Case: 23-50224 Document: 179 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/27/2024
`
`No. 23-50224
`
`In the United States Court of Appeals for the
`Fifth Circuit
`
`LEILA GREEN LITTLE; JEANNE PURYEAR; KATHY KENNEDY; RE-
`BECCA JONES; RICHARD DAY; CYNTHIA WARING; DIANE MOSTER,
`
`Plaintiffs-Appellees,
`
`v.
`
`LLANO COUNTY; RON CUNNINGHAM, in his official capacity as
`Llano County Judge; JERRY DON MOSS, in his official capacity
`as Llano County Commissioner; PETER JONES, in his official ca-
`pacity as Llano County Commissioner; MIKE SANDOVAL, in his
`official capacity as Llano County Commissioner; LINDA
`RASCHKE, in her official capacity as Llano County Commis-
`sioner; AMBER MILUM, in her official capacity as Llano County
`Library System Director; BONNIE WALLACE, in her official ca-
`pacity as Llano County Library Board Member; ROCHELLE
`WELLS, in her official capacity as Llano County Library Board
`Member; RHODA SCHNEIDER, in her official capacity as Llano
`County Library Board Member; GAY BASKIN, in her official ca-
`pacity as Llano County Library Board Member,
`
`Defendants-Appellants.
`
`On Appeal from the United States District Court
`for the Western District of Texas
`No. 1:22-cv-424-RP
`
`BRIEF OF STATES OF FLORIDA, TEXAS, ALASKA,
`ARKANSAS, IDAHO, INDIANA, IOWA, KANSAS,
`LOUISIANA, MISSISSIPPI, MISSOURI, MONTANA,
`NEBRASKA, NORTH DAKOTA, SOUTH CAROLINA,
`UTAH, AND WEST VIRGINIA AS AMICI CURIAE IN
`SUPPORT OF APPELLANTS’ PETITION FOR
`REHEARING EN BANC
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Case: 23-50224 Document: 179 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/27/2024
`
`KEN PAXTON
` Attorney General of Texas
`AARON L. NIELSON
` Solicitor General
`LANORA C. PETTIT
` Principal Deputy Solicitor General
`
`Office of the Attorney General
`P.O. Box 12548 (MC 059)
`Austin, TX 78711-2548
`(512) 936-1700
`aaron.nielson@oag.texas.gov
`
`June 27, 2024
`
`ASHLEY MOODY
` Attorney General of Florida
`HENRY C. WHITAKER
` Solicitor General
`DANIEL W. BELL
` Chief Deputy Solicitor General
`BRIDGET K. O’HICKEY
` Assistant Solicitor General
`
`Office of the Attorney General
`PL-01, The Capitol
`Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050
`(850) 414-3300
`henry.whitaker@myfloridalegal.com
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Case: 23-50224 Document: 179 Page: 3 Date Filed: 06/27/2024
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................................................... ii
`
`INTRODUCTION AND INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ....................... 1
`
`ARGUMENT ............................................................................................. 2
`
`I.
`
`The panel majority’s misapplication of the First Amendment
`to
`library-book-removal decisions poses questions of
`exceptional importance. ................................................................... 2
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`The selection and removal of public-library materials is
`government speech. ................................................................. 3
`
`The panel improperly extended Stanley’s right to receive
`information to the public-library context. .............................. 6
`
`The Court should grant rehearing en banc to restore
`consistency in this Court’s precedent and align it with
`Supreme Court precedent. ...................................................... 8
`
`II. The standard the majority adopted is likely to confuse
`librarians and lower courts. ........................................................... 10
`
`CONCLUSION ........................................................................................ 11
`
`CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ........................................................ 14
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................. 15
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`i
`
`

`

`Case: 23-50224 Document: 179 Page: 4 Date Filed: 06/27/2024
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Cases
`
`Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes,
`523 U.S. 666 (1998) ................................................................................ 4
`Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico,
`457 U.S. 853 (1982) ............................................................................ 3, 9
`Campbell v. St. Tammany Par. Sch. Bd.,
`64 F.3d 184 (5th Cir. 1995) ............................................................ 3, 8, 9
`Chiras v. Miller,
`432 F.3d 606 (5th Cir. 2005) ........................................................ 8, 9, 10
`Doe ex rel. Doe v. Governor of N.J.,
`783 F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 2015) ................................................................... 7
`Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Association,
`544 U.S. 550 (2005) ................................................................................ 9
`Little v. Llano Cnty.,
`No. 23-50224, 2024 WL 2860213 (5th Cir. June 6, 2024) ... 1, 3, 7, 8, 10
`Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley,
`524 U.S. 569 (1998) ................................................................................ 4
`Parnell v. Sch. Bd. of Lake Cnty.,
`No. 4:23-cv-414, 2024 WL 2703762 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 25, 2024) .............. 2
`Pelts & Skins, LLC v. Landreneau,
`448 F.3d 743 (5th Cir. 2006) .................................................................. 6
`People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Gittens,
`414 F.3d 23 (D.C. Cir. 2005) .................................................................. 4
`Pleasant Grove City v. Summum,
`555 U.S. 460 (2009) ........................................................................ 4, 5, 7
`Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va.,
`515 U.S. 819 (1995) ................................................................................ 4
`Shurtleff v. City of Bos.,
`596 U.S. 243 (2022) ............................................................................ 5, 6
`Stanley v. Georgia,
`394 U.S. 557 (1969) ........................................................................ 3, 6, 7
`United States v. Am. Libr. Ass’n, Inc. (ALA),
`539 U.S. 194 (2003) ........................................................................ 5, 6, 9
`United States v. 12 200-Foot Reels of Super 8mm. Film,
`413 U.S. 123 (1973) ................................................................................ 8
`
`ii
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`

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`Case: 23-50224 Document: 179 Page: 5 Date Filed: 06/27/2024
`
`Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc.,
`576 U.S. 200 (2015) ................................................................................ 7
`
`Statutes
`
`Section 323.005 of the Texas Local Government Code ............................. 5
`
`iii
`
`

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`Case: 23-50224 Document: 179 Page: 6 Date Filed: 06/27/2024
`
`INTRODUCTION AND INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
`
`The question presented to the panel in this case was whether a
`
`county library abridged its patrons’ First Amendment rights by removing
`
`17 books from its shelves, including Larry the Farting Leprechaun and
`
`Gary the Goose and His Gas on the Loose. The panel majority applied a
`
`four-part framework for answering this question, concluding that the
`
`First Amendment bars government officials from removing books from
`
`public libraries to deny access to ideas they disagree with but permits
`
`removing books that are inaccurate, “pervasively vulgar,” or “education-
`
`ally unsuitable.” Little v. Llano Cnty., No. 23-50224, 2024 WL 2860213,
`
`at *6 (5th Cir. June 6, 2024) (cleaned up); see also id. at *26 (Duncan, J.,
`
`dissenting). But then the majority itself could not agree on how its novel
`
`test applies to more than half of the books at issue in this case. Now,
`
`lower courts are left with more questions than answers.
`
`The panel majority’s fundamental error lies in its determination
`
`that the First Amendment has anything to say about a government’s de-
`
`cisions over what books to carry in its libraries. A government’s selection
`
`of books in a library constitutes its own speech that the First Amendment
`
`does not restrain. Amici the States of Florida, Texas, Alaska, Arkansas,
`
`1
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`

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`Case: 23-50224 Document: 179 Page: 7 Date Filed: 06/27/2024
`
`Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Mon-
`
`tana, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Carolina, Utah, and West Virginia
`
`have an interest in preventing federal courts from improperly inserting
`
`themselves into States’ and their subdivisions’ library-curation decisions.
`
`Similar cases are before the Eighth Circuit and the Northern District of
`
`Florida. See, e.g., GLBT Youth in Iowa Sch. Task Force v. Reynolds, No.
`
`24-1075 (8th Cir. 2024); Parnell v. Sch. Bd. of Lake Cnty., No. 4:23-cv-
`
`414, 2024 WL 2703762, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 25, 2024). En banc review is
`
`warranted to prevent the federal courts from meddling in state and local
`
`governments’ decisions about which speech to promote in their libraries.
`
`ARGUMENT
`
`The Court should rehear this case en banc because it raises issues
`
`of exceptional importance concerning the First Amendment’s application
`
`to library-curation decisions. The standard the majority adopted is both
`
`erroneous and impossible to apply in a principled fashion.
`
`I.
`
`The panel majority’s misapplication of the First Amend-
`ment to library-book-removal decisions poses questions of
`exceptional importance.
`
`The majority announced that a government’s discretion to select
`
`what books to purchase and maintain in its library “must be balanced
`
`2
`
`

`

`Case: 23-50224 Document: 179 Page: 8 Date Filed: 06/27/2024
`
`against patrons’ First Amendment rights,” Little, 2024 WL 2860213, at
`
`*5 (quoting Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v.
`
`Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 865 (1982) (plurality opinion)), which include “the
`
`right to receive information and ideas,” id. (quoting Stanley v. Georgia,
`
`394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)). A librarian violates a patron’s right to receive
`
`information, the majority says, when he removes a book “for the sole—or
`
`a substantial—reason that [he] does not wish patrons to be able to access
`
`the book’s viewpoint or message.” Id. (citing Campbell v. St. Tammany
`
`Par. Sch. Bd., 64 F.3d 184, 191 (5th Cir. 1995)). That reasoning overlooks
`
`that the curation of public-library books is government speech. In con-
`
`cluding otherwise, the panel erroneously elevated the prior Fifth Circuit
`
`panel opinion in Campbell over subsequent controlling Supreme Court
`
`precedent establishing that the Free Speech Clause of the First Amend-
`
`ment does not restrain such decisions.
`
`A. The selection and removal of public-library materials
`is government speech.
`
`
`
`Though the panel acknowledged that “[t]he Free Speech Clause . . .
`
`does not regulate government speech,” it nonetheless concluded that “col-
`
`lection decisions are not such speech.” Little, 2024 WL 2860213, at *7.
`
`That conclusion is wrong and conflicts with D.C. Circuit precedent. “With
`
`3
`
`

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`Case: 23-50224 Document: 179 Page: 9 Date Filed: 06/27/2024
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`respect to the public library,” the D.C. Circuit has explained, “the govern-
`
`ment speaks through its selection of which books to put on the shelves
`
`and which books to exclude.” People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals,
`
`Inc. v. Gittens, 414 F.3d 23, 28 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
`
`The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the government’s au-
`
`thority to “regulate the content of . . . its own message,” Rosenberger v.
`
`Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995), includes the
`
`discretionary selection and compilation of materials for presentation to
`
`citizens—the selection of library materials is no different. See Ark. Educ.
`
`Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 674 (1998) (government
`
`broadcaster has discretion to select and present programming); Nat’l En-
`
`dowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 586 (1998) (government has
`
`discretion to make content-based judgments when selecting art for fund-
`
`ing); Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 470–73 (2009).
`
`For example, in Summum, the Court held that the selection of mon-
`
`uments for a public park was government speech, even when the monu-
`
`ments were funded or donated by private parties. 555 U.S. at 470–73.
`
`“Government decisionmakers select[ed] the monuments that portray[ed]
`
`what they view[ed] as appropriate for the place in question, taking into
`
`4
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`

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`Case: 23-50224 Document: 179 Page: 10 Date Filed: 06/27/2024
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`account such content-based factors as esthetics, history, and local cul-
`
`ture.” Id. at 472. Accordingly, the “decision to accept certain privately
`
`donated monuments while rejecting respondent’s” was “government
`
`speech,” and the government was not required to “maintain viewpoint
`
`neutrality” in making that decision. Id. at 479, 481. Because these same
`
`“principles . . . also apply to a public library’s exercise of judgment in se-
`
`lecting the material it provides to its patrons,” United States v. Am. Libr.
`
`Ass’n, Inc. (ALA), 539 U.S. 194, 205 (2003) (plurality opinion), such deci-
`
`sions are also government speech funded through government dollars.
`
`In asking whether expression is government speech, the Supreme
`
`Court has also consulted three factors, including “the history of the ex-
`
`pression at issue; the public’s likely perception as to who . . . is speaking;
`
`and the extent to which the government has actively shaped or controlled
`
`the expression.” Shurtleff v. City of Bos., 596 U.S. 243, 252 (2022). All
`
`three dictate that the government is speaking when it selects public-li-
`
`brary books.
`
`First, the government “actively control[s],” id. at 256, the selection
`
`of library books. Section 323.005 of the Texas Local Government Code,
`
`for instance, provides for a “county librarian,” “if a county library is
`
`5
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`

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`Case: 23-50224 Document: 179 Page: 11 Date Filed: 06/27/2024
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`established,” and tasks that individual with “determin[ing] which books
`
`and library equipment will be purchased.” See also Pelts & Skins, LLC v.
`
`Landreneau, 448 F.3d 743, 743 (5th Cir. 2006) (“Speech constitutes gov-
`
`ernment speech when it is ‘effectively controlled’ by the government.”).
`
`Second, “the public would tend to view the [collection of books se-
`
`lected for a county library] as the government’s” speech. Shurtleff, 596
`
`U.S. at 255. When it selects library materials to make available in a pub-
`
`lic library, the government conveys that those materials are of the “req-
`
`uisite and appropriate quality” and will “be of the greatest direct benefit
`
`or interest to the community.” ALA, 539 U.S. at 204. The public under-
`
`stands perfectly well that publicly employed librarians, not patrons, se-
`
`lect library materials. See id.
`
`Third and finally, “the history of the expression at issue,” Shurtleff,
`
`596 U.S. at 252, points in the same direction. There is a firmly rooted
`
`history of government control over the selection of public-library materi-
`
`als. ALA, 539 U.S. at 203–04.
`
`B. The panel improperly extended Stanley’s right to re-
`ceive information to the public-library context.
`
`
`
`The panel held that the First Amendment “right to receive infor-
`
`mation and ideas” recognized under Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564, “applies to
`
`6
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`

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`Case: 23-50224 Document: 179 Page: 12 Date Filed: 06/27/2024
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`libraries and book removal.” Little, 2024 WL 2860213, at *3. But that is
`
`equivalent to saying that motorists have a constitutional right to see van-
`
`ity license plates of their choosing, and that tourists have a right to view
`
`public monuments that align with their preferred message—even if the
`
`Government may constitutionally decline to offer such a license plate,
`
`Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 576 U.S. 200, 210
`
`(2015), or erect such a monument, Summum, 555 U.S. at 470–73. There
`
`is no basis for such a rule in either law or logic. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Governor
`
`of N.J., 783 F.3d 150, 155 (3d Cir. 2015) (“[A] listener’s right to receive
`
`information is reciprocal to the speaker’s right to speak.”). Because pub-
`
`lic-library patrons have no right to speak through book-selection or -re-
`
`moval decisions, they have no reciprocal right to receive information ei-
`
`ther.
`
`Stanley cannot bear the weight the panel placed on it. There, the
`
`Court upheld the petitioner’s “right to read or observe what he please[d]
`
`. . . in the privacy of his own home.” 394 U.S. at 565. But subsequent Su-
`
`preme Court precedent makes clear that this “explicitly narrow and pre-
`
`cisely delineated privacy right,” which “reflects no more than . . . the law’s
`
`‘solicitude to protect the privacies of the life within (the home),’” has no
`
`7
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`

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`Case: 23-50224 Document: 179 Page: 13 Date Filed: 06/27/2024
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`application outside the home, in public—much less in a public library.
`
`United States v. 12 200-Foot Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 127
`
`(1973).
`
`C. The Court should grant rehearing en banc to restore
`consistency in this Court’s precedent and align it with
`Supreme Court precedent.
`
`
`
`The panel majority concluded that library-collection decisions are
`
`not government speech because “[n]owhere in Campbell, which is binding
`
`. . . , did [the court] suggest that a public official’s decision to remove a
`
`book from a school library was government speech.” Little, 2024 WL
`
`2860213, at *7 (citing Campbell, 64 F.3d at 190). But Campbell is wrong
`
`under current doctrine because the selection of public-school-library ma-
`
`terials is also government speech, and the majority’s opinion and Camp-
`
`bell are in tension with this Court’s decision in Chiras v. Miller, 432 F.3d
`
`606 (5th Cir. 2005).
`
`In Campbell, the Court held that the First Amendment prohibits
`
`school officials from “remov[ing] books from school library shelves simply
`
`because they dislike the ideas contained in those books.” Campbell, 64
`
`F.3d at 188 (quotation omitted). In doing so, it took “guidance” from Jus-
`
`tices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens’s right-to-receive-information
`
`8
`
`

`

`Case: 23-50224 Document: 179 Page: 14 Date Filed: 06/27/2024
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`theory that even Justice Blackmun refused to adopt. Id. at 189; Pico, 457
`
`U.S. at 878–79 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
`
`judgment). But Campbell was decided in 1995 before the Supreme
`
`Court’s guidance in ALA, 539 U.S. at 205, explaining that public library
`
`staff enjoy broad discretion in making collection decisions, and about ten
`
`years before the Court formally recognized the government-speech doc-
`
`trine in Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Association, 544 U.S. 550 (2005).
`
`For the reasons explained above, it is clear now that the selection of pub-
`
`lic-library materials is government speech.
`
`Campbell and the majority’s opinion are in tension with this Court’s
`
`decision in Chiras. In Chiras, the court recognized that under ALA, “pub-
`
`lic library staffs necessarily consider content in making collection deci-
`
`sions and enjoy broad discretion in making them.” 432 F.3d at 614 (quot-
`
`ing ALA, 539 U.S. at 205); see also ALA, 539 U.S. at 204; id. at 217
`
`(Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (discussing “the discretion nec-
`
`essary to create, maintain, or select a library’s ‘collection’”). Though Chi-
`
`ras concerned “the selection of curricular materials,” which the court de-
`
`termined to be government speech, 432 F.3d at 618, the broad discretion
`
`afforded libraries under ALA and recognized by this Court in Chiras
`
`9
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`

`

`Case: 23-50224 Document: 179 Page: 15 Date Filed: 06/27/2024
`
`applies with at least the same force in the library, rather than the text-
`
`book, context. Because Campbell was decided without the benefit of ALA
`
`or the Supreme Court’s now well-established government-speech juris-
`
`prudence, this Court should overrule Campbell, consistent with this
`
`Court’s reasoning in Chiras.
`
`II. The standard the majority adopted is likely to confuse li-
`brarians and lower courts.
`
`Tellingly, even the majority was unable to agree on the proper ap-
`
`plication of the standard it adopted. The majority concluded that
`
`(1) “[l]ibrarians may consider books’ contents in making [collection] deci-
`
`sions”; (2) library patrons have a First Amendment right to receive infor-
`
`mation, (3) which is violated when a government official removes a book
`
`to deny access to ideas he disagrees with; but (4) an official may remove
`
`a book if it is “pervasively vulgar” or educationally unsuitable. Little,
`
`2024 WL 2860213, at *5, *8. Of the 17 books at issue, however, the two
`
`judges in the majority could only agree on how the rules applied to eight
`
`books. Id. at *11 (Southwick, J, concurring in part and concurring in the
`
`judgment in part). They disagreed about whether it was permissible to
`
`remove In the Night Kitchen and It’s Perfectly Normal in response to ob-
`
`jections that they contained sexually explicit material that was not
`
`10
`
`

`

`Case: 23-50224 Document: 179 Page: 16 Date Filed: 06/27/2024
`
`appropriate for children, and whether the “butt and fart books” even “ex-
`
`press an ‘idea’ or ‘viewpoint.’” Id. at *11–12 (Southwick, J, concurring in
`
`part and concurring in the judgment in part). If the majority cannot apply
`
`its own rules to the set of facts before it, lower courts surely will fare no
`
`better. This Court should grant rehearing en banc to spare them the con-
`
`fusion that is sure to result from these rules.
`
`CONCLUSION
`
`The Court should grant Appellants’ petition for rehearing en banc.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`11
`
`

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`Case: 23-50224 Document: 179 Page: 17 Date Filed: 06/27/2024
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`ASHLEY MOODY
` Attorney General of Florida
`
`/s/ Henry C. Whitaker
`HENRY C. WHITAKER
`Solicitor General
`DANIEL W. BELL
`Chief Deputy Solicitor General
` BRIDGET K. O’HICKEY
`Assistant Solicitor General
`
`
`Florida Attorney General’s Office
`The Capitol, PL-01
`Tallahassee, Florida 32399
`(850) 414-3300
`henry.whitaker@myfloridale-
`gal.com
`
`Counsel for Amicus Curiae State
`of Florida
`
`
`
`
`Dated: June 27, 2024
`
`KEN PAXTON
` Attorney General of Texas
`
`/s/ Aaron L. Nielson
`AARON L. NIELSON
` Solicitor General
`LANORA C. PETTIT
` Principal Deputy Solicitor Gen-
`eral
`
`
`Texas Attorney General’s Office
`P.O. Box 12548 (MC 059)
`Austin, TX 78711-2548
`(512) 936-1700
`aaron.nielson@oag.texas.gov
`
`
`Counsel for Amicus Curiae State of
`Texas
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Amici Curiae
`
`Treg Taylor
`Attorney General of Alaska
`
`Tim Griffin
`Attorney General of Arkansas
`
`Raúl R. Labrador
`Attorney General of Idaho
`
`
`12
`
`

`

`Case: 23-50224 Document: 179 Page: 18 Date Filed: 06/27/2024
`
`Theodore E. Rokita
`Attorney General of Indiana
`
`Brenna Bird
`Attorney General of Iowa
`
`Kris W. Kobach
`Attorney General of Kansas
`
`Liz Murrill
`Attorney General of Louisiana
`
`Lynn Fitch
`Attorney General of Mississippi
`
`Andrew Bailey
`Attorney General of Missouri
`
`Austin Knudsen
`Attorney General of Montana
`
`Michael T. Hilgers
`Attorney General of Nebraska
`
`Drew Wrigley
`Attorney General of North Dakota
`
`Alan Wilson
`Attorney General of South Carolina
`
`Sean Reyes
`Attorney General of Utah
`
`Patrick Morrisey
`Attorney General of West Virginia
`
`13
`
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`Case: 23-50224 Document: 179 Page: 19 Date Filed: 06/27/2024
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`CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
`
`1.
`
`This document complies with the type-volume limits of Fed-
`
`eral Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(b)(4) because, excluding the parts of
`
`the document exempted by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(f),
`
`this document contains 2,143 words.
`
`2.
`
`This document complies with the typeface and type-style re-
`
`quirements of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(a)(5) and Federal
`
`Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(a)(6) because this document has been pre-
`
`pared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word in 14-
`
`point Century Schoolbook font.
`
`/s/ Henry C. Whitaker
`Solicitor General
`
`
`
`
`
`14
`
`

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`Case: 23-50224 Document: 179 Page: 20 Date Filed: 06/27/2024
`
`
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`I certify that on June 27, 2024, I electronically filed this document
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`with the Clerk of Court using the Court’s CM/ECF system, which will
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`send a notice of docketing activity to all parties who are registered
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`through CM/ECF.
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`/s/ Henry C. Whitaker
`Solicitor General
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`15
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