Case 6:22-cv-00535-ADA Document 104 Filed 08/23/23 Page 1 of 24
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`WACO DIVISION
`
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`DODOTS LICENSING SOLUTIONS LLC,
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`Plaintiff,
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`vs.
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`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD., and
`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC.,
`
`Defendants.
`
` Case No.: 6:22-cv-00535-ADA
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`
`
`
`PLAINTIFF DODOTS LICENSING SOLUTIONS LLC’S OPPOSITION TO
`DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
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`

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`Case 6:22-cv-00535-ADA Document 104 Filed 08/23/23 Page 2 of 24
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`I.
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`II.
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`III.
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`INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 1
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`LEGAL STANDARD - MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER FEDERAL RULE 12(B)(6) ......................... 3
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`ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................................... 4
`A.
`INDIRECT INFRINGEMENT .......................................................................................... 4
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`1.
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`2.
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`DODOTS LICENSING SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGED KNOWLEDGE ....................... 4
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`DODOTS SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGED INTENT TO INDUCE INFRINGEMENT ..... 11
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`DODOTS ENTITIES HAD NO OBLIGATION TO MARK PRODUCTS, NOR COULD IT HAVE ....
`B.
`14
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`CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................... 19
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`IV.
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`i
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`Case 6:22-cv-00535-ADA Document 104 Filed 08/23/23 Page 3 of 24
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`Cases
`
`Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. Directv, LLC,
`109 F. Supp. 3d 916 (W.D. Tex. 2015)....................................................................................18
`
`Am. Med. Sys. v. Med. Eng’g Corp.,
`6 F.3d 1523 (Fed. Cir. 1993)..............................................................................................16, 17
`
`Arctic Cat Inc. v. Bombardier Rec. Prods.,
`950 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2020)............................................................................................18, 19
`
`Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
`556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ..................................................3, 6, 18
`
`In re Bill of Lading Transmission & Processing Sys. Patent Litig.,
`681 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2012)..........................................................................................11, 12
`
`DoDots Licensing Sols. LLC v. Lenovo Holding Co., Inc.,
`No. CV 18-098 (MN), 2018 WL 6629709 (D. Del. Dec. 19, 2018) ..........................................9
`
`Dorsey v. Portfolio Equities, Inc.,
`540 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 2008) .....................................................................................................3
`
`French v. United States,
`42 Fed. Cl. 49 (1998) ...............................................................................................................18
`
`Glob.-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A.,
`563 U.S. 754 (2011) .................................................................................................................10
`
`Guerrero v. C.R. Eng., Inc.,
`Civil Action 7:21-cv-374, Dkt. 21 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 2021) .....................................................3
`
`Hafeman v. LG Elecs. Inc.,
`2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154764 (W.D. Tex. 2022) ..................................................................12
`
`Innovention Toys, LLC v. MGA Entertainment, Inc.,
`611 F. App'x 693 (Fed. Cir. 2015), rev’d on other grounds 136 S.Ct. 2483 .............................7
`
`Jawbone Innovations LLC, v. Google LLC,
`6:21-CV-00985-ADA, Dkt. 85 (W.D. Tx. October 12, 2022).........................................5, 9, 10
`
`Kirsch Rsch. & Dev., LLC v. IKO Indus., Inc.,
`No. 6:20-CV-00317-ADA, 2021 WL 4555608 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 4, 2021) ................................9
`
`ii
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`Case 6:22-cv-00535-ADA Document 104 Filed 08/23/23 Page 4 of 24
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`Lifetime Indus., Inc. v. Trim-Lok, Inc.,
`869 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2017)..................................................................................................3
`
`Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc.,
`565 F.3d 228 (5th Cir. 2009) .....................................................................................................3
`
`Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc.,
`580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009)................................................................................................12
`
`Nalco Co. v. Chem-Mod, LLC,
`883 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2018)..........................................................................................12, 14
`
`Red Rock Analytics, LLC v. Apple Inc.,
`No. 6:21-CV-00346-ADA, 2021 WL 5828368 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 8, 2021) ...........................4, 5
`
`Script Sec. Sols. L.L.C. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
`170 F. Supp. 3d 928 (E.D. Tex. 2016) .......................................................................................3
`
`Tex. Taco Cabana, Ltd. P'ship v. Taco Cabana of N.M., Inc.,
`304 F. Supp. 2d 903 (W.D. Tex. 2003)....................................................................................18
`
`Thompson v. City of Waco,
`764 F.3d 500 (5th Cir. 2014) .....................................................................................................3
`
`
`
`iii
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`Case 6:22-cv-00535-ADA Document 104 Filed 08/23/23 Page 5 of 24
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`I.
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`Introduction
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`Samsung’s latest motion to dismiss—arguing that DoDots Licensing has failed to
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`properly allege indirect infringement and compliance with the marking statute—is meritless.
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`Contrary to well-established law regarding motions to dismiss (where all facts are taken as true),
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`Samsung’s motion seeks to substantively argue about and contest the pleaded facts. Samsung
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`also seeks to introduce purported facts from outside of the pleadings and draws unfounded
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`conclusions in its own favor from the facts at every turn. But this is all improper for a motion to
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`dismiss.
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`Here, DoDots Licensing’s Second Amended Complaint sufficiently pleads facts showing
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`indirect infringement and compliance with the marking statue. That is all that matters at the
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`pleading stage. Thus, Samsung’s motion should be denied.
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`In particular, with respect to induced infringement, DoDots Licensing must plead “actual
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`knowledge” of the asserted patents. This requirement can be satisfied by allegations of notice of
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`the patents or an infringer’s willful blindness to those patents. The Second Amended Complaint
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`does both – it includes pages about how Samsung received actual notice of the asserted patents
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`on two separate occasions and also includes allegations of willful blindness. The allegations are
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`additionally supported by detailed sworn declarations that are attached to the Second Amended
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`Complaint.
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`Recognizing that it has no other path forward under the standard for a motion to dismiss,
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`Samsung attempts to shift the focus away from what is being pleaded. Instead, Samsung
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`questions the “credibility” of the declarants. This is improper. While Samsung can certainly seek
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`to test the veracity of witnesses’ assertions at trial, fact-finding and evidence-weighing are not
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`appropriate when considering a motion to dismiss.
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`With regard to the “intent” requirement for induced infringement, DoDots Licensing’s
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`1
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`allegations are much more than the mere general allegations of intent required by Rule 9 of the
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`Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and are supported by extensive factual references. Courts have
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`repeatedly found that the type of allegations that DoDots Licensing sets forth to be sufficient.
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`Thus, Samsung’s complaints are without merit.
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`With respect to patent marking, Samsung’s argument ignores the clear and direct
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`statements in DoDots Licensing’s Second Amended Complaint which explain that there was no
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`obligation to comply with the marking requirements of § 287(a). Samsung also ignores the
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`pleaded factual support which explains that there was no requirement to mark products
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`distributed by the operating company that first applied for the patents (called DoDots, Inc.)
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`because no products were sold after the patents issued. The DoDots, Inc. products were sold
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`years before the asserted patents issued at a time before any marking obligation could have
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`arisen. In fact, that company ceased operations over a decade before some of the asserted patents
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`issued.
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`Instead of accepting the pleaded facts to be true, Samsung again attempts to introduce
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`facts outside the Second Amended Complaint to cobble together an “implied license” theory. It
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`asks this Court to assume, find, or infer facts nowhere in the record – and then to draw a panoply
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`of conclusions in its favor. That is exactly the opposite of what the law requires for a motion to
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`dismiss.
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`Indeed, Samsung repeats its legal error when it speculates that other licenses may exist
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`that could create an obligation to mark. This time, in addition to relying upon facts outside the
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`record, it suggests facts that are contradicted by the record and which it knows to be false. For
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`example, it suggests that litigations with Lenovo/Motorola and Apple (6:22-cv-00533-ADA)
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`could have resulted in licenses which created a marking obligation. But Samsung has the
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`2
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`Case 6:22-cv-00535-ADA Document 104 Filed 08/23/23 Page 7 of 24
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`Lenovo/Motorola license – which was entered after the patents expired and, thus, created no
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`such obligation. It also knows that the Apple litigation is still ongoing, that this Court recently
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`transferred that case to California, and that there is no pre-existing license that could possibly
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`create a marking obligation.
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`Samsung’s reliance on facts found nowhere in the pleadings, creative findings of fact,
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`and lop-sided weighing of credibility in its favor simply cannot support a motion to dismiss.
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`For the foregoing reasons, Samsung’s motion should be denied.
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`II.
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`Legal Standard - Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rule 12(b)(6)
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`A complaint must state enough facts such that the claim to relief is plausible on its face.
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`Thompson v. City of Waco, 764 F.3d 500, 502 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
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`Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads
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`enough facts to allow the Court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
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`misconduct alleged. Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). In the context of
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`patent infringement, a complaint must place the alleged infringer on notice of what activity is
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`being accused of infringement. Lifetime Indus., Inc. v. Trim-Lok, Inc., 869 F.3d 1372, 1379 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2017). However, the plaintiff is not required to prove its case at the pleading stage. Id.
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`Motions to dismiss a claim at the pleadings stage are viewed with disfavor and are rarely
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`granted. Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 2009). “The Court may
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`consider ‘the complaint, any documents attached to the complaint, and any documents attached
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`to the motion to dismiss that are central to the claim and referenced by the complaint.’” Script
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`Sec. Sols. L.L.C. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 170 F. Supp. 3d 928, 935 (E.D. Tex. 2016) (quoting Lone
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`Star Fund V (U.S.) L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010)). A court must
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`generally limit its inquiry to the complaint and its proper attachments. See, e.g., Dorsey v.
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`Portfolio Equities, Inc., 540 F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted).
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`3
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`Findings of fact or weighing the credibility of evidence are inappropriate when
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`considering a motion to dismiss. Edmond v. Marathon Petroleum Co., LP, et. al, No. 20-cv-
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`00210-DCG, Dkt. 11, at *1-2, fn. 2 (W.D. Tex Feb. 17, 2021) (citing Ramirez v. Escajeda, 921
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`F.3d 497, 501 (5th Cir. 2019)) ("Iqbal does not allow us to question the credibility of the facts
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`pleaded”); see also Guerrero v. C.R. Eng., Inc., Civil Action 7:21-cv-374, Dkt. 21, *4-5 (S.D.
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`Tex. Dec. 7, 2021) (“The Court does not make credibility determinations or discount the
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`complaint's factual allegations”). Courts “assume the veracity of well-pleaded factual
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`allegations” and view all facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Edmond, No. 20-cv-
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`00210-DCG, Dkt. 11, at *1-2, n. 2. If a claim is plausible when the pleaded allegations are
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`viewed as true and the plaintiff is credited with all inferences flowing for the alleged facts, that
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`claim must stand and a motion to dismiss must be denied.
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`III. Argument
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`A.
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`Indirect infringement
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`Samsung complains about the sufficiency of DoDots Licensing’s allegations regarding
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`Samsung’s “knowledge” of the asserted patents and its “intent” to induce infringement. Neither
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`complaint is well-founded and DoDots Licensing has pleaded – and even supported with sworn
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`declarations – detailed facts regarding both claim elements.
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`1.
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`DoDots Licensing Sufficiently Alleged Knowledge
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`DoDots Licensing adequately pleads that Samsung has knowledge of the asserted patents.
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`Alleging either actual knowledge or willful blindness is sufficient. Red Rock Analytics, LLC v.
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`Apple Inc., No. 6:21-CV-00346-ADA, 2021 WL 5828368, *2 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 8, 2021)
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`(“plaintiff must plead specific facts sufficient to show that the accused infringer had actual
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`knowledge of the asserted patents, or was willfully blind to the existence of the asserted
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`patents.”) (citing Glob.-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 766, 769 (2011)).
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`4
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`Case 6:22-cv-00535-ADA Document 104 Filed 08/23/23 Page 9 of 24
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`Here, DoDots Licensing pled both actual knowledge and willful blindness.
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`a)
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`Actual Knowledge
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`DoDots Licensing pleaded infringement of U.S. Pat. Nos. 8,510,407 (“the ’407 patent”),
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`8,020,083 (“the ’083 patent”), and 9,369,545 (“the ’545 patent”) (collectively referred to as “the
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`asserted patents”). And it pleaded that, on at least two separate occasions, Samsung was
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`informed about patents asserted in this case.
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`First, the Second Amended Complaint alleges that Samsung was made aware of the ’083
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`patent as early as April 20, 2011 – over a decade before this instant lawsuit was filed.
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`Specifically, Wilfred Lam (a founder of Innovation Management Sciences, which is the entity
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`that prosecuted and first owned the asserted patents) reached out to his personal friend, KJ Kim,
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`an in-house counsel in the IP Department at Samsung, about the technology at issue in this case
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`and the related patent portfolio. See Dkt. 97, ¶58 (citing Ex. 9, Declaration of Wilfred Lam, at
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`¶¶9-13). Mr. Lam’s company, Innovation Management Sciences (“IMS”), helped to prosecute
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`the portfolio, owned the rights to the asserted patents at the time, and had been encouraged by
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`Samsung to share patent assets that might be of interest to Samsung. Id. Mr. Lam specifically
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`informed Samsung that the ’083 patent was about to issue noting that “[a]n office action with
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`allowable subject matter has been issued for 11/932,585.” Id. at Ex. 9, ¶12. That application was
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`publicly available at the time and the ’083 patent issued shortly thereafter with unchanged
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`claims. Id. at ¶59. In addition, the Second Amended Complaint alleges that Samsung proactively
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`“monitors patents” and would have continued to track the patent assets that it was made aware
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`of. Id. at ¶69. At a minimum there are reasonable inferences to be made that Samsung had
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`“knowledge” of the ’083 patent in 2011.1
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`1 Patent application 11/932,553 which issued at the ’407 patent was also filed well before Mr.
`Lam’s correspondence with Mr. Kim. It is not unreasonable to believe that when Samsung
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`5
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`Case 6:22-cv-00535-ADA Document 104 Filed 08/23/23 Page 10 of 24
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`Samsung contests that it actually had sufficient knowledge of the ’083 patent claims in
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`2011. To do so, Samsung attempts to introduce additional purported facts that are outside of the
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`pleadings. This is irrelevant and impermissible. For a motion to dismiss, the question is whether
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`DoDots Licensing pled that Samsung had knowledge and DoDots Licensing did just that. Thus,
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`the allegations support that Samsung was aware of at least the ’083 patent in 2011.
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`In particular, Samsung improperly seeks to offer additional facts (outside the pleadings)
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`to suggest that the person who received notice of the ’083 patent (Mr. Kim) changed positions
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`within Samsung during 2011 and that that notice might not have been “directed” to the right
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`“personnel” to “reasonably put Samsung on notice.” Dkt. 103 at 10. But none of this is contained
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`in the pleadings and, thus, cannot be considered to support a motion to dismiss. Samsung is
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`asking the Court to consider and weigh facts outside of the Second Amended Complaint about
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`the timing and effect of an employee’s moves within Samsung and about what the employee did
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`– or did not do – with the delivered notice. Seeking such a fact-finding and asking for the Court
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`to ignore reasonable inferences (such as that Mr. Kim would have passed the correspondence on
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`to the right person if he was no longer that person) is not appropriate to support a motion to
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`dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
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`content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
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`misconduct alleged.”).2
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`looked at the ’083 patent’s application it would have also tracked related patents as well. See
`Jawbone Innovations LLC, v. Google LLC, 6:21-CV-00985-ADA, Dkt. 85 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 12,
`2022) (allegations that Google had pre-suit knowledge of the Asserted Patents and was a
`sophisticated company that would search and monitor patents were factors in denying a motion
`to dismiss).
`2 It is noteworthy that Mr. Kim’s email address remained the same during the supposed transition
`(kj89.kim@samsung.com) and that there was no evidence to suggest that Mr. Kim did not
`receive the correspondence on behalf of Samsung. See Dkt. 97 at Ex. 8. There is also no
`authority cited by Samsung to suggest that there is any legal obligation on DoDots to follow up
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`6
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`

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`Case 6:22-cv-00535-ADA Document 104 Filed 08/23/23 Page 11 of 24
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`Second, DoDots Licensing also alleged that Samsung had notice of all of the asserted
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`patents by 2014. In particular, the Second Amended Complaint alleges that Mr. Ramde, also a
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`founder of Innovation Management Sciences, communicated with a Senior Licensing Manager at
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`Samsung named Il Seok Jang concerning the asserted patents. See Dkt. 97 at ¶¶56, 60-62 (citing
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`Ex. 10, Declaration of Rakesh Ramde, at ¶¶10-13). As part of their exchange, Mr. Ramde
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`provided Mr. Jang with a document listing the then-issued patents and patent applications.3 Id.,
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`Ex. 10 at ¶14; see Dkt. 97 at ¶ 62.
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`Samsung again improperly seeks to contest the allegations based on information not
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`found in the pleadings. Specifically, Samsung asserts that Mr. Jang – a patent licensing manager
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`– was not the most appropriate person to provide notice to at Samsung. Samsung makes this
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`statement despite acknowledging that Mr. Jang stated his “willingness to forward the listed
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`patents along to the right person” if another individual would be more appropriate. Dkt. 103 at
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`12. Resolving such fact questions is not appropriate during a motion to dismiss.4
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`on its notice to Samsung before that notice can support a sufficient allegation of “knowledge.”
`3 The ’083 and ’407 patents were issued and on this list. The ’545 patent issued with claims that
`were substantially unchanged from those filed in the ’227 patent application that existed and
`would have been on the list. To qualify for provisional rights, 35 USC §154(d)(2) requires that
`the “the invention as claimed in the patent is substantially identical to the invention as claimed in
`the published patent application.” Here, other than fixing some spelling errors, the claims that
`ultimately issued in the ’545 patent were identical to the originally filed claims in the ’227
`application, including no changes to any independent claims. See Dkt. 97, at ¶¶62-66.
`Accordingly, Mr. Ramde’s notice of this patent application to Samsung constitutes notice of the
`patent, because the claims of the ’227 patent application are substantially identical to the claims
`of the ‘545 patent. See Innovention Toys, LLC v. MGA Entertainment, Inc., 611 F. App'x 693
`(Fed. Cir. 2015), rev’d on other grounds 136 S. Ct. 2483 (affirming finding that claim scope
`from patent application to patent issuance was substantially the same).
`4 Samsung questions whether it was more appropriate to send the patent information to persons in
`charge of patent “licensing” or employees in charge of patent “acquisition.” Sending the patents
`to either—both responsible for patent matters at Samsung—would suffice to allege that Samsung
`had “knowledge” of the patents. Determining which employee might be better suited to help with
`a transaction concerning the patents is irrelevant to whether Samsung knew of the patents.
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`7
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`Case 6:22-cv-00535-ADA Document 104 Filed 08/23/23 Page 12 of 24
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`In the end, however, Samsung bases it challenge on the evidentiary contention that Mr.
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`Ramde’s declaration is not “credible.” In particular, Samsung complains – in the face of notice
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`specifically pleaded and supported by a declaration stating that the asserted patents were sent to
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`Samsung – that the allegation cannot be believed because there is not a documentary copy of the
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`list available. Dkt. 103 at 12-13. In the emails obtained thus far, however, Mr. Ramde makes
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`specific reference “the list of patents I previously sent over.” See Dkt. 97 at ¶62 (citing Ex. 10,
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`Declaration of Rakesh Ramde, at ¶¶12-16). While Samsung is free to test these facts at trial, the
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`allegations cannot be ignored at the pleading stage. Weighing the evidence is simply not
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`appropriate during a motion to dismiss. A determination regarding credibility is also not
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`something that is considered in a motion to dismiss because Courts are directed not “to question
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`the credibility of the facts pleaded”. Edmond v. Marathon Petroleum Co., LP, et. al, No. 20-cv-
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`00210-DCG, Dkt. 11, at *1-2, n. 2.
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`Nor can Samsung ignore the obvious inferences that could be drawn from the information
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`about the asserted patents that Mr. Ramde provided to Mr. Jang, a Samsung patent professional.
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`It is certainly reasonable to infer that, given the contemporaneous documentation referring to the
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`patents being sent, the patents were in fact sent. It is also reasonable to infer that Mr. Jang would,
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`if appropriate, forward the patents to the best person available to review them. And even if Mr.
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`Jang was not the best person to analyze the patents, nothing negates the fact that Samsung’s
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`licensing department was notified of the asserted patents. Such evidence is sufficient to prove
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`knowledge at trial – and is certainly sufficient to allege it at the pleading stage.5
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`5 Mr. Ramde’s declaration also explains that it was his common practice to send a list of patents
`and patent applications for the portfolios he was handling, and there is no reason to believe he
`would not have done that in this situation. Id. at Ex. 10, at ¶15. He even provided other emails to
`corroborate that practice. Id. at Ex. 10, at ¶16. While Samsung quibbles that the exemplary
`emails are not the emails sent to Samsung, they are exemplary of the practice sworn to in Mr.
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`8
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`

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`Case 6:22-cv-00535-ADA Document 104 Filed 08/23/23 Page 13 of 24
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`Lastly, Samsung argues that it lacks knowledge because the communications with
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`Samsung failed to specifically inform the Samsung employees that its customers were infringing
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`the asserted patents. Id. at 13-14. But there is simply no requirement that Samsung be informed
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`of its customers’ infringement for Samsung to have the requisite knowledge of the patents.
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`Samsung cites no legal support for its would-be pleading requirement. Instead, Samsung cites
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`two cases that have nothing to do with issues and facts here. In the IKO case, Dkt. 103 at 13-14,
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`the patentee never actually informed Defendant of its patent and relied only on speculative
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`evidence (including trade shows and an “offhand” comment about a marked product) to support
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`its claims of knowledge. See Kirsch Rsch. & Dev., LLC v. IKO Indus., Inc., No. 6:20-CV-00317-
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`ADA, 2021 WL 4555608, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 4, 2021). Here, Messrs. Ramde and Lam
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`specifically discussed the asserted patents and patent portfolio with Samsung employees and
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`therefore provided Samsung with the requisite knowledge. Likewise, Samsung’s citation to the
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`earlier DoDots v. Lenovo case in Delaware (Dkt. 103 at 14) has no relevance to this case. The
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`allegations made about Samsung’s knowledge in this case are different from the allegations made
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`about Lenovo’s knowledge in a different case. See DoDots Licensing Sols. LLC v. Lenovo
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`Holding Co., Inc., No. CV 18-098 (MN), 2018 WL 6629709, at *5 (D. Del. Dec. 19, 2018).
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`Here, as properly pleaded, Samsung had knowledge of the asserted patents through Messrs.
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`Ramde and Lam’s communications with multiple Samsung employees.
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`Collectively, the detailed factual allegations concerning the multiple communications to
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`Samsung about the asserted patents and Samsung’s practice of monitoring patents show that
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`Samsung had pre-suit knowledge of the asserted patents. See Jawbone Innovations LLC, v.
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`Ramde’s declaration. At a minimum, a reasonable inference exists that Mr. Ramde acted in
`accordance with his customary practice and sent a list of the asserted patents to Samsung. See
`Dkt. 97 at ¶¶ 67-69 (citing Ex. 10, ¶¶12-16).
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`9
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`Case 6:22-cv-00535-ADA Document 104 Filed 08/23/23 Page 14 of 24
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`Google LLC, 6:21-CV-00985-ADA, Dkt. 85 (W.D. Tx. October 12, 2022) (allegations that
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`Google had pre-suit knowledge of the asserted patents and was a sophisticated company that
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`would search and monitor patents was sufficient). Because DoDots Licensing’s allegations of
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`actual knowledge are well-pleaded, this Court does not need to address Samsung’s complaint
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`regarding the sufficiency of DoDots Licensing’s willful blindness allegations. Id. at 7 (the Court
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`did not need to decide willful blindness because Jawbone sufficiently pleaded Google’s actual
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`knowledge of the asserted patents).
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`b) Willful Blindness
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`In addition to actual notice of the asserted patents, the Second Amended Complaint also
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`pleaded that Samsung was willfully blind regarding the existence of the asserted patents. Willful
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`blindness requires that “(1) the defendant must subjectively believe that there is a high
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`probability that a fact exists and (2) the defendant must take deliberate actions to avoid learning
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`of that fact.” Glob.-Tech, 563 U.S. at 769.
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`DoDot Licensing’s allegations of willful blindness are sufficient. The Second Amended
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`Complaint alleges that the steps taken by Samsung to avoid knowledge of its patent infringement
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`amounted to willful blindness:
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`“Samsung knew that the use of the Accused Samsung Devices and/or the Accused
`Samsung Devices together with the Accused Samsung Software would constitute
`infringement of the Asserted patents, or believed there was a high probability that the use
`of the Accused Samsung Devices and/or Accused Samsung Devices together with the
`Accused Samsung Software would constitute infringement of the Asserted patents and
`took deliberate steps to avoid learning of that infringement.” (emphasis added).
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`Dkt. 97 at ¶115. That is precisely what is required by the caselaw. See Glob.-Tech, 563 U.S. at
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`769 (the active efforts of defendant to avoid learning of plaintiff’s patents despite studying the
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`competing product necessitated a finding of willful blindness). At the pleading stage, DoDots
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`Licensing’s allegation is more than sufficient for Samsung to be put on notice of the allegations
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`Case 6:22-cv-00535-ADA Document 104 Filed 08/23/23 Page 15 of 24
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`of willful blindness. Particularly, given Samsung’s arguments relying on their employees’
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`specific department associations and their potential failure to forward the patent information to
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`the “right” employees (despite discussions about the technology and patent portfolio), an
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`inference of willful blindness is fully warranted.
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`2.
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`DoDots Sufficiently Alleged Intent To Induce Infringement
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`Samsung presents a one-paragraph argument claiming that DoDot’s extensive allegations
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`regarding intent are deficient. Not so. Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
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`recognizes that “intent. . . may be alleged generally.” Nonetheless, DoDots Licensing’s Second
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`Amended Complaint does more than that, presenting detailed factual allegations supporting its
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`claims that Samsung possessed the intent to infringe. See Dkt. 97 at ¶¶ 127-135, 141, 143, 149,
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`151, 157, 159. Moreover, those allegations fairly put Samsung on notice of the acts that
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`constitute induced infringement and are exactly the kind of allegations that Courts have found to
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`be sufficient to allege inducement.
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`To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff’s complaint “must contain facts plausibly
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`showing that [defendant] specifically intended their customers to infringe…and knew that the
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`customer’s acts constituted infringement.” In re Bill of Lading Transmission & Processing Sys.
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`Patent Litig., 681 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2012). DoDots Licensing did exactly that. For each
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`patent, DoDots Licensing alleged that Samsung “intended to cause, and did cause, customers to
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`use the Accused Samsung Devices . . . to directly infringe.” See Dkt. 97 at ¶¶ 141, 149, 157. The
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`allegations specifically allege that even after notice of each of the asserted patents provided to
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`Samsung, Samsung “continued” with its infringing acts. Id. at ¶¶ 143, 151, 159.
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`Samsung faults DoDots Licensing’s allegations for a supposedly failing to plead that
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`“Samsung was aware of the alleged infringement.” Dkt. 103 at 14-15. Again, not true. DoDots
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`Licensing specifically alleged that “Samsung knew that the use of the Accused Samsung Devices
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`Case 6:22-cv-00535-ADA Document 104 Filed 08/23/23 Page 16 of 24
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`. . . would constitute infringement of the asserted patents.” Id. at ¶133.
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`The Federal Circuit has made clear that the pleading standard “does not” require that a
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`plaintiff “prove its case at the pleading stage.” In re Bill of Lading Transmission, 681 F.3d at
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`1339. Indeed, the Court has found error in a “failure to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of
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`the non-moving party.” Id. at 1340. Here, an abundance of facts have been pleaded from which
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`an inference of intent can be drawn.
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`Moreover, the Second Amended Complaint relied on Samsung’s use of advertisements
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`and instructions to customers to support its claims of intentional inducement. See Dkt. 97 at
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`¶¶88, 104, 106, 115, and 127-135. These modalities are exactly the kinds of acts that Courts
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`regularly find to be sufficient to support induced infringement. In re Bill of Lading Transmission,
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`681 F.3d at 1341-42 (“Common sense indicates that advertising that your product can be used”
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`in a certain way to achieve desired benefits “gives rise to a reasonable inference that you intend
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`to induce your customers to accomplish these benefits through utilization of the patented
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`method”); Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“active
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`steps taken to induce infringement, such as advertising an infringing use, can support a finding of
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`an intention for the product to be used in an infringing manner.”); Hafeman v. LG Elecs. Inc.,
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`2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154764, *14-15 (W.D. Tex. 2022) (providing customers “with
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`documents and instructions demonstrating how to use the devices to infringe the claims, and/or
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`by providing service, support, or other active assistance to its customers in using the Accused
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`Products in the U.S.” supports inducement); see also Nalco Co. v. Chem-Mod, LLC, 883 F.3d
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`1337, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding sufficient allegations that defendants “had knowledge of the
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`[] patent and performed various activities with specific intent to induce others . . . to infringe by,
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`among party.”).
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`Case 6:22-cv-00535-ADA Document 104 Filed 08/23/23 Page 17 of 24
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`Nor are, as Samsung suggests, the alleged advertisements and instructions unrelated to
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`Samsung’s infringement and its knowledge of infringement. For example, the ’083 and ’407
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`pat