Case 6:22-cv-00466-ADA-DTG Document 56 Filed 01/09/23 Page 1 of 14
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`WACO DIVISION
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`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`
`No. 6:22-CV-0466-ADA-DTG
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`ADVANCED SILICON
`TECHNOLOGIES LLC,
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`
`
`v.
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`NXP SEMICONDUCTORS N.V.,
`NXP B.V., and
`NXP USA, INC.,
`
`
`
`Plaintiff,
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`Defendants.
`
`DEFENDANT NXP USA, INC.’S
`REPLY CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`Case 6:22-cv-00466-ADA-DTG Document 56 Filed 01/09/23 Page 2 of 14
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1 
`AST’S PROPOSED CONSTRUCTIONS ARE OVERBROAD AND IGNORE THE
`INTRINSIC RECORD........................................................................................................ 1 
`Term 1: “A method for reducing power consumption for a video decoder comprising”
`....................................................................................................................................... 1 
`Term 2: “graphics pipeline” .......................................................................................... 3 
`Term 3: “graphics pipelines operative to process data in a dedicated tile” .................. 4 
`Term 4: “a memory controller . . . operative to transfer pixel data between each of a
`first pipeline and a second pipeline [the two graphics pipelines] and a memory shared
`among the at least two graphics pipelines” ................................................................... 5 
`Term 5: “NxM number of pixels” ................................................................................. 8 
`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................... 9 
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`A. 
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`B. 
`C. 
`D. 
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`E. 
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`
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`I. 
`II. 
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`III. 
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`Case 6:22-cv-00466-ADA-DTG Document 56 Filed 01/09/23 Page 3 of 14
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`
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`Page(s)
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`CASES
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`Anglefix, LLC v. Wright Med. Tech., Inc.,
`No. 2:13-cv-2407, 2015 WL 9581865 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 30, 2015) .........................................8
`
`Aylus Networks, Inc. v. Apple Inc.,
`856 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2017)..................................................................................................8
`
`Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Immunex Corp.,
`86 F. Supp. 2d 447 (D.N.J. 2000) ..........................................................................................1, 2
`
`Catalina Mktg. Int’l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc.,
`289 F.3d 801 (Fed. Cir. 2002)....................................................................................................2
`
`Corel Software, LLC v. Microsoft Corp.,
`No. 2:15-CV-528, 2016 WL 4444747 (D. Utah Aug. 23, 2016) ...............................................8
`
`Ecolab, Inc. v. FMC Corp.,
`569 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2009)..................................................................................................9
`
`Evolutionary Intelligence, LLC v. Sprint Nextel Corp.,
`No. C-13-4513, 2014 WL 4802426 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2014) ................................................8
`
`Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd.,
`133 F.3d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1998)..................................................................................................1
`
`Princeton Digital Image Corp. v. Konami Digital Entm’t Inc.,
`No. 12–1461, 2017 WL 6375173 (D. Del. Dec. 13, 2017) ........................................................8
`
`Signal IP, Inc. v. Fiat U.S.A., Inc.,
`No. 14-cv-13864, 2016 WL 5027595 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 20, 2016) ..........................................8
`
`Southwall Techs. Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co.,
`54 F.3d 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1995)....................................................................................................8
`
`RULES AND STATUTES
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`35 U.S.C. § 112 ................................................................................................................................7
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`Case 6:22-cv-00466-ADA-DTG Document 56 Filed 01/09/23 Page 4 of 14
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`Exhibit
`Number
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`TABLE OF EXHIBITS
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`Description
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`1
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`2
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`3
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`4
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`5
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`6
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`7
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`8
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`9
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`10
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`11
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`12
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`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(a), Unified
`Patents Inc. v. Advanced Silicon Techs. LLC, No. IPR2016-01060, Paper 8 (PTAB
`Aug. 23, 2016) (NXP-AST00156732–85)
`
`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(a),
`Volkswagen Grp. Of Am., Inc. v. Advanced Silicon Techs. LLC, No. IPR2016-
`00894, Paper 9 (PTAB July 18, 2016) (NXP-AST00156668–731)
`
`IBM Dictionary of Computing (10th 1994) (NXP-AST00156786–89)
`
`The Computer Desktop Encyclopedia (2d 1999) (NXP-AST00156790–92)
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`Excerpt of Prosecution History for the ’945 Patent, Applicants’ Response (Mar.
`14, 2005) (AST0000877–89)
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`Excerpt of Prosecution History for the ’945 Patent, Office Action (Feb. 9, 2007)
`(AST0000751–67)
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`Excerpt of Prosecution History for the ’945 Patent, Applicants’ Response (June 7,
`2007) (AST0000729–44)
`
`Excerpt of Prosecution History for the ’945 Patent, Office Action (Aug. 28, 2007)
`(AST0000700–12)
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`AST’s Preliminary Infringement Contentions, Exhibit B
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`Declaration of John C. Hart, Ph.D. in Support of Patent Owner’s Preliminary
`Response, Unified Patents Inc. v. Advanced Silicon Techs. LLC, No. IPR2016-
`01060, Exhibit 2001 (PTAB Aug. 23, 2016)
`
`Chicago Manual of Style (17th ed. 2017)
`
`Complainant Advanced Silicon Technologies LLC’s Reply Claim Construction
`Brief, Computing or Graphics Systems, Components Thereof, and Vehicles
`Containing Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-984 (ITC May 20, 2016).
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`Case 6:22-cv-00466-ADA-DTG Document 56 Filed 01/09/23 Page 5 of 14
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
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`The Court should adopt NXP’s proposed constructions, which are grounded in the intrinsic
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`record. AST’s proposed constructions impermissibly seek to ignore its own admissions to the
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`patent office in an attempt to improperly broaden the asserted claims. AST’s approach should be
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`rejected and the intrinsic record embraced by adoption of NXP’s constructions.1
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`II.
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`AST’S PROPOSED CONSTRUCTIONS ARE OVERBROAD AND IGNORE THE
`INTRINSIC RECORD
`A.
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`Term 1: “A method for reducing power consumption for a video decoder
`comprising”
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`AST paradoxically argues (a) that the preamble of claim 26 recites an intended benefit of
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`the claim, yet (b) such intended benefit does not even apply to the claim. Specifically, AST argues
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`that “reducing power consumption” is a “shorthand encapsulation of the advantages of the
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`invention.” Resp. (Dkt. 50) at 6 (quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Immunex Corp., 86 F. Supp.
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`2d 447, 451 (D.N.J. 2000)). But having conceded the importance of “reducing power
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`consumption” to the claim, AST then seeks to impermissibly broaden the scope of the claim to
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`include performance of the claimed method in a manner that does not actually reduce power
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`consumption. Resp. at 6 (contending “the claimed methods and systems dynamically raise and
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`lower consumption to achieve performance targets”), Hart Decl. (Dkt. 50-2), ¶ 14 (“I understand
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`1 In support of AST’s plain and ordinary meaning constructions, both AST’s Response and the
`corresponding expert declaration of Dr. John C. Hart repeatedly reference how a supposed
`POSITA would understand certain claim terms. But, critically, neither the response nor
`declaration provide any explanation about who the POSITA is, and what knowledge and
`experience he/she brings to the table. Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473,
`1477 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (noting that claims are construed through the eyes of a POSITA, who is
`“deemed to read the words used in the patent documents with an understanding of their meaning
`in the field, and to have knowledge of any special meaning and usage in the field”). As AST has
`not defined the skills necessary to qualify as a POSITA with respect to the asserted patents, it has
`failed to demonstrate the relevance of such opinions. Therefore, any statements in the Response
`or declaration regarding the understanding of a POSITA should be disregarded. However, even
`considering Dr. Hart’s declaration and AST’s statements regarding a POSITA, NXP’s proposed
`constructions should still be adopted as detailed below.
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`Case 6:22-cv-00466-ADA-DTG Document 56 Filed 01/09/23 Page 6 of 14
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`that NXP contends that claim 26 of the ‘435 Patent requires that the power consumption of the
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`video decoder decrease because the preamble refers to a method for reducing power
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`consumption. I disagree.”).2 As such, AST’s primary purpose for arguing the preamble of claim
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`26 is not limiting is to impermissibly broaden the claim to capture activity not contemplated by
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`the claim at all—i.e., activities that would increase power consumption.
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`In doing so, AST conveniently ignores a basis for finding a preamble limiting is “when the
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`preamble is essential to understand limitations or terms in the claim body.” Catalina Mktg. Int’l,
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`Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 808 (Fed. Cir. 2002). AST agrees that claim 26 recites
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`the steps described in Figure 9 of the ’435 patent. Resp. at 5–6. Here, if a practitioner followed
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`the exact steps recited in Figure 9 and that resulted in increasing “the power consumption for a
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`video decoder,” then under AST’s interpretation that practitioner would still infringe claim 26.
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`This alone makes the preamble the very definition of a term that is “essential to understand” the
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`claim body because the claim is on its face limited to a method for “reducing,” rather than
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`increasing, “power consumption.”
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`Further, AST’s reliance on Bristol-Myers Squibb is misplaced. Resp. at 6. In finding a
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`preamble non-limiting, the Bristol-Myers Squibb Court noted that “to achieve the beneficial results
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`promised in the preamble, a practitioner need only follow the method steps recited in the body of
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`the claim.” Bristol-Myers Squibb, 86 F. Supp. 2d at 451. That is not the case here. As admitted
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`by the ’435 patent itself, a practitioner could “follow the method steps recited in the body of” claim
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`26 and increase the power consumption for a video decoder, whereas the promised beneficial
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`result is decreased consumption.
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`Last, AST argues that finding the preamble limiting would create confusion about claim
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`2 All emphasis added unless otherwise noted.
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`Case 6:22-cv-00466-ADA-DTG Document 56 Filed 01/09/23 Page 7 of 14
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`scope. Resp. at 7. AST chose to draft and then assert claim 26. It cannot now run from the
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`language it chose by claiming it is confusing after the fact, nor can it attempt to broaden the claim
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`to include situations where the method steps result in an increase in power consumption for the
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`video decoder. AST’s series of rhetorical questions on page 7 of its Response3 confirms AST’s
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`true purpose is to broaden the scope of claim 26, underscoring the need to find claim 26’s preamble
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`limiting.
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`B.
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`Term 2: “graphics pipeline”
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`AST fails to identify any intrinsic evidence to support its argument that the claimed
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`graphics pipeline is not limited to “hardware, which may be one or more circuits.” First, with no
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`support in the intrinsic record, AST argues that a POSITA would understand that the claimed a
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`“memory controller could, and often does, implement software instructions.” Resp. at 8. The fact
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`that a memory controller could do anything has no
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`bearing on what is actually disclosed in the
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`specification for the separate graphics pipeline.
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`AST then distorts its only reference to the
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`specification, conflating the host [red] with the
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`separately disclosed graphics pipelines [blue].
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`Specifically, AST incorrectly contends that “the
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`graphics processing circuit 34 (which includes
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`graphics pipelines 101 and 102) may be integrated
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`3 AST’s rhetorical questions include: “If the claim requires ‘reducing power consumption,’ as NXP
`proposes, must ‘varying’ then only mean ‘reducing’? Must power consumption be reduced based
`on the input stream encoding description data more than it is increased by the receipt of more than
`one input stream? Does the power consumption of the video decoder have to decrease, even if
`the power consumption of the operational portion of the device increases?” Resp. at 7.
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`Case 6:22-cv-00466-ADA-DTG Document 56 Filed 01/09/23 Page 8 of 14
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`with a host processor, which in turn may be a ‘graphics application running on the system
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`processor.’” Resp. at 8 (citing ’945 patent at 3:61–67) (emphasis in original). AST’s cited portion
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`of the specification actually states that “the host” [red] that provides data 31 to circuit 34 “may be
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`a system processor (not shown) or a graphics application running on the system processor.” ’945
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`patent at 3:65–67. Nowhere does the specification describe the separate graphics pipelines 101
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`and 102 as an “application.”
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`AST’s contention that references cited by the examiner during prosecution disclosed
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`graphics pipelines that include software—inferring that an examiner would understand the ’945
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`patent to have the same disclosure—is similarly non-sensical and not relevant. The fact that
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`different references disclose a graphics pipeline that includes aspects of both software and
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`hardware does not change that here, in AST’s actual asserted patent, the applicant chose to embody
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`the claimed graphics pipeline as a collection of one or more “circuits” on a “chip;” cited prior art
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`cannot change that the ’945 patent consistently describes the graphics pipeline as hardware. See
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`’945 patent, 1:21–23, 4:5–9, 4:16–17; FIG. 2; claims 1, 4, 11, 21.
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`Because the specification and claims of the ’945 Patent specifically describe the “graphics
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`pipeline” as a “circuit” composed of “circuitry,” the proper construction of this term in view of the
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`intrinsic and extrinsic evidence is “hardware, which may be one or more circuits.”4
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`C.
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`Term 3: “graphics pipelines operative to process data in a dedicated tile”
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`As best understood, AST argues, without citation to the specification, that the ’945 Patent
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`discloses that a particular pipeline processes “pixel data 36 for a primitive that is not within a
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`single tile . . . to identify the pixels for which pixel attribute operations are performed.” Resp. at
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`10. AST ignores that such an approach directly conflicts with claim language requiring “a
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`4 To focus the parties’ dispute, NXP agrees to drop “that processes graphics data” from its proposed
`construction.
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`Case 6:22-cv-00466-ADA-DTG Document 56 Filed 01/09/23 Page 9 of 14
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`respective one of the at least two graphics pipelines operative to process data in a dedicated tile.”
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`If, as AST contends, each pipeline processes data that is not within its dedicated tiles, this claim
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`language is rendered meaningless, and AST’s own IPR argument distinguishing prior art is
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`misleading. NXP’s proposed construction is consistent with and appropriately clarifies that the
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`“dedicated tile” is processed by one and only one pipeline—an understanding connoted by the
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`term “dedicated” and confirmed in AST’s explanation to the PTAB.
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`AST does not dispute that the ’945 Patent discloses that “the first graphics pipeline 101 [is]
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`operative to process graphics data in a first set of tiles,” and the “second graphics pipeline 102 [is]
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`operative to process graphics data in a second set of tiles.” Resp. at 10–11; ’945 Patent at 4:5–13,
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`FIGS. 2–3. Nor does AST dispute that it distinguished prior art in the IPR proceedings based on
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`a particular pipeline/processor processing pixels “whether they are in the tile or not” and “not
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`within the tiles assigned to that processor.” Resp. at 11–12. There appears to be no distinction
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`between the argument AST is now advancing and the disclosures in the prior art references it
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`previously distinguished.
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`Accordingly, AST’s proposal of plain and ordinary meaning for the term “graphics
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`pipelines operative to process data in a dedicated tile” is a belated attempt to distance itself from
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`its prior arguments and to broaden the term for infringement purposes.
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`D.
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`Term 4: “a memory controller . . . operative to transfer pixel data between
`each of a first pipeline and a second pipeline [the two graphics pipelines] and
`a memory shared among the at least two graphics pipelines”
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`Rather than addressing the ambiguity in the actual claim phrase at issue, AST argues that
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`this “term employs the common and well understood formulation of ‘between each of X or Y and
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`Z.’” Resp. at 12. Such a “formulation” might be helpful if that is what the claim actually recited.
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`It is not. The claim does not include “or” but instead recites “between each of a first pipeline and
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`a second pipeline and a memory.” AST cannot rewrite the claim because the plain words are now
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`Case 6:22-cv-00466-ADA-DTG Document 56 Filed 01/09/23 Page 10 of 14
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`inconvenient.
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`In direct contravention to its multiple arguments in IPR proceedings detailed in NXP’s
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`Opening Brief, AST now states that “the claim language does not require any transfer of pixel data
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`between pipelines.” Resp. at 12 (emphasis in original). Specifically, in the VW POPR, AST stated
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`that “the memory controller does not just transmit data to the shared graphics memory 48, but also
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`to, from, and between the pipelines 101 and 102. . . . This interaction with and between the first
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`and second pipelines is confirmed by the only passage that Volkswagen quotes in support of its
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`claim construction.” Ex. 2 at 21. AST further argued over prior art that “Gove does not describe
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`. . . transferring pixel data between one parallel processor and another . . .” Id. at 32–33; see
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`also id. at 34 (“[I]t does not transfer data from one pipeline to another.”). In the Unified Patents
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`POPR, AST asserted “that the memory controller be operative between the shared memory and
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`between the first and second pipelines.” Ex. 1 at 22; see also id. at 23 (“[T]he memory controller
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`does not just transmit data to the shared graphics memory 48, but also to, from, and between the
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`pipelines 101 and 102.”). Distinguishing prior art, AST reiterated this understanding: “But Seiler
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`does not describe the ‘memory interface 210’ as transferring pixel data (or any data) between
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`one pipeline and another pipeline.” Id. at 26–27.
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`Moreover, in its Preliminary Infringement Contentions, AST confirms that this term
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`requires transfer “between pipelines”:
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`Ex. 9 at 14.
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`AST argues that the requirement to “transfer pixel data between the first and second
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`pipeline . . . would make no sense to a POSITA.” Resp. at 13. This argument is again belied by
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`AST’s IPR filings and its own expert. In the Unified POPR, AST’s expert, Dr. Hart explained that
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`Case 6:22-cv-00466-ADA-DTG Document 56 Filed 01/09/23 Page 11 of 14
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`a POSITA would understand that “the claimed memory controller is operative to transfer data
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`between the pipelines and from the pipelines to the shared memory.” Ex. 10 at ¶ 22. And Dr.
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`Hart distinguished prior art based on this very construction, explaining that: “Seiler does not
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`describe memory interface 210 [the prior art memory interface] as transferring processed pixel
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`data (or any data) from one pipeline to another. . . . Figure 2 and the Seiler reference does not
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`describe or depict memory interface 210 as transferring data from one pipeline to another.” Id.
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`at ¶ 25.
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`Despite its prior IPR arguments, AST now contends that the specification does not support
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`NXP’s construction (Resp. at 14–16 (citing ’945 Patent at 5:4–7, 5:33–36, 4:16–22)). Again, this
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`argument is the exact opposite of its representations in the IPR proceedings citing the very same
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`portions of the specification:
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`As illustrated in Fig. 2 (reproduced below), the specification describes pipeline 101
`including back end circuitry 39 and pipeline 102 as including back end circuitry 42.
`(’945 Patent at 4:5-15, 4:66 – 5:7, 5:28-36.) The specification further describes (and
`Fig. 2 further illustrates) that the memory controller does not just transmit data to
`the shared graphics memory 48, but also to, from, and between the pipelines 101
`and 102. (E.g., ’945 Patent at Fig. 2, 5:37-40.)
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`Ex. 1 at 23.5
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`Fundamentally, rather than address its representations in the multiple IPR proceedings
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`regarding necessary clarification based on a POSITA’s understanding of the scope of this term,
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`AST ignores the IPRs entirely and argues that “the IPR statements do not matter.”6 Resp. at 17.
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`AST is wrong. AST’s statements to the PTAB during the IPR proceedings constitute part of the
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`5 AST also conflates distinct requirements under 35 U.S.C. § 112 by arguing that inclusion of this
`term as lacking written description support in NXP’s Preliminary Invalidity Contentions but not
`arguing this term is indefinite during claim construction precludes adopting NXP’s proposed
`construction. Resp. at 15. As the Court is aware, written description and indefiniteness are two
`separate bases for invalidity under 35 U.S.C. § 112, and an allegation that a term is lacking written
`description is not waived by not raising it during claim construction.
`6 This despite relying on its IPR filings in support of its arguments for Term 3.
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`Case 6:22-cv-00466-ADA-DTG Document 56 Filed 01/09/23 Page 12 of 14
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`’945 Patent’s prosecution history. See Aylus Networks, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 856 F.3d 1353, 1360–
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`61 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Princeton Digital Image Corp. v. Konami Digital Entm’t Inc., No. 12–1461,
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`2017 WL 6375173, at *5 (D. Del. Dec. 13, 2017) (patent owner statements during IPR constitute
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`prosecution history disclaimer).7 Accordingly, AST’s attempt to disregard its prior arguments is
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`contrary to law and an impermissible attempt to rewrite this term. “A patentee may not proffer
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`an interpretation for the purposes of litigation that would alter the indisputable public record
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`consisting of the claims, specification and the prosecution history, and treat the claims as a ‘nose
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`of wax.’” Southwall Techs. Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (quotation
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`omitted).8
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`E.
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`Term 5: “NxM number of pixels”
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`As detailed in NXP’s Opening brief and undisputed by AST, during prosecution, AST
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`distinguished “NxM number of pixels” over prior art by arguing that this term refers only to “non-
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`square” blocks of pixels in contrast to a prior art reference, Kelleher, that taught “each block is
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`square.” Resp. at 18; Opening at 13–14. AST now argues that, after the examiner entered a
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`subsequent rejection based on a new prior art reference, Perego, “Applicants recognized their
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`7 See also Evolutionary Intelligence, LLC v. Sprint Nextel Corp., No. C-13-4513, 2014 WL
`4802426, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2014) (“The IPR proceedings will also add to the [patent’s]
`prosecution history.”); Corel Software, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., No. 2:15-CV-528, 2016 WL
`4444747, at *2 (D. Utah Aug. 23, 2016) (noting potential for “additional intrinsic record
`develop[ment] during IPR”); Anglefix, LLC v. Wright Med. Tech., Inc., No. 2:13-cv-2407, 2015
`WL 9581865, at *7–8 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 30, 2015) (prosecution history includes IPR proceedings);
`Signal IP, Inc. v. Fiat U.S.A., Inc., No. 14-cv-13864, 2016 WL 5027595, at *16 (E.D. Mich. Sept.
`20, 2016) (same).
`8 Separately, AST argues without support that had it wanted to indicate NXP’s proposed
`construction , it would have used “among” instead of “between” in the claims. Resp. at 13–14.
`This ignores the common usage of these terms. Indeed, the Chicago Manual of Style indicates that
`“between indicates one-to-one relationships” including relationships of more than two things. Ex.
`11 at 314–15. In contrast, “among” indicates a “undefined or collective relationships.” Id. at 315.
`Thus, the use of “between” followed by the recitation of three items indicates a one-to-one
`relationships between the three items, consistent with NXP’s proposed construction.
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`Case 6:22-cv-00466-ADA-DTG Document 56 Filed 01/09/23 Page 13 of 14
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`mistake and never again argued that NxM excluded square blocks.” Resp. at 18. AST fails to
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`mention (or realize) that it could not make this argument again because, as the examiner pointed
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`out, “Perego teaches that each region is rectangular.” Ex. 8 at 3 (Office Action (Aug. 28, 2007))
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`(AST0000700–12). Thus, rather than recognize a mistake, the argument was simply inapplicable.
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`Indeed, AST’s filings in the later ITC Action confirm its continued understanding that “NxM
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`number of pixels” refers to a non-square arrangement—AST agreed the proper construction was
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`“plain and ordinary meaning, for example: a rectangular, but not square, array of pixels denoted
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`by N number of row and M number of columns.” Ex. 12, AST’s Reply Claim Construction Brief
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`at 49–50.
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`Regardless, Ecolab does not support AST’s “acquiescence by the applicant” argument.
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`Resp. at 19 (citing Ecolab, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 569 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). In Ecolab, the
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`applicant argued that two prior art references did not disclose certain claim elements. 569 F.3d at
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`1343. After the examiner clarified the scope of the claims and maintained the rejection on the
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`same two prior art references, applicant made additional distinguishing arguments. Id. The
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`applicant in Ecolab clearly agreed with the examiner and advanced different arguments against the
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`same prior art refences. That is not the case here where the examiner entered a new rejection based
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`on a different prior art reference that disclosed rectangular blocks of pixels.
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`Because NXP’s construction reflects the intrinsic record and AST’s own prior art
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`distinctions, NXP’s proposal of a “rectangular block of pixels that is not square” should be
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`adopted.
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`III. CONCLUSION
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`For the foregoing reasons, NXP respectfully requests the Court adopt its constructions.
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`
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`- 9 -
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`

`

`Case 6:22-cv-00466-ADA-DTG Document 56 Filed 01/09/23 Page 14 of 14
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`January 9, 2023
`
`
`
`/s/ Richard S. Zembek
`
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`
`By:
`
`Richard S. Zembek (SBN 00797726)
`richard.zembek@nortonrosefulbright.com
`NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT US LLP
`Fulbright Tower
`1301 McKinney, Suite 5100
`Houston, Texas 77010-3095
`Tel: (713) 651-5151
`Fax: (713) 651-5246
`
`Eric C. Green (SBN 24069824)
`eric.green@nortonrosefulbright.com
`Catherine Garza (SBN 24073318)
`Cat.garza@nortonrosefulbright.com
`NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT US LLP
`98 San Jacinto Boulevard, Suite 1100
`Austin, Texas 78701
`Tel: (512) 474-5201
`Fax: (512) 536-4598
`
`COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT NXP USA,
`INC.
`
`
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`I certify that on January 9, 2023, the foregoing was electronically filed with the Clerk of
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`Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification of such filing to all counsel of
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`record.
`
`
`
`
`
`/s/ Catherine Garza
`By:
` Catherine Garza
`
`
`
`- 10 -
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`