Case 6:21-cv-00755-ADA Document 48 Filed 04/01/22 Page 1 of 21
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`WACO DIVISION
`
`GENTEX CORPORATION and INDIGO
`TECHNOLOGIES, LLC,
`
`Plaintiffs,
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`THALES VISIONIX, INC.,
`
`Involuntary Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`FACEBOOK, INC. and FACEBOOK
`TECHNOLOGIES, LLC,
`
`Defendants.
`
`Case No. 6:21-cv-00755-ADA
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`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`DEFENDANTS’ REPLY TO
`PLAINTIFFS’ OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`

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`
`I.
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`II.
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`Case 6:21-cv-00755-ADA Document 48 Filed 04/01/22 Page 2 of 21
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 1
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`Argument ........................................................................................................................... 1
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`A.
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`Family One Patents ................................................................................................. 1
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`1.
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`2.
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`3.
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`4.
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`5.
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`“sourceless orientation tracker” / “sourceless measurement” ..................... 1
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`“track a position of a first localized feature” .............................................. 3
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`“redisplaying the first object at a second position . . .” .............................. 4
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`“system” ...................................................................................................... 5
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`“a body stabilized information cockpit” ..................................................... 6
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`B.
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`Family Two Patents ............................................................................................... 7
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`1.
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`2.
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`3.
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`“expected” and “highest expected” terms ................................................... 7
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`“characterizes” / “characterizing” terms ..................................................... 8
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`Means-Plus-Function Terms ..................................................................... 10
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`a.
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`b.
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`c.
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`d.
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`e.
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`“estimation module” ..................................................................... 10
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`“estimation subsystem” ................................................................. 11
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`“sensor module(s)” ........................................................................ 12
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`“sensor subsystem” ....................................................................... 12
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`“data processing module” ............................................................. 13
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`C.
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`Family Three Patent .............................................................................................. 14
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`1.
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`2.
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`Claim 1 Preamble ...................................................................................... 14
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`“obtain candidate values for the azimuth of the object” ........................... 15
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`i
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`Case 6:21-cv-00755-ADA Document 48 Filed 04/01/22 Page 3 of 21
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`
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`Page(s)
`
`
`
`Cases
`
`Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Corp.,
`No. 3:14-CV-3942, 2017 WL 5905698 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 20, 2017) .......................................10
`
`Bos. Sci. Corp. v. Cook Inc.,
`187 F. Supp. 3d 249 (D. Mass. 2016) ........................................................................................9
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`Bose Corp. v. JBL, Inc.,
`274 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2001)................................................................................................15
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`CBT Flint Partners, LLC v. Return Path, Inc.,
`654 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2011)..................................................................................................5
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`Diebold Nixdorf, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
`899 F.3d 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2018)....................................................................................10, 11, 12
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`Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Applera Corp.,
`599 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2010)..................................................................................................7
`
`FastVDO LLC v. AT&T Mobility LLC,
`No. 3:16-cv-00385, 2016 WL 9410803 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2016) ............................................5
`
`Finjan, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc.,
`No. 17-cv-00072, 2019 WL 452038 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2019) ..............................................5, 6
`
`Geneva Pharms., Inc. v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC,
`349 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003)..................................................................................................4
`
`Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. M-I LLC,
`514 F.3d 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2008)..................................................................................................3
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`Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc.,
`381 F.3d 1111 (Fed. Cir. 2004)..................................................................................................3
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`Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.,
`902 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2018)..................................................................................................8
`
`Intellectual Ventures II LLC v. FedEx Corp.,
`No. 2:16-CV-00980, 2017 WL 5896180 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 29, 2017) ......................................10
`
`Microprocessor Enhancement Corp. v. Tex. Instruments Inc.,
`520 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2008)..................................................................................................8
`
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`ii
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`Case 6:21-cv-00755-ADA Document 48 Filed 04/01/22 Page 4 of 21
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`Sinorgchem Co., Shandong v. Int’l Trade Com’n,
`511 F.3d 1132 (Fed. Cir. 2007)..................................................................................................2
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`Sonix Tech. Co. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd.,
`844 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2017)..................................................................................................8
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`iii
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`Case 6:21-cv-00755-ADA Document 48 Filed 04/01/22 Page 5 of 21
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`
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
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`Plaintiffs’ brief fails to justify its proposed constructions. For the terms that the patents
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`expressly define, Plaintiffs reject those definitions and point to other, non-definitional language
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`that departs from the patentee’s intentions. For terms that Defendants identified as indefinite,
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`Plaintiffs’ explanations fail to resolve the ambiguity in those terms, as Plaintiffs’ own expert
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`testimony demonstrates. Finally, for the terms Defendants contend are governed by § 112 ¶ 6,
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`Plaintiffs repeatedly point to functional language reciting what the terms do because they are
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`unable to identify structural language in the patents describing what the terms are. Defendants’
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`constructions should be adopted.
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`II.
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`ARGUMENT
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`A.
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`Family One Patents
`1.
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`“sourceless orientation tracker” / “sourceless measurement”
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`Plaintiffs attempt to recast the patents’ express definition of “sourceless” as one of many
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`“benefits” provided by a sourceless tracking system. Plaintiffs’ Responsive Brief (“Resp.”) 3-4.
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`But the specification’s repeated, clear definition of “sourceless” to mean “can be used anywhere
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`with no set-up of a source” should control.1 Br. Ex. 1 (’068 Patent), Abstract and 1:36-38.
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`The patent’s repeated, express definition of “sourceless” does not merely describe a benefit
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`provided by the claimed “sourceless orientation tracker”; instead, this statement defines what
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`“sourceless” means, as denoted by the quotation marks around the word “sourceless” and the
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`transitional phrase “in that.” See Opening Brief (“Br.”) 5. Plaintiffs argue in response that “the
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`claimed sourceless tracking systems” include a number of benefits, but the “sourceless orientation
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`1 Plaintiffs’ own expert, Dr. LaViola, agrees with the patent’s definition of “sourceless.”
`LaViola Dep. 28:23-24. (“there’s no restriction on where you can go with [a sourceless
`tracker]”).
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`1
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`Case 6:21-cv-00755-ADA Document 48 Filed 04/01/22 Page 6 of 21
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`tracker” should not be defined by those alleged benefits. Resp. 4. Defendants agree that it would
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`be improper to import Plaintiffs’ list of non-definitional “benefits” of a sourceless tracking system
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`into the claims. The patent itself reflects that Plaintiffs’ listed benefits are “enable[d]” more
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`broadly by the patent’s full “invention” and its supposedly “new tracking technique.” ’068 Patent,
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`1:35-45 (“the invention provides a new tracking technique that is essentially ‘sourceless’ in that it
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`can be used anywhere with no set-up of a source, yet it enables [listing Plaintiffs’ recited
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`benefits]”). Those benefits list what the technique does (“enables”) as opposed to what it is
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`(“sourceless”). They follow a clause that expressly defines “sourceless,” but they are not
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`incorporated within that clause and are never introduced by the separate, defining “in that”
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`transitional phrase. Id.
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`Plaintiffs’ new argument that the phrase “in that” is not definitional is incorrect. See Resp.
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`4. The phrase is “used to introduce a statement that explains or gives more specific information
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`about what one has just said.” Ex. 14 (Merriam-Webster Dictionary). Thus, the specification’s
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`statement that “the invention provides a new tracking technique that is essentially ‘sourceless’ in
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`that it can be used anywhere with no set-up of a source” explains exactly what makes the new
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`tracking technique “sourceless.” Further, Plaintiffs’ reference to a separate, unrelated use of
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`quotations around the word “sourceless” to argue that the mere use of quotations is not definitional
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`lacks merit. Resp. 4 (citing ’068 Patent at 1:26-27). There, the patent’s “Background” section
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`explains that in the prior art “‘[s]ourceless’ orientation trackers have been developed based on
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`geomagnetic and/or inertial sensors.” ’068 Patent, 1:26-27. That use in the Background lacks the
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`defining, transitional phrase “in that,” which the patentee used in the patent’s Summary to act as
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`his own lexicographer and provide a clear definition. Absent this transitional phrase indicating an
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`intended definition, the phrasing in the Background is not definitional. See Sinorgchem Co.,
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`2
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`Case 6:21-cv-00755-ADA Document 48 Filed 04/01/22 Page 7 of 21
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`
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`Shandong v. Int’l Trade Com’n, 511 F.3d 1132, 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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`2.
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`“track a position of a first localized feature”
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`The term “localized” is unclear and unexplained in the patent. Bobick Decl. ¶¶ 26-27.
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`Rather than explain what the term means, or identify guidelines for a POSITA to use to understand
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`the term, Plaintiffs propose a construction that ignores the word altogether. Instead of tracking a
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`“localized feature,” Plaintiffs propose tracking “a first part of a limb of a user,” “an object,” or
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`“part of an object.” At best, however, these are just “features.” Nowhere in Plaintiffs’ proposed
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`construction do Plaintiffs explain what the difference is between these (or any) features and the
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`“localized features” the claim requires. Plaintiffs’ list of non-limiting examples of the types of
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`objects that might be tracked is similarly unhelpful, as they never explain why those particular
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`objects are “localized.” See Resp. 5. Indeed, Plaintiffs’ expert Dr. LaViola admits that there are at
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`least some examples that may or may not fall within the scope of the term. Ex. 15 (LaViola Dep.)
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`36:2-37:25. The examples do nothing to clarify the metes and bounds of “a localized feature
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`associated with a limb of the user,” they do not provide a POSITA with reasonable certainty. See
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`Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. M-I LLC, 514 F.3d 1244, 1251 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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`Plaintiffs’ interpretation also renders the phrases “localized” and “associated with a limb
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`of the user” redundant of each other within the claims. Dr. LaViola confirmed this, testifying that
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`“[a] localized feature is associated with a limb of the user,” and that “if it’s not associated with the
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`limb, meaning that it’s not something on the hand, held in the hand, or attached to the hand or
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`other limb, then it would not be a localized feature.” LaViola Dep. 33:21-34:7, 34:20-35:3. Such
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`an interpretation cannot be correct because it renders “localized” superfluous. Innova/Pure Water,
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`Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1119 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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`Notably, Plaintiffs admit that “nowhere does the specification or prosecution history
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`suggest a ‘localized feature’ depends on a degree of proximity to the limb, such that a feature is
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`3
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`Case 6:21-cv-00755-ADA Document 48 Filed 04/01/22 Page 8 of 21
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`‘localized’ at some distance and not “localized” at another.” Resp. 6. This is the point. A POSITA
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`would not and could not understand the scope of a “localized feature” without more information
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`from the specification. Bobick Decl. ¶¶ 27-30. While Plaintiffs contend that Defendants’ examples
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`are “bizarre,” the examples demonstrate that it is unclear to a POSITA what qualifies as “localized”
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`given the lack of guidance in the claims or specification. Moreover, Plaintiffs can only avoid these
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`examples by adding new limitations on how the claim is to be interpreted. For example, Plaintiffs
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`argue that “associated with” means “directly on or held by the user” (Resp. 6; LaViola Decl. ¶ 34)
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`and that the claims only cover (and yet fail to recite) “tracking a user’s limb position” (id.).
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`Plaintiffs further argue that the term “a first localized feature associated with a limb of the user”
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`excludes “measuring the position of something that does not move in conjunction with the limb”
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`(Resp. 6)—but the claims are not so limited. Plaintiffs’ attempts to rewrite the claims further
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`confirm that a POSITA would not understand the scope of the claims as written.
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`The term “localized” suffers from another problem: nothing in the patent indicates whether
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`the feature is “localized” in 2D space (e.g., the display) or 3D space (e.g., the real world). As Dr.
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`Bobick explains, an object whose position is known in one space may not be known in another.
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`Bobick Decl. ¶¶ 26-31. Plaintiffs disregard this issue, summarily stating that “the claims are not
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`ambiguous; they just encompass both.” Resp. 7. This misses the point. If the claims “encompass
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`both,” as Plaintiffs contend, a particular feature—such as a point on a ball—could either be
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`“localized” (e.g., in 2D space) or “not localized” (e.g., in 3D space), depending solely on the
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`coordinate space chosen by the viewer. Bobick Decl. ¶¶ 26–31. A POSITA would have no way of
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`knowing whether the feature fell within the claims, rendering the term indefinite. See Geneva
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`Pharms., Inc. v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, 349 F.3d 1373, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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`3.
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` “redisplaying the first object at a second position . . .”
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`Plaintiffs rewrite claim 26, changing “redisplaying the first object at a second position on
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`4
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`Case 6:21-cv-00755-ADA Document 48 Filed 04/01/22 Page 9 of 21
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`the display device … based on the change in orientation” to “redisplaying the first object at “the
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`second position . . . .” See Resp. 8. That is not the claim language. Claim 26 recites “a second
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`position,” although “a second position” was already recited in claim 15. Plaintiffs’ rewritten claim
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`language also does not make sense logically, because it requires “redisplaying” the “first object”
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`at the same position at which it is already displayed.
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`Plaintiffs separately argue that there does not need to be a static second position, suggesting
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`that there can be two different “second position[s].” See Resp. 8. Dr. LaViola even testified that
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`there can be infinite “second positions” in claims 15 and 26. LaViola Dep. 56:1-4. But if there
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`were infinite positions available to redisplay the object, all of which are called “second positions,”
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`a POSITA would have no way of knowing which “second position” was the one required by the
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`claims. Accordingly, the term is indefinite. Bobick Decl. ¶¶ 37–41; Br. 9–10.
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`4.
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`“system”
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`Plaintiffs ask this Court to rewrite claim 56, but fail to address one of the two requirements
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`to correct an error—namely, that the “prosecution history does not suggest a different
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`interpretation.” See Resp. 8-9; see also CBT Flint Partners, LLC v. Return Path, Inc., 654 F.3d
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`1353, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2011). The prosecution history does, in fact, suggest a different
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`interpretation: claim 56 issued exactly as originally submitted, suggesting the Applicant intended
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`to use the word “system.” Plaintiffs allege that courts have corrected such errors and rejected
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`indefiniteness challenges in similar circumstances, but this is incorrect. FastVDO LLC v. AT&T
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`Mobility LLC involved an “obvious” typographical error where a dependent claim cited to the
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`wrong independent claim. No. 3:16-cv-00385, 2016 WL 9410803, at *13 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2016).
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`The correction was immediately apparent because the claim referenced terms found only in the
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`correct claim. Id. Here, nothing suggests that the error was typographical. And Finjan, Inc. v. Cisco
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`Sys., Inc., No. 17-cv-00072, 2019 WL 452038 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2019) is also distinguishable—
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`5
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`Case 6:21-cv-00755-ADA Document 48 Filed 04/01/22 Page 10 of 21
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`the decision concerned a typographical error introduced during an amendment in prosecution. Id.
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`at *4-5. By contrast, the claim here issued exactly as filed.
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`5.
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`“a body stabilized information cockpit”
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`Plaintiffs argue that Defendants improperly construe “a body stabilized information
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`cockpit” by reading in the description of a different term, “information surround,” from the
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`specification. Resp. 9. Not so. Defendants’ construction comes directly from the specification’s
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`definition of “body-stabilized objects,” which are specified by their position on the “information
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`surround”: “Body-stabilized objects are displayed at a fixed location on the information
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`surround, a kind of cylindrical or spherical bubble of information that follows the user’s body
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`position around.” Br. Ex. 2 (’648 Patent) at 9:17-20. But when Plaintiffs refer to this portion of
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`the specification, they omit the language describing the “information surround” and argue that
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`“body-stabilized objects” are “displayed at a location ‘that follows the user’s body position
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`around.’” Resp. 9. To be clear, the specification does not describe “body-stabilized objects” as
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`those “that follow[] the user’s body position around.” Instead, it is the “information surround” that
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`“follows the user’s body position around.” ’648 Patent at 9:17-20. A body-stabilized object is
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`displayed at a fixed location on the information surround. Id.
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`Plaintiffs’ reference to the virtual desk example of the claimed “body-stabilized” system
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`does not support Plaintiffs’ argument. In that example, a “virtual desk” served as the “information
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`surround”: it was “kept in front of the user’s body by mounting an additional orientation tracker
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`on the user’s torso.” ’648 Patent at 9:43-51. The invention of the ’648 Patent uses an “information
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`cockpit” rather than a “virtual desk.” Id. at 9:61-67. Still, in both examples, body-stabilized objects
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`are displayed on an information surround, consistent with Defendants’ construction.
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`6
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`Case 6:21-cv-00755-ADA Document 48 Filed 04/01/22 Page 11 of 21
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`
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`B.
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`Family Two Patents
`1.
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`“expected” and “highest expected” terms
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`Plaintiffs argue that the claims are sufficiently definite, because, in their view, “[t]he
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`relevant question is whether a given system is programmed to make such predictions, not how.”
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`Resp. 10. While Plaintiffs summarily state that the response to this question is “objective” and
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`“easily ascertained” (id. at 10-11), they provide no explanation in support. In reality, as Dr. Bobick
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`explained, the specification only describes an “expected measurement” in the context of a Kalman
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`filter. Bobick Decl. ¶¶ 44-45. Because the disputed terms are used in claims that are not limited to
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`Kalman filters or similar approaches (id.), the specification does not provide “a general guideline
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`and examples sufficient to enable a [POSITA] to determine the scope of the claims.” Enzo
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`Biochem, Inc. v. Applera Corp., 599 F.3d 1325, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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`Dr. LaViola makes the conclusory assertion that “a POSITA would understand how the
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`expected sensor measurement calculations described in the specification would translate to other
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`approaches for tracking the pose of an object,” but neither he nor the specification provide that
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`translation. LaViola Decl. ¶ 51. Moreover, a particular measurement could be “expected” in some
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`contexts and not “expected” in other contexts, depending on various factors (calibration, error
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`values, individualized expectations, etc.); a POSITA could not determine whether such a
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`measurement is “expected” without further guidelines. Id.
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`The claims use of “expected” to refer to utility, i.e., “expected utility” and “highest
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`expected utility,” are also indefinite. Although Plaintiffs point to one example of utility in the
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`patents (Resp. 11), determining “highest expected utility” is subjective and variable, i.e., “in the
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`eyes of the programmer,” as Dr. LaViola admitted. LaViola Dep. 79:19-25. Because “utility”
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`means different things in different contexts, the same measurement could have the highest
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`expected utility in some contexts (and thus infringe) and not have the highest expected utility in
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`7
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`Case 6:21-cv-00755-ADA Document 48 Filed 04/01/22 Page 12 of 21
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`other contexts (and thus not infringe). Ex. 16 (Bobick Dep. Tr.) 168, 170-172; Bobick Decl. ¶¶ 46-
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`47. This uncertainty renders the term indefinite. It is not enough to simply state, as Plaintiffs do,
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`that the utility is “context-dependent,” when the patents provide no ability to understand the scope
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`of the term in those assorted contexts. Resp. 11. Because the specification does not describe
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`“expected utility” outside of Kalman filtering, no guidance is provided to determine what the utility
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`(or highest utility) is for any other approaches. Id. Unlike Sonix Tech., cited by Plaintiffs, the
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`specification does not provide criteria to determine expected utility. See, e.g., Sonix Tech. Co. v.
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`Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 844 F.3d 1370, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
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`2.
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`“characterizes” / “characterizing” terms
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`The “characteriz[es/ing]” claim elements are indefinite because the patent uses those terms
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`in at
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`least nine disparate contexts without providing any explanation as
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`to what
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`“characteriz[es/ing]” requires in any of them. Br. 14-16. Plaintiffs raise four arguments in
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`response, none of which is availing. First, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants ignore the “surrounding
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`words of the claim.” Resp. 12. But Defendants and Dr. Bobick addressed these terms on a claim-
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`by-claim basis in the context of each asserted claim.2 Br. 14-15; Bobick Decl. ¶¶ 53-60.
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`Second, Plaintiffs replace the claim term “characterizes” with the words “describes” or
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`“is,” based solely on Dr. LaViola’s say-so: “[T]he test, at least that I use, is I replace the word
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`‘characterize’ with those words, ‘described’ or ‘is,’ and then determine which one is more
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`appropriate.” LaViola Dep. 86:24-87:14; see also Resp. 12. No intrinsic support exists for this
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`method of construction, which flies in the face of established case law. See Intellectual Ventures I
`
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`2 Plaintiffs cite Microprocessor Enhancement Corp. v. Tex. Instruments Inc., 520 F.3d 1367,
`1376 (Fed. Cir. 2008) for the premise that even if a word is used inconsistently, it is not
`indefinite if the “appropriate meaning . . . is readily apparent from each occurrence in context.”
`Resp. 12-13. But the problem is, as stated in Defendants’ opening brief and Dr. Bobick’s
`declaration, the meaning is not readily apparent from the context.
`8
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`Case 6:21-cv-00755-ADA Document 48 Filed 04/01/22 Page 13 of 21
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`LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 902 F.3d 1372, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding indefinite term that
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`“depend[ed] on the unpredictable vagaries of any one person’s opinion”). Moreover, the
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`specification uses “describes,” “is,” and “characterizes,” indicating the inventor used the words to
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`mean different things. Further, “describes” would not make sense in context to a POSITA: Br. Ex.
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`4 (’632 Patent) cl. 17, e.g., would read “wherein the mapping . . . describes a linear mapping.”
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`See Bobick Decl. ¶¶ 58. “Describes” is also inconsistent with the parties’ dictionaries, which do
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`not define “characterizes” as simply “describes,” but as “describ[ing] the character or quality of.”
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`Br. Ex. 11.
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`Third, Plaintiffs accuse Defendants of “fundamentally misunderstand[ing] the claims” by
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`requiring “method step[s] of ‘characterizing’ something.” Resp. 12. Defendants never argued that
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`the claims required such “method steps”; instead, they explained that “characterizing” something
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`must mean something different from the thing itself. Br. 14. Otherwise, the term “characterizing”
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`would be read out of the claims. Dr. LaViola agrees. LaViola Dep. 86:24-87:14,
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`Fourth, Plaintiffs take issue with Dr. Bobick’s discussion of the commonly understood
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`meaning of “characterizing” in the art. There is nothing wrong with considering a term’s meaning
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`in the art, and Dr. LaViola agreed that Dr. Bobick’s technical definition is correct. LaViola Decl.
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`¶ 64; LaViola Dep. 91:23-92:4. Indeed, none of the lay definitions clarifies the claims. They define
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`“characterizes” to mean “describe” the “character” or “qualities” of the object, necessarily
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`requiring a subjective value judgment. Because “[s]oftware does not make value judgements,” as
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`Plaintiffs agree (see Resp. 12), the use of “characterizes” without any further guidance is unclear.3
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`3 Unlike Bos. Sci. Corp. v. Cook Inc., 187 F. Supp. 3d 249, 272 (D. Mass. 2016), which
`Plaintiffs cite (Resp. at 13), no possible meaning exists for the term “characterizes” here that
`is consistent with the evidence and makes sense in context.
`9
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`Case 6:21-cv-00755-ADA Document 48 Filed 04/01/22 Page 14 of 21
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`3.
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`Means-Plus-Function Terms
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`For each of the terms Defendants identify as subject to § 112 ¶ 6, Plaintiffs erroneously
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`point to functional recitations of what the terms do as structure. Resp. 13–28. Those purely
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`functional recitations, however, fail to disclose the structure that performs the recited functions.
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`None of Plaintiffs’ cited case law permits reliance on such purely functional language to describe
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`structure. Unlike the claims in Bascom, the claims here do not “disclose logical rules,” i.e., an
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`algorithm, for the functions. Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Corp., No. 3:14-CV-
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`3942, 2017 WL 5905698, at *16 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 20, 2017). Nor do the claims here “describe the
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`structural elements” or “the interaction between the structural elements.” See Intellectual Ventures
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`II LLC v. FedEx Corp., No. 2:16-CV-00980, 2017 WL 5896180, at *39-40 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 29,
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`2017). Instead, “estimation module,” “estimation subsystem,” “sensor module(s),” “sensor
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`subsystem,” and “data processing module” each employ nonce terms without describing sufficient
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`structure; they are therefore subject to § 112 ¶ 6.
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`a.
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`“estimation module”
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`“Estimation module” is subject to § 112 ¶ 6. Plaintiffs contend that “estimation module”
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`should be given its ordinary meaning, yet Dr. LaViola admits that there is no accepted meaning in
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`the art for that term. LaViola Dep. 93:16-23. He further testified that an “estimation module” was
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`not a conventional structure nor an off-the-shelf component or software. Id., 95:13-23. Plaintiffs
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`argue that the claims provide structure, but the alleged structure in the claims is nothing more than
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`functional language reciting what the “estimation module” does. See Resp. 17 (the “estimation
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`module” receives inputs, interacts with components, and maintains estimates). This is purely
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`functional claiming, rendering “estimation module” subject to § 112 ¶ 6. See Diebold Nixdorf, Inc.
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`v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 899 F.3d 1291, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
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`Further, “estimation module” is indefinite because the specification does not describe
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`10
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`Case 6:21-cv-00755-ADA Document 48 Filed 04/01/22 Page 15 of 21
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`structure clearly linked to the recited functions. Plaintiffs point to the “sensor fusion core” (Resp.
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`19), but that box—to the extent it even is structure—is not clearly linked to the “estimation
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`module” functions.4 Dr. LaViola even admits that “the specification does not use the word
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`‘estimation module’ to refer to the sensor fusion core,” but opines that the sensor fusion core
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`“performs the same functions and solves the same problems as the claimed estimation module.”
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`LaViola Decl. ¶ 83. But simply because Dr. LaViola is able to find something in the specification
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`that performs some of the estimation module’s functions does not mean the term is definite:
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`structure must be “clearly link[ed]” to all the recited functions. Diebold, 899 F.3d at 1303.
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`b.
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`“estimation subsystem”
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`Despite Plaintiffs’ contention that “estimation subsystem” should be given its ordinary
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`meaning, Dr. LaViola admits that “estimation subsystem” does not have a well understood
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`meaning in the art. LaViola Dep. 119:22-120:7. Dr. LaViola further concedes that an “estimation
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`subsystem” was not a conventional structure or an off-the-shelf component or software. Id.,
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`120:11-19. The alleged structure Plaintiffs identify is a list of things that the “estimation
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`subsystem” does: receiving information from the sensor subsystem (i.e., another black box),
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`interacting with sensor subsystem, and repeatedly updating the state estimate according to the
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`received information. See Resp. 22; ’632 Patent, cl 1. Because this only recites what the
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`“estimation subsystem” does and not what it is, “estimation subsystem” is subject to § 112 ¶ 6.
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`Plaintiffs point to the “sensor fusion core” as alleged structure for the “estimation
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`subsystem”—the same alleged structure Plaintiffs identify for the “estimation module.” Resp. 23;
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`4 To the extent the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that the “sensor fusion core” is sufficient structure
`clearly linked to the recited functions performed by the “estimation module” and/or
`“estimation subsystem,” Defendants contend that such structure must include all components
`of the “sensor fusion core 200” described in the specification and depicted in Figs. 2 and 3 of
`the ’632 Patent.
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`11
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`Case 6:21-cv-00755-ADA Document 48 Filed 04/01/22 Page 16 of 21
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`LaViola Dep. 114:1-5. This fails for the same reasons: it is not clearly linked to the “estimation
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`subsystem.” Further, Plaintiffs argue that the specification discloses an algorithm for the recited
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`function of “updating a state estimate,” but the alleged “algorithm for how a state estimate is
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`updated” is simply the specification’s rote restatement of the claims. See Resp. 23; see also ’632
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`Patent, 2:41-46. And while a Kalman filter is a more specific algorithm, the ’632 Patent references
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`multiple examples of a Kalman filter (e.g., distributed Kalman filter, federated Kalman filter), none
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`of which is clearly linked to all functions recited in the claims. ’632 Patent, cls. 54, 58. The claimed
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`“estimation module” is therefore indefinite. Diebold, 899 F.3d at 1303.
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`c.
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`“sensor module(s)”
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`Plaintiffs’ alleged structure for “sensor module(s)” is also nothing more than a recitation
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`of what the claimed “sensor module” does: the “sensor module” interacts with other components,
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`receives measurements from “associated sensors” and data from the “estimation module”, and
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`outputs “configuration information” and data. See Resp. 24. And the specification’s statement that
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`“a sensor module … includes a sensor interface for communicating with a measurement sensor,
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`and a communication interface for communication with an estimation subsystem” is unavailing
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`because it also fails to describe structure, let alone structure to perform each required function.
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`Further, Dr. LaViola admits that a “sensor module” is not a specific, well-defined piece of
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`hardware or software. LaViola Dep. 133:25-134:5.
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`Plaintiffs identify the “PSE drivers” as structure for the “sensor module(s)” if § 112 ¶ 6
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`applies. Resp. 25; LaViola Decl. ¶ 123. While Plaintiffs detail what the PSE drivers do and what
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`other components the PSE drivers interact with, they fail to articulate how the PSE drivers are
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`linked to the c