Case: 23-60167 Document: 243 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023
`
`No. 23-60167
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
`FIFTH CIRCUIT
`
`ILLUMINA, INC. AND GRAIL, INC.,
`
`v.
`FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
`
`Petitioners,
`
`Respondent.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`On Review of an Order of the Federal Trade Commission
`
`BRIEF OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW SCHOLARS AS
`AMICI CURIAE IN OPPOSITION TO PETITIONERS’
`REQUEST FOR REVERSAL
`
`Orlando Economos
` Counsel of Record
`Benjamin Seel
`DEMOCRACY FORWARD FOUNDATION
`P.O. Box 34553
`Washington, DC 20043
`(202) 788-6052
`
`Counsel for Amici Curiae
`Administrative Law Scholars
`
`

`

`Case: 23-60167 Document: 243 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/02/2023
`
`CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS
`Illumina, Inc., et al, v. Federal Trade Commission, No. 23-60167
`
`The undersigned counsel of record certifies that the following listed
`
`persons and entities as described in the fourth sentence of Rule 28.2.1
`
`have an interest in the outcome of this case. These representations are
`
`made in order that the judges of this Court may evaluate possible
`
`disqualification or recusal.
`
`Petitioners
`Illumina, Inc.
`
`Grail, Inc.
`
`Counsel
`David R. Marriott
`Christine A. Varney
`Antony L. Ryan
`Sharonmoyee Goswami
`Michael J. Zaken
`Jesse M. Weiss
`Benjamin A. Atlas
`CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE LLP
`825 Eighth Avenue
`Worldwide Plaza
`New York, NY 10019
`Telephone: (212) 474-1000
`
`Gregory G. Garre
`Michael G. Egge
`Marguerite M. Sullivan
`Anna M. Rathbun
`David L. Johnson
`LATHAM & WATKINS LLP
`555 Eleventh Street, NW
`Suite 1000
`Washington, D.C. 20004
`Telephone: (202) 637-2200
`
`
`
`i
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`

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`Case: 23-60167 Document: 243 Page: 3 Date Filed: 08/02/2023
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`Respondents
`Federal Trade Commission
`
`
`
`Amici Curiae
`Administrative Law Scholars
` William D. Araiza
` Blake Emerson
` Jeffrey Lubbers
` Todd Phillips
` Beau Baumann
`
`Washington Legal Foundation
`
`American Hospital Association
`
`Americans
`Foundation
`
`for
`
`Prosperity
`
`Counsel
`Anisha Dasgupta
`Matthew M. Hoffman
`FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
`600 Pennsylvania Ave. NW
`Washington, D.C. 20580
`Telephone: (202) 326-3097
`Counsel for Amici Curiae
`Orlando Economos
`Benjamin Seel
`DEMOCRACY FORWARD
`1441 New York Ave. NW
`Washington, D.C. 20043
`Telephone: (202) 788-6052
`
`John M. Masslon II
`Cory L. Andrews
`WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION
`209 Massachusetts Ave. NW
`Washington, D.C. 20036
`Telephone: (202) 588-0302
`
`Chad Golder
`Melinda Reid Hatton
`AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION
`800 10th Street, NW
`Two CityCenter, Suite 400
`Washington, D.C. 20001
`Telephone: (202) 626-4624
`
`Michael Pepson
`AMERICANS FOR PROSPERITY
`FOUNDATION
`1310 N. Courthouse Road, Suite
`700
`Arlington, VA 22201
`Telephone: (571) 329-4529
`
`
`
`ii
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`Case: 23-60167 Document: 243 Page: 4 Date Filed: 08/02/2023
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`U.S. Chamber of Commerce
`
`34 Members of Congress
`
`(See Appendix to Brief of 34
`Members of Congress as Amici
`Curiae in Support of Petitioners,
`Doc. No. 119)
`
`
`Tyler S. Badgley
`Jordan L. Von Bokern
`U.S. CHAMBER LITIGATION CENTER
`1615 H Street, N.W.
`Washington, D.C. 20062
`Telephone: (202) 463-5337
`
`
`Jeffrey M. Harris
`Frank H. Chang
`CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PLLC
`1600 Wilson Boulevard, Suite 700
`Arlington, VA 22201
`Telephone: (703) 243-9423
`
`Steven Cernak
`BONA LAW PC
`28175 Haggerty Road
`Novi, MI 48377
`Telephone: (248) 994-2221
`
`
`Aaron Gott
`BONA LAW PC
`331 2nd Avenue S., #420
`Minneapolis, MN 55401
`Telephone: (612) 284-5001
`
`
`Luke Hasskamp
`Luis Blanquez
`BONA LAW PC
`4275 Executive Square, Suite 200
`La Jolla, CA 92037
`Telephone: (858) 964-4589
`
`
`Patrick Pascarella
`BONA LAW PC
`100 Crescent Court, #700-3425
`Dallas, TX 75201
`Telephone: (469) 296-7716
`
`
`
`iii
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`Case: 23-60167 Document: 243 Page: 5 Date Filed: 08/02/2023
`
`Brianna L. Alderman
`Roger D. Blair
`
`Dr. George Charames
`Dr. Eric Duncavage
`
`Kathleen R. Hartnett
`COOLEY LLP
`3 Embarcadero Center, 20th Floor
`San Francisco, CA 94111
`Telephone: (415) 693-2000
`
`
`Adam S. Gershenson
`COOLEY LLP
`500 Boylston Street, 14th Floor
`Boston, MA 02116
`Telephone: (617) 937-2300
`
`
`Kathy O’Neill
`Ethan Glass
`COOLEY LLP
`1299 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
`Suite 700
`Washington, D.C. 20004
`Telephone: (202) 842-7800
`
`Jeffrey A. Lamken
`MOLOLAMKEN LLP
`The Watergate, Suite 500
`600 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
`Washington, D.C. 20037
`Telephone: (202) 556-2000
`
`Sara E. Margolis
`MOLOLAMKEN LLP
`430 Park Avenue, Floor 6
`New York, NY 10022
`Telephone: (212) 607-8160
`
`Matthew J. Fisher
`MOLOLAMKEN LLP
`300 N. LaSalle Street, Suite 5350
`Chicago, IL 60654
`Telephone: (312) 450-6700
`
`
`
`iv
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`Case: 23-60167 Document: 243 Page: 6 Date Filed: 08/02/2023
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`/s/ Orlando Economos
`
`Orlando Economos
` Counsel of Record
`Benjamin Seel
`DEMOCRACY FORWARD FOUNDATION
`P.O. Box 34553
`Washington, DC 20043
`202-448-9090
`oeconomos@democracyforward.org
`bseel@democracyforward.org
`
`Counsel for Proposed Amici Curiae
`Administrative Law Scholars
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`v
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`

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`Case: 23-60167 Document: 243 Page: 7 Date Filed: 08/02/2023
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`Certificate of Interested Persons ........................................................ i
`Table of Contents ................................................................................... vi
`Table of Authorities ............................................................................. vii
`Interest of Amici Curiae ....................................................................... x
`Introduction and Summary of Argument .......................................... 1
`Argument ................................................................................................... 5
`The Constitution permits Congress to delegate broadly to
`I.
`the Executive Branch. ............................................................................ 5
`II. The FTCA provides an intelligible principle that
`sufficiently guides the FTC’s enforcement under Section 5(b). ... 7
`A. The public interest is an intelligible principle. ................................. 8
`B. The FTCA’s structure provides an intelligible principle. ............... 15
`III. Petitioners’ requested remedy is unavailable because the
`FTC’s administrative authority predates its authority to bring
`claims in court. ...................................................................................... 22
`Conclusion .............................................................................................. 25
`
`
`
`
`
`vi
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`

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`Case: 23-60167 Document: 243 Page: 8 Date Filed: 08/02/2023
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Cases
`
`Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678 (1987) .................................................... 23
`
`Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90 (1946) ............................................ 6, 7, 10
`
`Axon Enter., Inc. v. FTC, 143 S. Ct. 890 (2023) .................................................... 19, 20
`
`Barr v. Am. Ass’n of Pol. Consultants, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 2335 (2020) ..................... 23, 24
`
`Big Time Vapes, Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin., 141 S. Ct. 2746 (2021) ........................ 9
`
`Big Time Vapes, Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin., 963 F.3d 436 (5th Cir. 2020) ........ 9, 10
`
`Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010) .............. 23, 24
`
`Frost v. Corporation Comm’n of Okla., 278 U.S. 515 (1929) ...................................... 23
`
`FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19 (1929) ................................................................................ 9
`
`FTC v. Lundbeck, Inc., 650 F.3d 1236 (8th Cir. 2011) ............................................... 18
`
`FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470 (1952) .................................................................. 12
`
`FTC v. Tronox Ltd., 332 F. Supp. 3d 187 (D.D.C. 2018) ............................................. 17
`
`Gibson v. FTC, 682 F.2d 554 (5th Cir. 1982) ................................................................ 9
`
`Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019) ........................................ 1, 6, 9, 20, 21
`
`In re Illumina, Inc., and GRAIL, Inc., FTC 201-0144, Op. of the Comm'n (March 31,
`
`2023) ............................................................................................................................ 5
`
`In re Lopez, 897 F.3d 663 (5th Cir. 2018) .................................................................... 15
`
`INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) ........................................................................... 23
`
`J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928) ............................. 3, 6
`
`Jarkesy v. SEC, 34 F.4th 446 (5th Cir. 2022) ................................................... 5, 19, 21
`
`
`
`vii
`
`

`

`Case: 23-60167 Document: 243 Page: 9 Date Filed: 08/02/2023
`
`Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) ....................................................... 4, 25
`
`Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) .................................... 3, 6, 7, 8, 10, 15
`
`N.Y. Cent. Secs. Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12 (1932) ......................................... 9
`
`NAACP v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 425 U.S. 662 (1976) ............................................. 9, 10
`
`Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943) ................................................ 9
`
`Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., 778 F.3d 775
`
`(9th Cir. 2015) ........................................................................................................... 18
`
`SEC v. Jarkesy, 2023 WL 4278448 (June 30, 2023) (No. 22-859) ................................ 5
`
`Seila L. LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020) ............. 4, 23, 25
`
`United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365
`
`(1988) ........................................................................................................................ 15
`
`United States v. Bonilla-Romero, 984 F.3d 414 (5th Cir. 2020) ................................. 22
`
`United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) .............................................................. 22
`
`United States v. Womack, 654 F.2d 1034 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981) ........................... 7, 12
`
`Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1 (1825) ......................................................................... 5
`
`Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001) ...................................... 15
`
`Wilkerson v. Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545 (1891) ..................................................................... 6
`
`Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008) ............................................ 13
`
`Statutes
`
`15 U.S.C. § 45(b) ................................................................................. 2, 8, 11, 16, 20, 21
`
`15 U.S.C. § 45(m) .......................................................................................................... 20
`
`15 U.S.C. § 53(b) ................................................................................. 2, 8, 11, 16, 20, 21
`
`
`
`viii
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`

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`Case: 23-60167 Document: 243 Page: 10 Date Filed: 08/02/2023
`
`15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(a) ...................................................................................................... 20
`
`15 U.S.C. § 78u-2 .................................................................................................... 20, 21
`
`15 U.S.C. §§ 78u–78u-3 ................................................................................................ 20
`
`Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 13, 38 Stat. 717, 719 (1914) .......................... 1, 24
`
`Pub. L. No. 93-153, 87 Stat. 576 (1973) ................................................................... 2, 12
`
`Other Authorities
`
`Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts
`
`(2012)) ....................................................................................................................... 15
`
`Neil W. Averitt, The Meaning of “Unfair Methods of Competition” in Section 5 of the
`
`Federal Trade Commission Act, 21 B.C. L. Rev. 227 (1980) .............................. 1, 12
`
`S. Rep. No. 93-151 (1973) ................................................................................. 13, 16, 17
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`ix
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`

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`Case: 23-60167 Document: 243 Page: 11 Date Filed: 08/02/2023
`
`INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1
`Amici curiae are administrative law scholars from universities
`
`around the United States. They are:
`
`• William D. Araiza, Professor of Law and Dean of Brooklyn
`Law School;
`• Blake Emerson, Professor of Law at UCLA School of Law;
`• Jeffrey Lubbers, Professor of Practice in Administrative Law
`at American University Washington College of Law;
`• Todd Phillips, Assistant Professor of Business Law at Georgia
`State University J. Mack Robinson College of Business; and
`• Beau Baumann, Doctoral candidate at Yale Law School.
`
`Amici have a strong interest in how the Court’s decision will affect
`
`the field of administrative law and the enforcement of properly issued
`
`regulations and statutes. Amici seek to assist this Court in resolving
`
`questions of law that go to the core of their professional expertise and
`
`scholarship, namely the application of the nondelegation doctrine to
`
`statutory structures that provide agencies with multiple avenues for
`
`enforcement.
`
`
`1 In accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 29(a)(2), counsel for amici
`sought and received consent to the filing of this brief from all parties.
`Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 29(a)(4)(E), no party’s counsel authored this
`brief in whole or in part, and no party, party’s counsel, or other person—
`besides amici and their counsel—contributed money to the preparation
`or submission of this brief.
`
`
`
`x
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`

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`Case: 23-60167 Document: 243 Page: 12 Date Filed: 08/02/2023
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`INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
`Congress has long relied on the “flexibility and practicality” of
`
`delegating to expert agencies when it enacts regulatory legislation. See
`
`Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2123 (2019). And it has relied
`
`for a century on the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC” or “Commission”)
`
`to execute Congressional directives on antitrust law and to articulate
`
`standards for the prosecution of restraints on trade. See Neil W. Averitt,
`
`The Meaning of “Unfair Methods of Competition” in Section 5 of the
`
`Federal Trade Commission Act, 21 B.C. L. Rev. 227, 232–33 (1980)
`
`[hereinafter “Averitt”]. Petitioners ask the Court to upend both,
`
`drastically limiting Congress’s ability to rely on expert agencies like the
`
`FTC generally, and the FTC’s ability to enforce antitrust law specifically.
`
`The Court should decline to do so.
`
`In 1914, Congress enacted the Federal Trade Commission Act
`
`(“FTCA”), creating the FTC and vesting it with authority to identify and
`
`prosecute unfair methods of competition and unfair and deceptive acts
`
`and practices. Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 13, 38 Stat. 717, 719
`
`(1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45). To that end, Congress
`
`provided in Section 5(b) of the FTCA that the Commission “shall
`
`
`
`1
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`

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`Case: 23-60167 Document: 243 Page: 13 Date Filed: 08/02/2023
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`issue . . . a complaint” and hold a hearing giving the entity “complained
`
`of . . . the right to appear” whenever it finds evidence of such methods or
`
`practices and that there is a public interest in the Commission’s attention
`
`to them. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (“Section 5(b)”).
`
`By 1973, however, Congress was convinced that the administrative
`
`procedure established in Section 5(b) was “inadequate” and had caused
`
`“significant delays” to critical trade investigations. Pub. L. No. 93-153, 87
`
`Stat. 576 § 408(A)(1) (1973). Thus, “to insure prompt enforcement of the
`
`laws” and more efficient use of agency resources, Congress added Section
`
`13(b) of the FTCA, which gave the FTC statutory authority to sue in
`
`federal court. Id. § 408(B); 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (“Section 13(b)”). Specifically,
`
`the amendment authorized the FTC to seek “a temporary restraining
`
`order or preliminary injunction,” whenever the Commission has reason
`
`to believe a violation of “any provision of law enforced by the [FTC]” is
`
`ongoing or likely to take place, and “in proper cases” to seek a “permanent
`
`injunction.” 15 U.S.C. § 53(b).
`
`A half-century later, Petitioners claim that the FTC’s ability to
`
`choose whether to conduct an administrative hearing under Section 5(b),
`
`to seek an injunction in federal court under Section 13(b), or to pursue
`
`
`
`2
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`

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`Case: 23-60167 Document: 243 Page: 14 Date Filed: 08/02/2023
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`both options violates the Constitution. They argue Congress failed to give
`
`the FTC clear enough guidance on how to select between these
`
`enforcement options, and so impermissibly delegated its legislative
`
`authority. Pet. Br. at 16–18. But the FTCA provides “‘an intelligible
`
`principle to which’ [the FTC] ‘is directed to conform,’” which is all the
`
`Constitution requires. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372
`
`(1989) (citing J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394,
`
`409 (1928)).
`
`Petitioners’ argument thus fails for two reasons. First, the Court
`
`should find an intelligible principle in the FTCA’s requirement that the
`
`FTC consider the public interest when it chooses a particular
`
`enforcement path. Courts have, “without deviation,” upheld “Congress’
`
`ability to delegate power under broad standards,” including by finding
`
`that similar “public interest” language provides a sufficiently intelligible
`
`principle. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 373; infra Part II.A. Moreover, the
`
`statutory structure and background of the FTCA provide the Commission
`
`with still more direction on how Congress intended for it to understand
`
`the “public interest” requirement and to choose between enforcement
`
`options. Infra Part II.B. The text, informed by the structure and purpose
`
`
`
`3
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`

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`Case: 23-60167 Document: 243 Page: 15 Date Filed: 08/02/2023
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`of Sections 5(b) and 13(b), thus confirms that the FTC is guided by an
`
`intelligible principle. That conclusion
`
`is
`
`fatal
`
`to Petitioners’
`
`nondelegation argument.
`
`But the Court need not consider the merits of Petitioners’
`
`nondelegation claim. Even if Petitioners were correct that the FTCA
`
`provides the Commission with insufficient guidance, their argument
`
`would still fail because the proper remedy for their asserted injury would
`
`be to sever the statutory provision that created the constitutional tension
`
`and to leave the rest of the statutory scheme intact. Seila L. LLC v.
`
`Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2208–09 (2020). Here, that
`
`would require the Court to strike the later-enacted Section 13(b), not the
`
`preexisting Section 5(b). But Petitioners lack standing to make such an
`
`argument, because the FTC proceeding they challenge was held under
`
`Section 5(b). Any hypothetical nondelegation harm is thus neither
`
`traceable to the Section 5(b) proceeding nor redressable by its reversal.
`
`See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
`
`
`
`4
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`

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`Case: 23-60167 Document: 243 Page: 16 Date Filed: 08/02/2023
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`For all these reasons, regardless of whether the authority to choose
`
`a forum for enforcement is properly considered a legislative power,2 the
`
`Court should reject Petitioners’ nondelegation argument.
`
`I.
`
`ARGUMENT
`The Constitution permits Congress to delegate broadly to
`the Executive Branch.
`Since the founding, it has been clear that “Congress may certainly
`
`delegate to others[] powers which the legislature may rightfully exercise
`
`itself.” Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1, 43 (1825). Congress may
`
`therefore “use officers of the executive branch within defined limits, to
`
`secure the exact effect intended by its acts of legislation, by vesting
`
`discretion in such officers to make public regulations interpreting a
`
`statute and directing the details of its execution.” J.W. Hampton, 276
`
`
`2 Petitioners rely heavily on the holding in Jarkesy v. SEC, 34 F.4th
`446 (5th Cir. 2022), cert. granted, SEC v. Jarkesy, 2023 WL 4278448
`(June 30, 2023) (No. 22-859), that “the power to assign disputes to agency
`adjudication is a legislative power.” Pet. Br. at 17 (citing 34 F.4th at 461).
`It is not clear that is correct, for the reasons explained by the Commission
`in its opinion accompanying its Final Order, see In re Illumina, Inc., and
`GRAIL, Inc., FTC 201-0144, Op. of the Comm’n, at 88 n.71 (March 31,
`2023). The Supreme Court has never found a nondelegation violation in
`a statute giving an agency procedural choice concerning enforcement
`mechanisms, and the Supreme Court has issued a writ of certiorari to
`review Jarkesy. But for purposes of this brief, amici assume that Jarkesy
`will remain governing law in this Circuit.
`
`
`
`5
`
`

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`Case: 23-60167 Document: 243 Page: 17 Date Filed: 08/02/2023
`
`U.S. at 406. Indeed, Congress is permitted to “confer substantial
`
`discretion on executive agencies to implement and enforce the laws.”
`
`Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2123 (emphasis added). “Congress simply cannot do
`
`its job” otherwise. Id. (quoting Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372). Since its
`
`earliest days, Congress has
`
`indeed relied on such
`
`interbranch
`
`coordination.
`
`Congress may not, of course, give away its authority “to make a
`
`law.” Wilkerson v. Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545, 562 (1891); see J.W. Hampton,
`
`276 U.S. at 406. But legislating under “broad general directives” does not
`
`amount to such an abdication, Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2123 (quoting
`
`Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372), provided Congress clearly delineates the
`
`general policy, the public agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries
`
`of this delegated authority,” Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372 (quoting Am.
`
`Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946)). As the Supreme
`
`Court has “held, time and again,” that requirement is met where
`
`Congress supplies an “intelligible principle” by which the delegated
`
`authority shall be exercised. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2123. Congress did
`
`exactly that when it promulgated the FTCA.
`
`
`
`6
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`Case: 23-60167 Document: 243 Page: 18 Date Filed: 08/02/2023
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`II. The FTCA provides an intelligible principle that sufficiently
`guides the FTC’s enforcement under Section 5(b).
`Petitioners claim that “[t]he Commission acted under an improper
`
`delegation of legislative power” when it exercised its Section 5(b)
`
`authority and initiated an administrative proceeding. Pet. Br. at 16. They
`
`describe the FTCA as giving the Commission “unfettered and unguided
`
`discretion to decide whether to bring antitrust enforcement actions in
`
`administrative proceedings instead of in Article III courts.” Id at 17. But
`
`the FTCA’s clear language directs the Commission to conform itself to
`
`the public interest, and that clear language “derive[s] meaningful content
`
`from the purpose of the statute and its factual background and the
`
`statutory context in which the standards appear.” United States v.
`
`Womack, 654 F.2d 1034, 1037 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981). The FTCA thus
`
`provides the Commission with constitutionally sufficient guidance that
`
`“clearly delineates the general policy” of efficiently enforcing the
`
`antitrust laws; identifies the FTC as “the public agency which is to apply
`
`it”; and sets “the boundaries of this delegated authority” to encompass
`
`only actions that are in the public interest, subject to the specific
`
`requirements of its authorizing provisions. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 373
`
`(quoting Am. Power, 329 U.S. at 105).
`
`
`
`7
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`A. The public interest is an intelligible principle.
`Sections 5(b) and 13(b) of the FTCA explicitly require the
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`Commission to consider how the public interest will be served when
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`deciding whether to initiate an administrative hearing (under Section
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`5(b)) or an action in federal court (under Section 13(b)). See 15 U.S.C.
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`§§ 45(b), 53(b). Specifically, the FTC may only initiate an administrative
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`proceeding against anticompetitive behavior “if it shall appear to the
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`Commission that a proceeding by it in respect thereof would be to the
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`interest of the public.” Id. § 45(b). Under Section 13(b), the Commission
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`must consider whether a court-issued injunction “would be in the interest
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`of the public.” Id. § 53(b).
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`Thus, before selecting a particular enforcement strategy, the
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`Commission is constrained by its obligation to serve the “public interest.”
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`15 U.S.C. §§ 45(b), 53(b). The Supreme Court has long held that a
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`delegation of legislative authority guided by the “public interest” does not
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`run afoul of Article I. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 373 (generally affirming,
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`“again without deviation, Congress’ ability to delegate power under broad
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`standards,” including by instructing agencies to regulate in the public
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`interest) (citation omitted); Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S.
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`190, 216 (1943) (holding that “the public interest . . . is as concrete as the
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`complicated factors for judgment in such a field of delegated authority
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`may permit” and is “not . . . so indefinite as to confer an unlimited power”)
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`(citations omitted); N.Y. Cent. Secs. Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12,
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`24 (1932) (similar);3 see also Big Time Vapes, Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin.,
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`963 F.3d 436, 442 n.18 (5th Cir. 2020) cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2746 (2021)
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`(collecting cases upholding the “public interest” as an intelligible
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`principle). Those words should suffice here, too.
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`Plainly, requiring an agency to act in the “public interest” confers
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`“broad discretion” regarding implementation. See Gibson v. FTC, 682
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`F.2d 554, 572 (5th Cir. 1982) (“The Commission has broad discretion in
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`determining whether the public interest requires an order.”). But “the
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`use of the words ‘public interest’ in a regulatory statute is not a broad
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`license to promote the general public welfare.” NAACP v. Fed. Power
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`Comm’n, 425 U.S. 662, 669 (1976); see also FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19,
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`28 (1929) (“[T]he public interest must be specific and substantial.”).
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`3 More recently, a plurality of the Court cited this line of cases with
`approval in Gundy. 139 S. Ct. at 2129 (citations omitted).
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`“Rather, the words take meaning from the purposes of the regulatory
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`legislation.” NAACP, 425 U.S. at 669.
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`This long line of Supreme Court cases guides the Court’s task of
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`“evaluating whether Congress laid down a sufficiently intelligible
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`principle” in the FTCA, which calls for the Court to “to consider ‘the
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`purpose of the [act], its factual background[,] and the statutory context.’”
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`Big Time Vapes, 963 F.3d at 443 (quoting Am. Power, 329 U.S. at 104).
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`Petitioners assert, without further elaboration, that the “public
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`interest” cannot provide an intelligible principle to choose between the
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`provisions because it appears in both. Pet. Br. at 18 n.3. But the statutory
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`text and context in which the words “public interest” appear show that
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`the phrase applies differently in Section 5(b) than it does in Section 13(b).
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`The nondelegation doctrine does not require that Congress provide
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`intelligible principles through unique terms, only that it provide
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`sufficient guidance to the agency on how the law should be carried out.
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`See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 371–72. The fact that the FTCA instructs the
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`Commission to be guided by the public interest—a common phrase for
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`regulatory statutes—in two different provisions does not dilute or
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`confuse its meaning in the FTCA. Rather, the text in which it appears
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`gives it meaning—and in this case, gives two texts two different
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`meanings.
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`Under Section 5(b), the Commission must find “that a proceeding
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`by it in respect thereof would be to the interest of the public” before
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`bringing such a proceeding—that is, whether the public has an interest
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`in the agency’s deliberative process as applied to the issue before it. 15
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`U.S.C. § 45(b) (emphasis added). Before bringing a civil suit, by contrast,
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`it must find that “enjoining [an extant or imminent violation] . . . would
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`be in the interest of the public”—in other words, that the public has an
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`interest in a particular form of relief, rather than the proceeding itself.
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`Id. § 53(b). Section 5(b) reflects the public’s interest in the Commission’s
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`expert process of investigation and in the careful delineation of complex
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`antitrust principles in cases where it makes sense for the Commission to
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`speak, both of which take time. On the other hand, Section 13(b) reflects
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`the public’s simultaneous and sometimes conflicting interest in the FTC
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`swiftly moving to adjudicate and enjoin certain ongoing harms, which is
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`more easily done in federal court. Thus, while both provisions are
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`concerned with violations of antitrust laws, only Section 13(b) is
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`preoccupied with prospective equitable relief in situations where the
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`“public interest” would be served by maintaining the status quo.
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`The “purpose [and] factual background” of each provision
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`demonstrates the different goals they serve. See Womack, 654 F.2d at
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`1037. The purpose of the FTCA, and of Section 5(b) in particular, was to
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`create a dedicated expert commission to produce a more comprehensive
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`and more consistent body of antitrust law through gradual adjudication
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`of the concept of unfairness. See Averitt, supra, at 229–38 (describing the
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`legislative history leading up to the creation of the FTC); see also FTC v.
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`Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 473 (1952) (“Congress placed the primary
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`responsibility for fashioning [orders to address unfair conduct] upon the
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`Commission, and Congress expected the Commission to exercise a special
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`competence in formulating remedies to deal with problems in the general
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`sphere of competitive practices.”).
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`But by 1973, it was clear to Congress that the FTC’s existing,
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`“inadequate legal authority” had “restricted and hampered” the agency
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`from carrying out its “law enforcement responsibilities.” Pub. L. No. 93-
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`153, 87 Stat. 576 § 408(A)(1) (1973). To address this, Congress added
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`Section 13(b) to the FTCA. Id. § 408(f). The Senate Committee on
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`Commerce explained its purpose: “to permit the Commission to bring an
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`immediate halt to unfair or deceptive acts or practices [through the
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`courts] when to do so would be in the public interest.” S. Rep. No. 93-151,
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`at 30–31 (1973) (emphasis added). The new provision provided an
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`expedited alternative to a full administrative trial, which takes a great
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`deal of time, by authorizing interim relief where the Commission can
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`show a likelihood of success on the merits rather than only after it proves
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`its whole case. See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20
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`(2008).
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`The FTCA thus contemplates distinct and specific rationales for the
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`use of administrative adjudication or suit in article III courts. When the
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`Commission “does not desire to further expand upon the prohibitions of
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`the Federal Trade Commission Act through the issuance of a cease-and-
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`desist order,” either because it has already spoken on the issue or wishes
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`to allow for further legal development before speaking, it may sue in
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`federal court instead, conserving Commission resources while efficiently
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`addressing unlawful conduct. S. Rep. No. 93-151, at 30–31. Thus, how
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`the public interest is best served in a given case—through an
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`administrative proceeding or a federal lawsuit—will depend on the facts
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`before the FTC. But that does not mean that the Commission exercises
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`unfettered discretion in making that determination. Article III is tailored
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`for speedy enforcement based on previously established law, whereas
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`administrative adjudication serves as a forum for evaluatio