Case: 23-60167 Document: 115 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/12/2023
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`No. 23-60167
`_________________________________________________________________
`IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
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`
`
`
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`
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`ILLUMINA, INCORPORATED; GRAIL, INCORPORATED, NOW KNOWN AS
`GRAIL, L.L.C.,
`
`Petitioners,
`
`v.
`
`FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
`
`Respondent.
`__________________________________________________________________
`
`PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF THE FEDERAL TRADE
`COMMISSION
`
`
`
`BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE
`AMERICANS FOR PROSPERITY FOUNDATION
`IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS AND REVERSAL
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Michael Pepson
`AMERICANS FOR PROSPERITY FOUNDATION
`1310 N. Courthouse Road, Ste. 700
`Arlington, VA 22201
`571.329.4529
`mpepson@afphq.org
`
`
`June 12, 2023 Attorney for Amicus Curiae
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`

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`Case: 23-60167 Document: 115 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/12/2023
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`CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS
`
`The undersigned counsel of record for amicus curiae Americans for
`
`Prosperity Foundation certifies that the following listed persons and entities as
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`described in Fifth Circuit Rule 28.2.1 have an interest in the outcome of this case.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Illumina, Incorporated
`Petitioner
`
`
`
`GRAIL, Inc., now known as GRAIL, L.L.C.
`Petitioner
`Federal Trade Commission
`Respondent
`Washington Legal Foundation
`Amicus Curiae
`Americans for Prosperity Foundation
`Amicus Curiae
`
`David R. Marriot; Christine A.
`Varney;
`Antony
`L.
`Ryan;
`Sharonmoyee Goswami; Michael J.
`Zaken; Jesse M. Weiss; Benjamin A.
`Atlas; Cravath, Swaine & Moore,
`L.L.P.
`Counsel for Petitioner Illumina
`Gregory G. Garre; Michael G. Egge;
`Marguerite M. Sullivan; Anna M.
`Rathbun; David L. Johnson; Alfred
`C. Pfeiffer; Latham & Watkins LLP
`Counsel for Petitioner GRAIL, Inc.
`Matthew Michael Hoffman
`Counsel for Respondent
`John M. Masslon II; Cory L. Andrews
`Counsel for Amicus Curiae WLF
`Michael Pepson
`Counsel for Amicus Curiae AFPF
`
`
`
`Undersigned counsel further certifies that amicus curiae Americans for
`
`Prosperity Foundation is a nonprofit corporation. It has no parent companies,
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`subsidiaries, or affiliates that have issued shares or debt securities to the public.
`
`These representations are made in order that the judges of this Court may
`
`evaluate possible disqualification or recusal.
`
`Dated: June 12, 2023
`
`
`
`/s/ Michael Pepson
` Michael Pepson
`
`i
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`
`

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`Case: 23-60167 Document: 115 Page: 3 Date Filed: 06/12/2023
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS .....................................................i
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................ii
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................................................................iv
`
`INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE .........................................................................1
`
`SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ..............................................................................2
`
`ARGUMENT ..........................................................................................................3
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`I. The FTC’s Administrative Prosecution Violates Article III and Is Therefore
`Void Ab Initio. .............................................................................................3
`
`
`
`A. The FTC’s Administrative Prosecution Implicates Private Rights ........3
`
`B. The Constitution Exclusively Vests the Judicial Power To Find Facts and
`Independently Interpret the Law in Article III Courts ...........................5
`
`C. The FTC Cannot Possess or Exercise Article III Judicial Power ..........7
`
`D. The Commissioners Are Usurpers In An Unlawful Office Whose Inhouse
`Enforcement Actions Are Void Ab Initio ..............................................11
`
`
`II. The FTC’s Administrative Prosecution Violates Due Process ...................12
`
`A. The FTC’s Administrative Process Is Rigged Against Respondents .....12
`
`B. The FTC’s Combination of Investigative, Prosecutorial, and Judicial
`Functions Violates Due Process .............................................................14
`
`III. The FTC’s Structure Violates Article II and the Separation of Powers ......16
`
`A. The President’s Constitutional Removal Power Protects Liberty and
`Ensures Agency Accountability .............................................................16
`
`B. The Commission Cannot Seek Refuge in Humphrey’s Executor ..........19
`ii
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`Case: 23-60167 Document: 115 Page: 4 Date Filed: 06/12/2023
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`C. This Court Should Enforce
`the Constitution’s Original Public
`Meaning ..................................................................................................23
`
`
`
`D. The ALJ’s Multi-Tier Removal Protections Are Unconstitutional ........25
`
`
`CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................25
`
`CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE .....................................................................27
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ..............................................................................28
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`iii
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`

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`Case: 23-60167 Document: 115 Page: 5 Date Filed: 06/12/2023
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
` Page(s)
`
`Cases
`
`AMG Capital Mgmt., LLC v. FTC,
`141 S. Ct. 1341 (2021) ........................................................................................ 23
`
`Axon Enter. v. FTC,
`143 S. Ct. 890 (2023) ....................................................... 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15
`
`Axon Enter. v. FTC,
`986 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2021) ............................................................................ 13
`
`B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus.,
`575 U.S. 138 (2015) ...................................................................................... 6, 7, 8
`
`Bowsher v. Synar,
`478 U.S. 714 (1986) .............................................................................................. 7
`
`Burgess v. FDIC,
`871 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 2017) .............................................................................. 25
`
`Calcutt v. FDIC,
`37 F.4th 293 (6th Cir. 2022) .....................................................4, 8, 10, 11, 12, 25
`
`CFTC v. Schor,
`478 U.S. 833 (1986) .......................................................................................... 5, 6
`
`City of Arlington v. FCC,
`569 U.S. 290 (2013) .............................................................................................. 7
`
`Collins v. Yellen,
`141 S. Ct. 1761 (2021) .................................................................................. 11, 18
`
`Consumers’ Rsch. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n,
`592 F. Supp. 3d 568 (E.D. Tex. 2022) .......................................................... 19, 20
`
`Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Seila Law LLC,
`997 F.3d 837 (9th Cir. 2021) .............................................................................. 17
`
`DOT v. Ass’n of Am. R.R.,
`575 U.S. 43 (2015) ................................................................................................ 6
`
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`iv
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`Case: 23-60167 Document: 115 Page: 6 Date Filed: 06/12/2023
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`Donziger v. United States,
`143 S. Ct. 868 (2023) .......................................................................................... 14
`
`Edmo v. Corizon, Inc.,
`949 F.3d 489 (9th Cir. 2020) .............................................................................. 25
`
`Exela Enter. Sols., Inc. v. NLRB,
`32 F.4th 436 (5th Cir. 2022) ................................................................... 16, 19, 21
`
`Feds for Med. Freedom v. Biden,
`63 F.4th 366 (5th Cir. 2023) ............................................................................... 17
`
`Fleming v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric.,
`987 F.3d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 2021) .................................................................... 17, 25
`
`Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd.,
`561 U.S. 477 (2010) ...................................................................................... 16, 17
`
`Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd.,
`537 F.3d 667, 692 (D.C. Cir. 2008) .................................................................... 17
`
`FTC v. Am. Nat’l Cellular,
`868 F.2d 315 (9th Cir. 1989) .............................................................................. 23
`
`FTC v. Cardiff,
`No. 18-2104, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137800 (C.D. Cal. July 24, 2020) .......... 22
`
`FTC v. Cement Inst.,
`333 U.S. 683 (1948) ............................................................................................ 22
`
`FTC v. Facebook, Inc.,
`581 F. Supp. 3d 34 (D.D.C. 2022) ...................................................................... 14
`
`FTC v. Ruberoid Co.,
`343 U.S. 470 (1952) .................................................................................... 1, 7, 18
`
`FTC v. Walmart Inc.,
`No. 22-CV-3372, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51445 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 27, 2023) ...... 23
`
`Garcia v. Garland,
`64 F.4th 62 (2d Cir. 2023) .................................................................................... 7
`
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`v
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`Case: 23-60167 Document: 115 Page: 7 Date Filed: 06/12/2023
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`Garza v. Idaho,
`139 S. Ct. 738 (2019) .......................................................................................... 24
`
`Heater v. FTC,
`503 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1974) .............................................................................. 22
`
`Hildreth’s Heirs v. M’Intire’s Devisee,
`24 Ky. 206 (Ky. 1829) ........................................................................................ 11
`
`Humphrey’s Executor v. United States,
`295 U.S. 602 (1935) ................................................................................ 19, 20, 21
`
`Impax Labs., Inc. v. FTC,
`994 F.3d 484 (5th Cir. 2021) ................................................................................ 9
`
`Int’l Ass’n of Bridge, Structural, Ornamental, & Reinforcing Iron Workers, Local
`229, AFL-CIO,
`974 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2020) ............................................................................ 24
`
`Jarkesy v. SEC,
`34 F.4th 446 (5th Cir. 2022) ............................................................... 4, 10, 16, 25
`
`Kisor v. Wilkie,
`139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019) ........................................................................................ 18
`
`Lorenzo v. SEC,
`872 F.3d 578 (D.C. Cir. 2017) .............................................................................. 9
`
`Lucia v. Securities & Exchange Commission,
`138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018) ........................................................................................ 25
`
`Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.,
`59 U.S. 272, 18 How. 272 (1856) ......................................................................... 5
`
`Myers v. United States,
`272 U.S. 52 (1926) ........................................................................................ 16, 17
`
`Newland v. Marsh,
`19 Ill. 376 (Ill. 1857) ............................................................................................. 5
`
`Norton v. Shelby Cnty.,
`118 U.S. 425 (1886) ............................................................................................ 11
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`vi
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`Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC,
`138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018) .......................................................................................... 5
`
`Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC,
`402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005) ............................................................................ 9
`
`Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau,
`140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020) ..................................................... 7, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 23
`
`Stern v. Marshall,
`564 U.S. 462 (2011) .................................................................................... 6, 8, 12
`
`Texas v. Rettig,
`993 F.3d 408 (5th Cir. 2021) .............................................................................. 24
`
`Tull v. United States,
`481 U. S. 412 (1987) ........................................................................................... 10
`
`United States v. Arthrex, Inc.,
`141 S. Ct. 1970 (2021) .................................................................................. 15, 18
`
`United States v. Ferreira,
`54 U.S. 40 (1851) ................................................................................................ 11
`
`United States v. Rife,
`33 F.4th 838 (6th Cir. 2022) ............................................................................... 23
`
`Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif,
`575 U.S. 665 (2015) .............................................................................................. 5
`
`Williams v. Pennsylvania,
`579 U.S. 1 (2016) ................................................................................................ 14
`
`Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A.,
`481 U.S. 787 (1987) ............................................................................................ 12
`
`Constitution
`
`U.S. Const. Art. II, § 1 ............................................................................................. 16
`
`U.S. Const. Art. III, § 1 .......................................................................................... 5, 8
`
`U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2, cl. 1 ..................................................................................... 5
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`vii
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`Case: 23-60167 Document: 115 Page: 9 Date Filed: 06/12/2023
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`U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2, cl. 2 ..................................................................................... 8
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`Statutes
`
`5 U.S.C. § 1202(d) ................................................................................................... 16
`
`5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) ................................................................................................... 16
`
`15 U.S.C. § 41 .......................................................................................................... 16
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`15 U.S.C. § 45(c) ....................................................................................................... 9
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`15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(a) ........................................................................................... 22
`
`15 U.S.C. § 53(a) ..................................................................................................... 22
`
`15 U.S.C. § 53(b) ..................................................................................................... 22
`
`15 U.S.C § 57b ......................................................................................................... 22
`
`15 U.S.C. § 1681s(a)(2) ........................................................................................... 22
`
`15 U.S.C. § 6505(d) ................................................................................................. 22
`
`Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 93-153, § 408(b),(f), 87 Stat.
`576, 591–92 (1973) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 53(b)) .......................................... 22
`
`Wheeler-Lea Act, Pub. L. No. 447, § 13(a), 52 Stat. 111, 115 (1938) (codified at
`15 U.S.C. § 53(a)) ............................................................................................... 22
`
`Regulations
`
`16 C.F.R. § 3.22(a) ..................................................................................................... 9
`
`16 C.F.R. § 3.54 ......................................................................................................... 9
`
`Federal Register
`
`74 Fed. Reg. 1,804 (Jan. 13, 2009) ............................................................................ 9
`
`Rules
`
`Fed. R. App. Proc. 29(a)(4)(E) .................................................................................. 1
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`Case: 23-60167 Document: 115 Page: 10 Date Filed: 06/12/2023
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`Other Authorities
`
`Amrep Corp.,
`102 F.T.C. 1362 (1983) ...................................................................................... 13
`
`Kent Barnett,
`Resolving the ALJ Quandary,
`66 Vand. L. Rev. 797 (2013) .............................................................................. 25
`
`Evan D. Bernick,
`Is Judicial Deference to Agency Fact-Finding Unlawful?,
`16 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 27 (2018) ...................................................... 5, 6, 8, 10
`
`Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell,
`Due Process as Separation of Powers,
`121 Yale L.J. 1672 (2012) ............................................................................ 14, 15
`
`Daniel Crane,
`Debunking Humphrey’s Executor,
`83 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1835 (2015) ................................................... 7, 21, 22, 23
`
`David M. FitzGerald,
`The Genesis of Consumer Protection Remedies Under Section
`13(b) of the FTC Act (Sept. 23, 2004), http://bit.ly/2kUIIcf ........................ 21, 22
`
`FTC, Criminal Liaison Unit,
`https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/criminal-liaison-unit ..................................... 22
`
`Justin Goetz,
`Note, Hold Fast the Keys to the Kingdom: Federal Administrative
`Agencies and the Need for Brady Disclosure,
`95 Minn. L. Rev. 1424 (2011) ............................................................................ 13
`
`Philip Hamburger,
`Is Administrative Law Unlawful? (2012) ....................................................... 9, 15
`
`Gary Lawson,
`The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State,
`107 Harv. L. Rev. 1231 (1994) ........................................................................... 11
`
`Jennifer Mascott,
`Constitutionally Conforming Agency Adjudication,
`2 Loyola U. Chi. J. Reg. Compliance 22 (2017) ................................................ 10
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`Case: 23-60167 Document: 115 Page: 11 Date Filed: 06/12/2023
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`McWane, Inc.,
`F.T.C. No. 9351, 2014 FTC LEXIS 28 (Jan. 30, 2014) ....................................... 9
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`1 Montesquieu, Spirit of Laws ................................................................................... 7
`
`Caleb Nelson,
`Adjudication in the Political Branches,
`107 Colum. L. Rev. 559 (2007) ............................................................................ 6
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`The Federalist No. 78 (Hamilton) .............................................................................. 7
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`Joshua D. Wright, Comm’r, FTC,
`Section 5 Revisited (Feb. 26, 2015), http://bit.ly/2c3FSYZ ............................... 13
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`Andrew N. Vollmer,
`Accusers as Adjudicators in Agency Enforcement Proceedings,
`52 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 103 (2018) .................................................................. 14
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`Case: 23-60167 Document: 115 Page: 12 Date Filed: 06/12/2023
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`INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1
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`Amicus curiae Americans for Prosperity Foundation (“AFPF”) is a 501(c)(3)
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`nonprofit organization committed to educating and training Americans to be
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`courageous advocates for the ideas, principles, and policies of a free and open
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`society. Some of those key ideas include the separation of powers and
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`constitutionally limited government. As part of this mission, AFPF appears as
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`amicus curiae before state and federal courts.
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`AFPF has a particular interest in this case because it believes the FTC’s
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`structure and existence offend the Constitution on many levels. The for-cause
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`removal protections the FTC’s Commissioners and Chief ALJ enjoy violate Article
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`II, unconstitutionally shielding these officials from accountability to the President
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`and thus to the American people. Worse, the FTC’s administrative process—in
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`which the FTC acts as investigator, prosecutor, and judge of its own cause—offends
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`due process, Article III, and the Seventh Amendment. AFPF believes this
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`unconstitutional arrangement cannot be allowed to stand and that the FTC’s
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`extralegal administrative prosecution is void ab initio.
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`1 All parties have consented to the filing of this brief. Pursuant to FRAP 29(a)(4)(E),
`amicus curiae states that no counsel for a party other than AFPF authored this brief
`in whole or in part, and no counsel or party other than AFPF made a monetary
`contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. No person
`other than amicus curiae or its counsel made a monetary contribution to its
`preparation or submission.
`
`1
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`

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`Case: 23-60167 Document: 115 Page: 13 Date Filed: 06/12/2023
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`SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
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`As Justice Jackson explained long ago, “[t]he rise of administrative bodies
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`probably has been the most significant legal trend of the last century[.]” FTC v.
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`Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952) (dissenting). He continued: “They have
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`become a veritable fourth branch of the Government, which has deranged our three-
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`branch legal theories much as the concept of a fourth dimension unsettles our three-
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`dimensional thinking.” Id. The problem is worse today, as Congress has devised
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`more novel and powerful administrative bodies unmoored from the Constitution.
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`The FTC is an exemplar of administrative state’s unconstitutionality. This
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`administrative body wields vast legislative, executive, and judicial power, posing a
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`grave threat to core private rights and individual liberty. As relevant here, it brings
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`inhouse prosecutions where it acts as investigator, prosecutor, and judge of its own
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`cause. The FTC also gets to make the rules for this slanted administrative process,
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`further rigging the game in its own favor. Unsurprisingly, the Commission
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`invariably finds in favor of itself, imposing liability in 100 percent of its inhouse
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`cases for the past quarter century. The Commission is also unconstitutionally
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`insulated from accountability to the political branches and, by extension, to the
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`American People. Even the President cannot meaningfully restrain the agency. This
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`unconstitutional arrangement cannot be allowed to stand.
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`
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`2
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`

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`Case: 23-60167 Document: 115 Page: 14 Date Filed: 06/12/2023
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`Petitioners are entitled to a meaningful remedy for the government’s
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`separation-of-powers violations that will afford them complete redress. Because the
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`Commissioners purported to wield Article III judicial power here to deprive
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`Petitioners of their private rights, they were mere usurpers in an unlawful office and
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`therefore this enforcement action against Petitioners is necessarily void ab initio and
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`the FTC’s Order must be vacated without remand.
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`ARGUMENT
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`I.
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`The FTC’s Administrative Prosecution Violates Article III and Is
`Therefore Void Ab Initio.
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`A. The FTC’s Administrative Prosecution Implicates Private Rights.
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`In analyzing whether the FTC’s inhouse administrative prosecution complies
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`with the Constitution, a threshold inquiry is whether it implicates Petitioners’ private
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`(as opposed to public) rights. It does. “Private rights encompass the three absolute
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`rights, life, liberty, and property[.]” Axon Enter. v. FTC, 143 S. Ct. 890, 907 (2023)
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`(Thomas, J., concurring). Here, the FTC sought to deprive Petitioners of vested
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`private property rights, infringe Petitioners’ economic liberty and freedom of
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`contract, penalize Illumina by forcing it to disgorge its profits, and impose other
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`monetary harms in the form of compliance costs. See RAB 45–46.
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`The FTC’s Final Order against Petitioners ordered divestiture of an already
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`consummated acquisition. See Order § II.A. Cf. Axon, 143 S. Ct. at 911 (Thomas, J.,
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`concurring) (“FTC seeks to require Axon to transfer intellectual property to another
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`3
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`

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`Case: 23-60167 Document: 115 Page: 15 Date Filed: 06/12/2023
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`entity.”). It also includes provisions that will force Illumina to incur substantial
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`monetary compliance costs. Indeed, Complaint Counsel even sought disgorgement
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`of Illumina’s naturally earned profits.2 See Proposed Order § II.B; RAB 46; Op. 97.
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`That well describes core private rights.
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`“There must be some limit to the government’s ability to dissolve the
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`Constitution’s usual separation-of-powers and due-process protections by waving a
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`nebulous ‘public rights’ flag at a court.”3 Calcutt v. FDIC, 37 F.4th 293, 349 (6th
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`Cir. 2022) (Murphy, J., dissenting), rev’d, 598 U.S. ____ (2023). The FTC’s
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`administrative prosecution exceeds that limit. Cf. Axon, 143 S. Ct. at 910 (Thomas,
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`J., concurring) (“The rights at issue in these cases appear to be core private rights
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`that must be adjudicated by Article III courts.”). Petitioners are therefore entitled to
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`the process the Constitution requires when private rights are at issue.
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`2 The Final Order did not include such a provision, apparently in an effort to moot
`Petitioners’ Seventh Amendment defense. See Op. 97–98 & n.80. But the
`Commission nonetheless claimed power to “order such a remedy where
`appropriate.” Op. 97.
`3 The government’s involvement is of no constitutional moment; “[t]he question is
`not just whether the government is a party, but also whether the right being
`vindicated is public or private, and how it is being vindicated.” Jarkesy v. SEC, 34
`F.4th 446, 458 (5th Cir. 2022), reh’g en banc denied, 51 F.4th 644 (5th Cir. 2023),
`cert. pending, Nos. 22-859, 22-991.
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`4
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`B. The Constitution Exclusively Vests the Judicial Power To Find Facts
`and Independently Interpret the Law in Article III Courts.
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`“[A]n exercise of the judicial power is required when the government wants
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`to act authoritatively upon core private rights that had vested in a particular
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`individual.” Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 575 U.S. 665, 713 (2015)
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`(Thomas, J., dissenting) (cleaned up); see Axon, 143 S. Ct. at 907 (Thomas, J.,
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`concurring) (“[W]hen private rights are at stake, full Article III adjudication is likely
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`required.”). Cf. Newland v. Marsh, 19 Ill. 376, 382 (Ill. 1857) (“The citizen cannot
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`be deprived of his property by involuntary divestiture of his right to it, or by such
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`transfer of it to another, except by judgment of law[.]”). “Article III of the
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`Constitution begins with a clause that vests [this] particular kind of power in a
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`specialized branch of the federal government.” Evan D. Bernick, Is Judicial
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`Deference to Agency Fact-Finding Unlawful?, 16 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 27, 43
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`(2018). The Judicial Vesting Clause exclusively vests the “judicial Power of the
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`United States” in Article III courts.4 U.S. Const. Art. III, § 1; see Oil States Energy
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`Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1381 (2018) (Gorsuch,
`
`J., dissenting) (“the federal ‘judicial Power’ is vested in independent judges”); CFTC
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`4 “As originally understood, the judicial power extended to ‘suit[s] at the common
`law, or in equity, or admiralty.’” Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1381 (Gorsuch, J.,
`dissenting) (quoting Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S.
`272, 18 How. 272, 284 (1856)); see also U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial
`Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution,
`[and] the Laws of the United States[.]”).
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`
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`5
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`Case: 23-60167 Document: 115 Page: 17 Date Filed: 06/12/2023
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`v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 867 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Our Constitution
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`unambiguously enunciates a fundamental principle—that the ‘judicial Power of the
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`United States’ be reposed in an independent Judiciary.”).
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`This sovereign function cannot be subdelegated. See Bernick, 16 Geo. J.L. &
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`Pub. Pol’y at 43–46. “The allocation of powers in the Constitution is absolute[.]”
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`DOT v. Ass’n of Am. R.R., 575 U.S. 43, 69 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in
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`judgment). And “[u]nder our Constitution, the ‘judicial power’ belongs to Article III
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`courts and cannot be shared with the Legislature or the Executive.” B&B Hardware,
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`Inc. v. Hargis Indus., 575 U.S. 138, 171 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Stern
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`v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 482–83 (2011)); see also Bernick, 16 Geo. J.L. & Pub.
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`Pol’y at 45–46; Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches, 107 Colum.
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`L. Rev. 559, 569–70 (2007). It “can no more be shared with another branch than the
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`Chief Executive, for example, can share with the Judiciary the veto power, or the
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`Congress share with the Judiciary the power to override a Presidential veto.” Stern,
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`564 U.S. at 483 (cleaned up). “Article III could neither serve its purpose in the
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`system of checks and balances nor preserve the integrity of judicial decisionmaking
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`if the other branches of the Federal Government could confer the Government’s
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`‘judicial Power’ on entities outside Article III.”5 Id. at 484.
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`5 The Framers understood that keeping the judiciary “truly distinct from both the
`legislature and the Executive” was important to protecting the “general liberty of the
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`6
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`Case: 23-60167 Document: 115 Page: 18 Date Filed: 06/12/2023
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`C. The FTC Cannot Possess or Exercise Article III Judicial Power.
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`“Administrative agencies” like the FTC “have been called quasi-legislative,
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`quasi-executive or quasi-judicial, as the occasion required, in order to validate their
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`functions within the separation-of-powers scheme of the Constitution.” FTC v.
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`Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. at 487 (Jackson, J., dissenting). But merely labeling their
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`function as “adjudicative” cannot change that all “federal administrative agencies
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`are part of the Executive Branch[.]” B&B Hardware, 575 U.S. at 171 (Thomas, J.,
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`dissenting). And “[e]ven when an executive agency acts like a legislative or judicial
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`actor, it still exercises executive power.” Garcia v. Garland, 64 F.4th 62, 70 n.7 (2d
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`Cir. 2023). Indeed, “under our constitutional structure,” all of the FTC’s activities,
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`including bringing inhouse administrative prosecutions, “must be exercises of”
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`Article II executive power. City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 304 n.4 (2013);
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`see also Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2198 n.2
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`(2020) (“The Court’s conclusion [in Humphrey’s Executor] that the FTC did not
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`exercise executive power has not withstood the test of time.”); Bowsher v. Synar,
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`478 U.S. 714, 761 n.3 (1986) (White, J., dissenting); Daniel Crane, Debunking
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`Humphrey’s Executor, 83 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1835, 1839, 1870–71 (2015).
`
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`people.” The Federalist No. 78 (Hamilton). As the Framers recognized, “‘there is no
`liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive
`powers.’” Id. (quoting 1 Montesquieu, Spirit of Laws 181).
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`7
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`Case: 23-60167 Document: 115 Page: 19 Date Filed: 06/12/2023
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`The FTC Commissioners and ALJ are executive officials housed within an
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`Article II ag