Case 6:21-cv-00667-ADA Document 56 Filed 05/06/22 Page 1 of 18
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`WACO DIVISION
`
`
`
`
`CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:21-cv-665-ADA
`
`
`
`CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:21-cv-667-ADA
`
`
`
`CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:21-cv-668-ADA
`
`
`VOIP-PAL.COM, INC.
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`META PLATFORMS, INC., and
`WHATSAPP, INC.
`
`Defendants.
`
`
`VOIP-PAL.COM, INC.
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`
`v.
`
`
`GOOGLE LLC,
`
`
`Defendant.
`
`
`
`VOIP-PAL.COM, INC.
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`AMAZON.COM, INC.,
`AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC, and
`AMAZON WEB SERVICES, INC.,
`Defendants.
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 6:21-cv-00667-ADA Document 56 Filed 05/06/22 Page 2 of 18
`
`
`CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:21-cv-672-ADA
`
`
`
`CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:21-cv-674-ADA
`
`
`
`VOIP-PAL.COM, INC.
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS, INC.,
`CELLCO PARTNERSHIP d/b/a VERIZON
`WIRELESS,
`VERIZON SERVICES, CORP., and
`VERIZON BUSINESS NETWORK
`SERVICES, INC.,
`
`Defendants.
`
`
`VOIP-PAL.COM, INC.
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`T-MOBILE US, INC., and
`T-MOBILE USA, INC.,
`
`Defendants.
`
`
`PLAINTIFF’S SURREPLY CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`ii
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`

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`Case 6:21-cv-00667-ADA Document 56 Filed 05/06/22 Page 3 of 18
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`SURREPLY ARGUMENT .................................................................................................1 
`A. 
`“roaming” ................................................................................................................ 1 
`B. 
`“callee identifier” .................................................................................................... 2 
`C. 
`“access code” .......................................................................................................... 4 
`D. 
`“access code request message”/ “access code reply message” ............................... 5 
`E. 
`“pool of access codes” ............................................................................................ 5 
`F. 
`“local call” .............................................................................................................. 6 
`G. 
`“means for initiating a call … ” .............................................................................. 8 
`H. 
`“means for selecting said access code … ” ............................................................. 8 
`I. 
`“gateway” ................................................................................................................ 9 
`CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................10 
`
`
`
`I. 
`
`II. 
`
`
`i
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`

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`Case 6:21-cv-00667-ADA Document 56 Filed 05/06/22 Page 4 of 18
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`
`
`Cases
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Arctic Cat Inc. v. GEP Power Prods., 919 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ......................................... 1
`
`IMS Tech., Inc. v. Haas Automation, Inc., 206 F.3d 1422 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ................................... 1
`
`Kara Tech Inc. v. Stamps.com Inc., 582 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ......................................... 6, 7
`
`Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91 (2011) .................................................................. 8
`
`
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`ii
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`Case 6:21-cv-00667-ADA Document 56 Filed 05/06/22 Page 5 of 18
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`TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS
`
`
`ABBREVIATION
`
`TERM
`
`VoIP-Pal
`
`Facebook
`
`WhatsApp
`
`Google
`
`Amazon
`
`
`Verizon
`
`T-Mobile
`
`Defendants
`
`
`The ’606 patent
`
`The ’234 patent
`
`The ’721 patent
`
`The Mobile Gateway patents or the patents-
`in-suit
`
`RBR
`
`POSITA
`
`U.S. Pat. App. No. 2014/0024367A1
`
`U.S. Patent No. 7,486,684
`
`
`Plaintiff VoIP-Pal.com, Inc.
`
`Facebook, Inc.
`
`WhatsApp, Inc.
`
`Google LLC
`
`Amazon.com, Inc., Amazon.com Services,
`LLC, and Amazon Web Services, Inc.
`
`Verizon Communications, Inc.,
`Cellco Partnership D/B/A Verizon Wireless,
`Verizon Services, Corp., and
`Verizon Business Network Services, Inc.
`
`T-Mobile USA, Inc.
`
`Facebook, WhatsApp, Google, Amazon,
`Verizon, T-Mobile
`
`U.S. Patent No. 10,218,606
`
`U.S. Patent No. 8,630,234
`
`U.S. Patent No. 10,880,721
`
`The ’234 and ’721 patents
`
`
`Routing, Billing, Rating
`
`Person of ordinary skill in the art
`
`Bjorsell
`
`Chu
`
`
`
`iii
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`

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`Case 6:21-cv-00667-ADA Document 56 Filed 05/06/22 Page 6 of 18
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`I.
`
`SURREPLY ARGUMENT
`A.
`
`“roaming”
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`The word “roaming” in the preamble is not limiting, nor is it restricted to the kind of
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`conventional roaming that mobile phones already do. Rather, the claims denote “roaming” in the
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`broad sense of geographic mobility including moving within areas serviced by the same provider.
`
`“Roaming” in the preamble is not limiting because it outlines the mobile condition of a device
`
`enabled to use the recited “set of limitations in the body of the claim that completely set forth the
`
`invention.”1 Notably, Defendants do not argue that conventional roaming constitutes “essential
`
`structure or steps” or is otherwise “‘necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality’ to the claim.”2
`
`The claims do not recite “home network” or “service provider” anywhere, as there is no need for
`
`these concepts. These extraneous concepts should not now be added via claim construction.
`
`While the Defendants wish to limit “roaming” in the preamble to “conventional roaming,”
`
`they cannot adequately account for the specification’s assertion that its improvements can
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`ameliorate problems arising from “conventional calling processes,” for example, “avoidance of
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`long distance or roaming charges,” which would be incurred during conventional roaming.3
`
`Furthermore, most of the claim preambles recite “enabling” “roaming”.4 Given that mobile
`
`phones are configured to automatically perform conventional roaming, claims merely directed to
`
`“enabling” such mobile phone to perform conventional “roaming” would be superfluous. And the
`
`steps and structures recited below in the claim body have nothing to do with conventional roaming.
`
`
`1 See IMS Tech., Inc. v. Haas Automation, Inc., 206 F.3d 1422, 1434-35 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
`2 See Arctic Cat Inc. v. GEP Power Prods., 919 F.3d 1320, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
`3 Dkt. No. 41-2 at 13:4-9. All Dkt. Nos. refers to docket entries in Case No. 6:21-cv-665-ADA
`unless otherwise indicated.
`4 Dkt. No. 41-2 at claims 19, 28, 30, 46, 62; Dkt. No. 41-3 at claims 34, 49.
`1
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`Case 6:21-cv-00667-ADA Document 56 Filed 05/06/22 Page 7 of 18
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`Defendants assert that an Office Action Reply (“OAR”) adopted a meaning for “roaming”
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`that is consistent with conventional roaming, yet the OAR contrasts the possibility of “avoid[ing]
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`engaging other mobile telephone service providers directly with the subscriber as in conventional
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`roaming.”5 Earlier, the OAR had distinguished a broader sense of “roaming” by putting quotes
`
`around the word.6 Defendants also overlook the OAR’s statement that, alternatively, “[t]he access
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`code may be a telephone number or an IP address.”7 In the latter case, the call would be established
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`by using the IP address as an access code—which is not a part of conventional roaming.
`
`The plain and ordinary use of “roaming” in the claim preambles is different and readily
`
`understandable to be broader than merely conventional roaming.
`
`B.
`
`“callee identifier”
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`Defendants’ persistence in attempting to narrowly define “callee identifier” as a “telephone
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`number, and not a username” is remarkable given the patent specification’s broad, open-ended
`
`statement that “[a] callee identifier may be a telephone number of a callee, for example.”8 Clearly,
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`if a “telephone number” is only an example, then a “callee identifier” may be other things, too.
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`The specification incorporates by reference an example in which a “callee identifier” is a
`
`username from PCT Publication WO 2008/052340.9 Defendants deflect the obvious conclusion
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`that a “callee identifier” may be a username by claiming that WO 2008/052340’s system is
`
`
`5 Dkt. No. 41-4 at 36 (emphasis added).
`6 Id. (“[T]he methods and systems claimed easily facilitate ‘roaming’ of the mobile telephone in a
`manner that is transparent to the user of the mobile telephone.”)
`7 Id.
`8 Dkt. No. 41-2 at 10:27-28; see also id. at 11:39-41
`9 Dkt. No. 41-2 at 29:61-67 (“In alternative embodiments … an additional block … may determine
`whether the callee identifier is a valid username.”).
`2
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`Case 6:21-cv-00667-ADA Document 56 Filed 05/06/22 Page 8 of 18
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`incompatible.10 WO 2008/052340’s system, however, cannot be incompatible because the patents-
`
`in-suit incorporate the functionality of WO 2008/052340’s embodiments in their entirety.11
`
`Defendants falsely allege “applicant disavowed the use of a ‘username’ by comparing the
`
`asserted patents to this PCT.”12 But the patent does not imply a disavowal of the possibility that a
`
`“callee identifier” may be a username; it simply notes that, given multiple possible alternative
`
`embodiments, the present application will focus on illustrating a particular one—with the express
`
`statement that other embodiments are possible, too.13 Choosing to more fully illustrate one
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`particular embodiment, e.g., “for simplicity,” is not a clear disavowal of other embodiments.14
`
`Defendants’ allegation, based on prosecution history—that applicant “repeatedly defined
`
`callee identifier as a dialed number to overcome prior art”—is misleading, if not deceptive, aided
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`and abetted by Defendants’ misquotation of applicant.15 The phrase quoted relates to applicant’s
`
`analysis of the Elliott reference, which the Examiner had cited, viz., a “table 14” “Number” column
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`that appeared to “hold a dialed number”, whereupon Applicant concluded: “there is nothing that
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`discloses or suggests the dialed number acting as a callee identifier…” [emphasis added].16 “[T]he
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`dialed number,” clearly refers to the “table 14” “Number” column in Elliott. Thus, the sentence
`
`that Defendants have mis-cited—is not defining a “callee identifier” as a dialed number—but
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`rather, is simply refuting the Examiner’s interpretation of table 14 in Elliott.17
`
`
`
`10 Dkt. No. 55 at 3.
`11 Dkt. No. 41-2 at 8:33-39; Dkt. No. 41-3 at 8:36-41.
`12 Dkt. No. 55 at 3 (citing ’234 patent, 29:61-67 (Dkt. No. 41-2)).
`13 Dkt. No. 41-2 at 34:30-33; see also id. at 9:1-5, 9:13-17, 15:3-6, 19:6-12, 22:30-32, 22:45-48,
`22:56-61.
`14 Cf. Dkt. No. 41-2 at 33:24-28, 10:14-20, 20:14-21, 30:44-52 (each focusing on describing one
`embodiment more fully to the neglect of describing others “for [the sake of] simplicity”).
`15 Dkt. No. 55 at 2-3 (citing Dkt. No. 41-4 at 32-33).
`16 Dkt. No. 41-4 at 32.
`17 Id. at 32-33.
`
`
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`3
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`Case 6:21-cv-00667-ADA Document 56 Filed 05/06/22 Page 9 of 18
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`Finally, VoIP-Pal has given multiple examples in the specification where a “callee
`
`identifier” is equated to a caller’s “username”.18 Defendants desperately discount these because
`
`the callee’s phone number was overwritten by the callee’s username, as if that matters. But this
`
`shows that a callee can be associated with more than one kind of callee identifier.
`
`The Court should reject Defendants’ proposed construction because it is unsupported.
`
`C.
`
`“access code”
`
`
`
`Defendants falsely allege that VoIP-Pal does not contest the plain and ordinary meaning
`
`that Defendants concocted, which is inconsistent with the patent specification and file history. But
`
`Defendants have mis-defined the plain and ordinary meaning of “access code” as “area code.” No,
`
`an “access code” is quite simply a “code” for enabling “access” to communication resources.19
`
`This plain and ordinary meaning is simple and consistent with the patent specification and history.
`
`Defendants arrived at an (incorrect) plain and ordinary meaning based on a misinterpretation of an
`
`irrelevant extrinsic source, which by “access code” likely meant “dial 9 to get an outgoing line”.20
`
`
`
`Defendants’ proposed construction arbitrarily ties an “access code” to a “callee identifier,”
`
`requires “use[] by the mobile telephone” of the “access code,” and requires use “in place of”. None
`
`of these arbitrary requirements are supported by the specification. First, an “access code” can exist
`
`without being assigned to any “callee identifier.”21 Second, an “access code” can exist without
`
`being used by the mobile telephone.22 Third, not every part of the system “uses” an “access code”
`
`in the manner described in Defendants’ proposal.23 Indeed, the words “in place of” do not appear
`
`
`18 Dkt. No. 52 at 8 (citing Dkt. No. 41-2 at 27:14-17, 60-62, 32:47-51, Fig. 18B (404)).
`19 Dkt. No. 41-2 at 14:11-19.
`20 Dkt. No. 41 at 7 (citing Ex. 7, DEFS-VOIP-2021-CC-00000052 (defining “access code”)).
`21 Dkt. No. 41-2 at 22:30-36.
`22 Id. at Fig. 10 (unused access codes).
`23 The access server may forward the “access code” but not “in place of the callee identifier.” See
`Dkt. No. 41 at 14:54-57. Even if the phone received the “access code,” it may timeout and thereby
`fail to use the access code “in place of the callee identifier”. See id., 13:10-20.
`4
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`Case 6:21-cv-00667-ADA Document 56 Filed 05/06/22 Page 10 of 18
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`anywhere in the specification, but are based on Defendants’ tortuous logic that incorporates,
`
`illicitly, various limitations of preferred embodiments.
`
`Defendants’ construction is problematic because it seeks to define “access code” by how
`
`it is used, not by what it is—an access code. Defendants suggests their construction is functional
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`claiming.24 It is not. Defendants’ construction does not specify what function the access code
`
`performs; it specifies how it used. Under Defendants’ construction, if a code is not used in place
`
`of a callee identifier, it is not an access code. But that begs the question: what type of code is it?
`
`Defendants also try to include elements that are already found in other claim language (e.g.,
`
`distinguishing between “callee identifier” and “access code”). Thus, Defendants’ proposed
`
`construction tries to limit the claims to preferred embodiments and so should be rejected.25
`
`D.
`
`“access code request message”/ “access code reply message”
`
`
`
`VoIP-Pal maintains that identity of the sender and recipient devices should be determined
`
`from the plain claim language rather than being incorporated into these terms by way of claim
`
`construction. Contrary to Defendants, VoIP-Pal does not agree “that the sender and recipient
`
`devices are either the claimed mobile telephone/wireless device or the access server.”26 VoIP-Pal
`
`maintains that the plain claim language identifies what sends the access code request message and
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`what receives the access code reply message and that the plain claim language should control.
`
`E.
`
`“pool of access codes”
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`The term “pool of access codes” has a simple, plain and ordinary meaning and may be
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`readily understood as a set of access codes. Defendants’ definition is much more complex,
`
`requiring the extensive, illicit mining of disclosed preferred embodiments.
`
`
`
`24 Dkt. No. 55 at 4.
`25 See Kara Tech Inc. v. Stamps.com Inc., 582 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
`26 Dkt. No. 55 at 5.
`
`
`
`5
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`Case 6:21-cv-00667-ADA Document 56 Filed 05/06/22 Page 11 of 18
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`First, Defendants improperly equate a “pool” with a “table,” thereby importing limitations
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`from a preferred embodiment. Defendants fail to provide evidence that the term “pool of access
`
`codes” requires a table. Defendants confidently insist that “every embodiment in the specification
`
`requires a table” and that “[n]o non-table embodiment is described or disclosed anywhere.”27 But
`
`they are mistaken; the specification provides a non-table embodiment: i.e., a “binary tree.”28 And
`
`the specification expressly states that other data structures may be used.29 Thus, the overly narrow
`
`“table” requirement of Defendants’ proposed construction should be rejected.
`
`Second, Defendants’ “exclusive association” limitation is again improperly cherry-picked
`
`from a preferred embodiment. In defense, Defendants cite a passage which suggests that in other
`
`embodiments the “aforementioned criteria” should be satisfied.30 This “criteria” may be that the
`
`access code is “available for use” but Defendants go further and universalize one example (i.e.,
`
`making an access code exclusive to a callee), and propose to limit all claims to that example. A
`
`POSITA would understand that there are different ways to associate access codes with callers and
`
`callees and to make them available or not-available. There is nothing in the term “pool of access
`
`codes” per se that restricts the use of access codes to one mechanism. Thus, Defendants’ proposed
`
`attempt to limit the claims to a specific embodiment or implementation should be rejected.31
`
`F.
`
`“local call”
`
`Defendants insist that “local call” is limited to a call within a “PSTN local calling area.”32
`
`But the specification never even uses this term and defines “local calling area” without limiting it
`
`
`27 Dkt. No. 55 at 5 (emphasis in original).
`28 Dkt. No. 41-2 at 45-53.
`29 Id. at 19:4-12.
`30 Dkt. No. 55 at 6.
`31 See Kara, 582 F.3d at 1348.
`32 Dkt. No. 55 at 6 (emphasis added).
`
`
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`6
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`Case 6:21-cv-00667-ADA Document 56 Filed 05/06/22 Page 12 of 18
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`to a PSTN local calling area.33 It may be appropriate to use a PSTN definition when a call is placed
`
`using an “access code” that is a PSTN telephone number. For example, the specification does
`
`disclose looking up PSTN area information in the specific case “where, for example, the access
`
`code is a PSTN telephone number.”34 But “for example” suggests that a non-PSTN “access code”
`
`could be used to access a non-PSTN communication channel. Indeed, in the very next paragraph,
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`the specification states that access codes “need not be PSTN telephone numbers,” and “need not
`
`be limited to particular [PSTN] geographical areas.”35 Thus, the specification expressly denies
`
`what Defendants affirm, namely, that “access codes” and communication channels and the
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`associated definitions of geographical area must always be limited to PSTN access codes (i.e.,
`
`telephone numbers), channels, and areas.36 Also, the specification gives multiple alternatives for
`
`mapping the caller’s location to indicate that “local calling area” need not be inflexibly defined.37
`
`Defendants’ argument that a “geographical area associated with the caller’s device” is
`
`confusing lacks merit.38 A POSITA would readily understand the specification’s disclosure that
`
`certain network infrastructure can be dedicated to providing services to mobile devices within a
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`particular geographical area, albeit this area need not always correspond to a PSTN calling area.39
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`Nor is it necessary to always define a service area by PSTN billing criteria such as long-distance
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`charges. As explained above and in the specification, PSTN concepts of billing are used in some
`
`embodiments but not others, which use internal (non-PSTN) billing criteria and mechanisms.40
`
`
`
`33 See Dkt. No. 52 at 14-15.
`34 Dkt. No. 41-3 at 18:24-43 (emphasis added).
`35 Dkt. No. 41-3 at 18:44-53 (emphasis added).
`36 Id.; see also Dkt. No. 41-3 at 9:39-46, 13:59-66 (“…in other embodiments, the access code
`need not be a telephone number” and “[an] IP address may act as the access code”).
`37 See Dkt. No. 52 at 15.
`38 Dkt. No. 55 at
`39 Dkt. No. 41-3 at 18:24-53, 8:41-47, 59-64, 12:14-20, 12:38-42, 19:1-5, 23:44-47.
`40 Dkt. No. 41-3 at 9:31-37, 12:14-20, 12:51-60, 34:31-35, 55-63.
`7
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`Case 6:21-cv-00667-ADA Document 56 Filed 05/06/22 Page 13 of 18
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`Because the specification expressly supports non-PSTN calling, area definitions need not be
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`PSTN-centric. VoIP-Pal’s proposed construction best accounts for the totality of the disclosure.41
`
`G.
`
`“means for initiating a call … ”
`
`
`
`The dispute between the parties concerns only the proper corresponding structure for this
`
`term, which the parties agree is a means-plus-function limitation subject to 35 U.S.C. §112(f).
`
`Defendants falsely state that VoIP-Pal does not contest the “fact” that the call is established across
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`“switched line PSTN channels.”42 VoIP-Pal does contest that the channels are necessarily PSTN
`
`channels. The specification also describes non-PSTN communication channels.43
`
`Defendants also allege the specification discloses insufficient structure for call initiation.
`
`Contrary to Defendants, the structure is not limited to “call-out 149” in FIG. 3. The specification
`
`also discloses how to implement a call initiation function that is responsive to receiving an access
`
`code.44 Thus, the specification provides a POSITA the requisite understanding.
`
`Finally, Defendants concede that a microprocessor is part of the corresponding structure.45
`
`Thus, their argument that the corresponding structure cannot be met by implementing the recited
`
`function in any suitable program language is irrelevant because VoIP-Pal’s proposed construction,
`
`which includes a microprocessor and additional structures, recites more than merely software.46
`
`H.
`
`“means for selecting said access code … ”
`
`The dispute between the parties concerns only the proper corresponding structure for this
`
`term, which the parties agree is a means-plus-function limitation subject to 35 U.S.C. §112(f).
`
`
`41 See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 97 (2011).
`42 Dkt. No. 55 at 7 (emphasis added).
`43 Dkt. No. 41-2 at 9:34-37.
`44 Dkt. No. 41-2 at 9:6-47; 10:6-11:22, 11:23-43, 12:55-59, 13:1-4, and 21-58.
`45 Dkt. No. 55 at 8.
`46 Id.
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`
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`8
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`Case 6:21-cv-00667-ADA Document 56 Filed 05/06/22 Page 14 of 18
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`
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`Defendants acknowledge that the specification provides alternative algorithms, but allege
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`that these alternatives are “not sufficiently developed” to be “corresponding structure.”47 But this
`
`allegation is mere attorney argument, without more. At least some of the alternative embodiments
`
`can be within the skill of a POSITA to implement, as the algorithms are modified.48
`
`VoIP-Pal has pointed out that the routing controller (30) is not the only hardware and
`
`Figure 12 is not the only algorithm disclosed. In some embodiments, the routing controller is part
`
`of or integrated with the access server, thus the access server may itself select a suitable access
`
`code.49 To this Defendants have responded by saying that the “access server” “lacks the
`
`information necessary” to select the access code. But that is only if the “access server” is not
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`integrated or does not have the routing controller as a part, contrary to the embodiments disclosed.
`
`I.
`
`“gateway”
`
`VoIP-Pal agrees that a “gateway” is a device that connects networks, but denies that the
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`networks must necessarily “use different communication protocols.” Defendants’ unsupported
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`assertion is mere attorney argument that assumes that all gateways convert protocols and cannot
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`have other purposes such as security, network address translation (NAT), or billing. Contrary to
`
`the Defendants, a router can be a gateway, or alternatively, NAT can be performed by a gateway.50
`
`Defendants try to argue a narrow PSTN-based meaning of “gateway” from the wording of
`
`dependent claim 133 in the ’721 patent. But claim 133 is special; it specifically recites a
`
`“communications supplier gateway operable to connect to the PSTN telephone”—a specific kind
`
`of gateway. But the term “gateway” is broader. For example, claim 1 recites a “gateway” without
`
`
`
`47 Dkt. No. 55 at 8.
`48 Dkt. No. 41-2 at 22:46-52, 22:53-23:10, 31:46-51.
`49 Dkt. No. 41-2 at 17:19-30 and 15:9-16.
`50 Dkt. No. 55 at 10 (“a device performing NAT, typically a router”). Notably, the cited
`quotation does not assert that routers cannot be gateways or that gateways cannot perform NAT.
`9
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`Case 6:21-cv-00667-ADA Document 56 Filed 05/06/22 Page 15 of 18
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`reciting that it connects to a PSTN. Indeed, claim 15, which depends from claim 1, recites that
`
`routing (in claim 1) can proceed either over the “PSTN” or via an “IP network.” Likewise, claims
`
`20, 38, 51, 77, and 103 broadly recite a “gateway” but not a PSTN-connected “gateway”.
`
`
`
`Defendants attack VoIP-Pal’s citation to Chu of an example of a “gateway” that has the
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`same protocol on both sides.51 Defendants demur that this is a “special gateway” that can also be
`
`called a “packet switch.”52 But Chu’s special gateway is a “gateway” nonetheless. Chu uses a
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`variety of qualifiers for different kinds of “gateways,” including “PSTN gateway[s],” because the
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`term “gateway” is inherently broad and thus includes non-PSTN gateways if left unqualified.53
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`Finally, Defendants misrepresent VoIP-Pal’s argument regarding the ’721 patent’s
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`specification, which is not about the call controller’s functionality, but rather, discloses that even
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`an IP-based telephone (56) may need a gateway for establishing a call.54 Defendants make the
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`unfounded assumption that the specification describes only one side of a gateway. But: (1) the IP
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`phone 56 can call other IP-based destinations analogous to IP phone 56; and (2) the specification
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`also discloses that gateway 18 may not provide PSTN channels, but instead may provide IP-based
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`channels.55 In both cases, both sides of gateway 18 (or an equivalent) would be IP-protocol-based.
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`Neither the patents-in-suit’s claim language nor the patent specification limits the term
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`“gateway” to “a gateway that converts between protocols,” and so, neither should this Court.
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`II.
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`CONCLUSION
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`In conclusion, VoIP-Pal respectfully requests that the Court adopt VoIP-Pal’s claim
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`constructions and reject Defendants’ proposed constructions.
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`51 Dkt. No. 55 at 10.
`52 Id.
`53 Dkt. No. 53-3 at 2:61-66, 14:6-21, 4:13-20 ( describing different kinds of “gateways,” some of
`which do not do PSTN TDM protocol conversion: see at 4:20).
`54 Dkt. No. 52 at 17-18.
`55 See Dkt. No. 41-3 at 13:56-66, 9:37-62, 25:25-40, 10:3-5.
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`Case 6:21-cv-00667-ADA Document 56 Filed 05/06/22 Page 17 of 18
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`/s/ Lewis E. Hudnell, III
`HUDNELL LAW GROUP P.C.
`Lewis E. Hudnell, III
`lewis@hudnelllaw.com
`Nicolas S. Gikkas
`800 W. El Camino Real Suite 180
`Mountain View, California 94040
`T: 650.564.3698
`F: 347.772.3034
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`ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
`VOIP-PAL.COM, INC.
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`Dated: May 6, 2022
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`Case 6:21-cv-00667-ADA Document 56 Filed 05/06/22 Page 18 of 18
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`I certify that on May 6, 2022, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of Court
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`using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification of such filing to all counsel of record.
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`/s/ Lewis E. Hudnell, III
`Lewis E. Hudnell, III
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