21-2143-cv
`Bryan v. Fleetbank N.A.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
`
`SUMMARY ORDER
`
`RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
`ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
`APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
`IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
`ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ASUMMARY ORDER@). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
`ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
`
`held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
`New York, on the 12th day of October, two thousand twenty-two.
`
`PRESENT:
`
`
`JON O. NEWMAN,
`JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
`EUNICE C. LEE,
`Circuit Judges.
`_____________________________________________
`
`Andres C. Bryan,
`
`
`Plaintiff-Appellant,
`
`
`
`v.
`
`Fleetbank N.A., Department of Finance, Tampa,
`Florida,
`
`
`Defendants-Appellees.
`
`
`_____________________________________________
`
`FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT:
`
`
`FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES:
`
`21-2143
`
`
`
`
`Andres C. Bryan, pro se,
`Brooklyn, NY.
`
`No appearance.
`
`

`

`1
`
`2
`
`3
`
`4
`
`5
`
`6
`
`7
`
`8
`
`9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
`
`York (Donnelly, J.).
`
`UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
`
`DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
`
`Appellant Andres Bryan, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s judgment
`
`dismissing his complaint sua sponte as frivolous. Bryan alleged that he had won $11 million from
`
`American Family Publishers (“AFP”) in 1998 and had not been paid, and he sought payment of
`
`those winnings. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural
`
`history, and the issues on appeal.
`
`District courts have inherent authority to “dismiss a frivolous complaint sua sponte even
`
`when the plaintiff has paid the required filing fee.” Fitzgerald v. First East Seventh Street Tenants
`
`Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 364 (2d Cir. 2000). We have not yet decided whether such dismissalss are
`
`reviewed de novo or for abuse of discretion, but it is not necessary to decide that issue if, as here,
`
`“the District Court’s decision easily passes muster under the more rigorous de novo review.” Id.
`
`at 364 n.2.
`
`
`
`An action is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact—that is, where it is “based
`
`on an indisputably meritless legal theory” or presents “factual contentions [that] are clearly
`
`baseless.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989); see also Gallop v. Cheney, 642 F.3d
`
`364, 368 (2d Cir. 2011). A complaint must plead sufficient facts to “state a claim to relief that is
`
`plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A complaint
`
`is “deemed to include any written instrument attached to it as an exhibit.” L-7 Designs, Inc. v.
`
`Old Navy, LLC, 647 F.3d 419, 422 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Factual
`
`allegations in the complaint are generally assumed to be true, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
`
`
`
`2
`
`

`

`1
`
`2
`
`3
`
`4
`
`5
`
`6
`
`7
`
`8
`
`9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`(2009), and pro se filings “must be construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest
`
`arguments that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir.
`
`2006) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted).
`
`We agree with the district court that the principal allegation underlying Bryan’s claim—
`
`that he won AFP’s $11 million prize—is contradicted by the mailings attached to the complaint,
`
`which show that the prize was conditioned on the number assigned to Bryan in the mailings
`
`matching a “secretly preselected winning number.” Although Bryan alleged that he was informed
`
`that he was the “winner” and that he had the “winning number,” he appears to be referring only to
`
`those mailings, and he does not allege that his number also matched the “secretly preselected
`
`winning number.” Although, as noted above, factual allegations are generally assumed to be true,
`
`the court was not required to credit allegations that were “contradicted by . . . documentary
`
`evidence” attached to the complaint. L-7 Designs, 647 F.3d at 422; see Blue Tree Hotels Inv.
`
`(Canada), Ltd. v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc., 369 F.3d 212, 222 (2d Cir. 2004)
`
`(declining to draw inference “belied” by letters attached to the complaint).
`
`Nor could it be inferred from this complaint, given the conditional language in the attached
`
`mailings, that Bryan reasonably believed that he had won. Cf. Sharpe v. Am. Fam. Publishers, 25
`
`F.3d 1040, 1994 WL 224180 (4th Cir. 1994) (unpublished disposition) (even assuming AFP
`
`mailer’s envelope falsely represented that the addressee had won a contest, plaintiffs could not
`
`have reasonably relied on that misrepresentation where the enclosed documents “explained that
`
`the addressee had to return the entry card to discover whether she had won the contest”). Bryan
`
`also alleged that he had a conversation with Dick Clark, but Clark’s alleged statements—that “he’s
`
`the one” and “the lady will take care of you”—were vague, and do not reflect a promise to Bryan.
`
`
`
`
`
`3
`
`

`

`1
`
`2
`
`3
`
`4
`
`5
`
`6
`
`7
`
`8
`
`9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`16
`
`In any event, even if Bryan had plausibly alleged the existence of an agreement to pay him
`
`$11 million and other necessary elements of a breach-of-contract claim, and regardless of whether
`
`New York or Florida law applied, such a claim would be time-barred. See Freedom Holdings,
`
`Inc. v. Spitzer, 408 F.3d 112, 114 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[W]e may affirm on any ground supported by
`
`the record.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Pino v. Ryan, 49 F.3d 51, 53–54 (2d Cir.
`
`1995) (holding that a court may dismiss a complaint sua sponte as time-barred if that defense is
`
`clear from the face of the complaint). The events in question occurred in 1998. The statute of
`
`limitations on a New York contract claim is six years; in Florida, it is five years. See N.Y.
`
`C.P.L.R. § 213(2); Fla. Stat. § 95.11(2)(b). The statute of limitations would be the same or even
`
`shorter if the complaint were construed to raise a fraud claim. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(8) (six
`
`years); Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(j) (four years). Accordingly, at the latest, Bryan would have had to
`
`file his complaint in 2004, and his 2021 complaint was untimely by many years.
`
`We have considered Bryan’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.
`
`Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
`
`FOR THE COURT:
`Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
`
`
`
`4
`
`