`Swatch Group v. Bloomberg
`
`
`UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`
`FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`_______________
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`August Term, 2013
`
`(Argued: October 21, 2013
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Decided: January 27, 2014
`
`Amended: May 30, 2014)
`
`Docket Nos. 12‐2412‐cv, 12‐2645‐cv
`
`_______________
`
`THE SWATCH GROUP MANAGEMENT SERVICES LTD.,
`
`Plaintiff‐Counter‐Defendant‐Appellant‐Cross‐Appellee,
`
`—v.—
`
`BLOOMBERG L.P.,
`
`Defendant‐Counter‐Claimant‐Appellee‐Cross‐Appellant.
`
` _______________
`
`Before:
`
`KATZMANN, Chief Judge, KEARSE and WESLEY, Circuit Judges.
`
`_______________
`
`
`
`
`Appeal and cross‐appeal from a judgment of the United States District
`
`Court for the Southern District of New York (Hellerstein, J.), granting summary
`judgment to the defendant as to the plaintiff’s claim of copyright infringement on
`the ground that the defendant had engaged in fair use. The plaintiff claims that
`the defendant, a financial news and data reporting service, infringed the
`plaintiff’s copyright in a sound recording of a foreign public company’s earnings
`call with invited investment analysts by obtaining a copy of the recording
`without authorization and making it available to the defendant’s paying
`subscribers. We hold, upon consideration of the relevant factors, see 17 U.S.C.
`§ 107, that the defendant’s use qualifies as fair use. We further grant the
`plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the defendant’s cross‐appeal because the defendant
`lacks appellate standing and we lack appellate jurisdiction.
`
`
`
`For the reasons stated below, the defendant’s cross‐appeal is DISMISSED,
`and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
`_______________
`
`JOSHUA PAUL (Jess M. Collen, Kristen Mogavero, on the brief),
`COLLEN IP, Ossining, NY, for Plaintiff‐Counter‐Defendant‐
`Appellant‐Cross‐Appellee.
`
`
`
`
`
`JOHN M. DIMATTEO (Thomas H. Golden, Amina Jafri, on the brief),
`Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP, New York, NY, for Defendant‐
`Counter‐Claimant‐Appellee‐Cross‐Appellant.
`_______________
`
`KATZMANN, Chief Judge:
`
`
`
`This case concerns the scope of copyright protection afforded to a sound
`
`recording of a conference call convened by The Swatch Group Ltd. (“Swatch
`
`Group”), a foreign public company, to discuss the company’s recently released
`
`
`
`2
`
`
`
`
`earnings report with invited investment analysts. In particular, we must
`
`determine whether Defendant‐Appellee Bloomberg L.P. (“Bloomberg”), a
`
`financial news and data reporting service that obtained a copy of that sound
`
`recording without authorization and disseminated it to paying subscribers, may
`
`avoid liability for copyright infringement based on the affirmative defense of
`
`“fair use.” 17 U.S.C. § 107. We also must determine whether we have jurisdiction
`
`to hear Bloomberg’s cross‐appeal on the issue of whether the sound recording of
`
`the conference call is copyrightable in the first instance.
`
`
`
`Plaintiff‐Appellant The Swatch Group Management Services Ltd.
`
`(“Swatch”), a subsidiary of Swatch Group, appeals from a judgment of the
`
`United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Hellerstein,
`
`J.), which sua sponte granted summary judgment to Bloomberg on Swatch’s claim
`
`of copyright infringement on the ground of fair use. On appeal, Swatch argues
`
`that the district court’s ruling was premature because Swatch had not yet had the
`
`opportunity to take discovery on three issues: (1) whether Bloomberg obtained
`
`and disseminated the sound recording for the purpose of “news reporting” or for
`
`some other business purpose; (2) Bloomberg’s state of mind when it obtained
`
`
`
`3
`
`
`
`
`and disseminated the recording; and (3) whether Bloomberg subscribers actually
`
`listen to sound recordings of earnings calls, or instead glean information about
`
`such calls by reading written transcripts or articles. Swatch also contends that the
`
`district court erroneously concluded that Swatch had published the sound
`
`recording before Bloomberg disseminated it. More broadly, Swatch argues that
`
`the district court erred in how it evaluated and balanced the various
`
`considerations relevant to fair use. For the reasons set forth below, we agree with
`
`the district court and hold that, upon consideration of the relevant factors and
`
`resolving all factual disputes in favor of Swatch, Bloomberg has engaged in fair
`
`use.
`
`
`
`In addition, Bloomberg cross‐appeals from the same judgment of the
`
`district court, urging us to hold that Swatch’s sound recording is not protected
`
`by the copyright laws in the first place. Swatch has moved to dismiss the cross‐
`
`appeal on the grounds that Bloomberg lacks appellate standing and we lack
`
`appellate jurisdiction. That motion is granted. Because the judgment designated
`
`in Bloomberg’s notice of appeal was entered in Bloomberg’s favor, Bloomberg is
`
`not “aggrieved by the judicial action from which it appeals,” Great Am. Audio
`
`
`
`4
`
`
`
`
`Corp. v. Metacom, Inc., 938 F.2d 16, 19 (2d Cir. 1991), and therefore lacks standing.
`
`Similarly, although the district court later dismissed as moot Bloomberg’s
`
`counterclaim for a declaration that Swatch’s copyright is invalid, Bloomberg
`
`never filed an additional notice of appeal identifying that subsequent order as
`
`the subject of an appeal, and thus we have no jurisdiction to review it.
`
`
`
`Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court, and we dismiss
`
`the cross‐appeal.
`
`BACKGROUND
`
`Factual Background
`
`The following facts are drawn from the record before the district court and
`
`I.
`
`
`
`are undisputed unless otherwise noted.
`
`
`
`On February 8, 2011, Swatch Group released its 2010 earnings report, a
`
`seven‐page compilation of financial figures and textual narrative about the
`
`company’s financial performance during the prior year. Because Swatch Group is
`
`incorporated in Switzerland and its shares are publicly traded on the Swiss stock
`
`exchange, Swatch Group is governed by Swiss securities law and the listing rules
`
`of the Swiss exchange. In accordance with those rules, Swatch Group filed its
`
`
`
`5
`
`
`
`
`earnings report with the exchange before trading opened for the day, and
`
`simultaneously posted the report in four languages (English, German, French,
`
`and Italian) on the Investor Relations section of its website.
`
`
`
`After it released this information to the public, Swatch Group held a
`
`conference call with an invited group of financial analysts, as is its custom. Swiss
`
`law permits public companies to hold this kind of earnings call with a limited
`
`group of analysts, provided that the company does not disclose non‐public,
`
`significantly price‐sensitive facts during the call. Before the call, Swatch Group
`
`sent invitations to all 333 financial analysts who had registered in advance with
`
`Swatch Group’s Investor Relations Department. In accordance with its practice,
`
`Swatch Group did not invite members of the press. Swatch Group held the call at
`
`2 p.m. local Swiss time, several hours after it had released the earnings report, in
`
`order to allow European, American, and Asian analysts to participate. In the end,
`
`approximately 132 analysts joined the call. For Swatch Group’s part, its Chief
`
`Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer, and three other senior executives
`
`participated in the call from the company’s offices in Switzerland.
`
`
`
`6
`
`
`
`
`
`
`At Swatch Group’s request, an audio conferencing vendor recorded the
`
`entire earnings call as it was in progress. At the beginning of the call, an operator
`
`affiliated with the vendor welcomed the analysts to the call and told them, “This
`
`call must not be recorded for publication or broadcast.” J.A. 22. Swatch Group’s
`
`executives then provided commentary about the company’s financial
`
`performance and answered questions posed by fifteen of the analysts. The entire
`
`call lasted 132 minutes; Swatch Group executives spoke for approximately 106 of
`
`those minutes.
`
`
`
`Neither Bloomberg nor any other press organization was invited to the
`
`earnings call. Nevertheless, within several minutes after the call ended,
`
`Bloomberg obtained a sound recording and written transcript of the call and
`
`made them both available online, without alteration or editorial commentary, to
`
`subscribers to its online financial research service known as Bloomberg
`
`Professional. According to Bloomberg’s promotional materials, Bloomberg
`
`Professional provides “[a] massive data stream” with “rich content” that is
`
`“unparalleled in scope and depth” and is “delivered to your desktop in real
`
`time,” as well as “access to all the news, analytics, communications, charts,
`
`
`
`7
`
`
`
`
`liquidity, functionalities and execution services that you need to put knowledge
`
`into action.” Id. 640.
`
`
`
`On February 10, 2011, after Swatch Group learned that the recording and
`
`transcript had been made available on Bloomberg terminals, Swatch Group sent
`
`Bloomberg a cease‐and‐desist letter demanding that they be removed.
`
`Bloomberg refused. On February 14, 2011, Swatch then filed its initial complaint
`
`against Bloomberg in this action claiming infringement of its copyright in the
`
`sound recording of the earnings call. In an agreement signed by representatives
`
`of Swatch Group and Swatch on February 14 and 15, 2011, Swatch Group
`
`assigned its interest in the copyright to its subsidiary Swatch.
`
`
`
`Two weeks later, on March 2, 2011, Swatch filed an application with the
`
`U.S. Copyright Office to register a copyright in a sound recording of the earnings
`
`call. The Copyright Office and Swatch then exchanged a series of emails over the
`
`scope of the claimed copyright. After Swatch narrowed the copyright to cover
`
`only the statements made by Swatch Group executives, and not the statements
`
`made by the operator or the questions posed by the analysts, the Copyright
`
`Office issued a registration on April 27, 2011.
`
`
`
`8
`
`
`
`
`II.
`
`
`
`Procedural History
`
`As stated, Swatch filed its initial complaint in this action on February 14,
`
`2011. Swatch then twice amended its complaint; the operative pleading thus is
`
`the Second Amended Complaint, filed on May 10, 2011. The Second Amended
`
`Complaint alleges that, by recording the earnings call and making the recording
`
`available to the public, Bloomberg infringed Swatch’s exclusive rights “to
`
`reproduce the copyrighted work” and “to distribute copies or phonorecords of
`
`the work to the public.” 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (3). Swatch does not challenge
`
`Bloomberg’s preparation or distribution of the written transcript of the earnings
`
`call.1
`
`
`
`On May 20, 2011, Bloomberg moved under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss the
`
`Second Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim, arguing inter alia that the
`
`earnings call was not copyrightable in the first place and that Bloomberg’s
`
`copying and dissemination of the call was fair use. The district court denied that
`
`motion in an order entered on August 30, 2011. Swatch Grp. Mgmt. Servs. Ltd. v.
`
`
`1 Swatch has disclaimed any such challenge in light of 17 U.S.C. § 114(b), under which a
`copyright owner’s right to prepare derivative works based on a sound recording “is
`limited to the right to prepare a derivative work in which the actual sounds fixed in the
`sound recording are rearranged, remixed, or otherwise altered in sequence or quality.”
`
`
`
`9
`
`
`
`
`Bloomberg L.P. (“Swatch I”), 808 F. Supp. 2d 634 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). The district court
`
`found that the recording was copyrightable, id. at 638–39, and declined to
`
`address the “fact‐intensive” questions implicated by Bloomberg’s fair use
`
`defense on a motion to dismiss, id. at 641.
`
`
`
`At an in‐court conference held two weeks later on September 16, 2011,
`
`however, the district court informed the parties of its belief that it could resolve
`
`the case through a motion for judgment on the pleadings, and directed Swatch to
`
`file such a motion. Swatch moved as directed on October 21, 2011, and
`
`Bloomberg opposed. The district court held oral argument on December 12, 2011,
`
`at which it denied Swatch’s motion and explained that, in the court’s view,
`
`“defendant’s use qualifies as fair use.” J.A. 581. Later that day, the district court
`
`issued a summary order stating that it had “preliminarily granted judgment to
`
`Defendant on the basis that if Defendant’s alleged actions constitute
`
`infringement, they are protected as fair use.” Id. 584. The order directed Swatch
`
`to submit “a brief regarding the existence of any triable issues of material fact
`
`with respect to Defendant’s fair use affirmative defense.” Id. Swatch did so,
`
`pointing out that it had taken no discovery in the action.
`
`
`
`10
`
`
`
`
`
`
`In an opinion and order entered on May 17, 2012, the district court sua
`
`sponte granted summary judgment to Bloomberg, finding that Bloomberg’s
`
`copying and dissemination of the recording qualify as fair use. Swatch Grp.
`
`Mgmt. Servs. Ltd. v. Bloomberg L.P. (“Swatch II”), 861 F. Supp. 2d 336 (S.D.N.Y.
`
`2012). On May 18, 2012, the clerk of the district court entered judgment “in favor
`
`of defendant.” J.A. 7.
`
`
`
`On June 14, 2012, Swatch filed a timely notice of appeal from that
`
`judgment. On June 28, 2012, Bloomberg filed a notice of cross‐appeal from the
`
`same judgment, and on July 24, 2012, Swatch moved to dismiss the cross‐appeal.
`
`On August 27, 2012, after the parties had filed a stipulation of dismissal without
`
`prejudice to reinstatement under Local Rule 42.1, the district court issued an
`
`order dismissing as moot all of Bloomberg’s counterclaims, including a
`
`counterclaim seeking a declaration that Swatch’s copyright is invalid. On
`
`November 13, 2012, upon receipt of a letter from Swatch, the Clerk reinstated the
`
`appeal. Finally, on January 14, 2013, the motions panel of this Court referred
`
`Swatch’s motion to dismiss the cross‐appeal to the merits panel.
`
`
`
`
`
`11
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`DISCUSSION
`
`We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, resolving
`
`all ambiguities and drawing all reasonable inferences against the moving party.
`
`See Garanti Finansal Kiralama A.S. v. Aqua Marine & Trading Inc., 697 F.3d 59, 63–64
`
`(2d Cir. 2012). Summary judgment is appropriate only where the record shows
`
`“that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is
`
`entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Under Federal Rule
`
`of Civil Procedure 56(f), district courts have discretion to grant summary
`
`judgment sua sponte “[a]fter giving notice and a reasonable time to respond” and
`
`“after identifying for the parties material facts that may not be genuinely in
`
`dispute.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f), (f)(3); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
`
`326 (1986) (“[D]istrict courts are widely acknowledged to possess the power to
`
`enter summary judgments sua sponte, so long as the losing party was on notice
`
`that [it] had to come forward with all of [its] evidence.”). Before granting
`
`summary judgment sua sponte, however, a district court “must assure itself that
`
`following the procedures set out in Rule 56[(a)–(e)] would not alter the
`
`outcome.” Ramsey v. Coughlin, 94 F.3d 71, 74 (2d Cir. 1996). In other words,
`
`
`
`12
`
`
`
`
`“[d]iscovery must either have been completed, or it must be clear that further
`
`discovery would be of no benefit,” such that “the record . . . reflect[s] the losing
`
`partyʹs inability to enhance the evidence supporting its position and the winning
`
`partyʹs entitlement to judgment.” Id.2
`
`I.
`
`
`
`Fair Use
`
`The Copyright Act of 1976 grants copyright holders a bundle of exclusive
`
`rights, including the rights to “reproduce, perform publicly, display publicly,
`
`prepare derivative works of, and distribute copies of” the copyrighted work.
`
`Arista Records LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 117 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing 17 U.S.C.
`
`§ 106). Because copyright law recognizes the need for “breathing space,”
`
`Campbell v. Acuff‐Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994), however, a defendant
`
`who otherwise would have violated one or more of these exclusive rights may
`
`avoid liability if he can establish that he made “fair use” of the copyrighted
`
`material. Though of common‐law origin, the doctrine of fair use is now
`
`
`2 Although Ramsey was decided before Rule 56 was amended in 2010 to provide express
`procedures governing the grant of summary judgment independent of a motion, its
`statements regarding the care a district court must take before sua sponte granting
`summary judgment remain good law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, advisory comm. notes (2010
`Amendments) (“Subdivision (f) brings into Rule 56 text a number of related procedures
`that have grown up in practice.”).
`
`
`
`13
`
`
`
`
`recognized at 17 U.S.C. § 107, which provides that “the fair use of a copyrighted
`
`work . . . for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching
`
`(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an
`
`infringement of copyright.”
`
`
`
`To evaluate whether a particular use qualifies as “fair use,” we must
`
`engage in “an open‐ended and context‐sensitive inquiry.” Blanch v. Koons, 467
`
`F.3d 244, 251 (2d Cir. 2006). The Copyright Act directs that, in determining
`
`whether a particular use is fair, “the factors to be considered shall include”:
`
`the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
`(1)
`use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
`purposes;
`
`(2)
`
`the nature of the copyrighted work;
`
`the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation
`(3)
`to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
`
`the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
`(4)
`the copyrighted work.
`
`17 U.S.C. § 107. Though mandatory, these four factors are non‐exclusive.
`
`Moreover, “[a]lthough defendants bear the burden of proving that their use was
`
`fair, they need not establish that each of the factors set forth in § 107 weighs in
`
`their favor.” NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 476–77 (2d Cir. 2004)
`
`
`
`14
`
`
`
`
`(internal citation omitted). Rather, “[a]ll [factors] are to be explored, and the
`
`results weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright.” Campbell, 510
`
`U.S. at 578.
`
`
`
`The determination of fair use is a mixed question of fact and law. See
`
`Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985). While we
`
`have reversed district courts that too hastily resolved factual questions relevant
`
`to fair use on summary judgment, see, e.g., Ringgold v. Black Entm’nt Television,
`
`Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 81 (2d Cir. 1997), “this [C]ourt has on a number of occasions
`
`resolved fair use determinations at the summary judgment stage where there are
`
`no genuine issues of material fact.” Blanch, 467 F.3d at 250 (quoting Castle Rock
`
`Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., 150 F.3d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 1998)) (ellipsis omitted).
`
`A. Purpose and Character of Use
`
`
`
`We turn first to “the purpose and character of the use.” 17 U.S.C. § 107(1).
`
`Below, the district court found that this factor favored fair use because
`
`“[Bloomberg]’s work as a prominent gatherer and publisher of business and
`
`financial information serves an important public interest, for the public is served
`
`
`
`15
`
`
`
`
`by the full, timely and accurate dissemination of business and financial news.”
`
`Swatch II, 861 F. Supp. 2d at 340.
`
`
`
`Swatch argues that this conclusion was error for several reasons. First,
`
`Swatch contends that the district court improperly accepted Bloomberg’s
`
`unsubstantiated claim that it had engaged in “news reporting.” Swatch notes
`
`that Bloomberg itself has characterized its Bloomberg Professional service as
`
`delivering both financial “news” and “data,” and argues that the district court
`
`erred in denying Swatch the chance to develop facts in discovery to show that
`
`the sound recording at issue here is the latter and not the former. Similarly,
`
`Swatch argues that the district court improperly denied Swatch the chance to
`
`develop facts relevant to Bloomberg’s state of mind. Swatch acknowledges that
`
`the district court “credited [Swatch]’s allegations that [Bloomberg] was not
`
`authorized to access the Earnings Call and that [Bloomberg]’s publication of the
`
`Infringing Work violated [Swatch Group’s] directive,” Swatch II, 861 F. Supp. 2d
`
`at 343, but argues that Swatch should have been able to take discovery into
`
`whether Bloomberg knew at the time that obtaining and publishing the recording
`
`violated Swatch Group’s directive. Swatch also argues that it should have been
`
`
`
`16
`
`
`
`
`permitted to take discovery into whether Bloomberg Professional subscribers
`
`actually choose to access information about earnings calls by listening to
`
`recordings, or instead choose to read written transcripts or articles. More
`
`broadly, Swatch argues that the district court gave insufficient weight to the fact
`
`that Bloomberg’s use was commercial and did not transform the underlying
`
`recording.
`
`
`
`We find these arguments unpersuasive and hold that the first statutory
`
`factor favors fair use here. To begin with, whether one describes Bloomberg’s
`
`activities as “news reporting,” “data delivery,” or any other turn of phrase, there
`
`can be no doubt that Bloomberg’s purpose in obtaining and disseminating the
`
`recording at issue was to make important financial information about Swatch
`
`Group available to investors and analysts. That kind of information is of critical
`
`importance to securities markets. Indeed, as Bloomberg points out, the Securities
`
`and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) has mandated that when American
`
`companies disclose this kind of material nonpublic information, they must make
`
`it available to the public immediately. See Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.100. At
`
`a minimum, such public dissemination of financial information serves this public
`
`
`
`17
`
`
`
`
`purpose in the nature of news reporting. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 561
`
`(“News reporting is one of the examples enumerated in § 107 to ‘give some idea
`
`of the sort of activities the courts might regard as fair use under the
`
`circumstances.’” (quoting S. Rep. No. 94‐473, at 61 (1975)).
`
`
`
`Seizing on Bloomberg’s citation to Regulation FD, Swatch protests that in
`
`crafting that regulation, the SEC expressly exempted “foreign private issuer[s]”
`
`like Swatch Group that are “incorporated or organized under the laws of [a]
`
`foreign country.” 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.101(b), 230.405. In fact, as initially proposed,
`
`Regulation FD would have applied to such issuers, see Selective Disclosure and
`
`Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590, 72,597 (Dec. 28, 1999), but the SEC
`
`ultimately “determined to exempt foreign private issuers . . . as it has in the past
`
`exempted them from certain U.S. reporting requirements such as Forms 10‐Q
`
`and 8‐K,” Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,724
`
`(Aug. 24, 2000). Swatch thus argues that giving weight to a public interest in the
`
`dissemination of important financial information in this case would in effect
`
`erase foreign issuers’ exemption from Regulation FD and set up organizations
`
`like Bloomberg as private enforcers of U.S. public disclosure rules.
`
`
`
`18
`
`
`
`
`
`
`This argument, however, misattributes to Regulation FD a role in the law
`
`of copyright. That regulation is relevant here only insofar as it provides
`
`additional support for a proposition that would be clear in any event: Investors
`
`and analysts have an interest in obtaining important financial information about
`
`companies whose securities are traded in American and other markets. The fact
`
`that the SEC has chosen not to require foreign issuers to follow certain disclosure
`
`rules imposed on domestic issuers in no way implies that information about
`
`foreign issuers is irrelevant. Accordingly, contrary to Swatch’s suggestion,
`
`nothing in our decision today subjects Swatch Group or any other foreign issuer
`
`to the requirements of Regulation FD. Nor do we hold that a foreign issuer’s
`
`failure to follow Regulation FD prevents it from enforcing its copyrights in the
`
`United States. We merely hold that where a financial research service obtains and
`
`disseminates important financial information about a foreign company in order
`
`to make that information available to investors and analysts, that purpose lends
`
`support to a finding of fair use.
`
`
`
`Swatch also stresses the commercial nature of Bloomberg’s use. Section 107
`
`expressly directs courts to consider whether the use “is of a commercial nature or
`
`
`
`19
`
`
`
`
`is for nonprofit educational purposes,” 17 U.S.C. § 107(1), and we have said that
`
`“[t]he greater the private economic rewards reaped by the secondary user (to the
`
`exclusion of broader public benefits), the more likely the first factor will favor the
`
`copyright holder and the less likely the use will be considered fair.” Am.
`
`Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 922 (2d Cir. 1994). It is undisputed
`
`here that Bloomberg is a commercial enterprise and that Bloomberg Professional
`
`is a subscription service available to paying users. At the same time, we have
`
`recognized that “[a]lmost all newspapers, books and magazines are published by
`
`commercial enterprises that seek a profit,” Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Gen.
`
`Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1049 (2d Cir. 1983), and have discounted this
`
`consideration where “the link between [the defendant]’s commercial gain and its
`
`copying is . . . attenuated” such that it would be misleading to characterize the
`
`use as “commercial exploitation.” Am. Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 922; see also
`
`Campbell, 510 U.S. at 594 (holding that “[i]t was error for the Court of Appeals to
`
`conclude that the commercial nature of [a secondary work] rendered it
`
`presumptively unfair”).
`
`
`
`20
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Here, Swatch does not contest that Bloomberg Professional is a
`
`multifaceted research service, of which disseminating sound recordings of
`
`earnings calls is but one small part. Moreover, it would strain credulity to
`
`suggest that providing access to Swatch Group’s earnings call more than trivially
`
`affected the value of that service. So while we will not ignore the commercial
`
`nature of Bloomberg’s use, we assign it relatively little weight.
`
`
`
`Swatch also contends that Bloomberg acted in bad faith and that this
`
`should count against it. Regardless of what role good or bad faith plays in fair
`
`use analysis, see Blanch, 467 F.3d at 255–56, we need not tarry over it here. Even
`
`assuming that Bloomberg was fully aware that its use was contrary to Swatch
`
`Group’s instructions, Bloomberg’s overriding purpose here was not to “scoop[]”
`
`Swatch or “supplant the copyright holder’s commercially valuable right of first
`
`publication,” Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562, but rather simply to deliver
`
`newsworthy financial information to investors and analysts. That kind of
`
`activity, whose protection lies at the core of the First Amendment, would be
`
`crippled if the news media and similar organizations were limited to sources of
`
`
`
`21
`
`
`
`
`information that authorize disclosure. See generally New York Times Co. v. United
`
`States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
`
`
`
`The Supreme Court has also instructed courts analyzing the first fair use
`
`factor to consider the transformativeness of the use—that is, whether “the new
`
`work merely supersedes the objects of the original creation, or instead adds
`
`something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first
`
`with new expression, meaning, or message.” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (internal
`
`citations, quotation marks, and alterations omitted). While a transformative use
`
`generally is more likely to qualify as fair use, “transformative use is not
`
`absolutely necessary for a finding of fair use.” Id.; see also Sony Corp. of Am. v.
`
`Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (finding a non‐transformative use
`
`to be a fair use).
`
`
`
`In the context of news reporting and analogous activities, moreover, the
`
`need to convey information to the public accurately may in some instances make
`
`it desirable and consonant with copyright law for a defendant to faithfully
`
`reproduce an original work without alteration. Courts often find such uses
`
`transformative by emphasizing the altered purpose or context of the work, as
`
`
`
`22
`
`
`
`
`evidenced by surrounding commentary or criticism. See, e.g., Bill Graham Archives
`
`v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 609–610 (2d Cir. 2006); Nunez v. Caribbean
`
`Intʹl News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 22–23 (1st Cir. 2000). Here, Bloomberg provided no
`
`additional commentary or analysis of Swatch Group’s earnings call. But by
`
`disseminating not just a written transcript or article but an actual sound
`
`recording, Bloomberg was able to convey with precision not only the raw data of
`
`the Swatch Group executives’ words, but also more subtle indications of
`
`meaning inferable from their hesitation, emphasis, tone of voice, and other such
`
`aspects of their delivery. This latter type of information may be just as valuable
`
`to investors and analysts as the former, since a speaker’s demeanor, tone, and
`
`cadence can often elucidate his or her true beliefs far beyond what a stale
`
`transcript or summary can show. As courts have long recognized in the context
`
`of witness testimony, “’a cold transcript contains only the dead body of the
`
`evidence, without its spirit,’” and “cannot reveal . . . ‘[the speaker’s] hesitation,
`
`his doubts, his variations of language, his confidence or precipitancy, his
`
`calmness or consideration.’” Zhou Yun Zhang v. INS, 386 F.3d 66, 73–74 (2d Cir.
`
`2004) (quoting Regina v. Bertrand, L.R. [1867] 1 L.R.P.C. 520, 535), overruled on
`
`
`
`23
`
`
`
`
`other grounds by Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Depʹt of Justice, 494 F.3d 296, 305 (2d Cir.
`
`2007).
`
`
`
`Furthermore, a secondary work “can be transformative in function or
`
`purpose without altering or actually adding to the original work.” A.V. ex rel.
`
`Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630, 639 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that
`
`making an exact digital copy of a student’s thesis for the purpose of determining
`
`whether it included plagiarism is a fair use); see also Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com,
`
`Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1165 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that a search engine’s publication
`
`of low‐resolution, thumbnail copies of copyrighted images was “highly
`
`transformative” because the thumbnails were “incorporate[ed] . . . into a new
`
`work, namely, an electronic reference tool”). Here, notwithstanding that the data
`
`disseminated by Bloomberg was identical to what Swatch Group had
`
`disseminated, the two works had different messages and purposes. To begin
`
`with, while Swatch Group purported to convey true answers to the analysts’
`
`questions and to justify the propriety and reliability of its published earnings
`
`statement, Bloomberg made no representation one way or another as to whether
`
`the answers given by Swatch Group executives were true or reliable. Nor did
`
`
`
`24
`
`
`
`
`Bloomberg purport to support the propriety or reliability of Swatch Group’s
`
`earnings statement. Bloomberg was simply revealing the newsworthy
`
`information of what Swatch Group executives had said. Bloomberg’s message—
`
`“This is what they said”—is a very different message from Swatch Group’s—
`
`“This is what you should believe.”
`
`
`
`Moreover, Swatch Group intended to exclude members of the press and to
`
`restrict the information supplied by its executives to a relatively small group of
`
`analysts who had identified themselves to the company in advance. Bloomberg’s
`
`objective in rebroadcasting the call, by contrast, was to make this information
`
`public, defeating Swatch Group’s effort to restrict access. Bloomberg’s purpose,
`
`in other words, was to publish this factual information to an audience from
`
`which Swatch Group’s purpose was to withhold it. These differences give
`
`Bloomberg’s use at least an arguably transformative character.
`
`
`
`In any event, regardless of how transformative the use is, we conclude that
`
`the first fair use factor, focusing on the purpose and character of the secondary
`
`use, favors fair use. We of course recognize that a news reporting purpose by no
`
`means guarantees a finding of fair use. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 557. After
`
`
`
`25
`
`
`
`
`all, “[t]he promise of copyright would be an empty one if it could be avoided
`
`merely by dubbing the infringement a fair use ‘news report.’” Id. A news
`
`organization thus may not freely copy creative expression solely because the
`
`expression itself is newsworthy. Nevertheless, we agree