Case 6:21-cv-00755-ADA Document 53 Filed 04/15/22 Page 1 of 21
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`WACO DIVISION
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`
`
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`Case No.: 6:21-cv-00755-ADA
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`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
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`Plaintiffs,
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`Involuntary Plaintiff,
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`
`
`
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`v.
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`GENTEX CORPORATION and INDIGO
`TECHNOLOGIES, LLC,
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`
`
`THALES VISIONIX, INC.,
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`
`
`
`
`META PLATFORMS, INC. and
`FACEBOOK TECHNOLOGIES, LLC,
`
`
`
`
`
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`Defendants.
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`PLAINTIFFS’ SUR-REPLY CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`Case 6:21-cv-00755-ADA Document 53 Filed 04/15/22 Page 2 of 21
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`I.
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`FAMILY ONE PATENTS ......................................................................................1
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`A.
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`B.
`
`C.
`
`D.
`
`E.
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`“sourceless orientation tracker” / “sourceless measurement” ......................1
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`“track a position of a first localized feature” ...............................................2
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`“redisplaying the first object at a second position . . .” ...............................4
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`“system” .......................................................................................................4
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`“a body stabilized information cockpit” ......................................................5
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`II.
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`FAMILY TWO PATENTS......................................................................................6
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`A.
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`B.
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`C.
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`“expected measurement” and “expected utility” terms ...............................6
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`“characterizes” / “characterizing” terms ......................................................7
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`Terms Challenged Under § 112, ¶ 6 ............................................................9
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`1.
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`2.
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`Meta Does Not Overcome the Presumption Against § 112, ¶ 6 ......9
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`Alternatively, the Claimed Functions Are Associated with
`Structure .........................................................................................11
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`III.
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`FAMILY THREE PATENT ..................................................................................14
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`A.
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`B.
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`Claim 1 Preamble .......................................................................................14
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`“obtain candidate values for the azimuth of the object” ............................15
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`i
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`Case 6:21-cv-00755-ADA Document 53 Filed 04/15/22 Page 3 of 21
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`CASES
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`Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp.,
`483 F.3d 800 (Fed. Cir. 2007)....................................................................................................3
`
`Am. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Biolitec, Inc.,
`618 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2010)..................................................................................................2
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`Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc.,
`757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014)................................................................................................10
`
`Bos. Sci. Corp. v. Cook Inc.,
`187 F. Supp. 3d 249 (D. Mass. 2016) ........................................................................................9
`
`Bose Corp. v. JBL, Inc.,
`274 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2001)................................................................................................15
`
`CBF Flint Partners, LLC v. Return Path, Inc.,
`654 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2011)..................................................................................................5
`
`Cultor Corp. v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co.,
`224 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2000)..................................................................................................2
`
`Dyfan, LLC v. Target Corp.,
`28 F.4th 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2022) ..........................................................................................10, 11
`
`FastVDO LLC v. AT&T Mobility LLC,
`2016 WL 9410803 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2016) ............................................................................5
`
`Finjan, Inc. v. Cisco Sys. Inc.,
`2019 WL 452038 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2019) ...............................................................................4
`
`Hill-Rom Servs., Inc. v. Stryker Corp.,
`755 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2014)..................................................................................................1
`
`Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.,
`902 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2018)..................................................................................................9
`
`Micro Chem., Inc. v. Great Plains Chem. Co.,
`194 F.3d 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1999)................................................................................................14
`
`Microprocessor Enhancement Corp. v. Tex. Instruments Inc.,
`520 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2008)..................................................................................................8
`
`Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc.,
`572 U.S. 898 (2014) ...................................................................................................................4
`
`
`
`ii
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`Case 6:21-cv-00755-ADA Document 53 Filed 04/15/22 Page 4 of 21
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`Niazi Licensing Corp. v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc.,
`--- F.4th ----, 2022 WL 1072909 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 11, 2022) .......................................................3
`
`Novo Indus., L.P. v. Micro Molds Corp.,
`350 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2003)..................................................................................................5
`
`Pfizer Inc. v. Alkem Labs. Ltd.,
`2015 WL 12843887 (D. Del. July 22, 2015) .............................................................................5
`
`Pulse Eng’g, Inc. v. Mascon, Inc.,
`2009 WL 755321 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2009) ...........................................................................4, 5
`
`Sinorgchem Co. v. ITC,
`511 F.3d 1132 (Fed. Cir. 2007)..................................................................................................2
`
`Sonix Technology Co. v. Publications Int’l, Ltd.,
`844 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2017)..................................................................................................7
`
`Typhoon Touch Techs., Inc. v. Dell, Inc.,
`659 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2011)................................................................................................13
`
`Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC,
`792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc)............................................................................9, 11
`
`
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`
`iii
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`Case 6:21-cv-00755-ADA Document 53 Filed 04/15/22 Page 5 of 21
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`When the Patents-in-Suit are read in full, the meanings of the claim terms at issue are clear,
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`and require no construction other than to correct one clear and obvious error on the face of the
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`’068 patent. Meta nonetheless insists that over a dozen terms either must be redefined or
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`abandoned entirely as indefinite. Its arguments ignore the context and guidance in the patents,
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`disregard relevant (and contrary) legal authority, and mischaracterize Plaintiffs’ brief and expert
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`testimony. None of Meta’s arguments justify departing from the plain and ordinary meaning of
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`the terms, let alone carry Meta’s burden to prove indefiniteness by clear and convincing evidence.
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`I.
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`FAMILY ONE PATENTS
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`A.
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`“sourceless orientation tracker” / “sourceless measurement”
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`Meta’s argument that the term “sourceless” requires construction rests on the notion that
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`the specification’s description of one benefit of sourceless systems, not recited in any claim,
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`constitutes lexicography. Reply 2. However, as Plaintiffs described—and Meta ignores—the
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`standard for lexicography is “exacting,” and requires that the specification “clearly express an
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`intent to redefine the term.” Hill-Rom Servs., Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 755 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir.
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`2014); Pls.’ Br. 4. The specification does not do so here. In full, the relevant passage reads:
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`In one aspect, in general, the invention provides a new tracking technique that is
`essentially “sourceless” in that it can be used anywhere with no set-up of a source,
`yet it enables a wider range of virtual environment-style navigation and interaction
`techniques than does a simple head-orientation tracker, including manual
`interaction with virtual objects.
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`’068 patent at 1:35-41 (emphasis added). Citing no precedent, Meta asserts that the phrase “in
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`that” is lexicographic. But Meta’s (new) dictionary definition confirms that “in that” does not
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`define, but rather “explains or gives more specific information about what one has just said.” Meta
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`Ex. 14.1 Giving “more specific information” is what specifications do; that does not rise to “clearly
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`1 Meta also improperly cites (Reply 1 n.1) to Dr. LaViola’s testimony, who did not address the
`meaning of “sourceless” in his declaration.
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`1
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`Case 6:21-cv-00755-ADA Document 53 Filed 04/15/22 Page 6 of 21
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`express[ing]” a definition of a term.
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`Meta’s only authority, Sinorgchem Co. v. ITC, 511 F.3d 1132 (Fed. Cir. 2007), does not
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`suggest otherwise. There, the specification explained that “[a] ‘controlled amount’ of protic
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`material is an amount up to that which inhibits the reaction of aniline with nitrobenzene.” Id. at
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`1136 (emphasis added). Likewise, in Cultor Corp. v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co. (relied on by
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`Sinorgchem), the specification stated that “[a]s used herein, the expression ‘water-soluble
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`polydextrose’ . . . specifically refers to the water-soluble polydextrose prepared by [a certain
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`process].” 224 F.3d 1328, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (emphasis added). The specification here bears
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`no resemblance to these cases, nor does it use other words like “means” that may indicate
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`lexicography. Am. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Biolitec, Inc., 618 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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`B.
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`“track a position of a first localized feature”
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`Meta continues to strip away the context of “track a position of a first localized feature
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`associated with a limb of the user,” now focusing on “localized” in isolation and again ignoring
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`the specification’s examples. Reply 3. Those examples are not merely what “Plaintiffs propose,”
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`Reply 3, they are the clear guidance the specification provides for what localized features are. The
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`patents describe that a “localized feature associated with the limb may include a hand-held object
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`or a hand-mounted object or a point on a hand,” ’068 patent at 1:49-51, along with a ring and
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`stylus, id. at 1:58-61, cls. 3-4. Meta asserts that “[a]t best . . . these are just ‘features,’” Reply 3,
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`but this ipse dixit disregards that the specification explicitly identifies them as “localized features.”
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`Meta also argues that “localized feature” and “associated with a limb of the user” are
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`redundant, Reply 3, mischaracterizing Dr. LaViola’s deposition. Dr. LaViola stated that “in the
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`context of these patents and the particular claim term, if it’s not associated with a limb . . . , then
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`it would not be a localized feature.” LaViola Dep. (Ex. 6) 33:25-34:5 (emphasis added). This
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`reflects only that the term Dr. LaViola considered recited both elements, not that a “localized
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`2
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`Case 6:21-cv-00755-ADA Document 53 Filed 04/15/22 Page 7 of 21
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`feature” inherently is “associated with a limb of the user.” In fact, Dr. LaViola explained that a
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`point on a stylus left on a table “would still be a ‘localized feature’ . . . but it would no longer be
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`‘associated with a limb of the user.’” LaViola ¶ 33. Regardless, the patent teaches that a “localized
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`feature” may be associated with other things, like a user’s head or body. ’068 patent, cls. 5, 40.
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`Meta also continues to misread “localized” as imposing a distance threshold and then
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`complains that it does not know what the threshold is. Reply 3-4. But as Plaintiffs have explained,
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`Pls.’ Br. 6-7, a “localized feature” as used in the patents and the art does not connote distance, and
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`Meta cites no contrary evidence to support its understanding. This mistaken premise that
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`“localized” is tied to distance also undergirds Meta’s insistence that the claims would need to
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`specify whether a “feature is ‘localized’” in 2D or 3D. Reply 4. As a POSITA would understand
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`the claims, a localized feature may be tracked in either two or three dimensions. LaViola ¶ 37;
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`Niazi Licensing Corp. v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc., --- F.4th ----, 2022 WL 1072909, at *5 (Fed. Cir.
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`Apr. 11, 2022) (“[A] claim is not indefinite just because it is broad.”).
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`Contrary to Meta’s suggestion, acknowledging the specification’s guidance and the claims’
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`context does not “rewrite the claims” or “add[] new limitations.” Reply 4. Nor can Meta prove
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`indefiniteness by ignoring the intrinsic record in favor of far-fetched examples, particularly where
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`the examples, such as whether a dog’s head is a “localized feature associated with a limb of the
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`user,” have no relation to the parties’ controversy. See Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp., 483 F.3d
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`800, 806 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Sound claim construction need not always purge every shred of
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`ambiguity,” and “some line-drawing problems” are “properly left to the trier of fact.”); Bobick
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`Dep. (Ex. 1) 117:19-118:23 (not aware of any systems that track a user’s limb via a dog’s head).
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`“Reasonable certainty” is not determined based on a litigant’s hypotheticals straining at the claims’
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`boundaries, but rather on the judgment of a POSITA practicing the invention in good faith in view
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`3
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`Case 6:21-cv-00755-ADA Document 53 Filed 04/15/22 Page 8 of 21
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`of the intrinsic record. See Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 908-10 (2014).
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`C.
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`“redisplaying the first object at a second position . . .”
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`Meta mischaracterizes Plaintiffs’ brief and addresses an argument Plaintiffs never made.
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`Reply 4-5. Plaintiffs do not rewrite “a second position” to “the second position”; rather, they
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`specifically addressed that distinction in claim language. Pls.’ Br. 8. There is no “rewritten claim,”
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`and Plaintiffs have never argued that the object is redisplayed “at the same position at which it is
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`already displayed.” Reply 5. Rather, Plaintiffs have argued just the opposite: that the two “‘second
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`position[s]’ may be different” since claim 26’s “second position” is “based on [a] change in
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`position of the first localized feature” that is not recited in claim 15. Pls.’ Br. 7-8. As to Plaintiffs’
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`actual argument, Meta has no substantive response. Meta points to Dr. LaViola’s testimony that
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`there could be “infinite” second positions, Reply 5, but that is both correct and irrelevant to
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`indefiniteness. Dr. LaViola simply recognizes that the claims do not limit the user’s actions on
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`which the “second position[s]” are based—in other words, the user can change her head orientation
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`and limb position however she wants and still practice the claims. LaViola Dep. 53:19-54:16.
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`D.
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` “system”
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`Courts routinely correct obvious errors like the one in the preamble to claim 56 of the ’068
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`patent. Finjan, Inc. v. Cisco Sys. Inc., 2019 WL 452038, at *4-5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2019)
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`(correcting preamble written as “method” where claim body read as computer readable program
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`code); Pulse Eng’g, Inc. v. Mascon, Inc., 2009 WL 755321, at *9-10 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2009)
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`(correcting “first” to “third” where clearly suggested by specification). So, too, should the Court
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`correct the facial error here, where the preamble recites a system but the body of the claim is
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`written as a method, and each dependent claim refers to claim 56 as a “method.” Pls.’ Br. 8-9.
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`Meta’s argument to the contrary rests on a single unexplained and unsupported proposition:
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`that claims “issued exactly as originally submitted” may not include an obvious and correctable
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`4
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`Case 6:21-cv-00755-ADA Document 53 Filed 04/15/22 Page 9 of 21
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`error. Reply 5. Meta cites no authority for this proposition, and offers no reason why original
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`claims should be deemed immune from clear mistakes that obviously may occur at any point
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`during prosecution. For example, in FastVDO LLC v. AT&T Mobility LLC, the court corrected a
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`claim with an obvious error evident from the claim’s dependency, i.e., “the only independent claim
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`[with] the same preamble as [the dependent claim] is claim 28.” 2016 WL 9410803, at *13 (S.D.
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`Cal. Oct. 17, 2016). Although the claim as written depended from a different claim, the court
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`concluded that correction to the proper independent claim was warranted, without considering
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`whether that error appeared in an original or amended claim. Id. Nor would there be any reason
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`to do so where the mistake was apparent on the face of the patent. See, e.g., Pfizer Inc. v. Alkem
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`Labs. Ltd., 2015 WL 12843887, at *2-3 (D. Del. July 22, 2015); Pulse, 2009 WL 755321, at *10.
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`Errors may be corrected only if “the prosecution history does not suggest a different
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`interpretation,” CBT Flint Partners, LLC v. Return Path, Inc., 654 F.3d 1353, 1358 (Fed. Cir.
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`2011); Pls.’ Br. 8, but that does not support Meta’s “original claims” theory. Rather, that
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`requirement prevents patentees from relying on the “substantive significance” of a limitation
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`during prosecution and later seeking to modify the limitation through correction. Novo Indus.,
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`L.P. v. Micro Molds Corp., 350 F.3d 1348, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2003). However, claim 56 was allowed
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`as originally submitted, so the prosecution history “does not suggest” that the claim is a system
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`even though it is written and referred to elsewhere as a method.
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`E.
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` “a body stabilized information cockpit”
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`Meta largely ignores the plain meaning of the words “body stabilized,” focusing instead on
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`one sentence in the specification where “body-stabilized” objects are distinguished from “head-
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`stabilized” and “world-stabilized” objects. Reply 6; ’648 patent at 9:9-22. This portion of the
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`specification does provide that “[b]ody-stabilized objects are displayed at a fixed location on the
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`information surround, a kind of cylindrical or spherical bubble of information that follows the
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`5
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`Case 6:21-cv-00755-ADA Document 53 Filed 04/15/22 Page 10 of 21
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`user’s body position around.” Id. The claims, however, do not recite an “information surround”;
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`instead, claim 20 recites a “body stabilized information cockpit,” which is a separate phrase
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`described elsewhere in the patent. See, e.g., ’648 patent at 9:8-10:12. Meta attempts to read in the
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`supposed “cylindrical or spherical bubble” requirement of an “information surround” into an
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`“information cockpit,” but lacks any intrinsic (or extrinsic) support. An “information cockpit” is
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`never described as such a “bubble.” Indeed, the specification’s contrasting of these two
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`embodiments teaches against equating them, as Meta does. Id. at 12:50-52 (describing the
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`“information cockpit” as a “specific variation on Feiner’s body stabilized information surround”).
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`II.
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`FAMILY TWO PATENTS
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`A.
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`“expected measurement” and “expected utility” terms
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`Meta offers no reason why a POSITA would be unable to determine whether a particular
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`value is an expected measurement within the scope of the claims; all it does is point out the
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`(undisputed) fact that the specification does not provide an example for every possible
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`computational approach. But it concedes that a POSITA would understand what the term means
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`in the context of “Kalman filters or similar approaches,” Reply 7, see Pls.’ Br. 11, and examples
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`for every possible scenario are not required. Dr. LaViola explained—and Dr. Bobick agreed—
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`that a POSITA would understand whether a value is an expected measurement “by analyzing the
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`nature of the calculations resulting in the value in question and how it is being used.” LaViola
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`¶¶ 50-51; see Bobick Dep. 160:14-24. Even accepting Meta’s attorney argument that “a particular
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`measurement could be ‘expected’ in some contexts and not ‘expected’ in other contexts, depending
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`on various factors,” Reply 7, that argument misses the point. The claims do not require a specific
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`expectation; they require that an expected value, or estimate, be used. On that question, a POSITA
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`evaluating whether a particular value falls within the scope of the claims would understand the
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`relevant context—how the value was calculated and what role it plays—by examining the
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`6
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`Case 6:21-cv-00755-ADA Document 53 Filed 04/15/22 Page 11 of 21
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`algorithm the tracking system employed. LaViola ¶ 50. If the algorithm predicted the value as
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`the next sensor measurement, that value would be an “expected sensor measurement,” whether or
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`not a different algorithm may have predicted a different value.
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`Meta’s obfuscation is no more persuasive with respect to the “expected utility” terms. Here
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`too, Dr. LaViola opined that the POSITA would recognize whether a tracking system is calculating
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`the “expected utility” of a sensor measurement by analyzing the nature of the calculations and how
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`they are being used, regardless of the particular algorithm employed. See LaViola ¶ 56. Similarly,
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`as Dr. LaViola explained at his deposition, a POSITA would understand whether a particular value
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`is “the highest expected utility” based on the computations that lead to it and the other values under
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`consideration. LaViola Dep. 79:19-25. To be sure, a POSITA may choose various ways to assess
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`utility in a given tracking system. But whether a system undertakes this type of analysis, and which
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`value from an array of values the system determines to be most useful, is not “subjective” and can
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`be determined by analyzing the system and calculations it performs.
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`Meta complains that “the specification does not describe ‘expected utility’ outside of
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`Kalman filtering.” Reply 8. But, as Dr. LaViola explained, that is not the case. For example, the
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`specification describes the concept of expected utility in general, LaViola ¶¶ 52, 55; see, e.g., ’632
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`patent at 19:33-41, and provides specific examples of factors that could play into the calculation
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`in any context, LaViola ¶¶ 53-54; see, e.g., ’632 patent at 26:20-27:12. Those descriptions provide
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`the “guidance” that Meta seeks. Reply 8; see LaViola ¶ 56. Just as in Sonix Technology Co. v.
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`Publications International, Ltd., 844 F.3d 1370, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2017), “an accused infringer could
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`compare the examples and criteria from the” specification to assess infringement.
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`B.
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`“characterizes” / “characterizing” terms
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`Meta’s argument hinges on the premise that a POSITA would be unable to divine what the
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`word “characterizes” or “characterizing” means in the context of each claim. That is simply not
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`7
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`Case 6:21-cv-00755-ADA Document 53 Filed 04/15/22 Page 12 of 21
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`true. Dr. LaViola explained at length how a POSITA would interpret the term in each claim. See
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`LaViola ¶¶ 57-63. For example, with respect to claim 5 of the ’632 patent, which recites that a
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`“state estimate characterizes an estimate of a location of the object,” Dr. LaViola opined that “[a]
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`POSITA would understand from the claim itself that the ‘state estimate’ describes ‘an estimate of
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`a location of the object,’” as shown in several embodiments. LaViola ¶ 58. In claim 6 of the ’632
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`patent, which recites that a “state estimate characterizes configuration information for one or more
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`sensing elements,” Dr. LaViola similarly explained that a POSITA would understand that the
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`claimed “state estimate” describes “configuration information” for sensing elements, as the
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`specification discloses. LaViola ¶ 59. And for claim 17 of the ’632 patent, which Meta cites in
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`its brief, Dr. LaViola discussed how “the claimed ‘mapping’ describes ‘a linear mapping,’ which
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`is a more specific type of mapping,” with reference to disclosures in the specification. LaViola
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`¶ 61 (citing ’632 patent at 15:43-47, 28:18-32). A term is not indefinite where, as here, its
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`“appropriate meaning . . . is readily apparent from each occurrence in context.” Microprocessor
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`Enhancement Corp. v. Tex. Instruments Inc., 520 F.3d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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`Meta tries to sow confusion where there is none. It argues again “that ‘characterizing’
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`something must mean something different from the thing itself,” and contends that Dr. LaViola
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`agreed. Reply 9 (citing LaViola Dep. 86:24-87:14). He did no such thing. Dr. LaViola has opined
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`that it “does not make sense in the context of the claims” that “the characterization of data must
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`be different from the data itself.” LaViola ¶ 58 (quoting Bobick ¶ 55). And at his deposition, he
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`again explained that “characterizes” could mean “is”—i.e., that a POSITA would interpret certain
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`claims such that the characterization of data could be the data. LaViola Dep. 87:6-22. In both
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`instances, Dr. LaViola testified about the single meaning that a POSITA would ascribe to the term
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`in context. That is a far cry from the case Meta cites, in which the specification itself described a
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`8
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`Case 6:21-cv-00755-ADA Document 53 Filed 04/15/22 Page 13 of 21
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`claim term as “a relative term, finding different meanings for different users.” Intellectual
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`Ventures I LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 902 F.3d 1372, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2018); see Reply 8-9.
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`Moreover, Dr. LaViola’s opinions are consistent with the lay definitions that Meta cites.
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`Meta contends that describing “the ‘character’ or ‘qualities’ of [an] object[] necessarily requir[es]
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`a subjective value judgment.” Reply 9. Not so. An object’s weight, for example, is a “quality”
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`of the object. A software program can describe the weight of an object without making any sort
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`of “subjective value judgment” about it. The same is true with respect to each of the claim terms
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`at issue here. See LaViola ¶¶ 57-63. Reading the word “characterize” to require subjectivity is
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`“nonsensical.” See Bos. Sci. Corp. v. Cook Inc., 187 F. Supp. 3d 249, 272 (D. Mass. 2016).
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`C.
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`Terms Challenged Under § 112, ¶ 6
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`1.
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`Meta Does Not Overcome the Presumption Against § 112, ¶ 6
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`Meta has not and cannot overcome the presumption against § 112, ¶ 6, because a POSITA
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`would understand the claims “to have a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for structure.”
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`Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc); see Pls.’ Br.
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`13-16; LaViola ¶¶ 72, 74-77, 97-99, 117-21, 132-33, 141-42. Meta’s argument that § 112, ¶ 6
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`applies boils down to two points: (1) the terms do not have understood meanings in the art or refer
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`to off-the-shelf components; and (2) the claims describe what the terms “do.” Reply 1, 10-13. But
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`even accepting for purposes of argument Meta’s characterizations, they do not answer the relevant
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`question. Repeatedly proclaiming that the claims here do not pass tests they are not required to
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`pass does not carry Meta’s burden to overcome the presumption against § 112, ¶ 6.
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`First, Meta emphasizes that the terms themselves have no understood meaning in a vacuum
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`and do not refer to “off-the-shelf” hardware or software, or, in the case of “sensor module,” “a
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`specific, well-defined piece of hardware or software.” Reply 10-13. None of that is necessary to
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`connote structure, however, and Meta cites no legal authority to suggest that it is. At this threshold
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`Case 6:21-cv-00755-ADA Document 53 Filed 04/15/22 Page 14 of 21
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`step, the Court “can look beyond the initial [alleged nonce] term to the functional language to see
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`if a person of ordinary skill would have understood the claim limitation as a whole to connote
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`sufficiently definite structure.” Dyfan, LLC v. Target Corp., 28 F.4th 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2022)
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`(emphasis added). Describing a “class of structures,” rather than “a single, specific structure,”
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`suffices. Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2014), overruled on other
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`grounds by Williamson, 792 F.3d 1339.
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`Second, the supposed distinction between what a claimed component “does” and what it
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`“is” was invented by Meta, rests on no legal authority, and makes no sense when it comes to
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`software. The law is clear: what the software “does”—i.e., how it operates—is structure. Pls.’
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`Br. 14-15. To the extent further clarity was required, the Federal Circuit recently provided it:
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`“structure can be recited in various ways, including through . . . a description of the claim
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`limitation’s operation and ‘how the function is achieved in the context of the invention.’” Dyfan,
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`28 F.4th at 1366 (quoting Apple, 757 F.3d at 1299).
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`As to the actual legal standard and the arguments Plaintiffs made in their opening brief,
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`Meta says little. Meta does not contest that Dr. Bobick misapplied the law when he improperly
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`required that the claims describe an “identifiable physical structure or component, or [a] specific
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`algorithm for performing the recited functions” and found them lacking under that standard.
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`Bobick ¶¶ 67, 73, 80, 88, 94; see Pls.’ Br. 18-19. Nor does Meta contest that it relied on Dr.
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`Bobick’s flawed opinion to argue that a POSITA would not understand the claims to describe
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`structure. Pls.’ Br. 18-19. Instead, Meta persists in applying that improper algorithmic
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`requirement, arguing these claims are different from those in one of Plaintiffs’ cited cases because
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`they supposedly do not disclose “an algorithm.”2 Reply 10.
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`2 Of course, Plaintiffs maintain that the claims do describe algorithms, infra II.C.2, but the Court
`need not reach that issue, because an algorithm is not required to connote structure at this step.
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`10
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`Case 6:21-cv-00755-ADA Document 53 Filed 04/15/22 Page 15 of 21
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`Moreover, Meta ignores examples and descriptions in the specification that support finding
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`the claims to be structural. See LaViola ¶¶ 75, 98-99, 142. For example, Meta offers no
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`substantive response to Dr. LaViola’s opinion that interfaces—components of sensor modules and
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`thus the sensor subsystem—are structural. LaViola ¶¶ 118-19, 133; Pls.’ Br. 24-26. Meta’s
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`conclusory assertion that the disclosure of interfaces “also fails to describe structure,” Reply 12,
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`includes no analysis or evidentiary support whatsoever. Meta also fails to address the additional
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`structure provided by the dependent claims. Pls.’ Br. at 17, 22; LaViola ¶¶ 76-77.
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`All told, Meta’s arguments and its expert’s opinion are built on an analytical framework
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`that courts, including the Federal Circuit in Dyfan, have rejected. And Meta simply disregards
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`Plaintiffs’ expert evidence instead of engaging with it. Particularly in light of Dr. LaViola’s
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`opinion that a POSITA would understand all of the asserted claims to connote sufficiently definite
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`structure, LaViola ¶¶ 72, 74-77, 97-99, 117-21, 132-33, 141-42, Meta does not come close to
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`overcoming the presumption against § 112, ¶ 6.
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`2.
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`Alternatively, the Claimed Functions Are Associated with Structure
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`To the extent the Court evaluates any of these terms under § 112, ¶ 6, Meta’s summary
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`arguments do not carry its burden to establish that a POSITA “would be unable to recognize the
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`structure in the specification and associate it with the corresponding function in the claim” so as
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`to render any of the terms at issue indefinite. Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1352.
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`Meta asserts that Plaintiffs point to the “sensor fusion core” as structure for the estimation
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`module, estimation subsystem, and data processing module, and “PSE drivers” for the sensor
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`module and sensor subsystem,3 Reply 11-13, implying—incorrectly—that the only relevant
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`3 Meta mistakenly omits the “meta-driver” from the sensor subsystem term, but within the
`exemplary embodiment the functions of the sensor subsystem would be carried out by the PSE
`drivers and meta-driver together. Compare Reply 12-13, with Pls.’ Br. 27, and LaViola ¶ 135.
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`11
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`Case 6:21-cv-00755-ADA Document 53 Filed 04/15/22 Page 16 of 21
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`structure arises from the exemplary embodiment detailed in the specification’s “Description”
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`section and figures. But while Plaintiffs agree that aspects of the exemplary embodiment may
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`bolster more general descriptions of structure, Plaintiffs’ brief and accompanying expert
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`declaration make clear that the embodiment is hardly the beginning or end of the inquiry.
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`Meta ignores that the claims themselves provide sufficient associated structure under
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`§ 112, ¶ 6. E.g., Pls.’ Br. 19, 23, App’x B. In particular, Meta does not dispute that Dr. Bobick
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`applied an incorrect standard whe