 226, 230-31 (2d Cir. 2012).
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`II.
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`Intervention
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`“We review a district court’s denial of a motion to intervene for abuse of
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`discretion.” In re Bank of N.Y. Derivative Litig., 320 F.3d 291, 299 (2d Cir. 2003). First, to
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`intervene as a matter of right under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2), an applicant must “(1) timely
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`file an application, (2) show an interest in the action, (3) demonstrate that the interest may
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`be impaired by the disposition of the action, and (4) show that the interest is not protected
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`adequately by the parties to the action.” Id. at 300. (cleaned up). “Failure to satisfy any
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`one of these requirements is a sufficient ground to deny the application.” Id. (cleaned
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`up).
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`The district court did not abuse its discretion by finding that Goodman’s motion
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`to intervene as of right was untimely, as it was filed a year and a half into the litigation
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`and only after Goodman realized MSD was at risk of a default judgment. Furthermore,
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`Goodman was the sole owner and employee of MSD, suggesting that his interests were
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`fully represented in the suit.
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`Second, as to permissive intervention under Fed. R. Civ. P 24(b), the district court
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`has “broad discretion” to deny such an application. N.Y. News, Inc. v. Kheel, 972 F.2d
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`482, 487 (2d Cir. 1992). The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
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`motion to intervene because Goodman filed a separate suit in which he sued Sharp, the
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`Academies, attorneys for the Academies, and others. Goodman thus had a full
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`opportunity for his claims to be heard before a court. Goodman’s interests have also
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`been represented on appeal by MSD.
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`We have considered all of Goodman’s remaining arguments and find them to be
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`without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. Because
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`we affirm the judgment, we DENY the Academies’ motion to strike as moot.1
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`FOR THE COURT:
`Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
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`1 The contested Appendix did not factor into our consideration of this appeal.
`6
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`

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