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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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`FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
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`WACO DIVISION
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`Plaintiffs,
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`v.
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`Case No. 6:21-cv-00898-ADA
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`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
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`ALMONDNET, INC,
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`AMAZON.COM, INC.; AMAZON.COM
`SERVICES LLC; and AMAZON WEB
`SERVICES, INC.,
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`Defendants.
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`OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR
`SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF INVALIDITY UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 101
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`PUBLIC VERSION
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`Case 6:21-cv-00898-ADA Document 180 Filed 09/14/23 Page 2 of 27
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`I.
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`Introduction .........................................................................................................................1
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`II. Relevant Legal Standards ...................................................................................................2
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`III. Factual Background ............................................................................................................4
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`A. The ’639 and ’586 Patents.......................................................................................................... 4
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`B. The ’139 Patent .......................................................................................................................... 5
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`IV. The ’639 and ’586 Patents are not directed to patent-ineligible subject matter............6
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`A. Step One: The ’639 and ’586 patent claims are not directed to abstract ideas but instead to
`technical improvements to computer networks.......................................................................... 6
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`B. Step Two: The asserted claims provide an inventive concept. ................................................ 12
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`1. Amazon’s Motion relies on an incorrect legal standard. ..................................... 12
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`2. Amazon provides no competent evidence disputing that the ordered combination
`of claim elements is inventive. ............................................................................ 13
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`V. The ’139 Patents is not directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. ...........................15
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`A. Step One: The ’139 Patent claims are not directed to abstract ideas but instead to technical
`improvements to computer networks. ...................................................................................... 15
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`B. Step Two: The asserted claims provide an inventive concept. ................................................ 19
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`Cases
`Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International,
`573 U.S. 208 (2014) ......................................................................................................... passim
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`Ancora Techs., Inc. v. HTC Am., Inc.,
`908 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ....................................................................................... 3, 8, 17
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`BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC,
`827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ..................................................................................... 4, 10, 15
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`Berkheimer v. HP Inc.,
`881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ............................................................................... 4, 13, 15, 21
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`Berkheimer v. HP, Inc.,
`890 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ........................................................................................ passim
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`Customedia Techs., LLC v. Dish Network Corp.,
`951 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2020) ............................................................................................... 12
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`Data Engine Techs., LLC v. Google, LLC,
`906 F.3d 999 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ................................................................................................... 3
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`DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P.,
`773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ........................................................................................ passim
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`Elec. Power Grp., LLC, v. Alstom S.A.,
`830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ........................................................................................... 9, 10
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`Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp.,
`822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ................................................................................................. 3
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`Exmark Mfg. Co. Inc. v. Briggs & Stratton Corp.,
`830 F. App’x 305 (Fed. Cir. 2020) .......................................................................................... 15
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`In re Morsa,
`809 F. App’x 913 (Fed. Cir. 2020) .......................................................................................... 12
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`Kononklijke KPN N.V. v. Gemalto M2M GmbH,
`942 F.3d 1143 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ................................................................................... 1, 3, 8, 17
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`Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs. Inc.,
`566 U.S. 66 (2012) .................................................................................................................... 3
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`McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc.,
`837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ....................................................................................... 3, 8, 17
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`USC IP P’ship, L.P. v. Facebook, Inc.,
`576 F. Supp. 3d 446 (W.D. Tex. 2021) ............................................................................. 13, 14
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`I.
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`Introduction
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`Amazon’s Motion fails at both levels of the two-step framework set forth in Alice Corp.
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`v. CLS Bank International, 573 U.S. 208 (2014) and its progeny. Applying that controlling law,
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`it is clear that the asserted claims are not directed to abstract ideas, but are instead directed to
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`inventive solutions to Internet-centric problems. Thus, they are patent-eligible as a matter of
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`law. DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[T]he
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`claimed solution amounts to an inventive concept for resolving this particular Internet-centric
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`problem, rendering the claims patent-eligible.”).
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`Amazon’s arguments to the contrary suffer from numerous flaws, each one of which is
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`fatal to its Motion. At Alice Step One, Amazon suggests various claim summaries depending on
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`which page of the brief the reader is on, but each of these summaries ignores the claimed
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`advance over the prior art. This violates controlling precedent, which makes clear that the Step
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`One “directed to” analysis must at least account for and examine each invention’s “claimed
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`advance” over the prior art. Kononklijke KPN N.V. v. Gemalto M2M GmbH, 942 F.3d 1143,
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`1150 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Amazon’s Step One analysis never even asks this question, much less
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`analyzes the intrinsic evidence that answers the question. This legal error alone is dispositive.
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`Furthermore, Amazon’s “directed to” characterizations in many instances ignore the
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`claim requirements, and interpret the claims contrary to prior decisions by this Court and the
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`Patent Office. For example, Amazon alleges that the claims of the ’639 and ’586 Patents are
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`directed to “display of overflow ads” from a “website that cannot accommodate additional
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`advertisements.” Mot. at 1; see also id. at 4, 9-10, 14 (characterizing the claimed solution as
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`placing “overflow ads”). However, the Court has already construed the claims in a manner
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`directly inconsistent with Amazon’s characterization, in holding that “[t]he claims do not
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`require that the first Internet site is saturated with advertisements.” Dkt. 113 (Claim
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`Construction Order) at 14. Amazon also contends that the claims of the ’139 Patent are directed
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`to “calculating profit for an ad placement” (Mot. at 6, 17-18), even though the claims do not
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`recite or require any calculation of profit. See Ex. H at 9-12 (PTAB decision holding that “the
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`[’139 Patent] claims do not recite any limitations regarding profit or expected profit”).
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`Amazon’s attempt to invalidate the claims by arguing they are “directed to” things that this
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`Court and the PTAB have already held are not the claimed focus should be rejected.
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`While this Court need not consider Alice Step Two, Amazon likewise fails to meet its
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`burden at that Step because the claims recite non-generic, non-routine, and unconventional
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`solutions to Internet-specific problems. In an effort to argue otherwise, Amazon isolates claim
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`elements and contends that each individual element, divorced from context, is routine or
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`conventional. But Amazon’s approach runs contrary to Alice, which requires considering the
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`entire claim “as an ordered combination.” See 573 U.S. at 217. And on this point, Amazon’s
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`motion presents only two short, conclusory paragraphs, which themselves rely only on
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`conclusory expert testimony insufficient to meet Amazon’s clear and convincing burden. See
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`Mot. at 15, 22 (citing Hanson Rep. ¶¶ 1094, 1114, 1162, which are each only a single sentence
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`with no underlying evidentiary support); see also Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 890 F.3d 1369, 1371-
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`72 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Moore, J., concurring) (reasoning that absent any evidence “beyond [an]
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`expert’s conclusory declaration,” “summary judgment had to be denied”).
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`At minimum, the evidence shows numerous factual questions that plainly preclude
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`granting summary judgment. Amazon’s motion should be denied in its entirety.
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`II.
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`Relevant Legal Standards
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`To determine patent eligibility under § 101, courts conduct a two-step analysis as
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`articulated by the Supreme Court in Alice, 573 U.S. at 216. Under Step One of the Alice inquiry,
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`courts must ask “whether the claim, as a whole, is ‘directed to’ [] an abstract idea.” Ancora
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`Techs., Inc. v. HTC Am., Inc., 908 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Under this step, a patent
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`claim is not abstract if it presents a “specific solution to [an] existing technological problem.”
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`Data Engine Techs., LLC v. Google, LLC, 906 F.3d 999, 1009 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
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`The Federal Circuit has made clear that this Step One “directed to” analysis must at least
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`account for and examine each invention’s “claimed advance” in the art according to the record.
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`Ancora, 908 F.3d at 1347-49; see also Kononklijke, 942 F.3d at 1150 (“At step one of the Alice
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`framework, we ‘look at the focus of the claimed advance over the prior art to determine if the
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`claim’s character as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter.’”).
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`Furthermore, the “directed to” inquiry “cannot simply ask whether the claims involve a
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`patent-ineligible concept, because essentially every routinely patent-eligible claim involving
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`physical products and actions involves a law of nature and/or natural phenomenon—after all,
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`they take place in the physical world.” McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d
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`1299, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (emphasis in original); see also Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
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`Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71 (2012) (cautioning against oversimplification because
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`“all inventions… embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or
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`abstract ideas”). Rather, the “directed to” inquiry evaluates claims based on whether “their
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`character as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter.” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp.,
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`822 F.3d 1327, 1334-36 (Fed. Cir. 2016). If the claims are not directed to an abstract idea, then
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`the inquiry ends and the claims are eligible under § 101. Ancora, 908 F.3d at 1349.
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`If the claims are “directed to” an abstract idea, the second step of the Alice analysis calls
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`for the court to “consider the elements of each claim both individually and ‘as an ordered
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`combination’ to determine whether [the claims contain] an element or combination of elements
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`that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent
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`upon the [abstract idea] itself.’” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217-18. Even a novel arrangement of purely
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`conventional elements can form the inventive concept. BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v.
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`AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Claims are patent-eligible if “the
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`claimed solution is necessarily rooted in computer technology in order to overcome a problem
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`specifically arising in the realm of computer networks.” DDR, 773 F.3d at 1257.
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`The Step Two inquiry of “whether a claim element or combination of elements is well-
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`understood, routine, and conventional to a skilled artisan in the relevant field is a question of
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`fact,” which “must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.” Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881
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`F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Facts supporting invalidity under Step Two cannot be
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`established by attorney argument or “conclusory” statements alone. Berkheimer, 890 F.3d at
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`1372-73. And because summary judgment is appropriate only if there is “no genuine dispute as
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`to any material fact,” any genuine factual dispute as to whether claims perform conventional
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`activities “mak[es] summary judgment inappropriate.” Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1365, 1370.
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`III.
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`Factual Background
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`A.
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`The ’639 and ’586 Patents
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`The ’639 and ’586 Patents share a common specification, and each relates to offsite
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`targeted advertising. Ex. A (Frankovitz Rep.) ¶24. As the common specification teaches, the
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`invention “provides a very technical solution to the saturation of many communication media.”
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`’639 Pat. 2:51-53. The solution allows the website to “let its advertisers reach its audience
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`outside of its web site” (i.e., offsite). Id., 3:30-47; Frankovitz Rep. ¶¶24-25 (explaining that the
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`patents use the “term ‘site’ in a particular way that refers to the entity that benefits from the
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`operation of the ‘site’ in question”). Although in certain instances, the solution may require a
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`“lower price” for advertisements than advertisements that would appear on the website, it can
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`still be greatly advantageous “to sell its advertisers the visitor to its web site outside its site” in
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`order to sell “a bigger number of [ad] exposures.” ’639 Pat., 3:35-47; Frankovitz Rep. ¶24.
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`At a high level, the invention of the ’639 and ’586 Patents operates whereby “clients
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`visiting the first broadcaster are tagged at the instance of this broadcaster,” and then when
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`visiting a site of a second broadcaster, “a recognized visitor” (i.e., a visitor recognized as having
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`visited the first broadcaster) “is presented with the first broadcaster’s special message [such as
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`an advertisement], situated in the second broadcaster.” ’639 Pat., 10:51-63. Aspects of this
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`process are reflected in the Asserted Claims. For example, method claim 24 of the ’639 Patent
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`recites in part, “creation of electronic records of visitor computers that visit a first Internet site,
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`using a tag on each of said visitors”; “computer-facilitating delivery to visitor computers
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`visiting a second, different Internet site of advertisements”; and “computer-causing the
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`proprietor of the second Internet site to receive revenue from direction of the advertisements to
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`the visitor computers visiting the second Internet site as a consequence of computer-
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`determining, using the tags and said electronic records, that such visitor computers have visited
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`the first Internet site”; where both the second Internet site and the first Internet site retain
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`revenue from the process. Frankovitz Rep. ¶26. The solution allows the owner of the first
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`website to benefit from advertisements placed outside that site in a manner that would not
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`otherwise have been possible. ’639 Pat., 10:64-11:6. This approach thus allows for a “‘virtual
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`expansion’ of a site’s online advertising space, roughly analogous to the technological
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`advancement of using ‘virtual memory’ in computing to virtually expand the amount of
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`memory available to a computer system.” Frankovitz Rep. ¶¶411, 424.
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`B.
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`The ’139 Patent
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`At a high level, the ’139 Patent “facilitate[s] selection of media properties on which to
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`display an advertisement, responsive to a profile collected on a first media property.” ’139 Pat.,
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`6:12-18. The patent makes clear that “a media property (in the present context) can also be
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`defined as any equipment [e.g., a server computer] that controls an ad space viewed by a
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`visitor.” Id., 3:38-48. This is reflected, e.g., in asserted claim 37 in the sole asserted independent
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`claim of the ’139 Patent, which recites, in part: “A system comprising one or more computers”
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`programmed to perform a method comprising “(a) automatically directing, to a third-party
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`server computer controlling advertising space on a second media property, indicia of a condition
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`for display of an advertisement, which condition relates specifically to an electronic visitor; and
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`(b) automatically electronically authorizing the [third-party] server computer to automatically
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`cause display of an advertisement, to the electronic visitor when the electronic visitor visits the
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`second media property at a time after the electronic visitor visits the first media property,
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`subject to determining that the condition has been met.” Id., Claim 37.
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`The intrinsic record further makes clear that by using the term “third-party,” the
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`“authorizing is being done of an unrelated site, to capture [a] distinction” over the prior art.
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`Frankovitz Rep. ¶¶19-20 (citing the ’139 Patent File History and the file history of its
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`grandparent application) (emphasis in original). Thus, in the claims as issued, the “third-party
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`server computer” must have a third-party relationship (i.e., be unrelated to) the machine
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`performing the claimed process. Id. at ¶¶19-20, 436. As such, the asserted claims of the ’139
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`Patent, in view of the intrinsic record, recite a particular technique for an advertising network
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`server to effectively expand its control over advertising placements in a distributed manner, by
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`using third-party servers that the advertising network doesn’t control to evaluate visitor-specific
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`conditions provided by the advertising network. See Frankovitz Rep. ¶439.
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`IV.
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`The ’639 and ’586 Patents are not directed to patent-ineligible subject matter.
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`A.
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`Step One: The ’639 and ’586 patent claims are not directed to abstract ideas
`but instead to technical improvements to computer networks.
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`Amazon’s arguments fail at Step One of the Alice analysis, thus precluding summary
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`judgment. The ’639 and ’586 Patent claims are “directed to” the virtual expansion of a website’s
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`online advertising space in a way that improves the functionality of a networked advertising
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`system. Specifically, as described by the ’586 and ’639 Patents, the advertising space of a
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`website is limited via “financial, aesthetic and pragmatic considerations.” ’639 Pat., 2:47-52.
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`The patents effectively make “additional space available, either at an alternative site or in an
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`alternative media” for display of advertisements to users who have visited the first website. Id.,
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`3:22-26. As the patents make clear, “[r]evenue from this resource would not ordinarily have
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`accrued to the original advertising media site without” this approach. Id., 3:22-29. The ability of
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`the first website to effectively expand its advertising space to include ad space on websites it
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`doesn’t itself control is “an innovative and very financially attractive solution generally using
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`existing modules and technology in an unobvious way.” Id., 3:22-29. In other words, the novel
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`arrangement of existing modules provides a technological advance by virtually expanding the
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`advertising space of a website. See id.; see also Frankovitz Rep. ¶411 (explaining that the
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`claimed invention “improv[es] the functionality of a networked advertising system”).
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`The intrinsic record additionally makes clear that the ability of the first site to retain
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`revenue from advertisements shown outside of the first site (and thus the ability of the first site
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`to effectively expand its advertising space beyond the first site) is a claimed advance over the
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`prior art. See Ex. B (’639 Patent File History) at 00003171 (the fact that “some of the resulting
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`revenue,” from “the advertising delivered when the tagged visitor contacts the second site,” “is
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`paid to the first site” is a “crucial feature [] missing from Roth (or the Engage system more
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`generally)”); id. at 00003172 (“[C]rucially, nothing in Roth discloses or suggests paying some
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`of the revenue to the previous sites visited by the viewer….”). Indeed, the applicant described
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`the first site’s profit from advertisements displayed on other sites as a “significant advance”
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`over the prior art, including art relied upon by Amazon. Id. at 00003174 (“Assignee here made a
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`significant advance over Roth/Engage by ensuring that the site that tags the computers receives
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`payment for them, when the tags are used to display advertisements.”).1
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`As AlmondNet’s expert explains, this claimed advance is roughly analogous to the
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`technical innovation of “virtual memory” in computer systems, which virtually expands the
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`amount of memory available to a computer system through a logical process that “allows an
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`operating system to escape the limitations of physical RAM.” Frankovitz Rep. ¶411; see
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`generally Ex. C (summarizing virtual memory technology). Just as virtual memory improves the
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`functionality of a computer system, the inventions of the ’639 and ’586 Patents improve the
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`functionality of a networked advertising system. Frankovitz Rep. ¶411.
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`Ignoring this claimed advance over the prior art, Amazon wrongly contends that the
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`claims are all directed to merely “receiving revenue from internet advertising targeted using
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`user profile and website visit information.” Mot. at 9, 12. Indeed, Amazon’s expert admitted
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`. See Ex. D (Hanson Dep.) 181:21-182:6
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`. Amazon’s characterization, therefore, improperly “oversimplif[ies] the claims” in
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`a manner that the Federal Circuit has cautioned against. See McRO, 837 F.3d at 1313; Ancora
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`Techs., 908 F.3d at 1347 (“We examine the patent’s ‘claimed advance’ to determine whether the
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`claims are directed to an abstract idea.”); Kononklijke, 942 F.3d at 1150 (“At step one of the
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`Alice framework, we ‘look at the focus of the claimed advance over the prior art to determine if
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`the claim’s character as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter.’”).
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`1 The fact that the ability to allow a first site to profit from off-site advertisements being shown
`to its visitors was the claimed advance over the prior art was further confirmed by the Reasons
`for Allowance. Id. at 00002942 (“[T]he [prior art] references do not disclose… that the first site
`automatically receives revenue because the advertisement was displayed on the second site.”).
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`Amazon’s formulation of the alleged “abstract idea” is strikingly similar to the alleged
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`“abstract idea” that the PTAB previously considered in Covered Business Method reviews:
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`“securing revenue from advertising.” See Ex. E at 11 (denying CBM for failure to establish
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`patent-ineligibility of the ’639 Patent). There, the PTAB held that “Petitioner has improperly
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`omitted ‘offsite’ from what independent claim 1 [and claim 24] is ‘directed to.’” Id. at 16; see
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`also Ex. F at 16 (same for the ’586 Patent). Of course, the “offsite” aspect of the claims reflects
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`the claimed advance over the prior art, that the first site derives revenue from advertisements
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`shown on a second site (i.e., “offsite”) by virtue of visitors having visited the first site.
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`Amazon’s purported “abstract idea” fails for exactly the same reason that the petitioner’s
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`previous challenges in the CBMs failed—it does not account for the claimed advance over the
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`prior art, which is the first site’s ability to virtually expand its ad space and profit from offsite
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`ads in the claimed manner, which the prior art does not demonstrate.
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`Amazon’s additional arguments regarding Step One fail. First, Amazon alleges that the
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`claims recite only results, and thus are patent-ineligible under the reasoning of Electric Power
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`Group. Mot. at 10 (citing Elec. Power Grp., LLC, v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir.
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`2016)). However, a cursory review of the claims makes clear that they do not merely cite
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`results. For example, limitation 24(a) of the ’639 patent recites “computer-causing creation of
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`electronic records of visitor computers that visit a first Internet site, using a tag on each of said
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`visitor computers.” Thus, the claim does not recite merely the result of creating electronic
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`records, but recites specific tools to create such records. Likewise, limitation 24(c) recites
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`“direction of the advertisements to the visitor computers visiting a second [different] Internet
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`site as a consequence of computer-determining, using the tags and said electronic records, that
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`such visitor computers have visited the first Internet site.” And as a result of this specific
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`process, the “proprietor of the first Internet site retains” revenue. ’639 Pat. at limitation 24(f).
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`The claims thus specify the use of “existing modules and technology” (such as tags) to allow a
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`website to profit from ads placed offsite “in an unobvious way.” Id. at 3:17-29.
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`This case is thus unlike Electric Power Group, where the claims “[m]erely requir[ed] the
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`selection and manipulation of information,” with no specifics regarding how to perform that
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`selection and manipulation. 830 F.3d at 1356. Indeed, that case recognized that “non-
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`conventional and non-generic arrangement of known, conventional pieces” can render claims
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`patent-eligible. Id. at 1355-56 (citing BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1349–52).
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`Second, Amazon states that “the patents simply take a common business model—
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`referring overflow ads to a different site—and apply it in the context of internet advertising.”
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`Mot. at 10-11; see also Mot. at 1 (characterizing the patented solution as placing “overflow ads”
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`to “target a visitor on a website that cannot accommodate additional advertisements”).
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`As an initial matter, the claims are not directed to “referring overflow ads to a different
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`site,” as the claims do not recite or require “overflow ads.” Indeed, the Court has already
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`considered and rejected Amazon’s argument in this respect.2 As such, “overflow ads” (i.e., ads
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`resulting from saturation, or as Amazon states, when “a website [] cannot accommodate
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`additional advertisements”) are not recited or required by the claims. Cf. Dkt. No. 134 at 5-6
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`(requesting exclusion of non-infringement opinions rooted in this rejected reasoning).
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`But even if the claims were directed to overflow ads, contrary to this Court’s prior
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`holding, Amazon presents no evidence other than conclusory expert testimony that “referring
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`overflow ads to a different site” was a “common business model” as of the priority of the
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`asserted patents. See Mot. at 10 (citing Hanson Rep. ¶ 1049, simply parroting Amazon’s
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`2 Dkt. 113 at 12 (describing Amazon’s contention “that the claimed invention is premised on the
`situation [where] the first Internet site becomes ‘saturated’ with advertisements, thus forcing
`advertisements that were sold for display on the first Internet site to instead be displayed on the
`second site”); id at 14 (“[W]ith respect to Amazon’s argument . . ., the Court disagrees. The
`claims do not require that the first Internet site is saturated with advertisements.”).
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`Case 6:21-cv-00898-ADA Document 180 Filed 09/14/23 Page 15 of 27
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`assertion without evidence). Indeed, AlmondNet’s expert testified to the contrary: “I am aware
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`of no instances (and Dr. Hanson does not identify any in his patent eligibility analysis) of any
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`entity ‘expanding advertising opportunities by referring overflow ads to a different site and
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`receiving additional revenue as a result’ before the priority date of the ’639 Patent.” Frankovitz
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`Rep. ¶412. Indeed, throughout the entirety Dr. Hanson’s invalidity report, he does not mention
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`any examples of any prior art solution involving “referring overflow ads to a different site and
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`receiving additional revenue as a result.” See generally Hanson Rep. ¶¶ 141, 1049, 1053, 1077
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`(only four results for “overflow ads” in Dr. Hanson’s report, each discussing only what is
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`described in the asserted patents themselves).
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`Amazon further argues that “the patents provide no specific technical solution because
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`the problem they purport to solve—saturation—is a non-technical problem that requires a non-
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`technical, business solution.” Mot. at 10. According to Amazon, the “solution is a series of
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`contracts between and among an agency and two websites.” Mot. at 10. Amazon’s theory,
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`however, is again inconsistent with the claims, which do not recite or require “contracts
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`between and among an agency and two websites.” Indeed, the prosecution history makes
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`explicit that “a series of contracts” is not the focus of the claims. During prosecution, the
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`examiner issued a restriction between two groups: “Group I” and “Group II.” Ex. B at
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`00003332-33. The applicant responded by electing “Group I,” and provided amendments “to
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`remove ‘contracting’ steps.” Id. at 00003319.3 Thus, Amazon’s characterization of the claims as
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`simply “a series of contracts” (Mot. at 10) is inconsistent with both the applicant and examiner’s
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`understanding of the invention as not being directed to “the act of entering into a contract.” Ex.
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`B at 00003333.
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`3 As the examiner clarified, “[w]hile the two entities disclosed in Group I may operate under a
`contract, the act of entering into a contract does not require that the method disclosed in Group I
`ever be performed.” Id. at 00003333 (emphasis added).
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`Case 6:21-cv-00898-ADA Document 180 Filed 09/14/23 Page 16 of 27
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`Amazon additionally argues that “the Federal Circuit has consistently held claims
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`directed to targeted advertising impermissibly abstract.” Mot. at 11-12 (citing Customedia and
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`In re Morsa). While Amazon does not provide any serious analysis of the cases on which it relies,
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`they are inapposite. Specifically, in Customedia, the patentee argued that “the claimed invention
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`improves [a] data delivery system’s ability to store advertising data, transfer data at improved
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`speeds and efficiencies, and prevent system inoperability.” Customedia Techs., LLC v. Dish
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`Network Corp., 951 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2020). At most, this represented an efficiency
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`improvement to a conventional process of storing and transferring advertising data. Id. Likewise, in
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`Morsa, the claims were “directed to the ‘fundamental economic practices long prevalent in our
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`system of commerce.’” In re Morsa, 809 F. App’x 913, 916 (Fed. Cir. 2020). In contrast, the
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`claimed advance of the ’639 and ’586 Patents does not merely make advertising more efficient, but
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`fundamentally improves the functionality of a networked advertising system such that it is able to
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`achieve results (such as the virtual expansion of ad space) that were not previously possible (much
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`less “long prevalent”) under the prior art. See Frankovitz Rep. ¶¶411-13.
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`Because Amazon has not shown that the claims of the ’639 and ’586 Patents are directed to
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`an abstract idea, summary judgment must be denied.
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`B.
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`Step Two: The asserted claims provide an inventive concept.
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`1.
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`Amazon’s Motion relies on an incorrect legal standard.
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`“[T]o the extent it is at issue in the case, whether a claim element or combination is
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`well-understood, routine, and conventional is a question of fact. This inquiry falls under step
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`two in the § 101 framework, in which we ‘consider the elements of each claim b