1The Honorable Beverly Stites Jones, United States Magistrate Judge for theWestern District of Arkansas, to whom this case was referred for final disposition byconsent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).United States Court of AppealsFOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT___________No. 99-2998___________Ruby N. Dickerson,**Appellant,**Appeal from the United Statesv.*District Court for the*Western District of Arkansas.Kenneth S. Apfel, Commissioner*Social Security Administration,* [UNPUBLISHED]*Appellee.*___________ Submitted: May 3, 2000 Filed: May 9, 2000___________Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, BOWMAN, and BEAM, Circuit Judges.___________PER CURIAM.Ruby Dickerson appeals the District Court’s1 order affirming theCommissioner’s decision to deny her application for supplemental security income.Dickerson had alleged she could not work because of epilepsy, heavy menstrual flow,and a nervous condition. After a hearing, the administrative law judge (ALJ)concluded, based upon the testimony of a vocational expert (VE), that Dickerson was
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`-2-not disabled because she had the residual functional capacity (RFC) to work as ahandler and packer--light work involving simple and repetitive tasks, and allowingalternating sitting and standing. For reversal, Dickerson argues the ALJ erred (1) inconcluding her impairments were severe, yet not disabling, and in discrediting hersubjective complaints of pain, excessive menstrual bleeding, depression, anxiety, andimpaired memory and concentration; (2) in formulating his hypothetical to the VE,because he ignored the opinion of Dr. Douglas Stevens, Dickerson’s consultingpsychologist; and (3) in failing to establish she had the RFC to meet the physical andmental demands of the identified jobs.Contrary to Dickerson’s suggestion, the ALJ’s finding that her impairments weresevere did not require a finding that they were also disabling. See 20 C.F.R.§ 416.920(c), (e), (f) (1999) (claimant’s impairment must be severe and also preventclaimant from performing past relevant work or other work). We also find the ALJproperly discounted her subjective complaints as inconsistent with the evidence as awhole. See Gray v. Apfel, 192 F.3d 799, 803-04 (8th Cir. 1999). At the hearing,Dickerson testified she had back pain, but described it as mild and dull, and admittedthat she had obtained relief from medication without side effects. Moreover, noabnormalities were identified on x-rays, and she never sought treatment for her back.See Siemers v. Shalala, 47 F.3d 299, 301-02 (8th Cir. 1995) (complaints of disablingback pain properly discredited based, in part, on lack of clinical findings and claimant’sfailure to seek regular medical treatment). As to her leg pain, a report generated afteran aorto-femoral bypass showed restored leg circulation, and Dickerson admitted that,since the surgery, she could walk farther and the pain had lessened. See Mittlestedt v.Apfel, 204 F.3d 847, 852 (8th Cir. 2000) (impairments controlled by treatment do notsupport finding of total disability). Although Dickerson alleged severe menstrualproblems, after a specialist found no pathology she denied further bleeding to him andfailed to follow up with him despite her reports to Dr. Stevens, only one month later,that she was bleeding excessively. Cf. Gwathney v. Chater, 104 F.3d 1043, 1045 (8th
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`-3-Cir. 1997) (failure to seek regular medical treatment for symptoms is inconsistent withcomplaints of disabling condition). Similarly, we find inconsistencies in the record as to Dickerson’s subjectivecomplaints of her mental condition. She reported depression related to menstrualbleeding and to memory and concentration problems only in her single visit to Dr.Stevens, and his report showed inconsistent results as to a memory problem. See Clarkv. Apfel, 141 F.3d 1253, 1256 (8th Cir. 1998) (ALJ properly rejected IQ test scores,in part, because they were product of claimant’s first and only meeting with non-treating psychologist and because other medical records made no mention ofintellectual impairment). Also, her primary physician, Dr. Cheney, did not refer her toa specialist or counselor for her anxiety complaints, or indicate the problem wasdisabling. We also reject Dickerson’s contention that the ALJ erred by failing to includeDr. Stevens’s mental-function ratings in the hypothetical to the VE upon which theALJ’s decision was based, as he was not required to adopt Dr. Stevens’s opinion, andthe ALJ’s mental RFC findings are otherwise supported by the record. See Pierce v.Apfel, 173 F.3d 704, 707 (8th Cir. 1999) (ALJ may reject conclusions of any medicalexpert if they are inconsistent with evidence as whole). Finally, we conclude the ALJ’s physical RFC findings are supported by themedical evidence, see Weiler v. Apfel, 179 F.3d 1107, 1109 (8th Cir. 1999)(Commissioner bears burden of establishing RFC by medical evidence), because twophysicians, including Dr. Cheney, declined to report any physical-activity limitationsand because the record reflects improvement in Dickerson’s physical condition post-bypass. We also note that Dr. Cheney’s conclusory opinion that Dickerson waspermanently disabled was not dispositive. See Rogers v. Chater, 118 F.3d 600, 602(8th Cir. 1997) (treating physician must support his opinion as to disability status withmedically-acceptable clinical or diagnostic data); Chamberlain v. Shalala, 47 F.3d
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`-4-1489, 1494 (8th Cir. 1995) (weight given to treating physician’s opinion is limited ifit consists only of conclusory statement). Accordingly, we affirm.A true copy.Attest:CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.